Independent Asian Credit Research, Bondcritic

Warut Promboon

Independent Asian Credit Research

Asian Fixed Income/Frontier Market Research

Bondcritic

Bondcritic, established in 2009, is designed to be an independent credit research voice that helps investors gain insights and unbiased analyses on Asian fixed income market. Our mission is to discover deep-value Asian high-yield and distressed bonds with a bottom-up approach, together with the help of our proprietary ESG (Environmental, Social Development, and Governance) model. At the same time, we focus on bringing investment cases of unrated and unloved issuers to the general public.

Credit

Here we summarize frequently asked questions (FAQs) we were asked by the press this month on China Evergrande Group ( <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/china-evergrande-group" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:479:1" rel="noopener">Evergrande (3333 HK)</a> ) and recent credit events for Evergrande and other Chinese property developers.
If our last Evergrande report ( <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/china-evergrande-group-never-grand" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:58256" rel="noopener">China Evergrande Group:  Never Grand</a> , dated 29-Sep) is about the rationale of Evergrande’s default and the lessons learned from the event. This flash note is about the continued saga where we do not see the end in sight just yet. We maintain our opinion that Evergrande is too big for the Chinese government to ignore and even though the trigger of the saga is the Three Red Lines<a href="#_ftn1" target="_blank" rel="noopener">[1]</a>, the cause is Evergrande’s leverage itself.
The bottom line for us is that the credit crisis of Chinese property developers will be contained as we believe China’s political system empowers the regulators with heavy hands which will force collaborations among issuers, investors, and intermediaries. Oftentimes, these participants are either owned or influenced by the central or local government entities.
Evergrande missed the coupon payments on 23-Sep (for its EVERRE 3/22s) and 29-Sep (for its EVERRE 3/24s) but eventually serviced its payments within the 30-day grace period. The company also secured more than 3 months of a maturity extension of its already defaulted USD260m bonds issued by Jumbo Fortune Enterprises, Evergrande’s joint venture, The bonds, guaranteed by Evergrande, matured on 3-Oct and defaulted as there is no provision for a grace period.
We believe it is difficult to gauge Evergrande’s recovery rate and, at the price between mid 20s to 30 cents on the dollar, the EVERRE complex’s fair value is unknown. As such our UNDERWEIGHT recommendation on the complex remains unchanged.
 
 
<div>
 <hr align="left" size="1" width="33%">
<div id="ftn1">
<a href="#_ftnref1" target="_blank" rel="noopener">[1]</a>The Three Red Lines include the following: 
(1) A net gearing ratio of less than 100%; 
(2) Cash to short-term debt ratio of more than 1x; and 
(3) A total liability to total asset ratio (excluding advance receipts) of less than 70%.
 
</div>
</div>

Here we summarize frequently asked questions (FAQs) we were asked by the press this month on China Evergrande Group ( Evergrande (3333 HK) ) and recent credit events for Evergrande and other Chinese property developers.
If our last Evergrande report ( China Evergrande Group:  Never Grand , dated 29-Sep) is about the rationale of Evergrande’s default and the lessons learned from the event. This flash note is about the continued saga where we do not see the end in sight just yet. We maintain our opinion that Evergrande is too big for the Chinese government to ignore and even though the trigger of the saga is the Three Red Lines[1], the cause is Evergrande’s leverage itself.
The bottom line for us is that the credit crisis of Chinese property developers will be contained as we believe China’s political system empowers the regulators with heavy hands which will force collaborations among issuers, investors, and intermediaries. Oftentimes, these participants are either owned or influenced by the central or local government entities.
Evergrande missed the coupon payments on 23-Sep (for its EVERRE 3/22s) and 29-Sep (for its EVERRE 3/24s) but eventually serviced its payments within the 30-day grace period. The company also secured more than 3 months of a maturity extension of its already defaulted USD260m bonds issued by Jumbo Fortune Enterprises, Evergrande’s joint venture, The bonds, guaranteed by Evergrande, matured on 3-Oct and defaulted as there is no provision for a grace period.
We believe it is difficult to gauge Evergrande’s recovery rate and, at the price between mid 20s to 30 cents on the dollar, the EVERRE complex’s fair value is unknown. As such our UNDERWEIGHT recommendation on the complex remains unchanged.
 
