Senior Bank Analyst - Japanese Banks, Windamee Research

J. Brian Waterhouse

Senior Bank Analyst - Japanese Banks

Windamee Research

Japanese Banks

Equity Bottom-Up

Mitsubishi UFJ Financial (MUFG) / Equity Bottom-Up

Interim results for <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/mitsubishi-ufj-financial-group" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:218:1" rel="noopener">Mitsubishi UFJ Financial (MUFG) (8306 JP)</a>highlighted the fragility of the profit contribution from several of the group’s recent overseas acquisitions, and the increasing reliance on equity-accounted profits from <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/morgan-stanley" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:1122:1" rel="noopener">Morgan Stanley (MS US)</a> to keep group earnings up.  Rising credit costs were by far the largest headwinds to group profitability, with 1H FY3/2021 credit costs rising to an annualized 48bps: far exceeding the group’s 21bps in credit costs for the whole of FY3/2020.Buying megabank shares is always a 'crowded trade' at the best of times.  While there often seems to be little difference in share price performance between MUFG and mega-rival <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/sumitomo-mitsui-financial-group-inc" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:217:1" rel="noopener">Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group (8316 JP)</a>, on balance we prefer the latter for the group’s tighter discipline and more stable profits ‘track record’.

Interim results for Mitsubishi UFJ Financial (MUFG) (8306 JP)highlighted the fragility of the profit contribution from several of the group’s recent overseas acquisitions, and the increasing reliance on equity-accounted profits from Morgan Stanley (MS US) to keep group earnings up.  Rising credit costs were by far the largest headwinds to group profitability, with 1H FY3/2021 credit costs rising to an annualized 48bps: far exceeding the group’s 21bps in credit costs for the whole of FY3/2020.Buying megabank shares is always a 'crowded trade' at the best of times.  While there often seems to be little difference in share price performance between MUFG and mega-rival Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group (8316 JP), on balance we prefer the latter for the group’s tighter discipline and more stable profits ‘track record’.

Silver Point

Thomas J. Monaco

Independent Insight Provider

Silver Point is a boutique research firm that focuses on the broader financial services sector, with a particular focus on troubled institutions globally. 

Asia Ex Japan

*First Out Of The Gate: J.P, Morgan &amp; Co. (JPM.US) [JPM] reported 3Q20 results of USD 9.3 bn or USD 2.92 per share – well ahead of consensus of USD 2.22 per share. Results improvement was led primarily by JPM’s USD 9.9 bn (94.2%) reduction in loss provisions on a linked quarter basis. Offsetting the stellar bottom-line performance, we note several troubling trends: a) net interest income declined on the back of NIM compression and loan portfolio contraction; b) a significant decline in capital markets related revenues; and c) expenses increases;    *Credit Weakness Decelerates: Despite calculating that NCOs were actually a negative USD 1.4 bn, we find that net new NPLs linked quarter amounted to a positive USD 184 mn or 7.0% on an annualized basis. While still weakening, the pace of increase has decelerated from the 26% posted in 2Q20; and* CAPM and Cost Pressure: Volatile capital markets-related revenues took a bit of a digger – declining USD 3.9 bn (26.7%) linked quarter - representing a declining 66.9% of total revenues at 3Q20 (down from the 77.0% posted at 2Q20). When we exclude compensation costs which have a large variable component, we note that the more fixed expenses increased. Comp/revenue, despite the overall bottom-line improvement, worsened to 53.5% - up 3.8% during the period while JPM’s efficiency ratio worsened to 57.9% versus 51.4% in 2Q20.

