Pan-Asia Catalysts/Events, Quiddity Advisors

David Blennerhassett

Pan-Asia Catalysts/Events

Quiddity Advisors

Event-Driven

Last Week in Event SPACE:  Swire, Hitachi Metal, Jardine, Softbank, Bingo, Japan Asia, Mainstream

Independent Asian Credit Research, Bondcritic

Warut Promboon

Independent Asian Credit Research

Asian Fixed Income/Frontier Market Research

Bondcritic

Bondcritic, established in 2009, is designed to be an independent credit research voice that helps investors gain insights and unbiased analyses on Asian fixed income market. Our mission is to discover deep-value Asian high-yield and distressed bonds with a bottom-up approach, together with the help of our proprietary ESG (Environmental, Social Development, and Governance) model. At the same time, we focus on bringing investment cases of unrated and unloved issuers to the general public.

Credit

Here, we have wrapped-up the recent fear on the Chinese debt bubble with our new periodical called “The Chinese Credit Chronicle (CCC)”. China is a bicycle economy which will fall down when the economy stops growing at a certain rate, in our view. We believe the minimum real GDP growth rate is c.5%. China’s real GDP growth was 2.3% in 2020, according to China’s National Bureau of Statistics. The 2.3% GDP growth achieved with the effective control of COVID-19 and without much government stimulus remains impressive, in our view, only if we believe this GDP growth is authentic.
Now comes the core of the problem. We have seen leverage in China being extended because of cheap funding costs rather than borrowers’ repayment capability.  Not to mention a shadow banking sector which the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC) once estimated at RMB84.8trn in 2019 or 29% of total banking assets in 2019, leverage was injected officially into ineffective and poorly-managed borrowers such as local government financing vehicles (LGFV). In addition, with China’s urbanization, the demand for residential and commercial properties has risen in tandem with leverage of the Chinese property sector, hence concentrating the leverage in the sector.
Many market participants in China seem to have gambled that China’s growth music will continue playing and when loan growth continues, non-performing loans may not be a big problem. We believe the music has stopped and the Chinese government seems to have agreed with us.
Here, we have raised three anecdotes on the Chinese debt bubble and how we see the situation going this year: China Evergrande (<a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/china-evergrande-group" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:479:1" rel="noopener">Evergrande Real Estate Group (3333 HK)</a> , <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/hna-group-co-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:25987:1" rel="noopener">HNA Group (HNAGRZ CH)</a> , and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/china-huarong-asset-management" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:968:1" rel="noopener">China Huarong Asset Management (2799 HK)</a> .

Here, we have wrapped-up the recent fear on the Chinese debt bubble with our new periodical called “The Chinese Credit Chronicle (CCC)”. China is a bicycle economy which will fall down when the economy stops growing at a certain rate, in our view. We believe the minimum real GDP growth rate is c.5%. China’s real GDP growth was 2.3% in 2020, according to China’s National Bureau of Statistics. The 2.3% GDP growth achieved with the effective control of COVID-19 and without much government stimulus remains impressive, in our view, only if we believe this GDP growth is authentic.
Now comes the core of the problem. We have seen leverage in China being extended because of cheap funding costs rather than borrowers’ repayment capability.  Not to mention a shadow banking sector which the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC) once estimated at RMB84.8trn in 2019 or 29% of total banking assets in 2019, leverage was injected officially into ineffective and poorly-managed borrowers such as local government financing vehicles (LGFV). In addition, with China’s urbanization, the demand for residential and commercial properties has risen in tandem with leverage of the Chinese property sector, hence concentrating the leverage in the sector.
Many market participants in China seem to have gambled that China’s growth music will continue playing and when loan growth continues, non-performing loans may not be a big problem. We believe the music has stopped and the Chinese government seems to have agreed with us.
Here, we have raised three anecdotes on the Chinese debt bubble and how we see the situation going this year: China Evergrande (Evergrande Real Estate Group (3333 HK) , HNA Group (HNAGRZ CH) , and China Huarong Asset Management (2799 HK) .

The Chinese Credit Chronicle: The CCC Danger

Silver Point

Thomas J. Monaco

Independent Insight Provider

Silver Point is a boutique research firm that focuses on the broader financial services sector, with a particular focus on troubled institutions globally. 

Asia Ex Japan

Equity Bottom-Up

China Huarong Asset Management / Equity Bottom-Up

*Already On Edge:  Again in mainland China, there have been rumblings of another credit default over the past several days. The CBIRC disclosed that China Huarong Asset Management (2799.HK) [Huarong] is actively working with its auditor to complete its annual report. The issue appears to be Huarong’s legacy exposure associated with the misdeeds of its former Chairman, which still need to be addressed post-removal in 2018; and *Another Audit Delay: Huarong is delaying its 2020 earnings results beyond the April 30, 2021 deadline, which, in our view, only exacerbates concerns over a potential Huarong default. Ironic, given that Huarong was supposed to help mainland China clean up its bad debt mess. This further delay will not help bond liquidity which already appears to have disappeared. Contagion risk remains a real threat as bondholders likely sell other holdings.

