Expert on Japan Retail and Consumer Markets, JapanConsuming

Michael Causton

Expert on Japan Retail and Consumer Markets

Real Insight on Japanese Consumer Markets

JapanConsuming

JapanConsuming is a specialist research firm producing intelligence on Japanese retail and consumer markets. Founded in 2000, JapanConsuming has become the leading provider of insights on Japanese retailers and consumer trends to retailers, brands, government agencies and investors. As well as a highly regarded monthly report on the market, JapanConsuming produces in-depth reports on retail sectors, seminars on key trends and telephone consulting to investors on trends and retailers.

JapanConsuming was founded by Michael Causton and Roy Larke. 

Thematic (Sector/Industry)

Contraction in apparel consumption aside, Japanese fashion retailers and brands have made dramatic strides to pull in customers online with e-commerce sales up 24% last year according to one survey, faster than the growth in e-commerce overall. Even some wholesalers are succeeding digitally. 
What the results show is a breakthrough shift to online with likely further growth this year, taking the online channel’s share above 25% and more than 30% for many of those firms with higher online ratios.

Contraction in apparel consumption aside, Japanese fashion retailers and brands have made dramatic strides to pull in customers online with e-commerce sales up 24% last year according to one survey, faster than the growth in e-commerce overall. Even some wholesalers are succeeding digitally. 
What the results show is a breakthrough shift to online with likely further growth this year, taking the online channel’s share above 25% and more than 30% for many of those firms with higher online ratios.