 



[1]The Three Red Lines include the following: 
(1) A net gearing ratio of less than 100%; 
(2) Cash to short-term debt ratio of more than 1x; and 
(3) A total liability to total asset ratio (excluding advance receipts) of less than 70%.
 



China Evergrande Group:   Trick Without Treat

Chart based progressive global trading strategies, Chart Partners

Thomas Schroeder

Chart based progressive global trading strategies

Chart Partners

Chart Partners objective is to discover medium-term cycle turns and profit opportunities before they unfold, within structural trends while preserving capital with clear degrees of risk. We have real return ideas. 

Markets are dynamic and trading systems must reflect this. It is crucial to determine underlying correlations and lead-lag relationships within global markets and the impact on linked instruments. Our weekly Chartonics product gives you short-term trading strategies that can be applied within the medium and longer term macro trends that are mapped out in our strategy updates. 

Our methodology fuses global market variables and isolates drivers in trends. We specialize in FX, index trade in NY and Asia with a focus on Asian stocks. 

Technical Analysis

Evergrande's recent bounce found lacking and now resuming the drift toward the 1.50-30 projection zone. Sell volumes on the decline is an underlying positive.RSI capped at 44 barrier with 20 the buy zone to try a long.Sell volumes are waning and constructive to set up a low.Looking for a bottom set up below 2.0 with RSI near 20. Ideally, want to see some buy volumes begin to shape direction.

Evergrande's recent bounce found lacking and now resuming the drift toward the 1.50-30 projection zone. Sell volumes on the decline is an underlying positive.RSI capped at 44 barrier with 20 the buy zone to try a long.Sell volumes are waning and constructive to set up a low.Looking for a bottom set up below 2.0 with RSI near 20. Ideally, want to see some buy volumes begin to shape direction.

Pan-Asia Catalysts/Events, Quiddity Advisors

David Blennerhassett

Pan-Asia Catalysts/Events

Quiddity Advisors

Event-Driven

Last Week in Event SPACE: Japan Post, Singapore Press, Siam Future, 51job, Kunlun, Shinsei Bank

SGX Market Strategist, Equity & Fixed Income, Singapore Exchange Ltd (SGX)

Geoff Howie

SGX Market Strategist, Equity & Fixed Income

Asia’s leading multi-asset exchange

Singapore Exchange Ltd (SGX)

Singapore Exchange is Asia’s leading and trusted market infrastructure, facilitating the exchange of capital and ideas to create value for people, businesses and economies. As a multi-asset exchange operating equity, fixed income and derivatives markets to the highest regulatory standards, SGX is a vertically integrated business that provides listing, trading, clearing, settlement, depository and data services.

With about 40% of listed companies and over 80% of listed bonds originating outside of Singapore as well as established linkages across the region and in Europe, SGX is Asia’s most international and connected exchange. Offering a full suite of derivatives products across Asian equity indices, commodities and currencies, SGX is the world’s most liquid international market for the benchmark equity indices of China, India, Japan and ASEAN.

As Asia’s pioneering central counterparty, SGX is globally recognised for its risk management and clearing capabilities, and was one of the first globally to adopt the Principles for Financial Market Infrastructure.

Headquartered in AAA-rated Singapore, SGX has over 800 employees including offices in Beijing, Chicago, Hong Kong, London, New York, Mumbai, San Francisco, Shanghai and Tokyo.

