bullish

Hitachi Ltd

Last Week in Event SPACE: Hitachi/Honda, AOF, Unizo, SVI, Maanshan, Osram, Genting, KCC

406 Views03 Nov 2019 09:00
SUMMARY

Last Week in Event SPACE ...

(This insight covers specific insights & comments involving Stubs, Pairs, Arbitrage, share Classification and Events - or SPACE - in the past week)

M&A - ASIA-PAC

Hitachi Ltd (6501 JP) / Honda Motor (7267 JP)

Travis Lundy and Mio Kato, CFA tackled the Yomiuri headlines suggesting that Honda's three large auto parts affiliates - Showa Corp (7274 JP), Keihin Corp (7251 JP), and Nissin Kogyo (7230 JP) - would merge with Hitachi's unlisted Hitachi Automotive business. What was a "merger" with Hitachi owning a "majority of the business" turned out to be a Honda Tender Offer to take each of the three companies private by conducting tender offers then squeezeouts, then Honda will merge these three companies with Hitachi Automotive Systems, whereupon Hitachi will end up owning 66.6% of the bundle and Honda will own 33.4%.

  • Travis believes Showa's Offer is objectionably low and deserves a bump. Keihin is probably the fairest of the three announced. Nissin Kogyo is the smallest of the three announced and it has the lowest foreign ownership. It also has the easiest path to clearing the 66.7% hurdle, although the Offer Price is a little light.
  • Mio points to the investment burden for continuing R&D for next generation CASE technologies and argues that these Offers are vindication of his long-standing argument that a key strength of Toyota is its formidable parts makers. In particular, Denso and Aisin Seiki would still be larger than even the combined entity resulting from the merger of all four auto parts units.
  • Since Hitachi will reportedly take a 66% stake in the new entity it is important to consider what this move may portend for Hitachi Construction Machinery and Hitachi Metals. Hitachi Chemicals is already reportedly attracting offers and Mio does not believe this move impacts the Hitachi High Technologies situation overly much.
  • This move could be quite significant for Honda and it is pertinent to consider whether Honda will move away from a keiretsu structure with key group company Keihin (which manufactures all important ECUs for Honda) coming under the wing of Hitachi.

links to:
Mio's insight:
Hitachi – Thoughts on the Honda Group Autoparts Merger
Travis' insights:
Honda TOB for Keihin (7251) - A Cheapish Buy For Honda But It Gets Up
Honda TOB for Nissin Kogyo (7230) - Honda Gets This Done Easily
Honda TOB for Showa (7274) - THIS One Is Too Cheap


Australian Unity Office Fund (AOF AU) (Mkt Cap: $339mn; Liquidity: $3mn)

With one week to go until AOF's Scheme Meeting, Offeror Charter Hall (CHC AU) announced it had divested its entire 19.9% stake at $2.95/unit. CHC still supports the Scheme. It is apparent the purpose behind this sale is to place these units in friendly hands which will vote in favour of the Scheme. Prior to the divestment, Scheme shareholders would not include Charter's 19.9% stake.
  • There are precedents for this type of action. Most recently in Vocus Communications (VOC AU) 2014/2015 takeover of Amcom Telecommunications (AMM AU). It's unorthodox - even debatable - however, Australia's Federal Court and ASIC have previously found no issue.
  • Given the Vocus precedent, it is logical to assume the Court and ASIC will similarly sign off on Charter's stake divestment. Although the stake in question here is larger, it's not apparent this alters the approval process.
  • Currently trading at a gross/annualised return of 1%/12.2%. It is worth noting Amcom's Scheme Meeting was pushed back by four weeks after Vocus sold its stake. Applying a similar delay to AOF's Meeting sees the annualised spread at 7.5%. I'd buy here. This was a done deal before, and is even more so with 19.9% of shares out "expected" to vote for the Offer. The only hiccup is a delay in the Scheme Meeting.

