Last Week in Event SPACE: Sembcorp, Keppel, Cathay Pacific, China Conch, BHP, Swire, Huya/Douyu
Last Week in Event SPACE ...
- The dynamics here make this entire exercise regarding Sembcorp Marine (SMM SP) effectively a "Virtual IPO" or a "Rolling Placement." In any event, buy Sembcorp Industries (SCI SP).
- Temasek exercises its MAC and walks from the Keppel Corp (KEP SP) deal. If one believes that Keppel deserves to have its future defined by its O&M revenue, then maybe 15% lower which is S$4.60. If you think it should be defined by its equity, then perhaps Keppel deserves to fall 6-8% (i.e. to S$4.95-5.05). Shares closed the week at $4.82.
- Cathay Pacific Airways (293 HK) remains utterly avoidable as a stock medium-term. It is illiquid, and will not necessarily get substantially more liquid. Anyone who bought the dip and became a new owner is not the owner of a money-making business, or even one which has an attractive capital structure.
- China Conch Venture Holdings (586 HK) touches an all-time low implied stub - negative value for the stub ops - as the parent ops steadily eke out increasingly more profit.
- With Unilever NV (UNIA NA) / Unilever PLC (ULVR LN)'s unification moving forward, don't expect a collapse in BHP Group (BHP AU) / Bhp Billiton (BLT LN)'s DLC as it is an all-together different animal to, with respect to the application of franking credits to the Aussie line. But the current Aussie premium is excessive/elevated with respect to historical levels.
- Despite record low discount to NAVs and 0.2x P/B, recommend aa continual avoidance of Swire Pacific (A) (19 HK) amidst a toxic investment mix of airlines, commercial real estate, and maritime (oi & gas) services
- It is entirely possible that there has been a window-dressing exercise for Douyu International Holdings (DOYU US) in anticipation of the potential merger with HUYA Inc (HUYA US). If so, it is still difficult to say whether that will end up working - Huya looks the preferred play.
- Plus, other events, CCASS movements and Mood Spins.
(This insight covers specific insights & comments involving Stubs, Pairs, Arbitrage, share Classifications, and Events - or SPACE - in the past week)
M&A - ASIA
Keppel Corp (KEP SP) (Mkt Cap: $6.4bn; Liquidity: $18mn)
After nearly 10 months of work across many jurisdictions, Temasek has decided (SGX link) that it would not proceed with the Partial Offer as the MAC Pre-Condition of no material adverse change (MAC) in the Group's financial performance occur over the 12 months to the latest financial statements as of the time when the deal might go forward (and because the long stop appears to be before the next quarter's earnings will be released, that means the Q2 earnings to 30 June 2020 were going to be the defining data set). The question was where should Keppel shares trade when uncontaminated by the possibility of being able to sell a portion at a higher price?
- The obvious answer was "Probably lower." But there is nuance in there. And a bunch of that nuance has to do with the fact that Sembcorp Marine has fallen more than 50% in just over 2 months because of the announcement of its intention to do a Rights Offering recapitalisation and spinout which would deliver a bunch of SMM shares to people who might not necessarily want them.
- If you think SMM is a proxy on a standalone basis, which needs no adjustment in the calculation because it is an awful business anyway, then one could have argued for a 15% drop to S$4.60/share. If you think that SMM as a proxy has been fairly severely impacted by the announcement of the rights offering, and Keppel's O&M business - if it were separately listed - would not have suffered as much, then one could have argued for several percent, and a price which settles above S$5.00/share.
- It would be tough to come up with an argument that it should be worth less than about S$4.50, though if you like Keppel as a high single-digit PER business, it could go to S$4.00/share. Travis Lundy did not think there are significantly large longs in the Tender Offer Arb trade who needed to blow out of their positions. Certainly, there are some people long who would rather not be long, but Travis is not sure they dominate the shareholder register. He expects this would be a buy at S$4.50 and below. Shares closed the week at $4.83, after touching a low of $4.80 after Temasek walked.
links to Travis' insight:
Temasek Walks Away from Keppel Deal
What Triggers a Temasek Decision on Keppel?
