Pan-Asia Index Rebalances/ Events/ Delta One, Periscope Analytics

Brian Freitas

Pan-Asia Index Rebalances/ Events/ Delta One

Quantitative Analysis

In this Insight, we look at Asian financial pairs that normally trade in a tight band versus each other and are now trading at levels that are close to an extreme, making it likely that there could be a short term reversal.These are all large cap financials that trade in excess of US$20m a day, so implementing the strategy should be possible using stock borrow or single stock futures.These ideas are based purely off the stock price history and we recommend investors use a fundamental overlay to determine if the price action is reflective of changes in the sector that benefit one company at the expense of the other, or benefit one company more than the other.

In this Insight, we look at Asian financial pairs that normally trade in a tight band versus each other and are now trading at levels that are close to an extreme, making it likely that there could be a short term reversal.These are all large cap financials that trade in excess of US$20m a day, so implementing the strategy should be possible using stock borrow or single stock futures.These ideas are based purely off the stock price history and we recommend investors use a fundamental overlay to determine if the price action is reflective of changes in the sector that benefit one company at the expense of the other, or benefit one company more than the other.

Silver Point

Thomas J. Monaco

Independent Insight Provider

Silver Point is a boutique research firm that focuses on the broader financial services sector, with a particular focus on troubled institutions globally. 

Asia Ex Japan

Equity Bottom-Up

*Gross Operating Revenues Do NOT Cover Recurring Costs At HSBCNA: HSBC Holdings plc’s (HSBC) [5.HK/HSBA.LN] US subsidiary, HSBC North America (US only) [HSBCNA], reported yet another troubling set of results for 4Q20, losing USD 152.6 mn – down USD 312.6 mn (195.4%) on a linked quarter basis. Excluding non-recurring items, core operating income declined USD 313.6 mn (230.1%) for a loss of USD 177.3 mn over the same period. As it stands again, HSBCNA’s operating costs exceed recurring revenues; *HSBCNA Is Evolving Into An Indian State Bank: Given the credit weakness, we find that NPL/TL and problem assets/TL ratios significantly worsened 92 bp and 160 bp linked quarter, respectively, to 2.82% and 5.01%. By our calculation, we note that net new problem loan growth is a scary USD 867.9 mn  - for an annualized rate of growth of 155.4% - in line with the Indian state banks. By our calculation, HSBCNA’s reserves are light by USD 3.8 bn or 17.6% of HSBCNA’s stated equity. We would have compared the reserve shortfall to PBT, but HSBCNA simply loses money on an operating basis; and*HSBCNA Should Be Dumped At Any Price: HSBCNA is a chronic mess, and there is absolutely no need for HSBC to maintain a full commercial/retail banking presence in the US. It cannot earn a positive return under its current structure; credit is again about to fall off a cliff; does not earning; NIMs are among the lowest in the USA; and capital is shortly about to fall below regulatory guidance. Further, the bad acquisitions and regulatory headaches should spur management to cut and run in the US. We look forward to Group results on February 23rd, and the clarity we will receive on its hot mess in the US.

*Gross Operating Revenues Do NOT Cover Recurring Costs At HSBCNA: HSBC Holdings plc’s (HSBC) [5.HK/HSBA.LN] US subsidiary, HSBC North America (US only) [HSBCNA], reported yet another troubling set of results for 4Q20, losing USD 152.6 mn – down USD 312.6 mn (195.4%) on a linked quarter basis. Excluding non-recurring items, core operating income declined USD 313.6 mn (230.1%) for a loss of USD 177.3 mn over the same period. As it stands again, HSBCNA’s operating costs exceed recurring revenues; *HSBCNA Is Evolving Into An Indian State Bank: Given the credit weakness, we find that NPL/TL and problem assets/TL ratios significantly worsened 92 bp and 160 bp linked quarter, respectively, to 2.82% and 5.01%. By our calculation, we note that net new problem loan growth is a scary USD 867.9 mn  - for an annualized rate of growth of 155.4% - in line with the Indian state banks. By our calculation, HSBCNA’s reserves are light by USD 3.8 bn or 17.6% of HSBCNA’s stated equity. We would have compared the reserve shortfall to PBT, but HSBCNA simply loses money on an operating basis; and*HSBCNA Should Be Dumped At Any Price: HSBCNA is a chronic mess, and there is absolutely no need for HSBC to maintain a full commercial/retail banking presence in the US. It cannot earn a positive return under its current structure; credit is again about to fall off a cliff; does not earning; NIMs are among the lowest in the USA; and capital is shortly about to fall below regulatory guidance. Further, the bad acquisitions and regulatory headaches should spur management to cut and run in the US. We look forward to Group results on February 23rd, and the clarity we will receive on its hot mess in the US.     

