Global Emerging Market Equities, Propitious Research

Wium Malan, CFA

Global Emerging Market Equities

Independent, Fundamental Quantitative Research

Propitious Research

Fully independent, fundamental and quantitative equity research, focused on companies in the Telecommunication, Media, Technology, Internet and Healthcare sectors in the Global Emerging Markets. Idea generation focused on Quality stocks, trading below their intrinsic Value, with sound Corporate Governance.

Equity Bottom-Up

<a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/vipshop-holdings-ltd-adr" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:1088:1" rel="noopener">Vipshop Holdings (VIPS US)</a> has had an exceptionally volatile 12 months of trading. Following a &gt;200% share price surge between October 2020 and March 2021, the share price has corrected 77%, wiping out nearly $24bn in market value. The significant sell-off, coupled with less severe earnings expectation downgrades (-18%) from the sell-side, has resulted in Vipshop de-rating from a peak forward PE ratio of 25.3x to only 6.9x, which is the cheapest the stock has ever been. 
In this insight, we take a closer look at the meaningful market events which have driven the sell-off in Vipshop as well as the short- and longer-term earnings outlook for the company. 
Going into their 3Q21 reporting period, Vipshop is facing an exceptionally high growth base set in the comparative period as well as macro-economic headwinds due to a slowing Chinese economy and retail spending, which could result in the continuation of the earnings downgrade cycle over the short- to medium-term. However, trading on an estimated 5.3x ex-cash forward PE ratio likely implies that the buy-side has factored most of this in and we are nearing the point of peak pessimism.

Vipshop Holdings (VIPS US) has had an exceptionally volatile 12 months of trading. Following a &gt;200% share price surge between October 2020 and March 2021, the share price has corrected 77%, wiping out nearly $24bn in market value. The significant sell-off, coupled with less severe earnings expectation downgrades (-18%) from the sell-side, has resulted in Vipshop de-rating from a peak forward PE ratio of 25.3x to only 6.9x, which is the cheapest the stock has ever been. 
In this insight, we take a closer look at the meaningful market events which have driven the sell-off in Vipshop as well as the short- and longer-term earnings outlook for the company. 
Going into their 3Q21 reporting period, Vipshop is facing an exceptionally high growth base set in the comparative period as well as macro-economic headwinds due to a slowing Chinese economy and retail spending, which could result in the continuation of the earnings downgrade cycle over the short- to medium-term. However, trading on an estimated 5.3x ex-cash forward PE ratio likely implies that the buy-side has factored most of this in and we are nearing the point of peak pessimism.

Equity Analyst, LightStream Research

Oshadhi Kumarasiri

Equity Analyst

Long-Short Analysis on Japan, Asia and the World

LightStream Research

LightStream conducts quantitatively rigorous and data-driven analysis with a focus on Japan and Asia.

We consistently cover the Tech, Consumer and Industrial sectors, and provide ECM and Events coverage more broadly.

We supplement traditional qualitative insights from company relationships with a robust quantitative foundation that examines as much historical data as is available.
We further refine the accuracy of our insights and calls through the use of alternative data to flesh out current trends, and through a valuation framework that emphasises non-superficial peer group selection and a proper attempt to understand the metrics and changes that have driven security valuations in the past.

Alibaba Group Holding  / Equity Bottom-Up

Amidst the regulatory scrutiny and other medium-term uncertainties resulting from the shift in government policy, the International Commerce Retail business segment of <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/alibaba-group" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:28434:1" rel="noopener">Alibaba Group (9988 HK)</a> has become an ever so important component of Alibaba’s portfolio of businesses.The segment includes several highly popular e-commerce platforms like Lazada, Daraz, AliExpress and trendyol with a total of 265m annual active consumers.

Amidst the regulatory scrutiny and other medium-term uncertainties resulting from the shift in government policy, the International Commerce Retail business segment of Alibaba Group (9988 HK) has become an ever so important component of Alibaba’s portfolio of businesses.The segment includes several highly popular e-commerce platforms like Lazada, Daraz, AliExpress and trendyol with a total of 265m annual active consumers.

International Commerce Retail: Lazada & AliExpress Are Losing Their Battles with Shopee

<a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/alibaba-group" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:28434:1" rel="noopener">Alibaba Group (9988 HK)</a> has had a disastrous year, ever since the IPO of their FinTech arm, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/ant-group-co-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:24240:1" rel="noopener">Ant Financial Services Group (6688 HK)</a>, was pulled last minute in November 2020. Since then, they have faced continued regulatory hurdles, including an RMB18.2bn anti-monopoly fine, which has culminated in a 51% share price drop, since its November 2020 peak, which means that Alibaba is currently trading on only a 14.3x forward PE ratio. Given that this is nearly 4 standard deviations below its 5-year historical average trading range, and that this multiple would imply only a 0.72x PEG ratio, for a company with an extremely strong net cash balance sheet, delivering returns on capital well above its cost of capital, with positive free cash flow generation, and a $15bn share buyback program, indicates that there is a massive disconnect between long-term Buy-side expectations and near-term Sell-side estimates. Looking at the reported group financials over this period it does not seem as though the regulatory impact has been that significant on core operations. The key concern, however, is that Alibaba is losing market share in its core businesses. In this insight, I take a closer look at the broader Chinese retail market, as well as the Chinese digital advertising market (I estimate that Alibaba still generates more than 40% of its Chinese commerce revenue, and roughly 1/3rd of group revenue, from marketing activities), to analyse Alibaba’s relative revenue share loss. Finally, I also revisit current valuation levels and analyse what this implies for its Core Commerce operations.

