Silver Point

Thomas J. Monaco

Independent Insight Provider

Silver Point is a boutique research firm that focuses on the broader financial services sector, with a particular focus on troubled institutions globally. 

Asia Ex Japan

Thematic (Sector/Industry)

* RBI Failure To Think Through Moratorium Leads To Continued Uncertainty for India: On September 3, 2020, the Supreme Court of India held a hearing on interest rate waivers for loans under moratorium granted by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). On September 10th, the Supreme Court clarified: a) the matter under discussion is related to interest on interest payments and not on the interest payments themselves; and b) that banks should not classify loans as NPL for another two month period, if they were not classified NPLs on August 31st.; and   *Dissatisfied Borrowers: The Supreme Court has now disposed of the 'interest on interest waiver' related petitions where borrowers were satisfied with the interest on interest waiver measures implemented by the RBI and the financial sector. However, there remain other borrowers (ie. power companies) who aren’t satisfied and have proposed further modifications to the RBI’s restructuring scheme.

* RBI Failure To Think Through Moratorium Leads To Continued Uncertainty for India: On September 3, 2020, the Supreme Court of India held a hearing on interest rate waivers for loans under moratorium granted by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). On September 10th, the Supreme Court clarified: a) the matter under discussion is related to interest on interest payments and not on the interest payments themselves; and b) that banks should not classify loans as NPL for another two month period, if they were not classified NPLs on August 31st.; and   *Dissatisfied Borrowers: The Supreme Court has now disposed of the 'interest on interest waiver' related petitions where borrowers were satisfied with the interest on interest waiver measures implemented by the RBI and the financial sector. However, there remain other borrowers (ie. power companies) who aren’t satisfied and have proposed further modifications to the RBI’s restructuring scheme. 

Reserve Bank of India – The Fun Never Stops

Equity Bottom-Up

Indiabulls Housing Finance / Equity Bottom-Up

*Solid Quarter: IndiaBulls Housing Finance (IHFL.IN) [IndiaBulls] reported FY 2Q21 results of INR 7.1 bn, increasing INR 4.4 bn (160.0%) linked quarter. Much of the linked quarter improvement can be attributed to net interest income growth of INR 4.7 bn (64.8%) resultant of INR 135.0 bn (14.5%) loan growth, NIM improvement of 137 bp (by our calculation) of 137 bp to 4.49%, and a buyback of bonds reducing debt by 9%; and*Credit Improving:During FY 2Q21, stated Stage 3 NPLs improved INR 4.3 bn (21.1%), declining 68 bp over the period to 1.52%.  Reinforcing this improvement, we find that net new NPLs were negative by a whopping INR 13.0 bn or over 100% on an annualized basis.

*Solid Quarter: IndiaBulls Housing Finance (IHFL.IN) [IndiaBulls] reported FY 2Q21 results of INR 7.1 bn, increasing INR 4.4 bn (160.0%) linked quarter. Much of the linked quarter improvement can be attributed to net interest income growth of INR 4.7 bn (64.8%) resultant of INR 135.0 bn (14.5%) loan growth, NIM improvement of 137 bp (by our calculation) of 137 bp to 4.49%, and a buyback of bonds reducing debt by 9%; and*Credit Improving:During FY 2Q21, stated Stage 3 NPLs improved INR 4.3 bn (21.1%), declining 68 bp over the period to 1.52%.  Reinforcing this improvement, we find that net new NPLs were negative by a whopping INR 13.0 bn or over 100% on an annualized basis. 

IndiaBulls Housing Finance – Rocking and Rolling

*Results Down, Credibility Up: LIC Housing Finance (LICHF.IN) [LIC] reported FY 2Q21 bottom-line of INR 7.9 bn, declining INR 266 mn (3.3%) on a linked period basis. LIC’s conservatism with respect to provisioning – especially relative to the rest of the Indian financial sector – is quite admirable;*Credit On The Mend: During the period, we note that Stage 3 NPLs declined INR 625 mn (1.1%) to INR 58.8 bn and represent 2.79% of total loans – down 4 bp linked quarter. In addition, we note that net new NPLs at LIC were negative as well – declining INR 586 mn for an annualized rate of NPL decline of 4.0%. Coupled with NCOs of just INR 39 mn  - which amount to just 1 bp of total loans on an annualized basis, we find that reserves improved INR 1.0 bn or 4.0% linked quarter. While we admire LIC’s conservatism relative to peer, we would still be comfortable with reserves being INR 3.3 bn (11.8%) higher. That said, at this pace, LIC should get there within three quarters; and        *Competition Intensifying: Increasing competition could impact profitability, however, with both housing lenders and private banks significantly cutting interest rates.