Sembcorp Industries (SCI SP) / Sembcorp Marine (SMM SP)
In early June, SCI and SMM announced what Travis called a "gloriously messy recap and de-merger", whereby SMM would conduct an enormously dilutive rights offering, which would be backstopped by current ~61% owner Sembcorp Industries (SCI) and SCI majority shareholder Temasek, and then Sembcorp Industries would distribute all its shares in SMM to its own shareholders, ~50.5% of which would go to Temasek, and 49+% to the other shareholders of SCI. SMM Rights went ex- on 13 August. That's when people may start questioning their priors - SCI shareholders are going to get a whole bunch of SMM shares.
- SCI shares at S$1.91 are cheap vs their forward earnings ex-SMM. That is somewhere south of 6.5x PER and 6.0x EBITDA for a stable "industrial" business which has gotten (ex-SMM) 90% of revenue and 95% of OP the last five years from operating power and water businesses, something which usually engenders a higher EBITDA multiple than 6.0x. And those multiples assume getting out of SMM shares at a truly awful very bad no good price. Get out better and SCI is even cheaper.
- For SMM, Travis didn't like the shares when the decision was announced. If you were OK owning SMM shares at the cum-price, you should have sold SMM and bought SCI. You would then get a bunch of SMM delivered to you in a month through the SCI spinoff of SMM shares. If you like them then, you can keep them, and you get the far better stock of the pair - SCI - at what is implied a cheap price.
links to:
Travis' insight: Sembcorp Industries - A Simple Story Which Looks Complicated
Travis' insight: Sembcorp Marine Rights Decided And "Virtual IPO" Set (Still Avoid)
my insight: StubWorld: Buy Sembcorp Industries. Don't Buy Swire)
ESR-REIT (EREIT SP) (Mkt Cap: $1bn; Liquidity: $4mn)
On the same day ESR-REIT announced that it does not intend to increase the Scheme Consideration and accordingly, the exchange ratio of 0.940x is final - except in a competitive situation - Quarz (along with Crane capital, together holding 10% of units out, or 5% each) issued an open letter to Sabana that they intend to reject the proposal at the current terms. The key issue - as singled out by Sumeet Singh in ESR-REIT/Sabana Merger - Buying Well Below Book - is the discount to book value under the share swap ratio. There are additional grievances. 10% is not an insignificant Against vote. Is this being done too cheap? Yes. By any yardstick, the merger terms are opportunistic, and it is great to see shareholders making a noise about this. Increasing - or appearing to increase the DPU is a good thing. But selling assets too cheaply is just that - selling assets too cheaply. Declaring terms final now appears a mistake.
- Sabana said the merger was not an asset sale. Perhaps it should be. Sabana might be better off selling the assets outright to the highest bidder, extracting a value closer to book than under the terms of the merger. Then distributing proceeds to shareholders and being wound-up.
- It goes both ways stating Sabana has consistently traded at a discount to its net asset value in recent years, therefore pricing is "fair". Even if the IFA concurs (which it probably will). That historical discount to NAV could be due to misguided management - it is revealing the occupancy rate has rolled over since ESR took over sponsorship. One also wonders why Shariah compliance hasn't been abandoned.
- If Quarz/Crane can drum up more support - it's a pretty straightforward pitch to shareholders the opportunism embedded in the deal terms - this deal is going to fail. Shares are trading at S$0.37 against S$0.36 at the time of the merger announcement. Downside appears limited if you buy here, even without the "benefit" of the merger. Buy Sabana here for a small "loss" vs ESR in the merger (vs buying ESR today) because if the deal goes through I expect both stocks to rise vs other S-REITs, and if the deal does not go through, the spotlight will be on Sabana's cheapness and that could lead it to better terms in the next deal.
(link to my insight: ESR/Sabana: Better Off Selling Assets)
Cathay Pacific Airways (293 HK) (Mkt Cap: $4.6bn; Liquidity: $6mn)
The owners of 85% of the shares promised to take up their rights, but banks underwrote the remaining portion in case the other shareholding public did not take them up. But not everyone else took up their rights, as announced the previous Friday night. If 2.5% of the rights were not taken up, that means that 12.5% out of the 15% were taken up - that is 83% of the float. What that means is that some portion of the rights were traded away and exercised, but a full 17% were simply allowed to lapse. It also means roughly 62.42mm shares are now owned by those who opportunistically bought shares at a significant "block discount" and will likely sell at some point. They bought at HK$4.68, and now they will try to sell. That is about 6.5 days of volume over the last few weeks, but 17 days of volume for the 6 months prior to the Wuhan shut down on 24 Jan.
