Pan-Asia Catalysts/Events, Quiddity Advisors

Travis Lundy

Pan-Asia Catalysts/Events

Quiddity Advisors

Event-Driven

<a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/china-evergrande-group" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Evergrande Real Estate Group (3333 HK)</a> shares rallied enormously sharply in 2017, moving from the mid single digits to HK$30+ by Q3 that year. That year the float in Evergrande was also sharply reduced by the purchases of shares by <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/chinese-estates-holdings-limited" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Chinese Estates Holdings (127 HK)</a> and its owners. 
When the shares fell back after getting squeezed, Evergrande conducted a buyback which got them within a hair's breadth of the residual minimum free float requirement mandated by the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. The shares stayed higher. 
Eventually, Evergrande saw more of the employee share options with low exercise prices exercised which increased the share count and float so when shares fell in 2020, the company could buy back shares, and it did so after shares fell to new 3yr lows in the covid-crash. It bought shares back from May to June, again reducing float to within a hair's breadth of the free float limit, and in the period, shares rose about 50%. 
Then at the start of H2, with a <a href="https://www1.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2020/0701/2020070100031.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">press release</a> about unaudited June sales results and how strong sales had been in H1, the shares popped 40% (from HK$20 to HK$28/share) in three days, then fell back over 6 weeks, going back below HK$20 when the company <a href="https://www1.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2020/0813/2020081301678.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">disclosed</a> it was pre-selling stakes in its property management unit before the IPO, and three days later Evergrande actually issued a <a href="https://www1.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2020/0816/2020081600097.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">profit warning</a>, just before releasing H1 results. 
Also in August, but undisclosed at the time, was the fact that several major real estate developers, including Evergrande, had been called on the carpet to discuss their participation in the so-called Three Red Lines pilot program (the three red lines are a liability-to-asset ratio excluding advanced receipts of 70%, net debt-to-equity ratio of 100%, and cash to short-term debt ratio at 1x). Companies which crossed one of three red lines could not increase interest-bearing borrowing by more than 10% in a year. Cross two of them and they were capped at 5% growth. Cross all three of them and the developer could not increase debt at all. This is tough when funding at high single digits to 10+% interest rates are used to carry ever more non-interest-earning land bank. But Evergrande "met" all three so needed to reduce debt and raise cash, discussed in <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/evergrande-may-be-facing-a-funding-squeeze" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Evergrande May Be Facing a Funding Squeeze</a>. 
There was a story about a "letter", later denied by the company, in September, discussing the importance of the local government helping Evergrande deal with its short-term funding issues, which included the issue of the buyback guarantee offered by Evergrande to minority shareholders of Evergrande's major onshore operating unit Hengda. Evergrande denied the existence of the letter, but despite the fact some Hengda shareholders reportedly wanted out as listing was unlikely, somehow, with the local government's help, Evergrande announced a new agreement meaning repayment in January 2021 was unnecessary. The shares rallied and two weeks later Evergrande raised some capital (discussed in <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/evergrande-equity-placement-musical-shares" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Evergrande Equity Placement - Musical Shares</a>).
I had my ideas about WHY those shares were placed, and it was not to raise equity to pay down debt. The capital raised was less than expected despite the large discount and the shares quickly fell below placement price.  So just 3 weeks after raising equity, it started buying back shares, reasonably quickly raising the price above where it had sold shares. This was discussed in <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/evergrande-equity-de-placement-musical-shares" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Evergrande Equity De-Placement: Musical Shares</a>. Then a couple weeks later, we saw <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/evergrande" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Evergrande Terminate Hengda's Backdoor Listing</a> so the story left was one of an optically "cheap" but heavily indebted developer, lowering selling prices to liquidate inventory, lower debt and raise cash levels, etc. There were sales of shares of recently listed subsidiaries. There were announcements of how much debt had been lowered. But shares fell. 
There were stories in Chinese media and in social media about issues with the company's trade acceptance bills. An <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-07-09/china-urged-evergrande-founder-to-find-quick-fix-for-debt-woes" target="_blank" rel="noopener">article</a> on Bloomberg.com a week ago reported that while Evergrande chairman Hui Ka Yan was in Beijing for the 100th anniversary celebrations 1 July, he met with the Financial Stability and Development Committee, which urged him to solve his company's debt problems pronto. The article is worth reading. It suggested more worry at the top than thought, and even says FSDC officials had suggested bringing in strategic investors. Hui said he was speaking with local investors. 
Bonds have traded lower and lower and the 2024-2025 maturity bonds appear to be trading in the 60s, with shorter-dated bonds trading at 30+% yield to maturity. Wednesday, the shares closed at HK$8.91 - lowest in four years. 
<h3>Yesterday, there was new news. </h3>
The company announced a board meeting for 27 July where the Board would consider a special dividend. 
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My first reaction was, I admit, one of surprise, but on second thought it should not be THAT surprising.
The immediate public comments I have seen suggested an attempt to squeeze shorts. According to data from the SFC, shorts have risen from levels near-matching covid-crash lows, and now stand at roughly 2.1% of shares out (a bit under 10% of float), but that would not do it.
The single most indebted real estate company in the world, with short-term bonds yielding risk-free-rate plus.... [checks notes] 30+%, where the chairman gets called onto the carpet of the highest financial regulator in China - not the PBOC, CSRC, or CBIRC - above them - urging him to Do Something - sell assets, lower debt, raise equity - deciding to pay a special dividend to its equity holders? 
I expect Hui Ka Yan has his reasons, and I expect those reasons do not include rewarding long-suffering minority shareholders. Or squeezing shorts.