*Results Down, Credibility Up: LIC Housing Finance (LICHF.IN) [LIC] reported FY 2Q21 bottom-line of INR 7.9 bn, declining INR 266 mn (3.3%) on a linked period basis. LIC’s conservatism with respect to provisioning – especially relative to the rest of the Indian financial sector – is quite admirable;*Credit On The Mend: During the period, we note that Stage 3 NPLs declined INR 625 mn (1.1%) to INR 58.8 bn and represent 2.79% of total loans – down 4 bp linked quarter. In addition, we note that net new NPLs at LIC were negative as well – declining INR 586 mn for an annualized rate of NPL decline of 4.0%. Coupled with NCOs of just INR 39 mn  - which amount to just 1 bp of total loans on an annualized basis, we find that reserves improved INR 1.0 bn or 4.0% linked quarter. While we admire LIC’s conservatism relative to peer, we would still be comfortable with reserves being INR 3.3 bn (11.8%) higher. That said, at this pace, LIC should get there within three quarters; and        *Competition Intensifying: Increasing competition could impact profitability, however, with both housing lenders and private banks significantly cutting interest rates.

LIC Housing Finance – Doing The Right Thing

Specialist in Indian Banking and Economic Research

Hemindra Hazari

A newly-appointed (on October 9, 2020) deputy governor of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has <a href="https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/BS_SpeechesView.aspx?Id=1101" target="_blank" rel="noopener">proposed</a>, for discussion, that large systemically-important non-bank finance companies (NBFCs) either convert themselves into banks, or that they contract assets, in order to protect financial stability. This proposal not only has major implications for prominent NBFCs some belonging to industrial houses, but also highlights the regulator’s present lack of capability to regulate such companies. Instead of arguing for the large NBFCs to either become banks or face an eventual demise by setting on a path to shrinking their size, the regulator should be examining how to improve its own regulation and supervision of large NBFCs. The collapses of IL&amp;FS (<a href="https://hemindrahazari.com/2019/01/31/ilfs-collapse-what-happens-when-infrastructure-development-is-privatised-hemindra-hazari/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">here</a>) and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/dewan-housing-finance-corp" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:8142:1" rel="noopener">Dewan Housing Finance (DEWH IN)</a> (<a href="https://hemindrahazari.com/2019/01/29/panel-discussion-on-cobrapost-expose-of-dhfl/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">here</a>) were not only a failure of corporate governance and the economic slowdown, but also the consequence of a severe shortfall in regulatory supervision.Financial deregulation and the entry of more players in the strategic financial sector require a more vigilant, intrusive regulator armed with the necessary systems, processes and human resource talent to effectively regulate and supervise the sector. Sadly, the total officer strength of the RBI is currently below the levels of 2015, and it needs to invest in more resources for regulating the NBFC sector instead of proposing to compel large NBFCs to become banks. NBFCs cater to specific needs of the economy which the banks, for whatever reasons, have been unable to address, and while some NBFCs may want to become banks, others owned by industrial houses may not even be permitted to get bank licenses, and some may not even want to become banks. In such a scenario it is imperative for the regulator to implement systems and processes to regulate large NBFCs instead of floating such proposals in the public domain.

A newly-appointed (on October 9, 2020) deputy governor of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has proposed, for discussion, that large systemically-important non-bank finance companies (NBFCs) either convert themselves into banks, or that they contract assets, in order to protect financial stability. This proposal not only has major implications for prominent NBFCs some belonging to industrial houses, but also highlights the regulator’s present lack of capability to regulate such companies. Instead of arguing for the large NBFCs to either become banks or face an eventual demise by setting on a path to shrinking their size, the regulator should be examining how to improve its own regulation and supervision of large NBFCs. The collapses of IL&amp;FS (here) and Dewan Housing Finance (DEWH IN) (here) were not only a failure of corporate governance and the economic slowdown, but also the consequence of a severe shortfall in regulatory supervision.Financial deregulation and the entry of more players in the strategic financial sector require a more vigilant, intrusive regulator armed with the necessary systems, processes and human resource talent to effectively regulate and supervise the sector. Sadly, the total officer strength of the RBI is currently below the levels of 2015, and it needs to invest in more resources for regulating the NBFC sector instead of proposing to compel large NBFCs to become banks. NBFCs cater to specific needs of the economy which the banks, for whatever reasons, have been unable to address, and while some NBFCs may want to become banks, others owned by industrial houses may not even be permitted to get bank licenses, and some may not even want to become banks. In such a scenario it is imperative for the regulator to implement systems and processes to regulate large NBFCs instead of floating such proposals in the public domain.

