Head of Research, IPOs & Placements, Aequitas Research

Sumeet Singh

Head of Research, IPOs & Placements

IPOs and Placements coverage across Asia Pacific

Aequitas Research

We cover all listing across the Asia Pacific along with follow-up placements. As of Dec 2020, our team had covered 539 IPOs with a hit rate of 73.5% and 685 placements with a hit rate of 66.8%.

We combine fundamental bottom-up views with our proprietary quantitative framework to provide a holistic coverage across new listings and placements. Our coverage includes pre-IPO notes before the deal is launched, follow-up analysis once the deal is live and post-listing trading analysis as well.

Event-Driven

<div>
Linklogis, a technology solution provider for supply chain finance in China raised around US$1bn in its Hong Kong IPO in Apr 21. It was subject of a short-seller report by Valliant Varriors which was published yesterday, see <a href="https://www.valiantvarriors.org/post/linklogis-the-brightest-stars-will-always-cast-the-deepest-shadows" target="_blank" rel="noopener">here</a>.
In this report, we will talk about the points raised by the short sellers.
</div><div>We have covered various aspects of the deal in our earlier notes:</div><div><ul style="list-style-type: disc;">
<li>
<a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/linklogis-pre-ipo-the-positives-fast-growing-blockchain-driven-supply-chain-financier" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Linklogis Pre-IPO - The Positives - Fast Growing Blockchain Driven Supply Chain Financier,</a> </li>
<li><a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/linklogis-pre-ipo-the-negatives-inconsistent-growth-and-margins-well-funded-competitors" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Linklogis Pre-IPO - The Negatives - Inconsistent Growth and Margins, Well Funded Competitors, and</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/linklogis-pre-ipo-earnings-forecast-peer-comparison-and-first-stab-at-valuation" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Linklogis Pre-IPO - Earnings Forecast, Peer Comparison and First Stab at Valuation</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/linklogis-pre-ipo-phip-updates-nothing-to-complain-about" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Linklogis Pre-IPO - PHIP Updates - Nothing to Complain About</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/linklogis-ipo-pricey-for-a-reason" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Linklogis IPO - Pricey for a Reason</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/linklogis-ipo-trading-decent-but-not-hot-demand" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Linklogis IPO Trading - Decent but Not Hot Demand</a></li>
</ul></div>


Linklogis, a technology solution provider for supply chain finance in China raised around US$1bn in its Hong Kong IPO in Apr 21. It was subject of a short-seller report by Valliant Varriors which was published yesterday, see here.
In this report, we will talk about the points raised by the short sellers.
We have covered various aspects of the deal in our earlier notes:

Linklogis Pre-IPO - The Positives - Fast Growing Blockchain Driven Supply Chain Financier, 
Linklogis Pre-IPO - The Negatives - Inconsistent Growth and Margins, Well Funded Competitors, and
Linklogis Pre-IPO - Earnings Forecast, Peer Comparison and First Stab at Valuation
Linklogis Pre-IPO - PHIP Updates - Nothing to Complain About
Linklogis IPO - Pricey for a Reason
Linklogis IPO Trading - Decent but Not Hot Demand


Linklogis Short Sheller Report - Some Merit, Some Plain Drama - Mixed Bag

Senior Credit Analyst, Lucror Analytics

Leonard Law, CFA

Senior Credit Analyst

High Yield Experts

Lucror Analytics

Lucror Analytics is a leading credit and ESG research specialist and a provider of technology solutions for differentiated fixed income strategies. Our roots are in bottom-up fundamental credit analysis with a specialization in high yield corporate credits from Europe, Asia and Latin America. We are one of few research specialists integrating ESG considerations with fundamental credit research through a dedicated ESG platform. Our ESG assessment covers five key criteria: Disclosure, E,S, & G Pillars, Controversies, ESG Impact on Credit and ESG Momentum.

Recognizing the importance and value-add of Factor Investing in fixed income, Lucror developed the Smart Quant Navigator (SQN), an intuitive platform that helps clients devise and implement factor-based strategies ranging from pure quant to active fundamental, with integrated ESG.

Our company has been at the forefront of developments in the fixed income markets, identifying opportunities and consistently delivering new products and value-adding solutions to clients. Lucror has close relationships with the largest and most reputable asset managers, family offices, hedge funds, investment and wealth managers globally.

