Link REIT US$2.4bn Rights Issue - Mistimed but Yield at the Rights Price Might Be the Saving Grace

Gravity Works As WeWork Doesn't; Now Plan B

Silver Point

Thomas J. Monaco

Independent Insight Provider

Silver Point is a boutique research firm that focuses on the broader financial services sector, with a particular focus on troubled institutions globally. 

Asia Ex Japan

Equity Bottom-Up

*Better, But Weak Metrics: Link REIT (823.HK) [Link REIT] reported a positive FY 2H21 bottom-line result of HKD 5.3 bn, increasing HKD 9.4 bn over the HKD 4.1 bn in losses posted in FY 1H21. However, when we exclude Link’s non-cash FV marks of HKD 2.0 bn, operating performance cam in at just HKD 3.3 bn – improving just HKD 143 mn (4.5%) HOH. The positive HOH operating performance was driven by an increase in revenues from mainland China and overseas related property;  *Worries Remain In Hong Kong: Hong Kong retail portfolio's rental reversion rate continued to be challenged YOY in FY 2H21, albeit slightly improving from a negative 2.6% in FY 1H21 to a negative 1.8%. Although not a enormous surprise, this trend would appear to be with us for an extended period in Hong Kong - especially given the continued border closures amid the COVID-19 disruption; and*Poor Capital Management Becoming A Big Problem: Link management also appears hellbent on destroying shareholder value with deals that make little financial sense. Link recently announced the acquisition of Happy Valley Shopping Mall in Guangzhou where the current annualized NPI yield barely covering the project’s cost of funding. In order to improve occupancy, it would appear that Link would likely need to offering significant tenant enticements, and investment massively in asset enhancement. Bizarrely instead of weighing buybacks return versus new investment ROI, management views share buybacks as a mechanism to defend shares against short-selling.

*Better, But Weak Metrics: Link REIT (823.HK) [Link REIT] reported a positive FY 2H21 bottom-line result of HKD 5.3 bn, increasing HKD 9.4 bn over the HKD 4.1 bn in losses posted in FY 1H21. However, when we exclude Link’s non-cash FV marks of HKD 2.0 bn, operating performance cam in at just HKD 3.3 bn – improving just HKD 143 mn (4.5%) HOH. The positive HOH operating performance was driven by an increase in revenues from mainland China and overseas related property;  *Worries Remain In Hong Kong: Hong Kong retail portfolio's rental reversion rate continued to be challenged YOY in FY 2H21, albeit slightly improving from a negative 2.6% in FY 1H21 to a negative 1.8%. Although not a enormous surprise, this trend would appear to be with us for an extended period in Hong Kong - especially given the continued border closures amid the COVID-19 disruption; and*Poor Capital Management Becoming A Big Problem: Link management also appears hellbent on destroying shareholder value with deals that make little financial sense. Link recently announced the acquisition of Happy Valley Shopping Mall in Guangzhou where the current annualized NPI yield barely covering the project’s cost of funding. In order to improve occupancy, it would appear that Link would likely need to offering significant tenant enticements, and investment massively in asset enhancement. Bizarrely instead of weighing buybacks return versus new investment ROI, management views share buybacks as a mechanism to defend shares against short-selling.

Link REIT – Hong Kong “Stabilizing”