Evergrande Real Estate Group (3333 HK) shares rallied enormously sharply in 2017, moving from the mid single digits to HK$30+ by Q3 that year. That year the float in Evergrande was also sharply reduced by the purchases of shares by Chinese Estates Holdings (127 HK) and its owners. 
When the shares fell back after getting squeezed, Evergrande conducted a buyback which got them within a hair's breadth of the residual minimum free float requirement mandated by the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. The shares stayed higher. 
Eventually, Evergrande saw more of the employee share options with low exercise prices exercised which increased the share count and float so when shares fell in 2020, the company could buy back shares, and it did so after shares fell to new 3yr lows in the covid-crash. It bought shares back from May to June, again reducing float to within a hair's breadth of the free float limit, and in the period, shares rose about 50%. 
Then at the start of H2, with a press release about unaudited June sales results and how strong sales had been in H1, the shares popped 40% (from HK$20 to HK$28/share) in three days, then fell back over 6 weeks, going back below HK$20 when the company disclosed it was pre-selling stakes in its property management unit before the IPO, and three days later Evergrande actually issued a profit warning, just before releasing H1 results. 
Also in August, but undisclosed at the time, was the fact that several major real estate developers, including Evergrande, had been called on the carpet to discuss their participation in the so-called Three Red Lines pilot program (the three red lines are a liability-to-asset ratio excluding advanced receipts of 70%, net debt-to-equity ratio of 100%, and cash to short-term debt ratio at 1x). Companies which crossed one of three red lines could not increase interest-bearing borrowing by more than 10% in a year. Cross two of them and they were capped at 5% growth. Cross all three of them and the developer could not increase debt at all. This is tough when funding at high single digits to 10+% interest rates are used to carry ever more non-interest-earning land bank. But Evergrande "met" all three so needed to reduce debt and raise cash, discussed in Evergrande May Be Facing a Funding Squeeze. 
There was a story about a "letter", later denied by the company, in September, discussing the importance of the local government helping Evergrande deal with its short-term funding issues, which included the issue of the buyback guarantee offered by Evergrande to minority shareholders of Evergrande's major onshore operating unit Hengda. Evergrande denied the existence of the letter, but despite the fact some Hengda shareholders reportedly wanted out as listing was unlikely, somehow, with the local government's help, Evergrande announced a new agreement meaning repayment in January 2021 was unnecessary. The shares rallied and two weeks later Evergrande raised some capital (discussed in Evergrande Equity Placement - Musical Shares).
I had my ideas about WHY those shares were placed, and it was not to raise equity to pay down debt. The capital raised was less than expected despite the large discount and the shares quickly fell below placement price.  So just 3 weeks after raising equity, it started buying back shares, reasonably quickly raising the price above where it had sold shares. This was discussed in Evergrande Equity De-Placement: Musical Shares. Then a couple weeks later, we saw Evergrande Terminate Hengda's Backdoor Listing so the story left was one of an optically "cheap" but heavily indebted developer, lowering selling prices to liquidate inventory, lower debt and raise cash levels, etc. There were sales of shares of recently listed subsidiaries. There were announcements of how much debt had been lowered. But shares fell. 
There were stories in Chinese media and in social media about issues with the company's trade acceptance bills. An article on Bloomberg.com a week ago reported that while Evergrande chairman Hui Ka Yan was in Beijing for the 100th anniversary celebrations 1 July, he met with the Financial Stability and Development Committee, which urged him to solve his company's debt problems pronto. The article is worth reading. It suggested more worry at the top than thought, and even says FSDC officials had suggested bringing in strategic investors. Hui said he was speaking with local investors. 
Bonds have traded lower and lower and the 2024-2025 maturity bonds appear to be trading in the 60s, with shorter-dated bonds trading at 30+% yield to maturity. Wednesday, the shares closed at HK$8.91 - lowest in four years. 
Yesterday, there was new news. 
The company announced a board meeting for 27 July where the Board would consider a special dividend. 