Alibaba Group (9988 HK) has had a disastrous year, ever since the IPO of their FinTech arm, Ant Financial Services Group (6688 HK), was pulled last minute in November 2020. Since then, they have faced continued regulatory hurdles, including an RMB18.2bn anti-monopoly fine, which has culminated in a 51% share price drop, since its November 2020 peak, which means that Alibaba is currently trading on only a 14.3x forward PE ratio. Given that this is nearly 4 standard deviations below its 5-year historical average trading range, and that this multiple would imply only a 0.72x PEG ratio, for a company with an extremely strong net cash balance sheet, delivering returns on capital well above its cost of capital, with positive free cash flow generation, and a $15bn share buyback program, indicates that there is a massive disconnect between long-term Buy-side expectations and near-term Sell-side estimates. Looking at the reported group financials over this period it does not seem as though the regulatory impact has been that significant on core operations. The key concern, however, is that Alibaba is losing market share in its core businesses. In this insight, I take a closer look at the broader Chinese retail market, as well as the Chinese digital advertising market (I estimate that Alibaba still generates more than 40% of its Chinese commerce revenue, and roughly 1/3rd of group revenue, from marketing activities), to analyse Alibaba’s relative revenue share loss. Finally, I also revisit current valuation levels and analyse what this implies for its Core Commerce operations.

Alibaba: How Much Core Market Share Loss Has Been Priced In?

Global TMT analyst with Asia ex-Japan focus.

Mitchell Kim

In June, I turned more constructive on <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/vipshop-holdings-ltd-adr" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:1088:1" rel="noopener">Vipshop Holdings (VIPS US)</a> as a rare value play among the online shopping platforms after the stock price fell more than 50% from the peak in March.  Since then, the stock price fell another 26% as the Chinese tech selloff continued even though VIPS faces relatively lower regulatory risk. Considering the continued operational improvements (even though the profits missed consensus expectations, margins remained stable). I believe the stock offers an attractive risk-return proposition.   I find VIPS more attractive at this point because of the following three reasons:<ol>
<li>
Vipshop is subject to relatively lower regulatory risk.  VIPS was penalized just a small fine thus far. VIPS is relatively immune from the new Data Security Law (DSL) to be adopted on 1 September.    </li>
<li>
Vipshop is trading near historic low valuations. VIPS shares trade at 8.6x FY21 and 7.4x FY22 consensus earnings and at the historic low P/E band.  This level is similar to when the company recorded 9% revenue growth and a 3.5% operating margin.  This is a whole new company with substantially higher revenue and profit growth. </li>
<li>
Weak 2Q21 results provide a better entry point. VIPS' 2Q21 showed resilient top-line growth but margins took a hit, indicating the higher cost of acquisitions.  But VIPS is a different company than the weaker 2018-2019 self.      </li>
</ol>

In June, I turned more constructive on Vipshop Holdings (VIPS US) as a rare value play among the online shopping platforms after the stock price fell more than 50% from the peak in March.  Since then, the stock price fell another 26% as the Chinese tech selloff continued even though VIPS faces relatively lower regulatory risk. Considering the continued operational improvements (even though the profits missed consensus expectations, margins remained stable). I believe the stock offers an attractive risk-return proposition.   I find VIPS more attractive at this point because of the following three reasons:

Vipshop is subject to relatively lower regulatory risk.  VIPS was penalized just a small fine thus far. VIPS is relatively immune from the new Data Security Law (DSL) to be adopted on 1 September.    

Vipshop is trading near historic low valuations. VIPS shares trade at 8.6x FY21 and 7.4x FY22 consensus earnings and at the historic low P/E band.  This level is similar to when the company recorded 9% revenue growth and a 3.5% operating margin.  This is a whole new company with substantially higher revenue and profit growth. 

Weak 2Q21 results provide a better entry point. VIPS' 2Q21 showed resilient top-line growth but margins took a hit, indicating the higher cost of acquisitions.  But VIPS is a different company than the weaker 2018-2019 self.      


