Silver Point

Thomas J. Monaco

Independent Insight Provider

Silver Point is a boutique research firm that focuses on the broader financial services sector, with a particular focus on troubled institutions globally. 

Asia Ex Japan

Equity Bottom-Up

*Major BEA Shareholder Under Stress In Front Of Merger: CaixaBank SA (CABK.SM), an 17.3% holder of Bank of East Asia’s (23.HK) [BEA] shares, and still has significant capital concerns. Combined with the acquisition of Bankia (BKIA.SM), pro forma CaixaBank’s (surviving entity) core CET1 target is 11.9%. With CaixaBank's restructuring charge only sufficient to fund EUR 1 bn in cost cuts, CaixaBank will need to find additional ways to manufacture capital in order to fund the restructuring - including asset sales, lower dividends, and/or capital raise; and*Expecting A BEA Offload: With an ownership value at EUR 786 mn, a capital charge of EUR 1.6 bn at pro forma CaixaBank under Basel III, the aforementioned solvency constraints at Caixabank, a fundamentally struggling BEA, and a resurgent mainland China, CaixaBank would have to finally be looking for an exit – which would be a massive overhang on the shares of BEA. The key terms of the CaixaBank/BEA Shareholder  Agreement likely cannot be upheld by the former given that its financial problems prevent it from fulfilling its responsibilities.

*Major BEA Shareholder Under Stress In Front Of Merger: CaixaBank SA (CABK.SM), an 17.3% holder of Bank of East Asia’s (23.HK) [BEA] shares, and still has significant capital concerns. Combined with the acquisition of Bankia (BKIA.SM), pro forma CaixaBank’s (surviving entity) core CET1 target is 11.9%. With CaixaBank's restructuring charge only sufficient to fund EUR 1 bn in cost cuts, CaixaBank will need to find additional ways to manufacture capital in order to fund the restructuring - including asset sales, lower dividends, and/or capital raise; and*Expecting A BEA Offload: With an ownership value at EUR 786 mn, a capital charge of EUR 1.6 bn at pro forma CaixaBank under Basel III, the aforementioned solvency constraints at Caixabank, a fundamentally struggling BEA, and a resurgent mainland China, CaixaBank would have to finally be looking for an exit – which would be a massive overhang on the shares of BEA. The key terms of the CaixaBank/BEA Shareholder  Agreement likely cannot be upheld by the former given that its financial problems prevent it from fulfilling its responsibilities.  

Bank of East Asia – How Much Longer Can Caixa Hold On?

*Poor US Results: In our latest review of HSBC Holdings’ (5.HK/HSBA.LN) [HSBC] US subsidiary, HSBC North America (HSBCNA), we note that fundamentals continue to worsen – although management seems to hope that no one will notice the poor quality and how managed 3Q20 results actually were. According to the 3Q20 US regulatory report, HSBCNA reported bottom-line results if USD 160.0 mn, a USD 111.3 mn (228.5%) increase linked quarter. 3Q20 results were driven by two factors: a massive loss provision and tax rate decline; *We Anxiously Await HSBC’s US Departure: According the Financial Times on November 28, 2020, HSBC is considering offloading its entire US retail network - although a full exit from other businesses in the US is unlikely. The recommendation of a US exit is expected to be presented to the board as early as this week, although the Group is scheduled to provide an update on its plans for its French and US businesses in February 2021; and *HSBCNA Should Be Sold: HSBCNA is a chronic mess, and there is absolutely no need for HSBC to maintain a full commercial/retail banking presence in the US. It cannot earn a positive return under its current structure; credit is again about to fall off a cliff; does not earning; NIMs are among the lowest in the USA; and capital is shortly about to fall below regulatory guidance. Further, the bad acquisitions and regulatory headaches should spur management to cut and run in the US. Knowing HSBC management as we do, they will continue making the same mistakes over and over again.

*Poor US Results: In our latest review of HSBC Holdings’ (5.HK/HSBA.LN) [HSBC] US subsidiary, HSBC North America (HSBCNA), we note that fundamentals continue to worsen – although management seems to hope that no one will notice the poor quality and how managed 3Q20 results actually were. According to the 3Q20 US regulatory report, HSBCNA reported bottom-line results if USD 160.0 mn, a USD 111.3 mn (228.5%) increase linked quarter. 3Q20 results were driven by two factors: a massive loss provision and tax rate decline; *We Anxiously Await HSBC’s US Departure: According the Financial Times on November 28, 2020, HSBC is considering offloading its entire US retail network - although a full exit from other businesses in the US is unlikely. The recommendation of a US exit is expected to be presented to the board as early as this week, although the Group is scheduled to provide an update on its plans for its French and US businesses in February 2021; and *HSBCNA Should Be Sold: HSBCNA is a chronic mess, and there is absolutely no need for HSBC to maintain a full commercial/retail banking presence in the US. It cannot earn a positive return under its current structure; credit is again about to fall off a cliff; does not earning; NIMs are among the lowest in the USA; and capital is shortly about to fall below regulatory guidance. Further, the bad acquisitions and regulatory headaches should spur management to cut and run in the US. Knowing HSBC management as we do, they will continue making the same mistakes over and over again. 