Equity Bottom-Up

SGX Asia Currencies and Commodities Insights

Travis Lundy

In <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/evergrande-as-a-study-of-quantum-mechanics-theory" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:55979" rel="noopener">Evergrande as a Study of Quantum Mechanics Theory</a> in August I discussed how the state of <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/china-evergrande-group" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:479:1" rel="noopener">Evergrande (3333 HK)</a>'s existence was somehow not dissimilar to the classic cat-in-a-box problem mooted by early quantum physics theorists.<section class="figure"><figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/237/678/original/catinabox3.jpeg?1635296450" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="237678"></figure>With coupon payments not being made, then being made at the last minute to avoid default, this quantum kitty has more life (or is using up its nine lives) than one might have thought. It is worth exploring.</section><h3>Evergrande Property Services Deal Broken - The Nuance</h3>Last week it became clear that <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/china-evergrande-group" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:479:1" rel="noopener">Evergrande (3333 HK)</a> ("Evergrande") would end up NOT selling a controlling stake in <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/evergrande-property-services" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:30921:1" rel="noopener">Evergrande Property Services (6666 HK)</a> ("EPS") to <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/hopson-development-holdings" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:8108:1" rel="noopener">Hopson Development (754 HK)</a> ("Hopson"), but that was less clear that it appeared. Evergrande <a href="https://www1.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2021/1020/2021102000957.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">said</a> Hopson had not fulfilled its obligations (with word being - getting the Guangzhou govt stamp of approval). Hopson's "<a href="https://www1.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2021/1020/2021102000969.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">clarification</a>" on the failure to settle the trade was nuanced quite differently. Evergrande had, according to Hopson, sought to change the terms of the deal, by asking for all the cash upfront before netting out the monies owned between Evergrande and its guarantors and EPS as the deal was originally laid out. The problem was that once the cash was paid out, it was not clear that Evergrande would pay to EPS the monies owed. The nuance here is that the "Cash and Short-Term Securities" at EPS may be in short-term securities issued by its parent. If the payment made to the parent (HK$20.04bn) nets out against HK$17bn possibly borrowed, that means that Evergrande only gets HK$3bn for 50.01%. It actually reduces debt, BUT getting that HK$3bn is less useful than getting HK$20bn. There is a HK$1bn break fee to the 'party which defaults' on the closure of the Sale of Target Company Shares. At this point, Evergrande is saying Hopson is at fault. Hopson has said it will go through with the transaction (and insists on doing so) at the terms agreed. Given the circumstances, I would expect this is now a HK$1bn payment to Hopson which will be owed but which could probably be marked to market at 20cts on the dollar. The other nuance one may derive from that little bust-up is that the shares in Evergrande Property Service - which are a crucial part of the value of the potential "estate" of Evergrande for the bondholders - may be worth a fair bit less than their traded value because if the netting could not occur, that means Evergrande Property Services may not control its significant net cash position. Evergrande and Hopson agreed at a price then below market based on the idea that the cash existed and Evergrande was good for it. The terms about timing would have been clear enough to Evergrande. Take that cash away and it is worth US$2bn less (which is a lot when the US$20bn of USD Evergrande debt is trading at 20cts on the dollar). That net cash position may be invested in Evergrande exposure, and if so, it may not be coming back out until Evergrande is fully healthy. Which may take awhile. But Hopson has stated its case. <h3>Coupons Paid and Unpaid - The Nuance</h3>The News we got last Friday and over the weekend was that the US$83.5mm of coupons which were in their grace period since the 23 September due date were paid to bondholders, apparently. While I had self-admittedly been up in the air about the likelihood they would pay, all reports suggest they have, and that means the company is in the clear until the 29th of October when more coupons run out their grace period. That would be ~US$47mm of coupons not paid on 29 September. There were other USD bond coupons unpaid recently - roughly US$148.13mm of coupons due on 11 October. Those would see their grace period expire on 10 November. There are another $82mm of coupons coming due on 6 November (where the grace period would be until 6 December) and another $255mm of coupons coming due on 28 December. But there is nuance here too. And timing. And that is better discussed in more detail below. <h3>The Discovery Phase of the Bezzle</h3>I used that phrase a bit more than a year ago when talking about Evergrande, suggesting that Galbraith's fabulously evocative word describing the cumulative increase in illusory/unrealised wealth and general excess marked by over-abundant trust and plentiful money on the way up - The Bezzle - was now in its discovery phase, where "Money is watched with a narrow, suspicious eye. The man who handles it is assumed to be dishonest until he proves himself otherwise. Audits are penetrating and meticulous."  