- Travis (and I) would avoid the shares. Most of the Enterprise Value is still debt, now at a higher average cost.
- Longer-term, aircraft deliveries have been delayed, and when they arrive, that will mean more capital is required, or higher costs will be incurred. And it is not clear when Cathay will be able to earn its 5-year pre-COVID Average EBITDA. Profitability is always based on the last bit of marginal capacity being filled. Post COVID-19, I am not sure people travel as much as they used to until there is a vaccine and everyone is comfortable. Near-term, there is probably an overhang of most of the Excess Rights Shares. Medium-term, this stock could be batted around.
(link to Travis' insight: Cathay Rights Results And Excess)
Village Roadshow (VRL AU) (Mkt Cap: $1.7bn; Liquidity: <$1mn)
After various extensions to that exclusivity arrangement, VRL has now entered into an Implementation Agreement such that VRL will receive, under Structure A, up to A$2.45/share comprising A$2.20/share (A$2.10/share under Structure B) plus an additional A$0.25/share upon the re-opening of theme parks and cinemas, and Queensland's border being open to any person from NSW and Victoria. The transaction is subject to limited conditions, including MACs. A Scheme meeting is expected to be held in November with implementation expected shortly thereafter. But Mittleman Brothers, which has been increasing its shareholding, is expected to be a key antagonist to the revised terms.
- This appears a highly opportunistic, heavily caveated transaction, enabling the key shareholders to remain largely invested in the back-end; and failing that option under Structure A - penalizing minorities via a lower cash option under Structure B of the Offer.
- I would pick shares up here on the possibility this does get up, either under Structure A & B, potentially with the theme park/cinema/open border uplift; or simply to play the back-end, such that the business is not irreparably damaged and should trade significantly higher from here.
(link to my insight: Village Roadshow: BGH's Overly Caveated Offer)
Sawada Holdings (8699 JP) (Mkt Cap: $0.3bn; Liquidity: $9mn)
The Tender Offer by Upsilon Investment Limited Partnership to buy just over 50% was announced with the briefest of intros on 19 February 2020, launched on 20 February with the expected end date of 24 March, and as of yesterday had been extended 11 times, and was scheduled to close tomorrow 13 August after having been extended by 95 business days in the interim. Surprise surprise. Upsilon extended it a 12th time. This time until 26 August 2020.
- Given that the buyer is a financial buyer and not strategic, and they have a strong incentive to monetize their purchase, one would expect that an exit would involve selling ALL of Sawada Holdings to the buyer. If that happens, it is unlikely to happen at a 30-35% discount to where the buyer bought in, a ten-year low PBV, at half of book value. The stock is illiquid, but picking stock up at this level seems like a smart trade.
(link to Travis' insight: Sawada Holdings (8699) Partial Tender. Delayed Again. 13th Time a Charm?)
After Qilu Expressway Co Ltd (1576 HK) was suspended "pursuant to the Code on Takeovers and Mergers", it appeared a shareholder restructuring was the likely rationale. This was confirmed after Qilu announced its largest shareholder Qilu Transportation shall be merged and absorbed by Shandong Hi-Speed Group (SHSG). The absorption simplifies the holding of Shandong SASAC, the ultimate parent of both Qilu Transportation and SHSG, into Qilu. The restructuring may trigger an obligation for SHSG to make a mandatory general offer for all shares not owned. SHSG and Qilu Transportation will jointly make an application to the SFC to waive this obligation. There is also the issue over the resulting free float - as the public float falls below the minimum prescribed percentage of 25% under the restructuring, before any MGO. But even if the SFC forces an MGO - and SHSG opts to proceed - expect a nil/derisory premium.
Links to my insights:
Qilu Expressway: MGO Waiver Sought
Qilu Expressway: C-REIT Pilot Or Restructuring?
