Financials Credit Analyst

Hank Calenti, CFA

CreditContinuum

Credit

<a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/jpmorgan-chase-co" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:277:1" rel="noopener">JPMorgan Chase &amp; Co's (JPM US)</a> fortress foundation needs repair. Rather than a rock-solid balance sheet, JPM’s capital foundation needs to be strengthened to handle the leverage load. It has the lowest Supplementary Leverage Ratio (SLR) amongst the largest US banks and its Tier 1 securities suffer, in part, due to this. It is time to lighten the leverage exposure and add a layer of capital. This creates an investment opportunity.As the pandemic-induced economic crisis unfolded last year, we noted that JPM Tier 1 securities were over-bought relative to the leverage exposure risk at the institution. Please see: <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/compose/insight/49670/Bank%20Credit%20Weekly:%20US%20Capital%20Buffer%20Risk%20&amp;%20Q1%20Earnings%20Reports-%20JPMorgan%20Looks%20Slightly%20Overbought.%20Read%20more:%20https:/skr.ma/uQHaQ" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Bank Credit Weekly: US Capital Buffer Risk &amp; Q1 Earnings Reports- JPMorgan Looks Slightly Overbought.</a>The Fed exemption of Treasury securities and deposits with the central bank from the SLR bought JPM time. Fast forward one year later to the expiration of these exemptions and, despite ample opportunity, JPMorgan did not issue Tier 1 securities until only two weeks ago when it brought a $25 par security. In additional to raising needed capital, the firm recently threatened to stop taking deposits. It may price itself out of the deposit market, temporarily, but this is not a long-term strategy. The SLR is the binding capital constrain on the firm’s asset growth. JPM needs to obtain or retain more Tier 1 capital. We quantify this within.We believe that JPM could easily bring a 10-year Tier 1 bond to the market and find between US$2 to US$3bn in demand, thereby taking the total Tier 1 financing needs, or balance sheet optimization equivalent, down materially for the remainder of the year. Based on its recently issued Preferred, we believe JPM could achieve a price of Treasuries plus circa 300bps in a 10-year Tier 1 note.Aside from its SLR level, JPMorgan’s credit metrics are on-par with, if not superior to, most other large systemically important financial institutions. And yet, as we present within, JPM’s Tier 1 bonds trade at a discount to materially weaker banks located outside the US. Furthermore, we find that JPMorgan’s 2025 callable Tier 1 bond is at least 40bps oversold as, in our view, its call option is overvalued by the same amount.JPM faces an inflection point with respect to its capital adequacy. Concurrently, the Fed may re-adjust the SLR requirements before year-end; however, we believe it would be foolish of JPM not to take the opportunity to increase its SLR in an improving economic environment. It should re-enforce the foundation of its fortress balance sheet. We believe investors should pre-position for this eventuality. We recommend overweighting JPMorgan’s Tier 1 securities.

JPMorgan Chase &amp; Co's (JPM US) fortress foundation needs repair. Rather than a rock-solid balance sheet, JPM’s capital foundation needs to be strengthened to handle the leverage load. It has the lowest Supplementary Leverage Ratio (SLR) amongst the largest US banks and its Tier 1 securities suffer, in part, due to this. It is time to lighten the leverage exposure and add a layer of capital. This creates an investment opportunity.As the pandemic-induced economic crisis unfolded last year, we noted that JPM Tier 1 securities were over-bought relative to the leverage exposure risk at the institution. Please see: Bank Credit Weekly: US Capital Buffer Risk &amp; Q1 Earnings Reports- JPMorgan Looks Slightly Overbought.The Fed exemption of Treasury securities and deposits with the central bank from the SLR bought JPM time. Fast forward one year later to the expiration of these exemptions and, despite ample opportunity, JPMorgan did not issue Tier 1 securities until only two weeks ago when it brought a $25 par security. In additional to raising needed capital, the firm recently threatened to stop taking deposits. It may price itself out of the deposit market, temporarily, but this is not a long-term strategy. The SLR is the binding capital constrain on the firm’s asset growth. JPM needs to obtain or retain more Tier 1 capital. We quantify this within.We believe that JPM could easily bring a 10-year Tier 1 bond to the market and find between US$2 to US$3bn in demand, thereby taking the total Tier 1 financing needs, or balance sheet optimization equivalent, down materially for the remainder of the year. Based on its recently issued Preferred, we believe JPM could achieve a price of Treasuries plus circa 300bps in a 10-year Tier 1 note.Aside from its SLR level, JPMorgan’s credit metrics are on-par with, if not superior to, most other large systemically important financial institutions. And yet, as we present within, JPM’s Tier 1 bonds trade at a discount to materially weaker banks located outside the US. Furthermore, we find that JPMorgan’s 2025 callable Tier 1 bond is at least 40bps oversold as, in our view, its call option is overvalued by the same amount.JPM faces an inflection point with respect to its capital adequacy. Concurrently, the Fed may re-adjust the SLR requirements before year-end; however, we believe it would be foolish of JPM not to take the opportunity to increase its SLR in an improving economic environment. It should re-enforce the foundation of its fortress balance sheet. We believe investors should pre-position for this eventuality. We recommend overweighting JPMorgan’s Tier 1 securities.