I can cherry pick quotes, and if I do, I'd note that section continues a bit, then says, "Just as the boom accelerated the rate of growth, so the crash enormously advanced the rate of discovery. Within a few days, something close to a universal trust turned into something akin to universal suspicion. Audits were ordered. Strained or preoccupied behavior was noticed."I'd say we are definitely there now.It's a great book, and well worth reading, and this particular section describes very clearly the increase of unrealised wealth under the curve - which separately Mr. Galbraith looked at as seeding wealth effect spending, something for which our favourite Belt Brother is known.<div class="content-highlight">What matters now is that there is pressure on those who profited from The Bezzle to unwind the gains to whence they came.</div>What struck many observers for many years was how impervious to the enormous risks born by Evergrande's capital providers and customers Founder Hui Ka Yan and his reputation seemed. That all seemed to end with a series of articles and posts on mainland media in July and August, culminating in this Caixin <a href="https://www.caixinglobal.com/2021-08-30/rich-friends-who-helped-evergrande-tycoon-count-their-losses-101763855.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">article</a> at the end of August which talked quite explicitly about Hui Ka Yan's poker buddies supporting him and his investments (the next day, one of his poker buddies - Joseph Lau and his wife, now head of <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/chinese-estates-holdings-limited" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:20954:1" rel="noopener">Chinese Estates Holdings (127 HK)</a>, started selling shares), and <a href="https://www.caixinglobal.com/2021-09-22/caixin-explains-how-evergrandes-hui-ka-yan-blew-up-a-43-billion-fortune-101776376.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">another article</a> perhaps 5 weeks ago which talked about Chairman Hui having blown up a US$43bn fortune.  Hui Ka Yan - also known by Xu Jiayin - has been on the Forbes China Philanthropy List for years, giving RMB 3bn in 2020, and RMB 3bn in 2019, RMB 4.1bn in 2018, and RMB 4.2bn in 2017, and he had topped the list in 2016 and 2015 as well (this year was his first year in several not in the top spot (taken by Jack Ma this year)). A Reuters <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-evergrande-shares-set-slide-105-after-26-bln-deal-collapses-2021-10-21/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">article</a> last week suggested that Evergrande chairman Hui Ka Yan had agreed to put up money into a project which backed a private $260mm USD bond issued by Jumbo Fortune Enterprises, an offshore JV affiliated with Evergrande subsidiary Hengda Real Estate, but guaranteed by Evergrande itself, with the idea that doing so gave more comfort to bondholders that they could extend the maturity, and avoid triggering an Event of Default on Evergrande proper. The nuance is that if this was the case, Chairman Hui is putting up his own money to make sure that default is delayed. That changes things. <h2>The Newest News</h2>On Monday 25 October there were headlines that the NDRC had called a meeting of real estate developers with the notable common factor among them that they had issued offshore bonds. Today they reportedly asked the companies to "optimise their foreign debt structures and proactively prepare for repayment of both principal and interest" <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/china-evergrande-debt-ndrc/chinese-regulators-meet-companies-over-foreign-debt-holdings-idUSB9N2R702G" target="_blank" rel="noopener">according to Reuters</a>. On 26 October, Modern Land <a href="https://www1.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2021/1026/2021102600163.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">defaulted</a> on a USD bond, which was something of a surprise given the chairman and controlling shareholder Zhang Lei and company president Zhang Peng <a href="https://www1.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2021/1011/2021101100057.pdf" target="_blank" data-v-6b4d63ed="" rel="noopener">together offered to loan the company 800 million yuan</a> "within the next 2-3 months" on 11 October and a surprise given the NDRC meeting.And Bloomberg <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-10-26/developer-s-payment-miss-signals-more-stress-evergrande-update" target="_blank" rel="noopener">reported</a> yesterday that the government had urged/ordered Chairman Hui Ka Yan to use his personal wealth to pay Evergrande's debt. While this is perhaps not surprising, especially as he is calculated to have taken out US$8bn in dividends in the past decade, it is indicative that "common prosperity" means rich people make sure those from whom they take money to become rich get what they are owed. There is nuance here too. And timing. More discussion of timing and nuance below the fold.