Pan-Asia Catalysts/Events, Quiddity Advisors

Travis Lundy

Pan-Asia Catalysts/Events

Quiddity Advisors

Event-Driven

Every year (usually in the beginning of September), the Nikkei Inc Index team conducts an annual review of the major price-weighted Nikkei indices - the most important being the Nikkei 225 Average - and adds and subtracts constituents according to the Rules.
Today, they announced the 2021 version of the changes (<a href="https://indexes.nikkei.co.jp/nkave/archives/news/20210906E_1.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">announcement</a>, <a href="https://indexes.nikkei.co.jp/nkave/archives/news/20210906E_3.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">PAF changes</a>).
Below is Some Background. If you want to skip ahead to the juicy analysis, you can jump ahead to the Changes Announced section just below, and then more below the fold.
<h3>Some Background</h3>
The Nikkei 225, well-known globally as "the Nikkei" is a price-weighted index, originally started nearly 70 years ago as an average of a selected number of stocks listed on the TSE First Section. Later, it became 225 members. 
Because it is price-weighted, and because for a long time it made no divisor adjustments for stock splits (so when a stock split 2:1 its weight fell by half because price fell by half and trackers had to sell half their shares in that stock), and the price multiplier was determined by the par value of a company, then they later they started adjusting for splits, stocks which are old, never split, AND have a high price end up having a high weight in the index. 
There was a huge reshuffle in April 2000 when the Nikkei decided that the system needed rebalancing to include more tech, so they changed the Rules. They pushed 30 names out and 30 names in, and the 30 names added were 50% of the new index. 
Twenty one years after the prior change in methodology, this past May 10 the Nikkei Inc Index Team announced new changes to the Rules. There was a <a href="https://indexes.nikkei.co.jp/nkave/archives/news/20210510E_1.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">proposal</a>, with an <a href="https://indexes.nikkei.co.jp/nkave/archives/news/20210510E_3.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">FAQ</a>, and <a href="https://indexes.nikkei.co.jp/nkave/archives/news/20210510E_2.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">supplemental data</a>. On 5 July, the Nikkei confirmed the proposal with a new <a href="https://indexes.nikkei.co.jp/nkave/archives/news/20210705E_1.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Guidebook</a>.
When I wrote about this on 10 May in <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/after-20yrs-nikkei-225-proposes-minor-impact-rule-changes-nintendo-disappointment" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:51277" rel="noopener">After 20yrs, Nikkei 225 Proposes Minor Impact Rule Changes (Nintendo Disappointment?)</a> I said I thought the changes disappointing. There are real problems with the index and this did not do much; the changes are evolutionary rather than revolutionary, with the only interesting change being that constituents are added with a weight no greater than 1%. If the normal price adjustment factor would allow a constituent to enter at a weight greater than 1%, the Price Adjustment Factor (base 1) is lowered in increments of 0.1 so that the deemed inclusion weight on Base Date (end of July) is no more than 1%. There is no change to the idea that the Nikkei Index Team can override their rankings at any time as they see fit.
Because the Nikkei Index Team had let the sector balances and rankings slide quite a bit over the years (not adding "obvious" names and not deleting names which should probably have been deleted, and not rebalancing the sectors as the rules say they should), the possibility was that some names like <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/nintendo-co-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:5415:1" rel="noopener">Nintendo Co Ltd (7974 JP)</a> and similar high-price-low-share-count names which "deserved" to be included were not simply because their very high price would create undue impact (it was undue impact and the lack of incremental float for high-weight low-share-count names which caused the BOJ to lower, then eventually cease their buying of Nikkei 225 ETFs). This rule on capping inclusions at 1% would go a ways to mitigating that problem so that would allow the Nikkei to add previously un-addable names. Expectations were high on a group of names, with <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/nintendo-co-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:5415:1" rel="noopener">Nintendo Co Ltd (7974 JP)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/keyence-corp" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:3077:1" rel="noopener">Keyence Corp (6861 JP)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/zozo-inc" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:18379:1" rel="noopener">ZOZO Inc (3092 JP)</a>, and probably <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/oriental-land-co-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:13517:1" rel="noopener">Oriental Land (4661 JP)</a>, with the latter two likely to create some real froth if actually selected. 
<h2>The Changes Announced</h2>
Today after the close, the Nikkei Index Team announced the following changes to the Nikkei 225 Average as a result of the Annual Review:
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The changes will be made on the last trading day of September, at the close. I expect to see $10bn trade on that day.
The new rules allow the Nikkei Index team to not do a lot to the sector mix if the additions are made because of "High Liquidity" because while the sector mix would normally mean more than three deleted, the new rules cap changes at 3 per annual rebalance (which is not enough).
As noted above, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/zozo-inc" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:18379:1" rel="noopener">ZOZO Inc (3092 JP)</a> and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/oriental-land-co-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:13517:1" rel="noopener">Oriental Land (4661 JP)</a> were among names which were expected as possible inclusions and therefore a certain amount of pre-positioning may be in place. They may get somewhat hurt tomorrow.
<div class="content-highlight">
There are a LOT of moving parts here. There are 3 ADDs, 3 DELETIONS, 1 Price Adjustment Factor moved sharply higher and one moved somewhat lower (a list of all the PAFs announced by the Nikkei is <a href="https://indexes.nikkei.co.jp/nkave/archives/news/20210906E_3.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">here</a>), then there are another 220 stocks which will see selling on 30 September at the rebalance. 
</div>
For more detailed analysis of the stocks, their positioning, how much to buy, etc, please read on.
<hr>
For more about passive tracking in Japan, please refer to <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/japan-passive-who-owns-what-2021" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:55008" rel="noopener">JAPAN PASSIVE: Who Owns What 2021?</a>