(link to my insight: AOF's Offer Is A-OK After Charter's Exit)


Unizo Holdings (3258 JP) (Mkt Cap: $1.6bn; Liquidity: $24mn)

Unizo announced its quarterly earnings for Q2 2019. Earnings were in line with forecasts of 10 October 2019 when the forecast was last revised. In H1 the company sold 10 investment real estate properties, 4 hotels, and one golf course. Some of the sales were likely meant to generate profits to offset losses from other sales. Because one cannot be sure how the company would plan on using the cash for the benefit of shareholders, and because there is one tender offer currently underway and one proposal for a tender offer in full negotiation mode, the earnings "surprise" from selling assets is effectively meaningless (and it is not a surprise anyway as they had previewed it earlier).

  • Depending on how you look at the cost of selling down assets, and the cost of keeping the company alive afterwards, adjusted NAV (current book value adjusted for the after-tax value of unrealized gains, less another adjustment to keep the company alive) could be anywhere from ¥7,000-8,000/share. A simple number from the company's presentation might be ¥7,867/share. Any way you look at it, unless a buyer goes quite hostile and liquidates the assets and the employees quickly, ¥5,000/share is not a bad price.
  • Even if UNIZO "consents", Travis doesn't think Blackstone pays more than ¥5,000 initially. He is not sure Fortress would want to "consent" to what Blackstone might agree to. He is also not sure either Fortress or Blackstone want to go really overtly hostile despite Blackstone saying that it will entertain all possibilities. If someone goes hostile, we will surely get a tender offer. If they do not, there is a possibility there is no successful tender near-term.
  • Travis thinks the stock trading over ¥5,000/share is a good place to get out of a long position. While he thinks the risk-adjusted value of the stock as the situation is now below ¥5,000, he would not necessarily go short. The stock is illiquid - the lack of volume while the stock is trading above ¥5,000/share suggests that there are a fair number of people "stuck" in the arb trade, unwilling to hurt their mark or cascade things lower. He thinks most participants see a Tender Offer, or an EGM to try to spill the board. The "Real NAV" provides them with some comfort that there is value and not much downside gap risk.

(link to Travis' insight: UNIZO: Results All Over the Place, Assets Are For Sale, and TOB Kerfuffle Is Extended)


SVI Pcl (SVI TB) (Mkt Cap: $424mn; Liquidity: $1mn)

Dislodging 19.29% of the register, to achieve the acceptance conditions in SVI's Tender Offer, at a price traded four months ago was always going to be a big ask, notably when the second-largest shareholder, Eagle Mount, added to its position in the 1Q19, when shares traded on average above the Offer Price.

  • 83mn shares traded on the 12 September, 53mn the following day, a further ~33 mn shares in the next two trading days - then volume dried up. 263mn shares have now traded since the initial announcement. Even in the unlikely scenario where all shares traded were to tender, this still requires an additional 8% of shares out to tender for the acceptance condition to be fulfilled.
  • The lackluster showing into the Tender Offer is illustrated in the Report on the Preliminary Result of the Tender Offer announced on the 28 October, wherein 160.3mn shares or 7.45% of shares out had tendered into the Offer.
  • A basket of Thai-listed peers are down 19% since the 12 September. One could argue shareholders should take advantage of the Offer and tender. But this won't halt what is likely to be a significant drop in SVI's shares once the Offer support is removed, possibly below Bt3.20. The trade (at the time of the insight) was to borrow shares and tender them. Whether the tender offer is successful or not, the back end should probably trade down.

(link to my insight: SVI's Offer Looks Set To Fail. And Fall)


Keppel Corp Ltd (KEP SP) (Mkt Cap: $9.2bn; Liquidity: $20mn)

Temasek's pre-conditional offer to go to a 51% stake in Keppel was "pre-conditional" on foreign anti-trust approvals, foreign investment approvals, approval from the Monetary Authority of Singapore and approval from the Info-Communications Media Development Authority (IMDA). Travis Lundy here discusses the nature of the Anti-Trust and Foreign Investor approvals required, with special emphasis on FIRB with some sensitive assets to be looked at under the purview of the Critical Infrastructure Centre.