*First Out Of The Gate: J.P, Morgan &amp; Co. (JPM.US) [JPM] reported 3Q20 results of USD 9.3 bn or USD 2.92 per share – well ahead of consensus of USD 2.22 per share. Results improvement was led primarily by JPM’s USD 9.9 bn (94.2%) reduction in loss provisions on a linked quarter basis. Offsetting the stellar bottom-line performance, we note several troubling trends: a) net interest income declined on the back of NIM compression and loan portfolio contraction; b) a significant decline in capital markets related revenues; and c) expenses increases;    *Credit Weakness Decelerates: Despite calculating that NCOs were actually a negative USD 1.4 bn, we find that net new NPLs linked quarter amounted to a positive USD 184 mn or 7.0% on an annualized basis. While still weakening, the pace of increase has decelerated from the 26% posted in 2Q20; and* CAPM and Cost Pressure: Volatile capital markets-related revenues took a bit of a digger – declining USD 3.9 bn (26.7%) linked quarter - representing a declining 66.9% of total revenues at 3Q20 (down from the 77.0% posted at 2Q20). When we exclude compensation costs which have a large variable component, we note that the more fixed expenses increased. Comp/revenue, despite the overall bottom-line improvement, worsened to 53.5% - up 3.8% during the period while JPM’s efficiency ratio worsened to 57.9% versus 51.4% in 2Q20.

JP Morgan & Co. – Good Credit Omen For US and Global Banks

*Weak Numbers Expected: Link REIT (823.HK) [Link] hosted a pre-blackout investor presentation on Oct 8, 2020.The outcome was generally a negative earnings pre-announcement whereby DPU is set to decline 7.6% - the first dividend decline since Link was listed in 2005. The culprit for the poor pre-announcement was a negative rental reversion rate and increased rental concessions (which we believe are not one off) in Hong Kong, factors which are anticipated to continue to place intense pressure on results for the foreseeable future; and  *Hong Kong Pressures Are Very Apparent: This recent London transaction is so far away from Link REIT’s core competencies speaks volumes as to where it believes its core Hong Kong retail business is heading. This doesn’t seem like smart diversification and smells more of panic leverage when one considers the price and location of this deal. We are hopeful that management doesn’t let the large cash position burn another hole its pocket.

*Weak Numbers Expected: Link REIT (823.HK) [Link] hosted a pre-blackout investor presentation on Oct 8, 2020.The outcome was generally a negative earnings pre-announcement whereby DPU is set to decline 7.6% - the first dividend decline since Link was listed in 2005. The culprit for the poor pre-announcement was a negative rental reversion rate and increased rental concessions (which we believe are not one off) in Hong Kong, factors which are anticipated to continue to place intense pressure on results for the foreseeable future; and  *Hong Kong Pressures Are Very Apparent: This recent London transaction is so far away from Link REIT’s core competencies speaks volumes as to where it believes its core Hong Kong retail business is heading. This doesn’t seem like smart diversification and smells more of panic leverage when one considers the price and location of this deal. We are hopeful that management doesn’t let the large cash position burn another hole its pocket.   

*Morgan Stanley/Eaton Vance Transaction: Morgan Stanley (MS.US) announced its intention to acquire Eaton Vance for approximately USD 7 bn in a 50/50 cash/stock transaction. According to MS, this transaction is expected to be earnings break-even on deal consummation. We are less optimistic;  *MUFG Should Worry About Dilution: Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group (8306.JP) [MUFG] collectively owns 22.6% of the outstanding shares of MS on a fully diluted basis; prior to both the E*Trade Financial and Eaton Vance (EV.US) transactions MS represented an estimated and outsized 25.4% of MUFG's FY (March) 2020 bottom-line - despite MUFG's high reliance on gains.In aggregate, both transactions dilute MUFG's MS stake by 3.57% to 18.99%. Both transactions are anticipated to dilute MUFG's earnings attributable to Morgan Stanley by USD 175 mn or close to 9.0% YOY or 2.2% overall for MUFG in FY 2020 – assuming the status quo on securities gains; and*MUFG Already Has Enough Headaches: Earnings at MUFG remain quite tenuous. Outside of its high reliance on volatile sources of securities trading, impairment losses associated with its ownership stake in Bank Danamon (BNMN.IJ),  earnings pressures from Union Bank in California,  the re-jigging of the systems integration at MUFG NICOS too should continue to weigh on future results.