My first reaction was, I admit, one of surprise, but on second thought it should not be THAT surprising.
The immediate public comments I have seen suggested an attempt to squeeze shorts. According to data from the SFC, shorts have risen from levels near-matching covid-crash lows, and now stand at roughly 2.1% of shares out (a bit under 10% of float), but that would not do it.
The single most indebted real estate company in the world, with short-term bonds yielding risk-free-rate plus.... [checks notes] 30+%, where the chairman gets called onto the carpet of the highest financial regulator in China - not the PBOC, CSRC, or CBIRC - above them - urging him to Do Something - sell assets, lower debt, raise equity - deciding to pay a special dividend to its equity holders? 
I expect Hui Ka Yan has his reasons, and I expect those reasons do not include rewarding long-suffering minority shareholders. Or squeezing shorts. 
  

Evergrande's Very Special... Special Dividend?

Founder of Antler Capital

Stanley Tsai, CFA

Thematic (Sector/Industry)

In the spirit of the long-awaited UEFA Euro 2020, we present our inaugural "China Financials: Silver Linings Playbook", which summarizes our views on the names that are best positioned to navigate an environment of progressively slower credit growth, tighter liquidity and rising defaults. 
Our screen consists of 100+ stocks in the A/H share universe, as well as a select number of international / non-traditional names that have significant exposures to China's financial system. We have a preference for larger-cap and liquid names, which are then filtered by our opinions on their fundamentals, value, momentum and recent trading volumes. We also try to make our selections versatile and less vulnerable to single-factor movements.
Each player's position on the pitch and the team formation itself convey incremental information about our thoughts on the sector's performance over a three to six-month horizon. To the extent possible, we intend to update our ideas on a periodic basis. This provides a feedback loop with our other ongoing research on the industry.
However, our team selections are not investment recommendations. Instead, they are meant to give structure to our analysis. The playbook allows us to articulate our views on the sector in a timely, concise manner. Our objective is to ensure we don't throw the baby out with the bathwater as sentiments on the sector remain bleak.
With that out of the way, the following is our starting XI. We will dive deeper into our rationale for our selections in the remainder of this insight (Exhibit 1).
<table class="table table-striped">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td style="width: 726.047px;">Exhibit 1: China Financials | Silver Linings Playbook</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="width: 726.047px;">
<figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/213/768/original/image_768460236451623962508577.png?1623962508" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="213768"></figure>

Source: Our analysis
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Related Insights
<a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/china-macro-consumers-remain-on-the-sidelines-as-their-home-equity-grows" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:53210" rel="noopener">China Macro: Consumers Remain on the Sidelines, as Their Home Equity Grows</a> 
<a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/glut-and-famine-we-might-see-snow-in-china-this-summer" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:52840" rel="noopener">Glut and Famine: We Might See Snow in China This Summer</a> 
<a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/china-macro-ppi-peaks-while-cpi-eases-tightening-fears" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:52778" rel="noopener">China Macro: PPI Peaks, while CPI Eases Tightening Fears</a> 
<a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/china-macro-exports-disappoint-but-it-s-still-early-in-the-game" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:52728" rel="noopener">China Macro: Exports Disappoint, but It's Still Early in the Game</a> 
<a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/glut-and-famine-china-s-monetary-conditions-a-notch-tighter-in-may" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:51799" rel="noopener">Glut and Famine: China's Monetary Conditions a Notch Tighter in May</a> 
<a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/icbc-the-bond-identity-a-zero-growth-dividend-discount-story" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:51463" rel="noopener">ICBC: The Bond Identity | A Zero-Growth Dividend Discount Story</a> 
<a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/boc-aviation-2588-hk-the-stars-don-t-look-bigger-but-they-do-look-brighter" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:52283" rel="noopener">BOC Aviation (2588 HK): The Stars Don't Look Bigger, but They Do Look Brighter</a>