*PRA Changes Its Tune On Dividends: The United Kingdom’s (UK) Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA) recommended last week that the that UK banks can resume paying dividends subject to FY 2020 results. Linking dividends to the recent success of profitability mirrors Federal Reserve Board policy for the large US banks; and *HSBC Should Stand Pat On The Dividend: While its true that HSBC North America (HSBCNA) doesn’t contribute to the bottom-line, it has weighed down Group results through 3Q20 with losses of USD 963 mn. This thing simply needs to go. With this kind of uncertainty along with risks in France and Asia – again exacerbated by COVID-19 – HSBC Holdings Plc (HSBA/LN/5.HK) should be conserving capital especially if the weak HSBCNA is considered a takeunder candidate.

*PRA Changes Its Tune On Dividends: The United Kingdom’s (UK) Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA) recommended last week that the that UK banks can resume paying dividends subject to FY 2020 results. Linking dividends to the recent success of profitability mirrors Federal Reserve Board policy for the large US banks; and *HSBC Should Stand Pat On The Dividend: While its true that HSBC North America (HSBCNA) doesn’t contribute to the bottom-line, it has weighed down Group results through 3Q20 with losses of USD 963 mn. This thing simply needs to go. With this kind of uncertainty along with risks in France and Asia – again exacerbated by COVID-19 – HSBC Holdings Plc (HSBA/LN/5.HK) should be conserving capital especially if the weak HSBCNA is considered a takeunder candidate.

HSBC Holdings Plc – PRA Says Yes, But Management Should Say No

*We Anxiously Await HSBC’s US Departure: According the Financial Times on November 28, 2020, HSBC is considering offloading its entire US retail network - although a full exit from other businesses in the US is unlikely. The recommendation of a US exit is expected to be presented to the board as early as this week, although the Group is scheduled to provide an update on its plans for its French and US businesses in February 2021; *HSBCNA Should Be Sold: HSBCNA is a chronic mess, and there is absolutely no need for HSBC to maintain a full commercial/retail banking presence in the US. It cannot earn a positive return under its current structure; credit is again about to fall off a cliff; does not earning; NIMs are among the lowest in the USA; and capital is shortly about to fall below regulatory guidance. Further, the bad acquisitions and regulatory headaches should spur management to cut and run in the US. Knowing HSBC management as we do, they will continue making the same mistakes over and over again; and    *Hong Kong Tax Rate Continues To Mask Management’s Global Mistakes: When your core subsidiary in Hong Kong has a statutory corporate tax rate of 16.5% and the organization is not subject to global taxation, low taxes can mask the many mistakes that HSBC makes.

*We Anxiously Await HSBC’s US Departure: According the Financial Times on November 28, 2020, HSBC is considering offloading its entire US retail network - although a full exit from other businesses in the US is unlikely. The recommendation of a US exit is expected to be presented to the board as early as this week, although the Group is scheduled to provide an update on its plans for its French and US businesses in February 2021; *HSBCNA Should Be Sold: HSBCNA is a chronic mess, and there is absolutely no need for HSBC to maintain a full commercial/retail banking presence in the US. It cannot earn a positive return under its current structure; credit is again about to fall off a cliff; does not earning; NIMs are among the lowest in the USA; and capital is shortly about to fall below regulatory guidance. Further, the bad acquisitions and regulatory headaches should spur management to cut and run in the US. Knowing HSBC management as we do, they will continue making the same mistakes over and over again; and    *Hong Kong Tax Rate Continues To Mask Management’s Global Mistakes: When your core subsidiary in Hong Kong has a statutory corporate tax rate of 16.5% and the organization is not subject to global taxation, low taxes can mask the many mistakes that HSBC makes. 