  • The Anti-Trust Reviews for EC, China (SAMR), and Brazil are probably pretty easy. None of the Keppel investments are significantly laterally or vertically interconnected with Temasek's other investments to warrant behavioural remedies.
  • The Foreign Investment Approval for FIRB is more difficult. The Keppel Infrastructure business has a water treatment chemical business, and an undersea electricity cable business. It also has data centres which are a key focus of FIRB chair David Irvine. Travis expects this will get done with minor behavioural restrictions on the data centres, and there may also be some behavioural restrictions on the other two.
  • MAS Approval should be straightforward. IMDA Approval based on the indirect holding in M1 Limited is going to be interesting. Temasek owns 52% of Singtel (ST SP) which owns one of the four mobile licenses in Singapore. M1 is jointly and indirectly held by Keppel after the joint takeover last year by SPH, Keppel T&T, etc. and then Keppel's takeover of Keppel T&T. If Temasek takes control of Keppel, they would potentially have reasonably strong influence on M1 Limited strategy. Travis expects behavioural remedies would be required here.

(link to Travis' insight: Gauging Foreign Investment Review Risk for Temasek Takeover of Keppel)


Qms Media (QMS AU) (Mkt Cap: $291m; Liquidity: $1mn)

Quadrant Private Equity has entered into a Scheme Implementation Deed with out-of-home (OOH) advertising business QMS under which Quadrant has agreed to acquire 100% of QMS at $1.22/share, a 36.3% premium to the close on the 23 October - the day prior to press speculation of Quadrant's tilt. A final dividend of A$0.013/share for the FYE Dec2019 will also be added. The Scheme includes equity rollover options for Nettlefold (QMS Media Group's CEO) and O'Neill (QMS Media Australia's CEO), together holding ~15% of shares out. This will necessitate two Scheme Meetings.

  • The industry has undergone two large mergers recently. Apn Outdoor (APO AU) complemented JCDecaux SA (DEC FP)’s existing OOH media assets in Australia; JCDecaux's last-minute proposal also thwarted APN’s potential move into JCDecaux's bus-advertising turf via its bid for Adshel, which was ultimately taken out by oOh!Media Ltd (OML AU). The upshot of these two transactions was marginalizing QMS' share of OOH revenue.
  • At a three-year high, the Offer price looks reasonable. It also has the backing of QMS' BoD and 15% of shares out. The implied EV/EBITDA is above listed peers, and roughly in line with that for precedent transactions.
  • There is scope for a kiss. Nettlefold and O'Neill are afforded the option of remaining fully invested, which could be viewed as a better value proposition than taking cash now. Some shareholders may prefer a similar choice, and if not, then be additionally compensated for that lack of option.

(link to my insight: Quadrant Cues QMS Offer In OOH Return)


Maanshan Iron & Steel H (323 HK) (Mkt Cap: $2.9bn; Liquidity: $9mn)

In my note the previous Friday (Maanshan's Offer Likely To Turn Unconditional), recent CCASS movements indicated the Offer for Maanshan would turn unconditional. As at 28 October 2019, 376,870,967 H shares have tendered, representing ~21.9% of the H-shares and ~4.89% of the total issued share capital of Maanshan, taking the Offeror's stake to 50.43% of the total issued shares (both A & H). The Offer has become unconditional in all respects. The Offer has been extended until the 11th November, 14 days from the unconditional date.

  • In what would have been the first closing date on the 29 October. 42.85% of H shares tendered. Or 742.5mn shares. To put that in context, 1.7bn shares traded since the 31 May announcement wherein Anhui SASAC and China Baowu had entered into an agreement. 1.14bn shares changed hands since the official 22 July announcement, up until the last day to theoretically buy and tender, that an MGO was expected to take place. There are of course other extenuating factors, such as existing shareholders who have tendered. However, tendered shares accounted for 44% of volume since 31 May and 65% since 22 July.