US Banks and the SLR Situation: Overweight JPM Tier 1 Securities

Asset Allocation & Fund Positioning, Copley Fund Research

Steven Holden

Asset Allocation & Fund Positioning

Copley Fund Research

Copley Fund Research provide research and data on asset allocation among Global and Emerging Market equity funds.  The analysis details absolute and relative positioning across countries, sectors and industries together with highly granular data on single stock and single fund allocations.  The data is updated monthly with time series going back to January 2011.

Global Research - Analysis of 165 prominent Global equity funds, combined AUM $335bn
GEM Research - Analysis of 127 prominent global EM equity funds, combined AUM $250bn

Asset Allocation - Global and GEM Equity

Thematic (Sector/Industry)

US Financial stocks are a key holding for Global active managers.  Average weights stand at 6.38% among the 383 Global funds in our analysis, the 3rd largest global country/sector allocation.After a heavy sell of during the first few months of COVID-19, allocations bottomed out in August 2020 and turned sharply to the upside.  US Financials captured some of the largest ownership increases among global country/sector peers, moving from underweight to overweight in the process.<a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/morgan-stanley" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:1122:1" rel="noopener">Morgan Stanley (MS US)</a> has broken out to new highs in active fund ownership, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/jpmorgan-chase-co" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:277:1" rel="noopener">JPMorgan Chase &amp; Co (JPM US)</a> is the most widely held Financial stock, whilst <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/citigroup-inc" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:279:1" rel="noopener">Citigroup Inc (C US)</a> exposure remains subdued.There are few signs of confidence levels abating or that managers are overly exposed to the sector, either on an absolute basis or relative to benchmark.  Therefore, we see it as low risk that managers will look to scale back exposure at this juncture.

US Financial stocks are a key holding for Global active managers.  Average weights stand at 6.38% among the 383 Global funds in our analysis, the 3rd largest global country/sector allocation.After a heavy sell of during the first few months of COVID-19, allocations bottomed out in August 2020 and turned sharply to the upside.  US Financials captured some of the largest ownership increases among global country/sector peers, moving from underweight to overweight in the process.Morgan Stanley (MS US) has broken out to new highs in active fund ownership, JPMorgan Chase &amp; Co (JPM US) is the most widely held Financial stock, whilst Citigroup Inc (C US) exposure remains subdued.There are few signs of confidence levels abating or that managers are overly exposed to the sector, either on an absolute basis or relative to benchmark.  Therefore, we see it as low risk that managers will look to scale back exposure at this juncture.

Silver Point

Thomas J. Monaco

Independent Insight Provider

Silver Point is a boutique research firm that focuses on the broader financial services sector, with a particular focus on troubled institutions globally. 

Asia Ex Japan

Equity Bottom-Up

*Super Results And Will Only Get Better: JP Morgan Chase &amp; Co (JPM.US) [JPM] reported 4Q20 bottom-line results of USD 12.1 bn, increasing USD 2.7 bn (28.5%) linked quarter. On a core operating basis, we note an even stronger QOQ improvement, with numbers coming in at USD 12.1 bn or USD 3.1 bn (34.6%) higher than 3Q20. Results were essentially driven by a reserve reversal of USD 1.9 bn, which no doubt will be a consistent theme in 2021;*Credit Weakness Significantly Decelerates: We find that net new NPLs on a linked quarter amounted to only USD 1 mn or well under 1.0% on an annualized basis. The pace of increase has decelerated from the 7.0% and 26% posted in 3Q20 and 2Q20, respectively; and*Solid Share Buyback In Place: JPM noted that it could repurchase a maximum number of shares of USD 4.5 bn for 1Q21.

*Super Results And Will Only Get Better: JP Morgan Chase &amp; Co (JPM.US) [JPM] reported 4Q20 bottom-line results of USD 12.1 bn, increasing USD 2.7 bn (28.5%) linked quarter. On a core operating basis, we note an even stronger QOQ improvement, with numbers coming in at USD 12.1 bn or USD 3.1 bn (34.6%) higher than 3Q20. Results were essentially driven by a reserve reversal of USD 1.9 bn, which no doubt will be a consistent theme in 2021;*Credit Weakness Significantly Decelerates: We find that net new NPLs on a linked quarter amounted to only USD 1 mn or well under 1.0% on an annualized basis. The pace of increase has decelerated from the 7.0% and 26% posted in 3Q20 and 2Q20, respectively; and*Solid Share Buyback In Place: JPM noted that it could repurchase a maximum number of shares of USD 4.5 bn for 1Q21. 