HSBC Holdings Plc –American Result Intimates Group Miss

*Costs Now An Issue: Ping An Bank (000001.CH) [PAB], the Ping An Insurance (2318.HK) [Ping An] banking subsidiary, reported CNY 6.5 bn – declining CNY 2.2 bn (25.1%) on a linked quarter basis. In this environment, credit troubles no doubt are a foregone conclusion. However, this was not necessarily PAB’s biggest issue in its most results announcement, where the bulk of the earnings decline was attributed to a CNY 1.9 bn (17.1%) linked quarter increase in costs;*Credit Is WEAKER Still:  We find that credit weakness is actually deteriorating at an even more accelerated pace than in 3Q20, as net new NPLs have increased CNY 20.5 bn or a massive 241% (223% in 3Q20) on an annualized basis. We also find that PAB’s reserves still remain quite light by CNY 152 bn if we assume a 2x NPL ratio. This shortfall represents 60% of stated equity; and*Fundamentally Challenged Still: Despite the Investor Day cheerleading session, Ping An P&amp;C operating profits declined CNY 2.6 bn (29.2%) HOH in 1H20, as the overall combined ratio eroded 1.5% to 98.1% due primarily to continued weakness within the credit insurance unit where the combined ratio came in at 125.6% (up 32.4%). The credit insurance segment reported a CNY 3.5 bn underwriting loss, due to defaults on underlying loans.

*Costs Now An Issue: Ping An Bank (000001.CH) [PAB], the Ping An Insurance (2318.HK) [Ping An] banking subsidiary, reported CNY 6.5 bn – declining CNY 2.2 bn (25.1%) on a linked quarter basis. In this environment, credit troubles no doubt are a foregone conclusion. However, this was not necessarily PAB’s biggest issue in its most results announcement, where the bulk of the earnings decline was attributed to a CNY 1.9 bn (17.1%) linked quarter increase in costs;*Credit Is WEAKER Still:  We find that credit weakness is actually deteriorating at an even more accelerated pace than in 3Q20, as net new NPLs have increased CNY 20.5 bn or a massive 241% (223% in 3Q20) on an annualized basis. We also find that PAB’s reserves still remain quite light by CNY 152 bn if we assume a 2x NPL ratio. This shortfall represents 60% of stated equity; and*Fundamentally Challenged Still: Despite the Investor Day cheerleading session, Ping An P&amp;C operating profits declined CNY 2.6 bn (29.2%) HOH in 1H20, as the overall combined ratio eroded 1.5% to 98.1% due primarily to continued weakness within the credit insurance unit where the combined ratio came in at 125.6% (up 32.4%). The credit insurance segment reported a CNY 3.5 bn underwriting loss, due to defaults on underlying loans. 

*Major BEA Shareholder Under Stress In Front Of Merger: CaixaBank SA (CABK.SM), an 17.3% holder of Bank of East Asia’s (23.HK) [BEA] shares, and still has significant capital concerns. Combined with the acquisition of Bankia (BKIA.SM), pro forma CaixaBank’s (surviving entity) core CET1 target is 11.9%. With CaixaBank's restructuring charge only sufficient to fund EUR 1 bn in cost cuts, CaixaBank will need to find additional ways to manufacture capital in order to fund the restructuring - including asset sales, lower dividends, and/or capital raise; and*Expecting A BEA Offload: With an ownership value at EUR 786 mn, a capital charge of EUR 1.6 bn at pro forma CaixaBank under Basel III, the aforementioned solvency constraints at Caixabank, a fundamentally struggling BEA, and a resurgent mainland China, CaixaBank would have to finally be looking for an exit – which would be a massive overhang on the shares of BEA. The key terms of the CaixaBank/BEA Shareholder  Agreement likely cannot be upheld by the former given that its financial problems prevent it from fulfilling its responsibilities.