In Mechanics and Details of the Uawithya Subsidiaries Divestment, Athaporn Arayasantiparb discusses Ua Withya PCL (UWC TB)'s shareholder approval to divest three of its renewable power subsidiaries at bargain-basement prices. The independent experts values the three businesses at Bt449m vs the sale price of Bt200mn. Athaporn reckons management should do a better job on pricing, and has rejected the deal in hopes that they would hold out for a better price from ACE.
Samsung Life Insurance (032830 KS) is on a tear after announcing the sale of its stake in Samsung Electronics (005930 KS) and the expectation of a substantially higher dividend. In Samsung Life: Samsung Electronics-Pumped Dividend Revision Estimation, Sanghyun Park estimates at a 20% payout ratio, the dividend rate is 12.28%. At a 30% payout ratio, it is 18.43%.
In Korea M&A Spotlight: SK Innovation to Sell SK Lubricants & Expand Rechargeable Battery Business, Douglas Kim discussed reports that SK Innovation (096770 KS) plans to sell its controlling stake in SK Lubricants, one of the largest lubricants companies in the world. Local media mention the value of SK Lubricants to be between ₩3tn to ₩5tn, against a current market cap of ₩15.4bn.
SKC Co Ltd (011790 KS) & Skc Solmics (057500 KS) announced a merger swap to take Solmics private. The merger ratio is at 0.0688707 for each Solmic share (₩82,938 for the acquirer and ₩5,712 for the acquired). It is a small-scale merger, so the acquirer doesn't grant its shareholders stock purchase rights unless more than 20% of the shareholders express dissent from August 27 to September 10. But given the tight spread, in SKC & SKC Solmics Merger Swap with Tender Offer: Terms & Status, Sanghyun reckons the acquirer might set a premium at a decent level.
In FamilyMart: Itochu's Offer May Not Be Enough to Persuade a Sale From Long Term Investors, Oshadhi Kumarasiri reckons Itochu Corp (8001 JP)’s offer price, which undermines FamilyMart Co Ltd (8028 JP)’s historical premium over the peers may not be enough to persuade long-term FamilyMart investors to sell their positions.
STUBS
I estimate CCV is trading at a ~30% discount to NAV compared to a one-year average of ~17%. The implied stub has never been lower. Anhui Conch's As are currently around the highest premium to the Hs since CCV's listing in December 2013.
Source: CapIQ
The outperformance of Anhui Conch versus CCV, is reflected in the across the board performance for cement plays. The consensus target price for Anhui Conch was unwavering during the current virus. Yet the CCV/Anhui bifurcation is unjustified. The market is assigning an increasingly negative value for the stub ops - an all-time low value currently - at a time those stub ops are steadily generating more profit. The current bottom-line growth for the stub ops is estimated at 64% in FY20E, or HK$1.8bn - not an insignificant sum.
(link to my insight: StubWorld: Waste Not, Want Not. China Conch Venture's All-Time Low)
I estimate Swire Pac is trading at a 43% discount to NAV, around its 12-month low. Swire Pac recorded a net loss of HK$7.7bn in the 1H20, following Cathays' 1H20 net loss of S$9.9bn. Swire Prop saw no signs of recovery in HK's retail space, booking a profit of HK$2.75bn, down 80% yoy. According to Guy Bradley, Swire's CEO of Swire Prop, the second half is not going to be much better than the first half for HK retail.
- Cathay has dialled in its monthly burn rate to HK$1.5bn, about half what it was in April. But the outlook remains bleak.
- Swire Pac's weighting the HSI is estimated at 0.25%. Speculation was rife the Hang Seng Indexes company would exclude Swire in its second-quarter review. Not to be.
- I still advocate Swire restructuring its investment stable, such as letting Cathay go - Air China Ltd (H) (753 HK) taking full control is the logical course of action, although obviously its a buyer's market at present. Until such time, there is not a lot of improvement to look forward to in the medium term.