In the spirit of the long-awaited UEFA Euro 2020, we present our inaugural "China Financials: Silver Linings Playbook", which summarizes our views on the names that are best positioned to navigate an environment of progressively slower credit growth, tighter liquidity and rising defaults. 
Our screen consists of 100+ stocks in the A/H share universe, as well as a select number of international / non-traditional names that have significant exposures to China's financial system. We have a preference for larger-cap and liquid names, which are then filtered by our opinions on their fundamentals, value, momentum and recent trading volumes. We also try to make our selections versatile and less vulnerable to single-factor movements.
Each player's position on the pitch and the team formation itself convey incremental information about our thoughts on the sector's performance over a three to six-month horizon. To the extent possible, we intend to update our ideas on a periodic basis. This provides a feedback loop with our other ongoing research on the industry.
However, our team selections are not investment recommendations. Instead, they are meant to give structure to our analysis. The playbook allows us to articulate our views on the sector in a timely, concise manner. Our objective is to ensure we don't throw the baby out with the bathwater as sentiments on the sector remain bleak.
With that out of the way, the following is our starting XI. We will dive deeper into our rationale for our selections in the remainder of this insight (Exhibit 1).



Exhibit 1: China Financials | Silver Linings Playbook





Source: Our analysis




Related Insights
China Macro: Consumers Remain on the Sidelines, as Their Home Equity Grows 
Glut and Famine: We Might See Snow in China This Summer 
China Macro: PPI Peaks, while CPI Eases Tightening Fears 
China Macro: Exports Disappoint, but It's Still Early in the Game 
Glut and Famine: China's Monetary Conditions a Notch Tighter in May 
ICBC: The Bond Identity | A Zero-Growth Dividend Discount Story 
BOC Aviation (2588 HK): The Stars Don't Look Bigger, but They Do Look Brighter

China Financials: Silver Linings Playbook

David Blennerhassett

<div>
This week in StubWorld ...
</div>
<div>
<div>
<div class="content-highlight">
A bubble warning on <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/china-evergrande-new-energy-vehicle-group-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:713:1" rel="noopener">Evergrande Auto (708 HK)</a> from state-media suggests <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/china-evergrande-group" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:479:1" rel="noopener">Evergrande Real Estate Group (3333 HK)</a>, at a 77% discount to NAV, is a better bet.
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div>
Preceding my comments on Evergrande are the weekly setup/unwind tables for Asia-Pacific Holdcos.
</div>
<div>
These relationships trade with a minimum liquidity threshold of US$1mn on a 90-day moving average, and a % market capitalisation threshold - the $ value of the holding/opco held, over the parent’s market capitalisation, expressed in percent - of at least 20%.
</div>


This week in StubWorld ...




A bubble warning on Evergrande Auto (708 HK) from state-media suggests Evergrande Real Estate Group (3333 HK), at a 77% discount to NAV, is a better bet.




Preceding my comments on Evergrande are the weekly setup/unwind tables for Asia-Pacific Holdcos.


These relationships trade with a minimum liquidity threshold of US$1mn on a 90-day moving average, and a % market capitalisation threshold - the $ value of the holding/opco held, over the parent’s market capitalisation, expressed in percent - of at least 20%.


StubWorld: Evergrande Auto's Bubble Trouble

On the 30 July, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/evergrande-health-industry-group-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:713:1" rel="noopener">Evergrande Health Industry (708 HK)</a>'s (EHI) market cap surpassed the market cap of its parent (&amp; controlling shareholder) <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/evergrande-real-estate-group-limited" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:479:1" rel="noopener">China Evergrande Group (3333 HK)</a> (CEG). That 74.99% stake in ERI currently accounts for 77% of CEG's market cap.
EHI's entry into the new energy vehicle industry in 2019 is fuelling the share price gain, and currently trades at a nosebleed 51.8x trailing revenue, having gained 272% in the last six months.
But not all is beer and skittles. Short interest (in terms of shares) has increased seven-fold in the last five weeks. And the SFC just completed an inquiry into the shareholding of the company and <a href="https://www1.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2020/0819/2020081900676.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">concluded</a> there is a high concentration of shareholders.
Stripping out CEG's stake and 19.83% held by 18 shareholders (not named), remaining shareholders in EHI hold just 5.18% of shares out. This has all the hallmarks of bubble trouble.
As always, more below the fold.