Every year (usually in the beginning of September), the Nikkei Inc Index team conducts an annual review of the major price-weighted Nikkei indices - the most important being the Nikkei 225 Average - and adds and subtracts constituents according to the Rules.
Today, they announced the 2021 version of the changes (announcement, PAF changes).
Below is Some Background. If you want to skip ahead to the juicy analysis, you can jump ahead to the Changes Announced section just below, and then more below the fold.
Some Background
The Nikkei 225, well-known globally as "the Nikkei" is a price-weighted index, originally started nearly 70 years ago as an average of a selected number of stocks listed on the TSE First Section. Later, it became 225 members. 
Because it is price-weighted, and because for a long time it made no divisor adjustments for stock splits (so when a stock split 2:1 its weight fell by half because price fell by half and trackers had to sell half their shares in that stock), and the price multiplier was determined by the par value of a company, then they later they started adjusting for splits, stocks which are old, never split, AND have a high price end up having a high weight in the index. 
There was a huge reshuffle in April 2000 when the Nikkei decided that the system needed rebalancing to include more tech, so they changed the Rules. They pushed 30 names out and 30 names in, and the 30 names added were 50% of the new index. 
Twenty one years after the prior change in methodology, this past May 10 the Nikkei Inc Index Team announced new changes to the Rules. There was a proposal, with an FAQ, and supplemental data. On 5 July, the Nikkei confirmed the proposal with a new Guidebook.
When I wrote about this on 10 May in After 20yrs, Nikkei 225 Proposes Minor Impact Rule Changes (Nintendo Disappointment?) I said I thought the changes disappointing. There are real problems with the index and this did not do much; the changes are evolutionary rather than revolutionary, with the only interesting change being that constituents are added with a weight no greater than 1%. If the normal price adjustment factor would allow a constituent to enter at a weight greater than 1%, the Price Adjustment Factor (base 1) is lowered in increments of 0.1 so that the deemed inclusion weight on Base Date (end of July) is no more than 1%. There is no change to the idea that the Nikkei Index Team can override their rankings at any time as they see fit.
Because the Nikkei Index Team had let the sector balances and rankings slide quite a bit over the years (not adding "obvious" names and not deleting names which should probably have been deleted, and not rebalancing the sectors as the rules say they should), the possibility was that some names like Nintendo Co Ltd (7974 JP) and similar high-price-low-share-count names which "deserved" to be included were not simply because their very high price would create undue impact (it was undue impact and the lack of incremental float for high-weight low-share-count names which caused the BOJ to lower, then eventually cease their buying of Nikkei 225 ETFs). This rule on capping inclusions at 1% would go a ways to mitigating that problem so that would allow the Nikkei to add previously un-addable names. Expectations were high on a group of names, with Nintendo Co Ltd (7974 JP), Keyence Corp (6861 JP), ZOZO Inc (3092 JP), and probably Oriental Land (4661 JP), with the latter two likely to create some real froth if actually selected. 
The Changes Announced
Today after the close, the Nikkei Index Team announced the following changes to the Nikkei 225 Average as a result of the Annual Review:







The changes will be made on the last trading day of September, at the close. I expect to see $10bn trade on that day.
The new rules allow the Nikkei Index team to not do a lot to the sector mix if the additions are made because of "High Liquidity" because while the sector mix would normally mean more than three deleted, the new rules cap changes at 3 per annual rebalance (which is not enough).
As noted above, ZOZO Inc (3092 JP) and Oriental Land (4661 JP) were among names which were expected as possible inclusions and therefore a certain amount of pre-positioning may be in place. They may get somewhat hurt tomorrow.

There are a LOT of moving parts here. There are 3 ADDs, 3 DELETIONS, 1 Price Adjustment Factor moved sharply higher and one moved somewhat lower (a list of all the PAFs announced by the Nikkei is here), then there are another 220 stocks which will see selling on 30 September at the rebalance. 

For more detailed analysis of the stocks, their positioning, how much to buy, etc, please read on.

For more about passive tracking in Japan, please refer to JAPAN PASSIVE: Who Owns What 2021? 

2021 Nikkei 225 Rebalance: Nintendo, Murata, Keyence IN; Nisshinbo, Toyo Seikan, 'Skupper' OUT

Smartkarma Research Team, Smartkarma

Smartkarma Research

Smartkarma Research Team

Smartkarma

Smartkarma unites the fragmented investment industry, connecting institutional investors, independent research providers, and corporates within a single network.