*Already On Edge:  Again in mainland China, there have been rumblings of another credit default over the past several days. The CBIRC disclosed that China Huarong Asset Management (2799.HK) [Huarong] is actively working with its auditor to complete its annual report. The issue appears to be Huarong’s legacy exposure associated with the misdeeds of its former Chairman, which still need to be addressed post-removal in 2018; and *Another Audit Delay: Huarong is delaying its 2020 earnings results beyond the April 30, 2021 deadline, which, in our view, only exacerbates concerns over a potential Huarong default. Ironic, given that Huarong was supposed to help mainland China clean up its bad debt mess. This further delay will not help bond liquidity which already appears to have disappeared. Contagion risk remains a real threat as bondholders likely sell other holdings.

China Huarong Asset Management  - This Can’t Be Good

Last Week in Event SPACE:  Intouch, Toshiba, Orocobre/Galaxy, Tilt, Primewest/Centuria, Huarong

China Huarong Asset Management / Event-Driven

<div>
<a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/china-huarong-asset-management" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:968:1" rel="noopener">China Huarong Asset Management (2799 HK)</a> was<a href="https://www1.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2021/0401/2021033101720.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener"></a> <a href="https://www1.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2021/0401/2021033101720.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">suspended</a> on the 1 April 2021 after failing to despatch its 2020 annual report. It remains suspended.
Yet the bigger issue was the distressed asset manager's US$22bn of dollar-denominated bonds. 
A damaging commentary from Caixin Media last week speculating of a possible bankruptcy sent some of Huarong's bonds into free fall. The near-dated 2022 bonds touched a low of 67.7 cents. The 4.5% perps dipped below 50 cents.
The 2022 3.375% bonds
<figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/202/156/original/image_18891551441619084449487.png?1619084450" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="202156"></figure>
The 4.5% perpetual bonds
<figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/202/155/original/image_58242332231619084400903.png?1619084401" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="202155"></figure>
In <a href="https://skr.ma/Q1rV4" target="_blank" rel="noopener">China Huarong Asset Management (2799 HK): This Is Manageable</a>, I reckoned a systematic restructuring process was a more likely outcome here as opposed to a less-than-optimal major debt restructuring.
Reportedly the central bank is now considering taking on RMB100bn of assets from Huarong, towards refocusing the company on distressed debt. Under "recently departed" Lai Xiaomin, Huarong expanded well beyond its original mandate of managing distressed debt.
I thought the bonds at ~70c looked interesting. That was the right call though it has been bumpy.
More below the fold.
</div>
<hr>
The title hijacks Wellington's comment about Waterloo, wherein he said: "A damned nice thing ... the nearest-run thing you ever saw in your lif


China Huarong Asset Management (2799 HK) was suspended on the 1 April 2021 after failing to despatch its 2020 annual report. It remains suspended.
Yet the bigger issue was the distressed asset manager's US$22bn of dollar-denominated bonds. 
A damaging commentary from Caixin Media last week speculating of a possible bankruptcy sent some of Huarong's bonds into free fall. The near-dated 2022 bonds touched a low of 67.7 cents. The 4.5% perps dipped below 50 cents.
The 2022 3.375% bonds

The 4.5% perpetual bonds

In China Huarong Asset Management (2799 HK): This Is Manageable, I reckoned a systematic restructuring process was a more likely outcome here as opposed to a less-than-optimal major debt restructuring.
Reportedly the central bank is now considering taking on RMB100bn of assets from Huarong, towards refocusing the company on distressed debt. Under "recently departed" Lai Xiaomin, Huarong expanded well beyond its original mandate of managing distressed debt.
I thought the bonds at ~70c looked interesting. That was the right call though it has been bumpy.
More below the fold.


The title hijacks Wellington's comment about Waterloo, wherein he said: "A damned nice thing ... the nearest-run thing you ever saw in your lif

China Huarong Asset Management (2799 HK): Not A Near Run Thing

China

China Huarong Asset Management Co Ltd. provides a variety of financial services. The Company offers asset management, banking, securities services, financial leasing, trust services, and investment services. China Huarong Asset Management maintains branch locations throughout China.

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China Huarong Asset Management (2799 HK)

Last Week in Event SPACE: Swire, Hitachi Metal, Jardine, Softbank, Bingo, Japan Asia, Mainstream

The weekend is here! Pour yourself a coffee, grab a comfortable seat, and sift through a brief summary of insights on various events discussed...

David Blennerhassett

The Chinese Credit Chronicle: The CCC Danger

Here is our first Chinese Credit Chronicle (CCC) to track the debt bubble in China. China Huarong could be the first domino to fall.

Bondcritic

China Huarong Asset Management - This Can’t Be Good

CHINA HUARONG ASSET MANAGEMENT: Huarong is delaying its 2020 earnings results beyond the April 30, 2021 deadline, which, in our view, only...

Thomas J. Monaco

Last Week in Event SPACE: Intouch, Toshiba, Orocobre/Galaxy, Tilt, Primewest/Centuria, Huarong

The weekend is here! Pour yourself a coffee, grab a comfortable seat, and sift through a brief summary of insights on various events discussed...

David Blennerhassett

China Huarong Asset Management (2799 HK): Not A Near Run Thing

One can talk about the adherence to market-based principles and investors bear the brunt of a fallout. Yet future investment in China would be...

David Blennerhassett

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