In Evergrande as a Study of Quantum Mechanics Theory in August I discussed how the state of Evergrande (3333 HK)'s existence was somehow not dissimilar to the classic cat-in-a-box problem mooted by early quantum physics theorists.With coupon payments not being made, then being made at the last minute to avoid default, this quantum kitty has more life (or is using up its nine lives) than one might have thought. It is worth exploring.Evergrande Property Services Deal Broken - The NuanceLast week it became clear that Evergrande (3333 HK) ("Evergrande") would end up NOT selling a controlling stake in Evergrande Property Services (6666 HK) ("EPS") to Hopson Development (754 HK) ("Hopson"), but that was less clear that it appeared. Evergrande said Hopson had not fulfilled its obligations (with word being - getting the Guangzhou govt stamp of approval). Hopson's "clarification" on the failure to settle the trade was nuanced quite differently. Evergrande had, according to Hopson, sought to change the terms of the deal, by asking for all the cash upfront before netting out the monies owned between Evergrande and its guarantors and EPS as the deal was originally laid out. The problem was that once the cash was paid out, it was not clear that Evergrande would pay to EPS the monies owed. The nuance here is that the "Cash and Short-Term Securities" at EPS may be in short-term securities issued by its parent. If the payment made to the parent (HK$20.04bn) nets out against HK$17bn possibly borrowed, that means that Evergrande only gets HK$3bn for 50.01%. It actually reduces debt, BUT getting that HK$3bn is less useful than getting HK$20bn. There is a HK$1bn break fee to the 'party which defaults' on the closure of the Sale of Target Company Shares. At this point, Evergrande is saying Hopson is at fault. Hopson has said it will go through with the transaction (and insists on doing so) at the terms agreed. Given the circumstances, I would expect this is now a HK$1bn payment to Hopson which will be owed but which could probably be marked to market at 20cts on the dollar. The other nuance one may derive from that little bust-up is that the shares in Evergrande Property Service - which are a crucial part of the value of the potential "estate" of Evergrande for the bondholders - may be worth a fair bit less than their traded value because if the netting could not occur, that means Evergrande Property Services may not control its significant net cash position. Evergrande and Hopson agreed at a price then below market based on the idea that the cash existed and Evergrande was good for it. The terms about timing would have been clear enough to Evergrande. Take that cash away and it is worth US$2bn less (which is a lot when the US$20bn of USD Evergrande debt is trading at 20cts on the dollar). That net cash position may be invested in Evergrande exposure, and if so, it may not be coming back out until Evergrande is fully healthy. Which may take awhile. But Hopson has stated its case. Coupons Paid and Unpaid - The NuanceThe News we got last Friday and over the weekend was that the US$83.5mm of coupons which were in their grace period since the 23 September due date were paid to bondholders, apparently. While I had self-admittedly been up in the air about the likelihood they would pay, all reports suggest they have, and that means the company is in the clear until the 29th of October when more coupons run out their grace period. That would be ~US$47mm of coupons not paid on 29 September. There were other USD bond coupons unpaid recently - roughly US$148.13mm of coupons due on 11 October. Those would see their grace period expire on 10 November. There are another $82mm of coupons coming due on 6 November (where the grace period would be until 6 December) and another $255mm of coupons coming due on 28 December. But there is nuance here too. And timing. And that is better discussed in more detail below. The Discovery Phase of the BezzleI used that phrase a bit more than a year ago when talking about Evergrande, suggesting that Galbraith's fabulously evocative word describing the cumulative increase in illusory/unrealised wealth and general excess marked by over-abundant trust and plentiful money on the way up - The Bezzle - was now in its discovery phase, where "Money is watched with a narrow, suspicious eye. The man who handles it is assumed to be dishonest until he proves himself otherwise. Audits are penetrating and meticulous."  