Coupang's share price fell 8% in the first-day trading session after the company's 2Q21 results were announced.  Does this present an entry opportunity?  No, I believe there is still a downside to Coupang's story. I believe the results validated my concerns highlighted in my previous two reports ( <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/coupang-cpng-us-crack-in-the-armor" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:51455" rel="noopener">Coupang (CPNG US): Crack in the Armor</a> and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/coupang-cpng-us-going-mano-e-mano-with-jd-com" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:49065" rel="noopener">Coupang (CPNG US): Going Mano E Mano with JD.com</a>): <ol>
<li>
Coupang's revenue growth is sharply decelerating towards 60% in 2H21.  In my "Mano e Mano" report, I highlight what happened to high-growth stocks when their growth slowed to 50% - 60% (e.g.,<a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/jd-com-inc-adr" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:446:1" rel="noopener">JD.com Inc (ADR) (JD US)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/vipshop-holdings-ltd-adr" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:1088:1" rel="noopener">Vipshop Holdings (VIPS US)</a>).</li>
<li>
Operating leverage has not been reached yet. In fact, operating losses still doubled even after excluding costs associated with the FC Fire as losses from Eats and Rocket Fresh grocery delivery continues.  </li>
<li>
 Adding new customers is key as revenue per customer growth continues to decelerate. </li>
</ol>Valuations remain uncompelling. Coupang trades at a significant premium to JD.com on EV/revenue and EV/Gross Profit even after considering the difference in growth. The key upside risk is if investors rotate from Chinese platforms to Coupang to mitigate Chinese regulatory risk.  I would note though that Coupang also faces regulatory risk and poor public perception as highlighted in my previous report, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/coupang-cpng-us-under-the-regulator-s-microscope" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:54103" rel="noopener">Coupang (CPNG US): Under the Regulator's Microscope.</a>

Coupang's share price fell 8% in the first-day trading session after the company's 2Q21 results were announced.  Does this present an entry opportunity?  No, I believe there is still a downside to Coupang's story. I believe the results validated my concerns highlighted in my previous two reports ( Coupang (CPNG US): Crack in the Armor and Coupang (CPNG US): Going Mano E Mano with JD.com): 

Coupang's revenue growth is sharply decelerating towards 60% in 2H21.  In my "Mano e Mano" report, I highlight what happened to high-growth stocks when their growth slowed to 50% - 60% (e.g.,JD.com Inc (ADR) (JD US), Vipshop Holdings (VIPS US)).

Operating leverage has not been reached yet. In fact, operating losses still doubled even after excluding costs associated with the FC Fire as losses from Eats and Rocket Fresh grocery delivery continues.  

 Adding new customers is key as revenue per customer growth continues to decelerate. 
Valuations remain uncompelling. Coupang trades at a significant premium to JD.com on EV/revenue and EV/Gross Profit even after considering the difference in growth. The key upside risk is if investors rotate from Chinese platforms to Coupang to mitigate Chinese regulatory risk.  I would note though that Coupang also faces regulatory risk and poor public perception as highlighted in my previous report, Coupang (CPNG US): Under the Regulator's Microscope.

Coupang (CPNG US): Heavier Bleeding Takes the Wind Out of Coupang's Sails

China

Vipshop Holdings Ltd. retails branded products at discount over the Internet. The Company retails through flash sales, in which limited quantities of an item are sold at deep discount for a specified period of time.

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Vipshop Holdings (VIPS US)

Vipshop: Cheapest It Has Ever Been

In this insight, we take a closer look at the meaningful market events which have driven the sell-off in Vipshop as well as the short- and longer...

Wium Malan, CFA

International Commerce Retail: Lazada & AliExpress Are Losing Their Battles with Shopee

Even though it seems a bit extreme, we think it is difficult to completely rule out the possibility that Alibaba’s valuation multiples can re-rate...

Oshadhi Kumarasiri

Vipshop (VIPS US): Too Cheap to Ignore

Rejuvenated growth slowed in 2Q21, but I offer three reasons why investors should use the recent pullback as an opportunity.

Mitchell Kim

Coupang (CPNG US): Heavier Bleeding Takes the Wind Out of Coupang's Sails

Coupang's share price fell 8% after the company's 2Q21 results were announced. Does this present an entry opportunity? I believe there is still a...

Mitchell Kim

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52-week Range

Market Cap (USDm)

P/E

Dividend (Yield)

Vipshop: Cheapest It Has Ever Been

In this insight, we take a closer look at the meaningful market events which have driven the sell-off in Vipshop as well as the short- and longer...

Wium Malan, CFA

International Commerce Retail: Lazada & AliExpress Are Losing Their Battles with Shopee

Even though it seems a bit extreme, we think it is difficult to completely rule out the possibility that Alibaba’s valuation multiples can re-rate...

Oshadhi Kumarasiri

Alibaba: How Much Core Market Share Loss Has Been Priced In?

In this insight, I analyse Chinese retail sales and digital advertising market share changes and what is implied by Alibaba’s current valuation...

Wium Malan, CFA

Vipshop (VIPS US): Too Cheap to Ignore

Rejuvenated growth slowed in 2Q21, but I offer three reasons why investors should use the recent pullback as an opportunity.

Mitchell Kim

Coupang (CPNG US): Heavier Bleeding Takes the Wind Out of Coupang's Sails

Coupang's share price fell 8% after the company's 2Q21 results were announced. Does this present an entry opportunity? I believe there is still a...

Mitchell Kim