Credit

Lucror Analytics Morning Views comprise our fundamental credit analysis, opinions and trade recommendations on high yield issuers in the region, based on key company-specific developments in the past 24 hours. Our Morning Views include a section with a brief market commentary, key market indicators and a macroeconomic and corporate event calendar.<ul><li><a href='#lucror-entity-13022'>Anton Oilfield</a></li><li><a href='#lucror-entity-479'>Evergrande Real Estate Group</a></li></ul>

Lucror Analytics Morning Views comprise our fundamental credit analysis, opinions and trade recommendations on high yield issuers in the region, based on key company-specific developments in the past 24 hours. Our Morning Views include a section with a brief market commentary, key market indicators and a macroeconomic and corporate event calendar.Anton OilfieldEvergrande Real Estate Group

Morning Views Asia: Anton Oilfield, Evergrande Real Estate Group

Pan-Asia Catalysts/Events, Quiddity Advisors

David Blennerhassett

Pan-Asia Catalysts/Events

Quiddity Advisors

Last Week in Event SPACE: Evergrande, Spark Infra, Naspers/Prosus, Boral, China Conch Ventures

Travis Lundy

<a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/china-evergrande-group" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Evergrande Real Estate Group (3333 HK)</a> shares rallied enormously sharply in 2017, moving from the mid single digits to HK$30+ by Q3 that year. That year the float in Evergrande was also sharply reduced by the purchases of shares by <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/chinese-estates-holdings-limited" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Chinese Estates Holdings (127 HK)</a> and its owners. 
When the shares fell back after getting squeezed, Evergrande conducted a buyback which got them within a hair's breadth of the residual minimum free float requirement mandated by the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. The shares stayed higher. 
Eventually, Evergrande saw more of the employee share options with low exercise prices exercised which increased the share count and float so when shares fell in 2020, the company could buy back shares, and it did so after shares fell to new 3yr lows in the covid-crash. It bought shares back from May to June, again reducing float to within a hair's breadth of the free float limit, and in the period, shares rose about 50%. 
Then at the start of H2, with a <a href="https://www1.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2020/0701/2020070100031.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">press release</a> about unaudited June sales results and how strong sales had been in H1, the shares popped 40% (from HK$20 to HK$28/share) in three days, then fell back over 6 weeks, going back below HK$20 when the company <a href="https://www1.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2020/0813/2020081301678.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">disclosed</a> it was pre-selling stakes in its property management unit before the IPO, and three days later Evergrande actually issued a <a href="https://www1.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2020/0816/2020081600097.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">profit warning</a>, just before releasing H1 results. 
Also in August, but undisclosed at the time, was the fact that several major real estate developers, including Evergrande, had been called on the carpet to discuss their participation in the so-called Three Red Lines pilot program (the three red lines are a liability-to-asset ratio excluding advanced receipts of 70%, net debt-to-equity ratio of 100%, and cash to short-term debt ratio at 1x). Companies which crossed one of three red lines could not increase interest-bearing borrowing by more than 10% in a year. Cross two of them and they were capped at 5% growth. Cross all three of them and the developer could not increase debt at all. This is tough when funding at high single digits to 10+% interest rates are used to carry ever more non-interest-earning land bank. But Evergrande "met" all three so needed to reduce debt and raise cash, discussed in <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/evergrande-may-be-facing-a-funding-squeeze" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Evergrande May Be Facing a Funding Squeeze</a>. 
There was a story about a "letter", later denied by the company, in September, discussing the importance of the local government helping Evergrande deal with its short-term funding issues, which included the issue of the buyback guarantee offered by Evergrande to minority shareholders of Evergrande's major onshore operating unit Hengda. Evergrande denied the existence of the letter, but despite the fact some Hengda shareholders reportedly wanted out as listing was unlikely, somehow, with the local government's help, Evergrande announced a new agreement meaning repayment in January 2021 was unnecessary. The shares rallied and two weeks later Evergrande raised some capital (discussed in <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/evergrande-equity-placement-musical-shares" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Evergrande Equity Placement - Musical Shares</a>).
I had my ideas about WHY those shares were placed, and it was not to raise equity to pay down debt. The capital raised was less than expected despite the large discount and the shares quickly fell below placement price.  So just 3 weeks after raising equity, it started buying back shares, reasonably quickly raising the price above where it had sold shares. This was discussed in <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/evergrande-equity-de-placement-musical-shares" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Evergrande Equity De-Placement: Musical Shares</a>. Then a couple weeks later, we saw <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/evergrande" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Evergrande Terminate Hengda's Backdoor Listing</a> so the story left was one of an optically "cheap" but heavily indebted developer, lowering selling prices to liquidate inventory, lower debt and raise cash levels, etc. There were sales of shares of recently listed subsidiaries. There were announcements of how much debt had been lowered. But shares fell. 
There were stories in Chinese media and in social media about issues with the company's trade acceptance bills. An <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-07-09/china-urged-evergrande-founder-to-find-quick-fix-for-debt-woes" target="_blank" rel="noopener">article</a> on Bloomberg.com a week ago reported that while Evergrande chairman Hui Ka Yan was in Beijing for the 100th anniversary celebrations 1 July, he met with the Financial Stability and Development Committee, which urged him to solve his company's debt problems pronto. The article is worth reading. It suggested more worry at the top than thought, and even says FSDC officials had suggested bringing in strategic investors. Hui said he was speaking with local investors. 
Bonds have traded lower and lower and the 2024-2025 maturity bonds appear to be trading in the 60s, with shorter-dated bonds trading at 30+% yield to maturity. Wednesday, the shares closed at HK$8.91 - lowest in four years. 
<h3>Yesterday, there was new news. </h3>
The company announced a board meeting for 27 July where the Board would consider a special dividend. 
<section class="figure">
<figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/218/832/original/Screenshot+2021-07-16+at+10.05.32+AM.png?1626401169" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="218832"></figure>
</section>