(link to my insight: StubWorld: Buy Sembcorp Industries. Don't Buy Swire)
EVENTS
BHP Group (BHP AU) (Mkt Cap: $135bn; Liquidity: $171mn)
With Unilever NV (UNA NA) holding its EGM on 21 September 2020 to vote on its unification. Unilever PLC (ULVR LN)'s shareholder meetings will be held on 12 October 2020, it is worthwhile assessing whether this unification will renew focus on other DLC structures such as BHP. Back on the 10 April 2017, Elliott Advisors (HK) Limited issued a number of proposals via an open letter to the board of BHP, with the latter responding promptly (two days later), rebutting all such proposals. This was discussed in greater detail in Elliott's Proposals Test BHP's Metal.
- Elliott argued the DLC structure was obsolete, hinders the ability of BHP to reach its full potential, and creates a long-term trading mismatch between Limited and PLC shares. A key tenet from Elliott was providing greater access to BHP’s franking credits. Elliott proposed under the unified BHP, attaching franking credits to any dividends it makes, enabling all shareholders to participate via fungibility. A similar argument was made for buybacks.
- But there ARE Fundamental Reasons for BHP’s Premium. Briefly, Australian investors have a highly tax-advantaged position when investing in the Australian line which provides them with a material advantage over other investors. Australian dividends are generally paid with a franking credit attached which can be used to offset the income tax liabilities of an Australian recipient. The Australian franking credit system also confers a capital gains tax benefit when BHP carries out off-market tender offers. It is because of these franking credits, I don't expect a unification anytime soon. BHP is a very different animal to Unilever, with respect to the franking credits for the Aussie line. Nor expect the Aussie line premium to go to parity.
- There does exist a correlation between a widening premium and the A$ strengthening against the Pound; and also a strengthening in the iron ore price. The recovery in iron ore prices since the 2Q20 places prices near the multi-year high in July last year. However, given the current premium % is above its long-term average, I would be pre-disposed to Long BBL ADR, short the BHP ADR.
(link to my insight: Unilever: When Two Heads Are Not Better Than One. What About BHP's DLC?)
M&A - US
- Based on consensus, the EV/OP multiple for Huya and Douyu combined would be about 30.3x on 2020 numbers and 18.5x on 2021 numbers. Using the more aggressive estimates on Mio's logarithmic fit brings those numbers down to 18.8x and 9.7x respectively. That would look very cheap. Using the more conservative 65% marginal COGS assumptions gets you 26.5x and 15.9x. He notes that the platforms’ take rates (~50%) are significantly higher than those of other platforms at about 20-30%, and while we consider this to be a downside risk long-term, it doesn’t matter if Tencent takes this off your hands before those risks come through. In addition, it does lend credence to the ability of these companies to restrain COGS if they are able to avoid incentive wars to get streamers to switch platforms.
- At the time of Mio's insight, Huya’s EV (USD3,780m) was 14.3% higher than Douyu’s (USD3,307m) while its T12 revenue is about 13% higher. OP generation has been weaker than Douyu recently but we believe this is likely to be temporary. He believes the market may be giving Huya some credit for better future growth prospects vs. Douyu due to more sustainable looking spending levels. However, he questions the sustainability of Douyu’s cost structure and does not feel that there is sufficient evidence that they can match Huya’s cost structure long-term, let alone improve on it.
link to Mio's insight:
Huya and Douyu – Implications for Valuation From the Gross Margin Trend
Huya – Nice Results and Why We Favour Huya Over Douyu
M&A - EUROPE
Liberty Global Plc A (LBTYA US) has launched an all-cash friendly voluntary takeover offer for Sunrise at a price of CHF 110 per share for the whole share capital, a 27.6% premium to last close. This follows the failed attempt by Sunrise to acquire Liberty’s Swiss business (UPC Switzerland) in 2019. The bid price represents 3.5x EV/Revenue, 9.7x EV/NTM EBITDA and 45.x Price/Forward EPS (Capital IQ consensus). Liberty is trading at 4.0x EV/2020e EBITDA. Which appears fair vs peers. Minimum acceptance condition is 2/3rds of the shares on a fully diluted basis, i.e. 30,176,964 shares. Trading tight (<1% gross), reflecting the high chances of this deal completing.
