Silver Point

Thomas J. Monaco

Independent Insight Provider

Silver Point is a boutique research firm that focuses on the broader financial services sector, with a particular focus on troubled institutions globally. 

Asia Ex Japan

Equity Bottom-Up

*Negative Jaws:  Oversea Chinese Banking Corp. (OCBC.SP) [OCBC] reported 4Q20 net profit of SGD 1.1 bn, a SGD 102 mn (9.9%) increase on a linked quarter basis. Were it not for the 0.7% tax rate as opposed to the 12.2% tax rate during 3Q20, OCBC’s bottom-line performance would have come in at SGD 994 mn  - down SGD 34 mn (3.3%). In addition, OCBC continues to suffer from negative operating jaws, with revenues declining 2.6% and costs increasing 2.3%;*Credit Improving In Reality: We have become more optimistic. By our calculation, we find that net new NPL growth continued to be negative on an annualized basis at SGD 78 mn or 8.0% annualized (versus 2.3% annualized).  We also find that reserves are now where they need to be, which is a far cry from where currently DBS Group Holdings (DBS.SP) is; and*Insurance Weakness: Great Eastern Holdings (GE.SP) [Great Eastern] reported 2H20 bottom-line results of SGD 688.5 mn, improving SGD 348.6 mn (102.5%) HOH. However, when we exclude 2H20’s net gains on sale of SGD 3.8 bn, core operating results were far from impressive at a loss of SGD 3.1 bn versus operating income SGD 217.3 mn in 1H20.

*Negative Jaws:  Oversea Chinese Banking Corp. (OCBC.SP) [OCBC] reported 4Q20 net profit of SGD 1.1 bn, a SGD 102 mn (9.9%) increase on a linked quarter basis. Were it not for the 0.7% tax rate as opposed to the 12.2% tax rate during 3Q20, OCBC’s bottom-line performance would have come in at SGD 994 mn  - down SGD 34 mn (3.3%). In addition, OCBC continues to suffer from negative operating jaws, with revenues declining 2.6% and costs increasing 2.3%;*Credit Improving In Reality: We have become more optimistic. By our calculation, we find that net new NPL growth continued to be negative on an annualized basis at SGD 78 mn or 8.0% annualized (versus 2.3% annualized).  We also find that reserves are now where they need to be, which is a far cry from where currently DBS Group Holdings (DBS.SP) is; and*Insurance Weakness: Great Eastern Holdings (GE.SP) [Great Eastern] reported 2H20 bottom-line results of SGD 688.5 mn, improving SGD 348.6 mn (102.5%) HOH. However, when we exclude 2H20’s net gains on sale of SGD 3.8 bn, core operating results were far from impressive at a loss of SGD 3.1 bn versus operating income SGD 217.3 mn in 1H20. 

Oversea Chinese Banking Corp. – Mixed Bag, But AQ Improving

*Poor Showing: Hang Seng Bank (11.HK) [Hang Seng] reported both a weak and low quality 2H20 result of HKD 7.5 bn, declining HKD 1.6 bn (17.5%) HOH. The decline in earnings was attributed to net interest income decline due to loan contraction, and NIM compression; and*Did HSBC Overstate Results?:While the current NPL ratio is not alarming, the HOH increase in net new NPLs is at HKD 3.0 bn  - which amounts to an alarming 201% increase on an annualized basis. This is not the first major subsidiary that HSBC is allowing to fall into the abys from a credit perspective, with HSBC North America (HSBCNA) posting net new problem loan growth at 155.4%. Like HSBCNA, we calculate Hang Seng under-provided for to the tune of HKD 6.3 bn or nearly 75% of the bank’s PBT. Combining both subsidiaries, we find that HSBC Holdings Plc overstated 2H20 results (adjusted for ownership) to the tune of USD 4.3 bn – just on these two subsidiaries alone.

*Poor Showing: Hang Seng Bank (11.HK) [Hang Seng] reported both a weak and low quality 2H20 result of HKD 7.5 bn, declining HKD 1.6 bn (17.5%) HOH. The decline in earnings was attributed to net interest income decline due to loan contraction, and NIM compression; and*Did HSBC Overstate Results?:While the current NPL ratio is not alarming, the HOH increase in net new NPLs is at HKD 3.0 bn  - which amounts to an alarming 201% increase on an annualized basis. This is not the first major subsidiary that HSBC is allowing to fall into the abys from a credit perspective, with HSBC North America (HSBCNA) posting net new problem loan growth at 155.4%. Like HSBCNA, we calculate Hang Seng under-provided for to the tune of HKD 6.3 bn or nearly 75% of the bank’s PBT. Combining both subsidiaries, we find that HSBC Holdings Plc overstated 2H20 results (adjusted for ownership) to the tune of USD 4.3 bn – just on these two subsidiaries alone.  