My first reaction was, I admit, one of surprise, but on second thought it should not be THAT surprising.
The immediate public comments I have seen suggested an attempt to squeeze shorts. According to data from the SFC, shorts have risen from levels near-matching covid-crash lows, and now stand at roughly 2.1% of shares out (a bit under 10% of float), but that would not do it.
The single most indebted real estate company in the world, with short-term bonds yielding risk-free-rate plus.... [checks notes] 30+%, where the chairman gets called onto the carpet of the highest financial regulator in China - not the PBOC, CSRC, or CBIRC - above them - urging him to Do Something - sell assets, lower debt, raise equity - deciding to pay a special dividend to its equity holders? 
I expect Hui Ka Yan has his reasons, and I expect those reasons do not include rewarding long-suffering minority shareholders. Or squeezing shorts.

Evergrande Real Estate Group (3333 HK) shares rallied enormously sharply in 2017, moving from the mid single digits to HK$30+ by Q3 that year. That year the float in Evergrande was also sharply reduced by the purchases of shares by Chinese Estates Holdings (127 HK) and its owners. 
When the shares fell back after getting squeezed, Evergrande conducted a buyback which got them within a hair's breadth of the residual minimum free float requirement mandated by the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. The shares stayed higher. 
Eventually, Evergrande saw more of the employee share options with low exercise prices exercised which increased the share count and float so when shares fell in 2020, the company could buy back shares, and it did so after shares fell to new 3yr lows in the covid-crash. It bought shares back from May to June, again reducing float to within a hair's breadth of the free float limit, and in the period, shares rose about 50%. 
Then at the start of H2, with a press release about unaudited June sales results and how strong sales had been in H1, the shares popped 40% (from HK$20 to HK$28/share) in three days, then fell back over 6 weeks, going back below HK$20 when the company disclosed it was pre-selling stakes in its property management unit before the IPO, and three days later Evergrande actually issued a profit warning, just before releasing H1 results. 
Also in August, but undisclosed at the time, was the fact that several major real estate developers, including Evergrande, had been called on the carpet to discuss their participation in the so-called Three Red Lines pilot program (the three red lines are a liability-to-asset ratio excluding advanced receipts of 70%, net debt-to-equity ratio of 100%, and cash to short-term debt ratio at 1x). Companies which crossed one of three red lines could not increase interest-bearing borrowing by more than 10% in a year. Cross two of them and they were capped at 5% growth. Cross all three of them and the developer could not increase debt at all. This is tough when funding at high single digits to 10+% interest rates are used to carry ever more non-interest-earning land bank. But Evergrande "met" all three so needed to reduce debt and raise cash, discussed in Evergrande May Be Facing a Funding Squeeze. 
There was a story about a "letter", later denied by the company, in September, discussing the importance of the local government helping Evergrande deal with its short-term funding issues, which included the issue of the buyback guarantee offered by Evergrande to minority shareholders of Evergrande's major onshore operating unit Hengda. Evergrande denied the existence of the letter, but despite the fact some Hengda shareholders reportedly wanted out as listing was unlikely, somehow, with the local government's help, Evergrande announced a new agreement meaning repayment in January 2021 was unnecessary. The shares rallied and two weeks later Evergrande raised some capital (discussed in Evergrande Equity Placement - Musical Shares).
I had my ideas about WHY those shares were placed, and it was not to raise equity to pay down debt. The capital raised was less than expected despite the large discount and the shares quickly fell below placement price.  So just 3 weeks after raising equity, it started buying back shares, reasonably quickly raising the price above where it had sold shares. This was discussed in Evergrande Equity De-Placement: Musical Shares. Then a couple weeks later, we saw Evergrande Terminate Hengda's Backdoor Listing so the story left was one of an optically "cheap" but heavily indebted developer, lowering selling prices to liquidate inventory, lower debt and raise cash levels, etc. There were sales of shares of recently listed subsidiaries. There were announcements of how much debt had been lowered. But shares fell. 
There were stories in Chinese media and in social media about issues with the company's trade acceptance bills. An article on Bloomberg.com a week ago reported that while Evergrande chairman Hui Ka Yan was in Beijing for the 100th anniversary celebrations 1 July, he met with the Financial Stability and Development Committee, which urged him to solve his company's debt problems pronto. The article is worth reading. It suggested more worry at the top than thought, and even says FSDC officials had suggested bringing in strategic investors. Hui said he was speaking with local investors. 
Bonds have traded lower and lower and the 2024-2025 maturity bonds appear to be trading in the 60s, with shorter-dated bonds trading at 30+% yield to maturity. Wednesday, the shares closed at HK$8.91 - lowest in four years. 
Yesterday, there was new news. 
The company announced a board meeting for 27 July where the Board would consider a special dividend. 