Research Reinvented

Equity Bottom-Up

For our next Webinar, we are excited to welcome back Insight Provider <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/profiles/mio-kato" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="accounts:713" rel="noopener">Mio Kato</a> and the LightStream Research team, as they present unique views into approaching the Japanese market. LightStream offers insights gleaned from their expertise on the ground, engaging with company management and bridging business and culture gaps between Japan and western Investors.<h3>The webinar will be hosted on Wednesday, 1 September 2021, 17:00 SGT/HKT.</h3><div class="content-highlight"><h2><a href="https://share.hsforms.com/1H9pFZOB-RF2J00kbvMmxcw2c5gj?zoom_webinar_id=89011968584" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Register for the Webinar here</a></h2></div>Mio Kato has over 15 years of experience looking at Japanese and Asian cyclically driven sectors such as Gaming, Factory Automation and Autos. He was previously with FrontPoint Partners LP, Arrowhawk Capital Partners, and Uzabase before founding LightStream Research.LightStream Research conducts quantitatively rigorous and data-driven analysis with a focus on Japan and Asia. The team supplement traditional qualitative insights from company relationships with a robust quantitative foundation that examines as much historical data as is available. They further refine the accuracy of their insights and calls through the use of alternative data to flesh out current trends, and through a valuation framework that emphasises non-superficial peer group selection and a proper attempt to understand the metrics and changes that have driven security valuations in the past.

For our next Webinar, we are excited to welcome back Insight Provider Mio Kato and the LightStream Research team, as they present unique views into approaching the Japanese market. LightStream offers insights gleaned from their expertise on the ground, engaging with company management and bridging business and culture gaps between Japan and western Investors.The webinar will be hosted on Wednesday, 1 September 2021, 17:00 SGT/HKT.Register for the Webinar hereMio Kato has over 15 years of experience looking at Japanese and Asian cyclically driven sectors such as Gaming, Factory Automation and Autos. He was previously with FrontPoint Partners LP, Arrowhawk Capital Partners, and Uzabase before founding LightStream Research.LightStream Research conducts quantitatively rigorous and data-driven analysis with a focus on Japan and Asia. The team supplement traditional qualitative insights from company relationships with a robust quantitative foundation that examines as much historical data as is available. They further refine the accuracy of their insights and calls through the use of alternative data to flesh out current trends, and through a valuation framework that emphasises non-superficial peer group selection and a proper attempt to understand the metrics and changes that have driven security valuations in the past.

Smartkarma Webinar | Understanding Japanese Companies: Insights from LightStream Research

Fashion retailers continue to rely on third-party platforms, especially <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/zozo-inc" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:18379:1" rel="noopener">ZOZO Inc (3092 JP),</a> to sell online but the scale of investment in direct mobile and web is growing. With Baycrews alone seeing customers that shop both online and in stores hitting 52% of all customers and spending 3.7 times more than store-only customers, it is not hard to see why.While there is no likelihood of direct sales taking significant share from the major online malls anytime soon, it is also true that the biggest competitive threat to the big three malls plus Zozo isn't another mall but the determination of fashion retailers and brands to wrest more control of online. On advantage they do have is experience of running retail stores and re opening more stores branded with the online shop name to increase awareness and cross-use.With one fashion retailer seeing the average annual purchase value of cross-use users 3.7 times that of store-only users, an astonishingly high difference, it is no surprise there is momentum to invest more in direct online sales.

Fashion retailers continue to rely on third-party platforms, especially ZOZO Inc (3092 JP), to sell online but the scale of investment in direct mobile and web is growing. With Baycrews alone seeing customers that shop both online and in stores hitting 52% of all customers and spending 3.7 times more than store-only customers, it is not hard to see why.While there is no likelihood of direct sales taking significant share from the major online malls anytime soon, it is also true that the biggest competitive threat to the big three malls plus Zozo isn't another mall but the determination of fashion retailers and brands to wrest more control of online. On advantage they do have is experience of running retail stores and re opening more stores branded with the online shop name to increase awareness and cross-use.With one fashion retailer seeing the average annual purchase value of cross-use users 3.7 times that of store-only users, an astonishingly high difference, it is no surprise there is momentum to invest more in direct online sales.