  • Investors can probably buy up until the 6 November and still be able to tender. This suggests support for the stock from the Offer will probably taper off around the 7 November. On a simple ratio - Maanshan over Angang Steel Co Ltd (H) (347 HK) - at a current 8+% premium, has only briefly exceeded this ratio in the past ten years, a handful of times in August, early September and in the past week. In addition, Maanshan H shares are trading roughly at par with the As, compared to a 10-year average of a 40% premium in favour of the As.
  • Angang is down 15% since the 22 July, the time of the joint announcement, compared to +1% for Maanshan. Around the 7 November, the trade here would be to short Maanshan against Angang.

(link to my insight: Maanshan's Offer Likely To Turn Unconditional)


Briefly ...

Brian Freitas wrote on five Japanese buybacks. Orix Corp (8591 JP)'s buyback of up to 70mm shares and ¥100bn to be conducted between 1 November 2019 and 8 May 2020 should be considered "big". Given the size of the buyback and its impact on average daily trading volume, the stock could continue running higher once the buyback commences on 1 November. (link to Brian's insight: Orix Corp - Big Buyback)

STUBS

Genting Bhd (GENT MK) / Genting Singapore (GENS SP)

I estimate Genting is trading at a 47% discount to NAV, around its 12-month low and +2STD, and against a one-year average of 40%.

  • Howard J Klein asked in his insight Genting: End Game Approaching on It's Biggest Bet yet in the US" Las Vegas: "Is the company’s biggest bet yet in Las Vegas, the wisest allocation of assets for the parent?" The US$4bn Resorts World Las Vegas (RWLV) is expected to open in December 2020. There is certainly no shortage of choices for punters in Las Vegas, and it is debatable whether Genting can leverage its Asian player base to visit its new Las Vegas flagship and whether this is justification for a US$4bn investment.
  • Genting is pretty beaten up. At 5x EV/EBITDA (L), it's not expensive relative to regional peers (10.7x). GENS is at 6.4x and 7.5x for Genting Malaysia (GENM MK). Now would be a suitable time for the Lim family to support the parent. Until then, shares may well languish until the opening (assuming it is not delayed again) of RWLV, and then for another three months until initial numbers begin to surface. If you are a bigger player, you could use times like this to accumulate. If you are a small trader, you would probably wait until it bounces a little.
  • Genting Sing, which accounts for 44% of NAV, has clearer visibility after recently entering into a long-term license renewal deal with the government through to 2030, which provides for an increase in the gaming space - but at a cost.

(link to my insight: StubWorld: Las Vegas Bet To Elevate Genting?)


Briefly ...

Sanghyun Park discussed Orion Holdings (001800 KS) and discount to NAV of 54.5%, a year high. Orion Corp (271560 KS) accounts for 75% of the NAV and 174% of the parent's market cap. I see the discount no NAV at 57% against a one-year average of 50%. The pushback - the parent's liquidity is less than US$1mn/day.

EVENTS

Kcc Corp (002380 KS) (Mkt Cap: $1.9bn; Liquidity: $4mn)

Company split-offs in Korea can sometimes (but not always) provide interesting investment opportunities. KCC Corp’s stock price has been in a multi-year bear market. KCC Corp's stock price has collapsed nearly 70% since its highs in October 2014 and is down 27% YTD. The main driver of the lower share price has been worsening financial results.

  • Post KCC Corp's split-off, the first son Chung Mong-Jin will likely end up the major owner of KCC Corp. The second son Chung Mong-Ik will likely end up the major shareholder of KCC Glass. The third son Chung Mong-Yeol will likely end up the major shareholder of KCC Construction. KCC Corp plans to hold an extraordinary general shareholders' meeting on November 13th to potentially approve the business plan of company split.
  • Overall, Douglas Kim believes there could be some positive changes as a result from this company split-off and giving responsibility and accountability to the three brothers in specific business units of KCC affiliates.
  • Assuming a 20% discount on the value of its cash, short term investments, and long-term investment assets (as of end of 2Q19), and assuming 8x estimated operating profit of ₩264bn in 2020, Douglas backs out a NAV of ₩3.5tn or ₩335,193/share, 48% higher than the (then) current price. Applying a 30% discount and 8x operating profit, backs out a NAV of ₩2.8tn or ₩263,854/share, a 17% lift.