Hang Seng Bank – HSBC Fingerprints All Over This Print

Pan-Asia Index Rebalances/ Events/ Delta One, Periscope Analytics

Brian Freitas

Pan-Asia Index Rebalances/ Events/ Delta One

Quantitative Analysis

In this Insight, we look at Asian financial pairs that normally trade in a tight band versus each other and are now trading at levels that are close to an extreme, making it likely that there could be a short term reversal.These are all large cap financials that trade in excess of US$20m a day, so implementing the strategy should be possible using stock borrow or single stock futures.These ideas are based purely off the stock price history and we recommend investors use a fundamental overlay to determine if the price action is reflective of changes in the sector that benefit one company at the expense of the other, or benefit one company more than the other.

In this Insight, we look at Asian financial pairs that normally trade in a tight band versus each other and are now trading at levels that are close to an extreme, making it likely that there could be a short term reversal.These are all large cap financials that trade in excess of US$20m a day, so implementing the strategy should be possible using stock borrow or single stock futures.These ideas are based purely off the stock price history and we recommend investors use a fundamental overlay to determine if the price action is reflective of changes in the sector that benefit one company at the expense of the other, or benefit one company more than the other.

*Gross Operating Revenues Do NOT Cover Recurring Costs At HSBCNA: HSBC Holdings plc’s (HSBC) [5.HK/HSBA.LN] US subsidiary, HSBC North America (US only) [HSBCNA], reported yet another troubling set of results for 4Q20, losing USD 152.6 mn – down USD 312.6 mn (195.4%) on a linked quarter basis. Excluding non-recurring items, core operating income declined USD 313.6 mn (230.1%) for a loss of USD 177.3 mn over the same period. As it stands again, HSBCNA’s operating costs exceed recurring revenues; *HSBCNA Is Evolving Into An Indian State Bank: Given the credit weakness, we find that NPL/TL and problem assets/TL ratios significantly worsened 92 bp and 160 bp linked quarter, respectively, to 2.82% and 5.01%. By our calculation, we note that net new problem loan growth is a scary USD 867.9 mn  - for an annualized rate of growth of 155.4% - in line with the Indian state banks. By our calculation, HSBCNA’s reserves are light by USD 3.8 bn or 17.6% of HSBCNA’s stated equity. We would have compared the reserve shortfall to PBT, but HSBCNA simply loses money on an operating basis; and*HSBCNA Should Be Dumped At Any Price: HSBCNA is a chronic mess, and there is absolutely no need for HSBC to maintain a full commercial/retail banking presence in the US. It cannot earn a positive return under its current structure; credit is again about to fall off a cliff; does not earning; NIMs are among the lowest in the USA; and capital is shortly about to fall below regulatory guidance. Further, the bad acquisitions and regulatory headaches should spur management to cut and run in the US. We look forward to Group results on February 23rd, and the clarity we will receive on its hot mess in the US.

*Gross Operating Revenues Do NOT Cover Recurring Costs At HSBCNA: HSBC Holdings plc’s (HSBC) [5.HK/HSBA.LN] US subsidiary, HSBC North America (US only) [HSBCNA], reported yet another troubling set of results for 4Q20, losing USD 152.6 mn – down USD 312.6 mn (195.4%) on a linked quarter basis. Excluding non-recurring items, core operating income declined USD 313.6 mn (230.1%) for a loss of USD 177.3 mn over the same period. As it stands again, HSBCNA’s operating costs exceed recurring revenues; *HSBCNA Is Evolving Into An Indian State Bank: Given the credit weakness, we find that NPL/TL and problem assets/TL ratios significantly worsened 92 bp and 160 bp linked quarter, respectively, to 2.82% and 5.01%. By our calculation, we note that net new problem loan growth is a scary USD 867.9 mn  - for an annualized rate of growth of 155.4% - in line with the Indian state banks. By our calculation, HSBCNA’s reserves are light by USD 3.8 bn or 17.6% of HSBCNA’s stated equity. We would have compared the reserve shortfall to PBT, but HSBCNA simply loses money on an operating basis; and*HSBCNA Should Be Dumped At Any Price: HSBCNA is a chronic mess, and there is absolutely no need for HSBC to maintain a full commercial/retail banking presence in the US. It cannot earn a positive return under its current structure; credit is again about to fall off a cliff; does not earning; NIMs are among the lowest in the USA; and capital is shortly about to fall below regulatory guidance. Further, the bad acquisitions and regulatory headaches should spur management to cut and run in the US. We look forward to Group results on February 23rd, and the clarity we will receive on its hot mess in the US.     