*We Anxiously Await HSBC’s US Departure: According the Financial Times on November 28, 2020, HSBC is considering offloading its entire US retail network - although a full exit from other businesses in the US is unlikely. The recommendation of a US exit is expected to be presented to the board as early as this week, although the Group is scheduled to provide an update on its plans for its French and US businesses in February 2021; *HSBCNA Should Be Sold: HSBCNA is a chronic mess, and there is absolutely no need for HSBC to maintain a full commercial/retail banking presence in the US. It cannot earn a positive return under its current structure; credit is again about to fall off a cliff; does not earning; NIMs are among the lowest in the USA; and capital is shortly about to fall below regulatory guidance. Further, the bad acquisitions and regulatory headaches should spur management to cut and run in the US. Knowing HSBC management as we do, they will continue making the same mistakes over and over again; and    *Hong Kong Tax Rate Continues To Mask Management’s Global Mistakes: When your core subsidiary in Hong Kong has a statutory corporate tax rate of 16.5% and the organization is not subject to global taxation, low taxes can mask the many mistakes that HSBC makes.

*We Anxiously Await HSBC’s US Departure: According the Financial Times on November 28, 2020, HSBC is considering offloading its entire US retail network - although a full exit from other businesses in the US is unlikely. The recommendation of a US exit is expected to be presented to the board as early as this week, although the Group is scheduled to provide an update on its plans for its French and US businesses in February 2021; *HSBCNA Should Be Sold: HSBCNA is a chronic mess, and there is absolutely no need for HSBC to maintain a full commercial/retail banking presence in the US. It cannot earn a positive return under its current structure; credit is again about to fall off a cliff; does not earning; NIMs are among the lowest in the USA; and capital is shortly about to fall below regulatory guidance. Further, the bad acquisitions and regulatory headaches should spur management to cut and run in the US. Knowing HSBC management as we do, they will continue making the same mistakes over and over again; and    *Hong Kong Tax Rate Continues To Mask Management’s Global Mistakes: When your core subsidiary in Hong Kong has a statutory corporate tax rate of 16.5% and the organization is not subject to global taxation, low taxes can mask the many mistakes that HSBC makes. 

HSBC Holdings Plc – Act Now, You’ll Never See These Prices Again

Senior Bank Analyst - Japanese Banks, Windamee Research

J. Brian Waterhouse

Senior Bank Analyst - Japanese Banks

Windamee Research

Japanese Banks

Mitsubishi UFJ Financial (MUFG) / Equity Bottom-Up

Interim results for <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/mitsubishi-ufj-financial-group" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:218:1" rel="noopener">Mitsubishi UFJ Financial (MUFG) (8306 JP)</a>highlighted the fragility of the profit contribution from several of the group’s recent overseas acquisitions, and the increasing reliance on equity-accounted profits from <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/morgan-stanley" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:1122:1" rel="noopener">Morgan Stanley (MS US)</a> to keep group earnings up.  Rising credit costs were by far the largest headwinds to group profitability, with 1H FY3/2021 credit costs rising to an annualized 48bps: far exceeding the group’s 21bps in credit costs for the whole of FY3/2020.Buying megabank shares is always a 'crowded trade' at the best of times.  While there often seems to be little difference in share price performance between MUFG and mega-rival <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/sumitomo-mitsui-financial-group-inc" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:217:1" rel="noopener">Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group (8316 JP)</a>, on balance we prefer the latter for the group’s tighter discipline and more stable profits ‘track record’.

Interim results for Mitsubishi UFJ Financial (MUFG) (8306 JP)highlighted the fragility of the profit contribution from several of the group’s recent overseas acquisitions, and the increasing reliance on equity-accounted profits from Morgan Stanley (MS US) to keep group earnings up.  Rising credit costs were by far the largest headwinds to group profitability, with 1H FY3/2021 credit costs rising to an annualized 48bps: far exceeding the group’s 21bps in credit costs for the whole of FY3/2020.Buying megabank shares is always a 'crowded trade' at the best of times.  While there often seems to be little difference in share price performance between MUFG and mega-rival Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group (8316 JP), on balance we prefer the latter for the group’s tighter discipline and more stable profits ‘track record’.

United States

Morgan Stanley, a bank holding company, provides diversified financial services on a worldwide basis.  The Company operates a global securities business which serves individual and institutional investors and investment banking clients. Morgan Stanley also operates a global asset management business.

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Morgan Stanley (MS US)

US Banks and the SLR Situation: Overweight JPM Tier 1 Securities

JPM’s fortress foundation needs repair. It has the lowest SLR buffer, and its Tier 1 suffers from this. Leverage slimming and a deeper capital...

Hank Calenti, CFA

US Financials: Back in Vogue

After a heavy sell of during the first few months of COVID-19, US Financials exposure bottomed out in August 2020 and turned sharply to the...

Steven Holden

JP Morgan Chase & Co. – Just Wow

JP MORGAN CHASE: JPM] reported 4Q20 bottom-line results increased 28.5% linked quarter, driven by a reserve reversal. Net new NPLs on a linked...

Thomas J. Monaco

HSBC Holdings Plc – Act Now, You’ll Never See These Prices Again

HSBC HOLDINGS PLC: Financial Times Suggesting Board Will Be Presented With Options On US Franchise This Week. This Was A Long Time In Coming.

Thomas J. Monaco

MUFG (8306 JP): Wavering in the Ranks

Interim results for MUFG (8306 JP) highlighted the fragility of the profit contribution from some of its recent overseas acquisitions, with credit...

J. Brian Waterhouse

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