RBI Proposal to Convert Large NBFCs into Banks: No Solution to the Problem of Regulatory Failures

*Results Supported By Premature Provision Cut: State Bank of India (SBIN.IN) [SBI] reported FY 2Q21 results of INR 45.7 bn, increasing INR 3.8 bn (9.2%) linked quarter. Results were even better when we exclude the FY 1Q21 exceptional gain of INR 15.4 bn – increasing INR 19.2 bn or 72.6% linked quarter. Results were driven by three factors: a) net interest income improvement of INR 15.4 bn (5.8%) due primarily to NIM improvement of 8 bp to 2.96%; b) a loan loss provision decline of INR 18.1 bn (16.0%) despite much weaker credit metrics; and c) non-interest income improvement of INR 5.7 bn (7.2%); and* Credit Risk and Weak Cover: By our calculation, we find net new NPL growth of INR 144.0 bn or 44.4% on an annualized basis and that the annualized NCO rate of 66 bp – which are quite troublesome even for an SOE bank. We also find that reserves are light in the neighborbood of INR 1.1 tn  - nearly four years of pre-tax results or 61% of market-cap.

*Results Supported By Premature Provision Cut: State Bank of India (SBIN.IN) [SBI] reported FY 2Q21 results of INR 45.7 bn, increasing INR 3.8 bn (9.2%) linked quarter. Results were even better when we exclude the FY 1Q21 exceptional gain of INR 15.4 bn – increasing INR 19.2 bn or 72.6% linked quarter. Results were driven by three factors: a) net interest income improvement of INR 15.4 bn (5.8%) due primarily to NIM improvement of 8 bp to 2.96%; b) a loan loss provision decline of INR 18.1 bn (16.0%) despite much weaker credit metrics; and c) non-interest income improvement of INR 5.7 bn (7.2%); and* Credit Risk and Weak Cover: By our calculation, we find net new NPL growth of INR 144.0 bn or 44.4% on an annualized basis and that the annualized NCO rate of 66 bp – which are quite troublesome even for an SOE bank. We also find that reserves are light in the neighborbood of INR 1.1 tn  - nearly four years of pre-tax results or 61% of market-cap. 

State Bank of India – Credit Continues To Fall Off A Cliff

India

Housing Development Finance Corporation Ltd. HDFC provides housing finance company. The Company provides wide range of housing loans, loan for home improvement, extensions, top ups, and non housing loans and loans for non resident Indian (NRI). HDFC serves customers in India, kuwait, Singapore, Oman, UAE, and the United Kingdom.

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HDFC Limited (HDFC IN)

Reserve Bank of India – The Fun Never Stops

RESERVE BANK OF INDIA: Certain Borrowers Are Dis-Satisfied With "Interest On Interest Waiver" And Proposed Additional Modifications To RBI...

Thomas J. Monaco

IndiaBulls Housing Finance – Rocking and Rolling

INDIABULLS HOUSING FINANCE: IndiaBulls posted a solid set of results for FY 2Q21, as net interest income took off on the back of NIM improvement...

Thomas J. Monaco

LIC Housing Finance – Doing The Right Thing

LIC HOUSING FINANCE: Although Results Were Weaker Linked Quarter, They Were Driven By Higher Credit Costs. This Was Unnecessary Given Credit...

Thomas J. Monaco

RBI Proposal to Convert Large NBFCs into Banks: No Solution to the Problem of Regulatory Failures

Instead of forcible conversion to banks the RBI should ensure that it improves the regulation of important NBFCs so as to ensure that these...

Hemindra Hazari

State Bank of India – Credit Continues To Fall Off A Cliff

STATE BANK OF INDIA: Costs Increasing, Credit Deteriorating, Reserve Cover Declining. This Is A Recipe For A Massive Capital Raise.

Thomas J. Monaco

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