Japanese Fashion Retailers Advance Online Investment

NTT (Nippon Telegraph & Telephone) / Event-Driven

With its Q1 earnings release on Friday 6 August, NTT also announced a buyback. This is the seventh large buyback in five years. The buyback programs for on-market buyback announced from 2016-2019 were ¥150bn in size, uniformly. Since then, the two on-market buybacks have been ¥250bn. One might have expected this one to be ¥150-200bn but at ¥250bn it is likely at the high end of expectations for three reasons.<ol>
<li>In order to buy back ¥300bn next time from the government, it needs to buy back ¥250bn from the market this time. </li>
<li>This larger buyback represents continued effort at offsetting the dilution from the ¥200bn share sale to Toyota in March 2020, and </li>
<li>This larger buyback represents NTT using the additional earnings power of NTT Docomo. NTT used to buy back shares from the market and from NTT, then NTT would take that cash and capital and buy back its own shares. Now NTT Docomo doesn't have to spend any money on buybacks from minority shareholders. All of its cash can go to the parent NTT. NTT therefore has more to spend on buybacks. Given several of the recent NTT Docomo buybacks were on the order of ¥300bn, the one-third of that amount which did not accrue to NTT now does. So now it accrues to NTT shareholders. </li>
</ol>I expect a buyback size of ¥250-300bn to be the new standard.Of course, this lets us take a look at NTT vs its competitors KDDI and Softbank Corp yet again, and compare the impact on the market of the various buyback programs in place.More below the fold.

With its Q1 earnings release on Friday 6 August, NTT also announced a buyback. This is the seventh large buyback in five years. The buyback programs for on-market buyback announced from 2016-2019 were ¥150bn in size, uniformly. Since then, the two on-market buybacks have been ¥250bn. One might have expected this one to be ¥150-200bn but at ¥250bn it is likely at the high end of expectations for three reasons.
In order to buy back ¥300bn next time from the government, it needs to buy back ¥250bn from the market this time. 
This larger buyback represents continued effort at offsetting the dilution from the ¥200bn share sale to Toyota in March 2020, and 
This larger buyback represents NTT using the additional earnings power of NTT Docomo. NTT used to buy back shares from the market and from NTT, then NTT would take that cash and capital and buy back its own shares. Now NTT Docomo doesn't have to spend any money on buybacks from minority shareholders. All of its cash can go to the parent NTT. NTT therefore has more to spend on buybacks. Given several of the recent NTT Docomo buybacks were on the order of ¥300bn, the one-third of that amount which did not accrue to NTT now does. So now it accrues to NTT shareholders. 
I expect a buyback size of ¥250-300bn to be the new standard.Of course, this lets us take a look at NTT vs its competitors KDDI and Softbank Corp yet again, and compare the impact on the market of the various buyback programs in place.More below the fold.

NTT Buybacks Continue - Bigger, Better, Faster, Stronger

Japan

ZOZO Inc operates internet shopping sites for apparel.  The Company also provides communication services relating to apparel such as blogs by fashion moguls and internet chat room for users.

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ZOZO Inc (3092 JP)

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On 1 September, 5pm SGT, join us for a Webinar with Mio Kato and the LightStream Research team, as they present unique views into approaching the...

Smartkarma Research

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The major competitor for the major online malls in the Japanese fashion market, like Zozo and Rakuten, isn't another online mall but the growing...

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NTT Buybacks Continue - Bigger, Better, Faster, Stronger

NTT Announces good earnings and a big buyback. Buybacks are normal but this buyback is the new normal, delivering NTT Docomo's earnings to NTT...

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