HSBC Holdings Plc – Act Now, You’ll Never See These Prices Again

*Much Better Than Expected: Oversea Chinese Banking Corp. (OCBC.SP) [OCBC] posted 3Q20 net profit of SGD 1.0 bn, an SGD 298 mn (40.8%) increase on a linked quarter basis – well ahead of consensus. Two factors pushed the outperformance: 1) a somewhat justifiable SGD 400 mn (53.3%) decline in loss provisions (unlike DBS Group Holdings [DBS.SP]), as OCBC witnessed “negative”growth in net new NPLs; and 2) a 290 bp decline in its tax rate to 13.1%, which was additive to the bottom-line by SGD 36 mn or 3.6%;*Credit Improving In Reality: By our calculation, given the SGD 99 mn in net recoveries, we find that new new NPL growth was actually negative on an annualized basis at 2.3%. While we are ecstatic to see negative growth in net new NPLs on the back of strong net recoveries of previously charged off loans, we continue to believe that credit risk will remain elevated. As such, we find that reserves should be bolstered by SGD 288 mn – 25% of pre-tax results, which is a far cry from where currently DBS is; and*Insurance Weakness: Great Eastern Holdings (GE.SP) [Great Eastern] reported 3Q20 bottom-line results of SGD 287.9 mn, declining SGD 9.6 mn (3.2%) linked quarter. On an operating basis excluding market-related gains, the decline in profits was even more pronounced at SGD 24.6 mn or 9.4% over the period due to new business strain. New Business Embedded Value (NBEV) margins continued their descent to 37.0%  - down 1.1% linked quarter due a weaker Malaysian component. Management’s confidence is low and it anticipates the weaker economic environment to pose continued headwinds, and will reassess the dividend.

*Much Better Than Expected: Oversea Chinese Banking Corp. (OCBC.SP) [OCBC] posted 3Q20 net profit of SGD 1.0 bn, an SGD 298 mn (40.8%) increase on a linked quarter basis – well ahead of consensus. Two factors pushed the outperformance: 1) a somewhat justifiable SGD 400 mn (53.3%) decline in loss provisions (unlike DBS Group Holdings [DBS.SP]), as OCBC witnessed “negative”growth in net new NPLs; and 2) a 290 bp decline in its tax rate to 13.1%, which was additive to the bottom-line by SGD 36 mn or 3.6%;*Credit Improving In Reality: By our calculation, given the SGD 99 mn in net recoveries, we find that new new NPL growth was actually negative on an annualized basis at 2.3%. While we are ecstatic to see negative growth in net new NPLs on the back of strong net recoveries of previously charged off loans, we continue to believe that credit risk will remain elevated. As such, we find that reserves should be bolstered by SGD 288 mn – 25% of pre-tax results, which is a far cry from where currently DBS is; and*Insurance Weakness: Great Eastern Holdings (GE.SP) [Great Eastern] reported 3Q20 bottom-line results of SGD 287.9 mn, declining SGD 9.6 mn (3.2%) linked quarter. On an operating basis excluding market-related gains, the decline in profits was even more pronounced at SGD 24.6 mn or 9.4% over the period due to new business strain. New Business Embedded Value (NBEV) margins continued their descent to 37.0%  - down 1.1% linked quarter due a weaker Malaysian component. Management’s confidence is low and it anticipates the weaker economic environment to pose continued headwinds, and will reassess the dividend.

Hong Kong

BOC Hong Kong (Holdings) Limited provides a comprehensive range of financial products and services to retail and corporate customers.  Its products include retail banking, corporate banking, and treasury services.  The Company operates its branches in Hong Kong and China.

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BOC Hong Kong (BOC HK) (2388 HK)

Bank of East Asia – How Much Longer Can Caixa Hold On?

BANK OF EAST ASIA: CaixaBank is a 17.3% holder of BEA, and still has significant capital concerns. CaixaBank needs to find additional ways to...

Thomas J. Monaco

HSBC Holdings Plc – Cut and Run

HSBC HOLDINGS: HSBCNA fundamentals continue to worsen – although management seems to hope that no one will notice the poor quality and how managed...

Thomas J. Monaco

HSBC Holdings Plc – PRA Says Yes, But Management Should Say No

HSBC HOLDINGS: PRA Allowing UK Banks To Dividend But Is Restrictive. HSBC Should Stay Away From Cash Dividends Given The High Degree Of Balance...

Thomas J. Monaco

HSBC Holdings Plc – Act Now, You’ll Never See These Prices Again

HSBC HOLDINGS PLC: Financial Times Suggesting Board Will Be Presented With Options On US Franchise This Week. This Was A Long Time In Coming.

Thomas J. Monaco

Oversea Chinese Banking Corp. – Solid

OVERSEA CHINESE BANKING CORP.: Credit Showing Signs Of Recovery With Negative NPL Growth - Offsetting Weakness In NIMs and Insurance.

Thomas J. Monaco

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