My first reaction was, I admit, one of surprise, but on second thought it should not be THAT surprising.
The immediate public comments I have seen suggested an attempt to squeeze shorts. According to data from the SFC, shorts have risen from levels near-matching covid-crash lows, and now stand at roughly 2.1% of shares out (a bit under 10% of float), but that would not do it.
The single most indebted real estate company in the world, with short-term bonds yielding risk-free-rate plus.... [checks notes] 30+%, where the chairman gets called onto the carpet of the highest financial regulator in China - not the PBOC, CSRC, or CBIRC - above them - urging him to Do Something - sell assets, lower debt, raise equity - deciding to pay a special dividend to its equity holders? 
I expect Hui Ka Yan has his reasons, and I expect those reasons do not include rewarding long-suffering minority shareholders. Or squeezing shorts. 
  

Evergrande's Very Special... Special Dividend?

Lucror Analytics Morning Views comprise our fundamental credit analysis, opinions and trade recommendations on high yield issuers in the region, based on key company-specific developments in the past 24 hours. Our Morning Views include a section with a brief market commentary, key market indicators and a macroeconomic and corporate event calendar.<ul><li><a href='#lucror-entity-479'>Evergrande</a></li><li><a href='#lucror-entity-6159'>China SCE</a></li><li><a href='#lucror-entity-28672'>Powerlong Commercial Management Holdings</a></li><li><a href='#lucror-entity-4153'>Shui On Land</a></li></ul>

Lucror Analytics Morning Views comprise our fundamental credit analysis, opinions and trade recommendations on high yield issuers in the region, based on key company-specific developments in the past 24 hours. Our Morning Views include a section with a brief market commentary, key market indicators and a macroeconomic and corporate event calendar.EvergrandeChina SCEPowerlong Commercial Management HoldingsShui On Land

Morning Views Asia: Evergrande, China SCE, Powerlong Commercial Management Holdings, Shui On Land

China

China Evergrande Group is an integrated residential property developer. The Company, through its subsidiaries, operates in property development, investment, management, finance, internet, health, culture, and tourism markets.

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Evergrande (3333 HK)

Linklogis Short Sheller Report - Some Merit, Some Plain Drama - Mixed Bag

Linklogis, a technology solution provider for supply chain finance in China raised around US$1bn in its Hong Kong IPO in Apr 21. It was subject of...

Sumeet Singh

Morning Views Asia: Anton Oilfield, Evergrande Real Estate Group

Lucror Analytics Morning Views comprise our fundamental credit analysis, opinions and trade recommendations on high yield issuers in the region,...

Lucror Analytics

Last Week in Event SPACE: Evergrande, Spark Infra, Naspers/Prosus, Boral, China Conch Ventures

The weekend is here! Pour yourself a coffee, grab a comfortable seat, and sift through a brief summary of insights on various events discussed...

David Blennerhassett

Evergrande's Very Special... Special Dividend?

Evergrande has been in a world of hurt, actively selling down assets. It has repaid some short-term bonds, but commercial bills remain an issue. So...

Travis Lundy

Morning Views Asia: Evergrande, China SCE, Powerlong Commercial Management Holdings, Shui On Land

Lucror Analytics Morning Views comprise our fundamental credit analysis, opinions and trade recommendations on high yield issuers in the region,...

Lucror Analytics

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