On the 30 July, Evergrande Health Industry (708 HK)'s (EHI) market cap surpassed the market cap of its parent (&amp; controlling shareholder) China Evergrande Group (3333 HK) (CEG). That 74.99% stake in ERI currently accounts for 77% of CEG's market cap.
EHI's entry into the new energy vehicle industry in 2019 is fuelling the share price gain, and currently trades at a nosebleed 51.8x trailing revenue, having gained 272% in the last six months.
But not all is beer and skittles. Short interest (in terms of shares) has increased seven-fold in the last five weeks. And the SFC just completed an inquiry into the shareholding of the company and concluded there is a high concentration of shareholders.
Stripping out CEG's stake and 19.83% held by 18 shareholders (not named), remaining shareholders in EHI hold just 5.18% of shares out. This has all the hallmarks of bubble trouble.
As always, more below the fold.

China Evergrande (3333 HK): Set-Up Vs. Electrified Health

Technical Analyst, Vermilion Research

Joe Jasper

Technical Analyst

Technical and Quantitative Research

Vermilion Research

Vermilion’s objective is to deliver timely, actionable, and unique technical research to professional investors through the application of our various technical indicators.

Our research strategists seek to highlight securities which we believe are at major inflection points, based on our various technical and quantitative indicators, and offer asymmetric risk/return profiles. Our unique research methodology, centered on relative strength, enables our strategists to deliver superior investment recommendations.

Our process begins by organizing the universe of actively traded stocks into discrete sectors, then into industry groups. We then apply our technical and quantitative tools to identify developing price trends. Once attractive trends are identified within a selected sector or group, we screen for individual stocks which we believe offer the best risk/reward profile. We provide a historical perspective that often reveals, through our long-term charts, how price patterns often repeat themselves over time.

Technical Analysis

Several equity indexes and indicators we watch are telling us an initial primary low has been established for global equities (ACWI-US). At the same time, after this type of major waterfall decline there is often a test of this initial low - and oftentimes we get an undercut of the initial low. Barring approval of a first-line therapy for COVID-19 we are of the belief that we will get an eventual test of this initial low and potentially an undercut. In this report we highlight key technical levels and indicators to watch and suggest investment opportunities with defensive and/or growth characteristics. We are also expanding our recommendations to include bottom-up ideas within several other Sectors.

Several equity indexes and indicators we watch are telling us an initial primary low has been established for global equities (ACWI-US). At the same time, after this type of major waterfall decline there is often a test of this initial low - and oftentimes we get an undercut of the initial low. Barring approval of a first-line therapy for COVID-19 we are of the belief that we will get an eventual test of this initial low and potentially an undercut. In this report we highlight key technical levels and indicators to watch and suggest investment opportunities with defensive and/or growth characteristics. We are also expanding our recommendations to include bottom-up ideas within several other Sectors.

Global Equity Strategy: Initial Low Established

China

Shengjing Bank Co. Ltd. provides banking services. The Company offers various financial services, funds business, international business, and investment services for individuals and small and medium enterprises.

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Shengjing Bank Co Ltd H (2066 HK)

Evergrande's Very Special... Special Dividend?

Evergrande has been in a world of hurt, actively selling down assets. It has repaid some short-term bonds, but commercial bills remain an issue. So...

Travis Lundy

China Financials: Silver Linings Playbook

Our Silver Linings Playbook outlines our views on the China financials names that are most likely to remain resilient in the face of macro...

Stanley Tsai, CFA

StubWorld: Evergrande Auto's Bubble Trouble

CEA's hare price appears unsustainable. Xinhua's commentary is stating the obvious. CEG is a set-up here versus CEA. CEG is tightly held. It would...

David Blennerhassett

China Evergrande (3333 HK): Set-Up Vs. Electrified Health

On the 30 July, Evergrande Health Industry (708 HK)'s (EHI) market cap surpassed the market cap of its parent (& controlling shareholder) China...

David Blennerhassett

Global Equity Strategy: Initial Low Established

Several equity indexes and indicators we watch are telling us an initial primary low has been established for global equities (ACWI-US). At the...

Vermilion Research

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