INDEX REBALS
S&P Dow Jones Indices will announce changes to the S&P/ASX 200 (AS51 INDEX) as part of the September index review on 4 September. In ASX200 Index Rebalance Preview - Couple of High Probability Changes; Couple on the Cusp, Brian Freitas sees a high probability of Ramelius Resources (RMS AU) and Zip Co Ltd (Z1P AU) being included in the index and of Southern Cross Media (SXL AU) and oOh!Media Ltd (OML AU) being excluded from the index. Sitting right at the edge of the buffer zone, there is a lower probability of Austbrokers Holdings (AUB AU) and Westgold Resources (WGX AU) being included and Orocobre Ltd (ORE AU) and Western Areas (WSA AU) being excluded.
STOXX will announce the results of the September review of the DAX indices on 3 September post-market close. STOXX has clearly flagged Wirecard AG (WDI GR) as not eligible for index membership and the stock will be deleted. In DAX Index Rebalance Preview - Delivery Hero an Inclusion Shoo-In, Covestro Is at Risk, Brian sees Delivery Hero Ag (DHER GY) as a high probability addition replacing Wirecard. He also sees a high probability of Covestro AG (1COV GR) being deleted from the DAX, but it could still remain in the index if Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc (TMO US)'s tender offer for QIAGEN NV (QIA GY) is successful.
ICICI Bank Ltd (ICICIBC IN) is looking to raise INR 150 bn (~US$2bn) through a Qualified Institutional Placement (QIP). The floor price for the issue has been fixed at INR 351.36 per share, a discount of 3.35% to the last close. The Board of Directors will meet on 14 August to determine the final issue price. Indications are that the shares will be issued in the range of INR 355-358 per share. In ICICI Bank - Passive Flow Post QIP Should Support the Stock, Brian estimates passive funds tracking various indices will need to buy around 10% of the shares issued in the QIP over the next few weeks and the stock could trade stronger than its peers in the short term.
The KRX confirmed something that was widely expected: SK Biopharmaceuticals (326030 KS) meets the Fast Entry criteria for inclusion in the Korea Stock Exchange Kospi 200 Index (KOSPI2 INDEX) and will replace Kiswire Ltd (002240 KS) at the close of trading on 10 September, coinciding with the September futures expiry. This is discussed in Brian's insight SK Biopharmaceuticals - KOSPI200 Inclusion Confirmed, Large Impact Expected, and Sanghyun's Fast Entry of SK Biopharmaceuticals to KRX Indices, Incl. KOSPI 200.
OTHER M&A & EVENT UPDATES
- Zhaojin Mining Industry H (1818 HK) has received formal approval for the HKEx to convert its 1,560.34mn domestic shares into H shares.
- Hang Yick Holdings (1894 HK) suspended "pursuant to the Hong Kong Code on Takeovers and Mergers". Trades <US$1mn. Shares up 26.5% ahead of the suspension - funny that. The major shareholder (74.26%) has entered into an MOU, the completion of which will trigger an MGO.
Soho China Ltd (410 HK) has announced that "all previous discussions with various investors have now been terminated and have not at this time resulted in the terms for a Potential Transaction being agreed." So that's that - for now.
- Hexaware Technologies (HEXW IN) delisting proposal was approved by shareholders to move forward to a Reverse Book Build auction as announced by the company on the evening of 10 August.
CCASS
My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions. These may be indicative of share pledges. Or potential takeovers. Or simply help understand volume swings.
Often these moves can easily be explained - the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, lock-up expiry, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.
Name | %chg | Into | Out of |
| Digital Domain Holdings (547 HK) | 15.62% | St Chart | Outside CCASS |
| Colour Life Services (1778 HK) | 13.60% | BNP | China Ind |
| Prosper Future (1259 HK) | 11.05% | All Evergreen | Outside CCASS |
The following large movement(s) concern recently listed companies, and therefore are (likely) lock-up related.
Name | % chg | Into | Out of |
| Kangji Medical (9997 HK) | 18.48% | HSBC | Outside CCASS |
| China East Education (667 HK) | 22.34% | BNP | Outside CCASS |
| Hangzhou Tigermed Consulting (H) (3347 HK) | 10.70% | HSBC | ML |
| Kwung's (1925 HK) | 13.37% | China Ind | Outside CCASS |
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