I can cherry pick quotes, and if I do, I'd note that section continues a bit, then says, "Just as the boom accelerated the rate of growth, so the crash enormously advanced the rate of discovery. Within a few days, something close to a universal trust turned into something akin to universal suspicion. Audits were ordered. Strained or preoccupied behavior was noticed."I'd say we are definitely there now.It's a great book, and well worth reading, and this particular section describes very clearly the increase of unrealised wealth under the curve - which separately Mr. Galbraith looked at as seeding wealth effect spending, something for which our favourite Belt Brother is known.What matters now is that there is pressure on those who profited from The Bezzle to unwind the gains to whence they came.What struck many observers for many years was how impervious to the enormous risks born by Evergrande's capital providers and customers Founder Hui Ka Yan and his reputation seemed. That all seemed to end with a series of articles and posts on mainland media in July and August, culminating in this Caixin article at the end of August which talked quite explicitly about Hui Ka Yan's poker buddies supporting him and his investments (the next day, one of his poker buddies - Joseph Lau and his wife, now head of Chinese Estates Holdings (127 HK), started selling shares), and another article perhaps 5 weeks ago which talked about Chairman Hui having blown up a US$43bn fortune.  Hui Ka Yan - also known by Xu Jiayin - has been on the Forbes China Philanthropy List for years, giving RMB 3bn in 2020, and RMB 3bn in 2019, RMB 4.1bn in 2018, and RMB 4.2bn in 2017, and he had topped the list in 2016 and 2015 as well (this year was his first year in several not in the top spot (taken by Jack Ma this year)). A Reuters article last week suggested that Evergrande chairman Hui Ka Yan had agreed to put up money into a project which backed a private $260mm USD bond issued by Jumbo Fortune Enterprises, an offshore JV affiliated with Evergrande subsidiary Hengda Real Estate, but guaranteed by Evergrande itself, with the idea that doing so gave more comfort to bondholders that they could extend the maturity, and avoid triggering an Event of Default on Evergrande proper. The nuance is that if this was the case, Chairman Hui is putting up his own money to make sure that default is delayed. That changes things. The Newest NewsOn Monday 25 October there were headlines that the NDRC had called a meeting of real estate developers with the notable common factor among them that they had issued offshore bonds. Today they reportedly asked the companies to "optimise their foreign debt structures and proactively prepare for repayment of both principal and interest" according to Reuters. On 26 October, Modern Land defaulted on a USD bond, which was something of a surprise given the chairman and controlling shareholder Zhang Lei and company president Zhang Peng together offered to loan the company 800 million yuan "within the next 2-3 months" on 11 October and a surprise given the NDRC meeting.And Bloomberg reported yesterday that the government had urged/ordered Chairman Hui Ka Yan to use his personal wealth to pay Evergrande's debt. While this is perhaps not surprising, especially as he is calculated to have taken out US$8bn in dividends in the past decade, it is indicative that "common prosperity" means rich people make sure those from whom they take money to become rich get what they are owed. There is nuance here too. And timing. More discussion of timing and nuance below the fold. 

Evergrande Bezzle Discovered - Quantum Kitty's Regenerative Capabilities Have Nuance and Timing

China

China Evergrande Group is an integrated residential property developer. The Company, through its subsidiaries, operates in property development, investment, management, finance, internet, health, culture, and tourism markets.

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Evergrande (3333 HK)

China Evergrande Group: Trick Without Treat

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Evergrande Bezzle Discovered - Quantum Kitty's Regenerative Capabilities Have Nuance and Timing

Evergrande as Quantum Kitty has more lives. Coupons have been paid to avoid default, and that suggests it could be months before an offshore EoD is...

Travis Lundy

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