HSBC Holdings Plc –American Result Intimates Group Miss

*Costs Now An Issue: Ping An Bank (000001.CH) [PAB], the Ping An Insurance (2318.HK) [Ping An] banking subsidiary, reported CNY 6.5 bn – declining CNY 2.2 bn (25.1%) on a linked quarter basis. In this environment, credit troubles no doubt are a foregone conclusion. However, this was not necessarily PAB’s biggest issue in its most results announcement, where the bulk of the earnings decline was attributed to a CNY 1.9 bn (17.1%) linked quarter increase in costs;*Credit Is WEAKER Still:  We find that credit weakness is actually deteriorating at an even more accelerated pace than in 3Q20, as net new NPLs have increased CNY 20.5 bn or a massive 241% (223% in 3Q20) on an annualized basis. We also find that PAB’s reserves still remain quite light by CNY 152 bn if we assume a 2x NPL ratio. This shortfall represents 60% of stated equity; and*Fundamentally Challenged Still: Despite the Investor Day cheerleading session, Ping An P&amp;C operating profits declined CNY 2.6 bn (29.2%) HOH in 1H20, as the overall combined ratio eroded 1.5% to 98.1% due primarily to continued weakness within the credit insurance unit where the combined ratio came in at 125.6% (up 32.4%). The credit insurance segment reported a CNY 3.5 bn underwriting loss, due to defaults on underlying loans.

*Costs Now An Issue: Ping An Bank (000001.CH) [PAB], the Ping An Insurance (2318.HK) [Ping An] banking subsidiary, reported CNY 6.5 bn – declining CNY 2.2 bn (25.1%) on a linked quarter basis. In this environment, credit troubles no doubt are a foregone conclusion. However, this was not necessarily PAB’s biggest issue in its most results announcement, where the bulk of the earnings decline was attributed to a CNY 1.9 bn (17.1%) linked quarter increase in costs;*Credit Is WEAKER Still:  We find that credit weakness is actually deteriorating at an even more accelerated pace than in 3Q20, as net new NPLs have increased CNY 20.5 bn or a massive 241% (223% in 3Q20) on an annualized basis. We also find that PAB’s reserves still remain quite light by CNY 152 bn if we assume a 2x NPL ratio. This shortfall represents 60% of stated equity; and*Fundamentally Challenged Still: Despite the Investor Day cheerleading session, Ping An P&amp;C operating profits declined CNY 2.6 bn (29.2%) HOH in 1H20, as the overall combined ratio eroded 1.5% to 98.1% due primarily to continued weakness within the credit insurance unit where the combined ratio came in at 125.6% (up 32.4%). The credit insurance segment reported a CNY 3.5 bn underwriting loss, due to defaults on underlying loans. 

Hong Kong

BOC Hong Kong (Holdings) Limited provides a comprehensive range of financial products and services to retail and corporate customers.  Its products include retail banking, corporate banking, and treasury services.  The Company operates its branches in Hong Kong and China.

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BOC Hong Kong (BOC HK) (2388 HK)

Oversea Chinese Banking Corp. – Mixed Bag, But AQ Improving

OVERSEA CHINESE BANKING CORP: Were it not for the 0.7% tax rate as opposed to the 12.2% tax rate during 3Q20, OCBC’s bottom-line would've declined...

Thomas J. Monaco

Hang Seng Bank – HSBC Fingerprints All Over This Print

HANG SENG BANK: Hang Seng reported both a weak and low quality 2H20 result - declining 17.5% HOH due loan contraction and NIM compression. The...

Thomas J. Monaco

Pairs Trading Ideas - Asian Financials

We look at liquid and large cap pairs from the financials sector that exhibit mean-reversion and are currently trading at or near an extreme based...

Brian Freitas

HSBC Holdings Plc –American Result Intimates Group Miss

HSBC HOLDINGS PLC: HSBCNA reported troubling results in 4Q20 - declining 195% linked quarter, as operating costs exceed recurring revenues. This...

Thomas J. Monaco

Ping An Insurance - Awful Bank Result

PING AN INSURANCE: PAB reported a 25.1% lower linked quarter result. The bulk of the earnings decline was attributed to a 17.1% increase in costs;...

Thomas J. Monaco

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