M&A - EUROPE/UK

Just Eat PLC (JE/ LN) (Mkt Cap: $6.5bn; Liquidity: $30mn)

On the 29 July, Takeaway.com NV (TKWY NA) and Just East reached an agreement in principle whereby Just Eat shareholders would get 0.09744 shares of Takeaway.com and would own 52.2% of the newly-merged company. Since then, despite Just Eat trading through terms relatively consistently, a combination of a 10+ fall in Takeaway.com and a sharp rise in the value of the pound sterling has meant a fall in the sterling price of Just Eat shares. The terms of the Just Eat/Takeaway deal do seem to favour Takeaway to an inordinate degree. Travis would vote against if he were a shareholder.

  • On the 22 October, Prosus (PRX NA) announced an unsolicited cash Takeover Offer for Just Eat at GBp710/share, a 20% premium to where Just Eat closed the day before. Just Eat rejected the Prosus offer (as they had rejected previous offers of GBp670 and GBp700) because the proposal "significantly undervalues Just Eat and the Takeaway.com combination" and the Prosus Offer "fails to appropriately reflect the quality of Just Eat and its attractive assets and prospects."
  • Prosus' deal for Just Eat is at a premium to the Takeaway terms but at a discount to where Just Eat was trading just several weeks prior. The lack of ability to stay on as an investor makes the deal unattractive to a large number of shareholders in Just Eat who really like the space. Prosus also bid too little - even trading at a premium to Prosus' proposed terms, it is still cheap to its comps.
  • THE TRADE: Buy any dip on Just Eat. Own it now. Travis expects Prosus will have to come over the top if it wants to get this done.
  • THE CAVEAT: Travis thinks it is not clear Prosus really wants to go that high. They may just want to stymie the deal currently supported by management.

OSRAM Licht AG (OSR GR) (Mkt Cap: $4.2bn; Liquidity: $48mn)

The previous week, ams AG (AMS SW) announced that it intended to launch a new Offer for Osram at the same price (€41.00/share) as the last Offer which did not meet the minimum acceptance threshold of 62.5% (which had been lowered from 70%) including shares owned by ams after on-market purchases of 19.9%. This one has a lower minimum threshold of 55% and is seemingly declared final, with a possible launch by month-end, and closure expected in H1 2020, from which point a Domination Agreement and Profit and Loss Pooling Agreement vote would almost certainly proceed.

  • ams and Osram have been in discussions since early October to obtain an agreement for management support. Getting ams to honour the ideas behind the Zukunftskonzept OSRAM Agreement of July 2017 would likely go a fair way to getting this deal supported by management. Last time they got to 51.6%. With a little more visible support from Osram's executive committee and board, more lead time, and without the prospect of a higher Bain+Advent deal waiting in the wings, this should get done.
  • Trading at €40.00/share, that provided a 2.5% gross spread and a decent annualized spread, but without a doc and without Osram management agreement, it suggests a strong degree of market confidence that it gets done. Strategically, ams has probably made a mistake. They should have raised the price a little and lowered the minimum threshold as they did (though perhaps a little less). If they get this deal done, they will pay more than €41/share on the back end to get minorities out.
  • ams is not going away. They own 19.99%, which makes it more difficult for others to get a deal done. Travis thinks this deal gets done and would buy at €40.00/share and add on weakness.

(link to Travis' insight: New ams Deal for Osram In Store - It's Doable)

M&A - US

Tiffany & Co (TIF US) (Mkt Cap: $15bn; Liquidity: $249mn)

Tiffany & Co, an American luxury jewellery and specialty retailer, confirmed the receipt of an unsolicited and non-binding proposal from LVHM Moet Hennessy, the global leader in luxury goods, to acquire Tiffany for $14.5bn. This translates to $120/share, a premium of around 22% premium to last close.

  • The offer implies a trailing EV/EBITDA multiple of 16.5x. Louis Vuitton’s offer to buy Tiffany was made when the share price was at a cyclical low level, and a 14% discount to Tiffany’s all-time high price.
  • Oshadhi Kumarasiri is of the opinion that the Board of Directors is likely to reject the offer on the expectation of higher bid. A deal in the range of the historical high price of $139/share is probably the best Tiffany’s board can get for shareholders. But Oshadhi believes a body of shareholders would be happy to sell at $120/share given Tiffany's valuation with a looming recession.