*Major BEA Shareholder Under Stress In Front Of Merger: CaixaBank SA (CABK.SM), an 17.3% holder of Bank of East Asia’s (23.HK) [BEA] shares, and still has significant capital concerns. Combined with the acquisition of Bankia (BKIA.SM), pro forma CaixaBank’s (surviving entity) core CET1 target is 11.9%. With CaixaBank's restructuring charge only sufficient to fund EUR 1 bn in cost cuts, CaixaBank will need to find additional ways to manufacture capital in order to fund the restructuring - including asset sales, lower dividends, and/or capital raise; and*Expecting A BEA Offload: With an ownership value at EUR 786 mn, a capital charge of EUR 1.6 bn at pro forma CaixaBank under Basel III, the aforementioned solvency constraints at Caixabank, a fundamentally struggling BEA, and a resurgent mainland China, CaixaBank would have to finally be looking for an exit – which would be a massive overhang on the shares of BEA. The key terms of the CaixaBank/BEA Shareholder  Agreement likely cannot be upheld by the former given that its financial problems prevent it from fulfilling its responsibilities.  

Bank of East Asia – How Much Longer Can Caixa Hold On?

*Poor US Results: In our latest review of HSBC Holdings’ (5.HK/HSBA.LN) [HSBC] US subsidiary, HSBC North America (HSBCNA), we note that fundamentals continue to worsen – although management seems to hope that no one will notice the poor quality and how managed 3Q20 results actually were. According to the 3Q20 US regulatory report, HSBCNA reported bottom-line results if USD 160.0 mn, a USD 111.3 mn (228.5%) increase linked quarter. 3Q20 results were driven by two factors: a massive loss provision and tax rate decline; *We Anxiously Await HSBC’s US Departure: According the Financial Times on November 28, 2020, HSBC is considering offloading its entire US retail network - although a full exit from other businesses in the US is unlikely. The recommendation of a US exit is expected to be presented to the board as early as this week, although the Group is scheduled to provide an update on its plans for its French and US businesses in February 2021; and *HSBCNA Should Be Sold: HSBCNA is a chronic mess, and there is absolutely no need for HSBC to maintain a full commercial/retail banking presence in the US. It cannot earn a positive return under its current structure; credit is again about to fall off a cliff; does not earning; NIMs are among the lowest in the USA; and capital is shortly about to fall below regulatory guidance. Further, the bad acquisitions and regulatory headaches should spur management to cut and run in the US. Knowing HSBC management as we do, they will continue making the same mistakes over and over again.

*Poor US Results: In our latest review of HSBC Holdings’ (5.HK/HSBA.LN) [HSBC] US subsidiary, HSBC North America (HSBCNA), we note that fundamentals continue to worsen – although management seems to hope that no one will notice the poor quality and how managed 3Q20 results actually were. According to the 3Q20 US regulatory report, HSBCNA reported bottom-line results if USD 160.0 mn, a USD 111.3 mn (228.5%) increase linked quarter. 3Q20 results were driven by two factors: a massive loss provision and tax rate decline; *We Anxiously Await HSBC’s US Departure: According the Financial Times on November 28, 2020, HSBC is considering offloading its entire US retail network - although a full exit from other businesses in the US is unlikely. The recommendation of a US exit is expected to be presented to the board as early as this week, although the Group is scheduled to provide an update on its plans for its French and US businesses in February 2021; and *HSBCNA Should Be Sold: HSBCNA is a chronic mess, and there is absolutely no need for HSBC to maintain a full commercial/retail banking presence in the US. It cannot earn a positive return under its current structure; credit is again about to fall off a cliff; does not earning; NIMs are among the lowest in the USA; and capital is shortly about to fall below regulatory guidance. Further, the bad acquisitions and regulatory headaches should spur management to cut and run in the US. Knowing HSBC management as we do, they will continue making the same mistakes over and over again. 

Hong Kong

BOC Hong Kong (Holdings) Limited provides a comprehensive range of financial products and services to retail and corporate customers.  Its products include retail banking, corporate banking, and treasury services.  The Company operates its branches in Hong Kong and China.

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BOC Hong Kong (BOC HK) (2388 HK)

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