*Morgan Stanley/Eaton Vance Transaction: Morgan Stanley (MS.US) announced its intention to acquire Eaton Vance for approximately USD 7 bn in a 50/50 cash/stock transaction. According to MS, this transaction is expected to be earnings break-even on deal consummation. We are less optimistic;  *MUFG Should Worry About Dilution: Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group (8306.JP) [MUFG] collectively owns 22.6% of the outstanding shares of MS on a fully diluted basis; prior to both the E*Trade Financial and Eaton Vance (EV.US) transactions MS represented an estimated and outsized 25.4% of MUFG's FY (March) 2020 bottom-line - despite MUFG's high reliance on gains.In aggregate, both transactions dilute MUFG's MS stake by 3.57% to 18.99%. Both transactions are anticipated to dilute MUFG's earnings attributable to Morgan Stanley by USD 175 mn or close to 9.0% YOY or 2.2% overall for MUFG in FY 2020 – assuming the status quo on securities gains; and*MUFG Already Has Enough Headaches: Earnings at MUFG remain quite tenuous. Outside of its high reliance on volatile sources of securities trading, impairment losses associated with its ownership stake in Bank Danamon (BNMN.IJ),  earnings pressures from Union Bank in California,  the re-jigging of the systems integration at MUFG NICOS too should continue to weigh on future results. 

Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group – MS Continues to Dilute MUFG

Founder & CEO Bond Angle, LLC, Bond Angle, LLC

Vicki Bryan

Founder & CEO Bond Angle, LLC

Bond Angle, LLC

Insightful commentary and analysis on bond markets and market movers, including financial, economic, and industry catalysts and management shenanigans. 

High yield market investment research

Credit

<a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/the-we-company" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:28061:1" rel="noopener">The We Company (WeWork) (WE US)</a> sold its majority stake in its China business to <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/153f2775-72cc-451e-b7a3-03978c69f97b" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Trustbridge Partners</a> for $200 million, a price far below the $5 billion where the unit had been valued in 2018.But in 2018, WeWork was still being pitched by its bankers to investors as worth as much as $100 billion, substantially higher versus my $5-7 billion estimate. Less than a year later WeWork's IPO collapsed and it sunk into insolvency as I had projected (see <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/gravity-works-as-wework-doesn-t-now-plan-b" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:32107" rel="noopener">Gravity Works As WeWork Doesn't; Now Plan B</a> on 9/17/20). We know how that worked out. Times and fortunes have changed for the worse since then, and now WeWork is lucky to get a meaningful price for any of its still struggling assets, as we can see in the following quick review.Read on as Bond Angle discussion continues...

The We Company (WeWork) (WE US) sold its majority stake in its China business to Trustbridge Partners for $200 million, a price far below the $5 billion where the unit had been valued in 2018.But in 2018, WeWork was still being pitched by its bankers to investors as worth as much as $100 billion, substantially higher versus my $5-7 billion estimate. Less than a year later WeWork's IPO collapsed and it sunk into insolvency as I had projected (see Gravity Works As WeWork Doesn't; Now Plan B on 9/17/20). We know how that worked out. Times and fortunes have changed for the worse since then, and now WeWork is lucky to get a meaningful price for any of its still struggling assets, as we can see in the following quick review.Read on as Bond Angle discussion continues...

Breaking: WeWork Nets $200 Million for China Business

United States

Morgan Stanley, a bank holding company, provides diversified financial services on a worldwide basis.  The Company operates a global securities business which serves individual and institutional investors and investment banking clients. Morgan Stanley also operates a global asset management business.

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Morgan Stanley (MS US)

MUFG (8306 JP): Wavering in the Ranks

Interim results for MUFG (8306 JP) highlighted the fragility of the profit contribution from some of its recent overseas acquisitions, with credit...

J. Brian Waterhouse

JP Morgan & Co. – Good Credit Omen For US and Global Banks

JPM Results, A Good Credit Omen For US and Global Banks. Reserve Reversals Likely To Be A Trend For 4Q20 Results Season -Although Issues Persist

Thomas J. Monaco

Link REIT – Weak Results Preview

*Weak Numbers Expected: Link REIT (823.HK) [Link] hosted a pre-blackout investor presentation on Oct 8, 2020.The outcome was generally a negative...

Thomas J. Monaco

Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group – MS Continues to Dilute MUFG

MUFG Receives Additional Dilution From Morgan Stanley In Another Overpriced US Transaction. Eaton Vance Was The Fourth In a Series of Wealth...

Thomas J. Monaco

Breaking: WeWork Nets $200 Million for China Business

The We Company (WeWork) (WE US) is lucky to get $200 million for its China business, in my view, even though it had been valued at $5 billion back...

Vicki Bryan

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