(link to Oshadhi's insight Louis Vuitton Offers to Acquire Tiffany: Luxury Valuation to Semi Luxury Brand)

SHARE CLASS

Tata Motors DVR (TTMT/A IN) / Tata Motors Ltd (TTMT IN)

Along with 2Q results, the Board of Directors of Tata Motors approved a preferential allotment of ordinary shares and warrants to the promoter, Tata Sons, for an aggregate consideration of INR 6,494 crore (US$920m) subject to shareholder approval.

  • With the Tata Sons voting shareholding increasing from 37.71% to 41.71% on allotment of ordinary shares and to 45.71% post-exercise of the warrants, the likelihood of further buying by Tata Sons in the ordinary shares is small and the ordinary shares will be less impacted by Tata Sons desire to get closer to a 50% shareholding.
  • Tata Motors' DVRs have widened from 20% in mid-2016 to 54% currently. This may be an opportune time to buy the DVR shares to participate in the Tata Motors' long-term story, to get a pick up from the narrowing discount and a higher dividend than the ordinary shares. Arb traders can also give the long DVR, short TTMT trade another go for a potential reversal in the discount.

(link to Brian's insight: Tata Motors - Driving Gains)


Briefly ...

Samsung Electronics (005930 KS)'s common/pref #1 was at a +1.5σ on a 20D MA. This month will see the KOSPI 200 30% cap and the MSCI EM rebalancing. In addition, memory price is still at a historic low - Samsung Elec's share price may face strong resistance at the current price level. Sanghyun recommends a short C and long 1P. (link to Sanghyun's insight: Samsung Elec C/1P At +1.5σ: Situations Favoring 1P)


Bangkok Bank Public (BBL TB) has outperformed Kasikornbank PCL (KBANK TB) by 19.5% over the last eight trading sessions. With the price ratio now trading beyond +6σ levels, Brian feels that a short-term reversal could occur taking the ratio back toward 1.22. Given the blowout in the price ratio, we would wait to confirm an end to BBL's outperformance over KBANK before entering a new position. Over the last week, the number of NVDRs increased on BBL and KBANK. In the case of BBL, the NVDR usage is at 32.12% vs the regulatory limit of 35%, so there could be more buying in the short term before the number of NVDRs reaches its limit. (link to Brian's insight: Battle of the Banks Round 3 - BBL Vs. KBANK)

M&A ROUND-UP IN OCTOBER

For the month of October, 17 new deals were discussed on Smartkarma with an overall announced deal size of ~US$34bn.

  • While Scottish Salmon Co Plc (SSC NO)'s Offer comes at a slight discount of 0.4% to the pre-announcement closing price, the offer price translates to premia of 22.0% and 43.9% to the 6-month and 1-year VWAPs respectively.
  • United Engineers (UEM SP)'s takeunder was triggered by a restructuring of the major shareholder. Ideally, this was not an Offer Yanlord Land (YLLG SP) had any intention of launching. This is not dissimilar to the restructuring of government-related entities which triggered a conditional MGO in Maanshan Iron & Steel H (323 HK). Those entities tried to avoid an Offer but were obligated to adhere to takeover rules.
  • The average premium for the new deals announced in October was 30%, while the average for the first ten months of 2019 is ~32%.

OTHER M&A AND EVENT UPDATES

CCASS

My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions. These may be indicative of share pledges. Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings.

Often these moves can easily be explained - the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, lock-up expiry, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.

I don't see any large moves this week.

The following large movement(s) concern recently listed companies, and therefore are (likely) lock-up related.

Name

% chg

Into

Out of

Euroeyes (1846 HK)50.20%BOCIOutside CCASS
Jilin Province Chuncheng Heating (1853 HK) 10.99%BOCIPhillip Sec
GHPC (1847 HK)25.44%CICCOutside CCASS
Source: HKEx
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