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Global Emerging Market Equities, Propitious Research

Wium Malan, CFA

Global Emerging Market Equities

Independent, Fundamental Quantitative Research

Propitious Research

Fully independent, fundamental and quantitative equity research, focused on companies in the Telecommunication, Media, Technology, Internet and Healthcare sectors in the Global Emerging Markets. Idea generation focused on Quality stocks, trading below their intrinsic Value, with sound Corporate Governance.

Equity Bottom-Up

Alibaba Group Holding  / Equity Bottom-Up

<a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/alibaba-group" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:28434:1" rel="noopener">Alibaba Group (9988 HK)</a> has had a disastrous year, ever since the IPO of their FinTech arm, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/ant-group-co-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:24240:1" rel="noopener">Ant Financial Services Group (6688 HK)</a>, was pulled last minute in November 2020. Since then, they have faced continued regulatory hurdles, including an RMB18.2bn anti-monopoly fine, which has culminated in a 51% share price drop, since its November 2020 peak, which means that Alibaba is currently trading on only a 14.3x forward PE ratio. Given that this is nearly 4 standard deviations below its 5-year historical average trading range, and that this multiple would imply only a 0.72x PEG ratio, for a company with an extremely strong net cash balance sheet, delivering returns on capital well above its cost of capital, with positive free cash flow generation, and a $15bn share buyback program, indicates that there is a massive disconnect between long-term Buy-side expectations and near-term Sell-side estimates. Looking at the reported group financials over this period it does not seem as though the regulatory impact has been that significant on core operations. The key concern, however, is that Alibaba is losing market share in its core businesses. In this insight, I take a closer look at the broader Chinese retail market, as well as the Chinese digital advertising market (I estimate that Alibaba still generates more than 40% of its Chinese commerce revenue, and roughly 1/3rd of group revenue, from marketing activities), to analyse Alibaba’s relative revenue share loss. Finally, I also revisit current valuation levels and analyse what this implies for its Core Commerce operations.

Alibaba Group (9988 HK) has had a disastrous year, ever since the IPO of their FinTech arm, Ant Financial Services Group (6688 HK), was pulled last minute in November 2020. Since then, they have faced continued regulatory hurdles, including an RMB18.2bn anti-monopoly fine, which has culminated in a 51% share price drop, since its November 2020 peak, which means that Alibaba is currently trading on only a 14.3x forward PE ratio. Given that this is nearly 4 standard deviations below its 5-year historical average trading range, and that this multiple would imply only a 0.72x PEG ratio, for a company with an extremely strong net cash balance sheet, delivering returns on capital well above its cost of capital, with positive free cash flow generation, and a $15bn share buyback program, indicates that there is a massive disconnect between long-term Buy-side expectations and near-term Sell-side estimates. Looking at the reported group financials over this period it does not seem as though the regulatory impact has been that significant on core operations. The key concern, however, is that Alibaba is losing market share in its core businesses. In this insight, I take a closer look at the broader Chinese retail market, as well as the Chinese digital advertising market (I estimate that Alibaba still generates more than 40% of its Chinese commerce revenue, and roughly 1/3rd of group revenue, from marketing activities), to analyse Alibaba’s relative revenue share loss. Finally, I also revisit current valuation levels and analyse what this implies for its Core Commerce operations.

Alibaba: How Much Core Market Share Loss Has Been Priced In?