Head of Research, IPOs & Placements, Aequitas Research

Sumeet Singh

Head of Research, IPOs & Placements

IPOs and Placements coverage across Asia Pacific

Aequitas Research

We cover all listing across the Asia Pacific along with follow-up placements. As of Dec 2020, our team had covered 539 IPOs with a hit rate of 73.5% and 685 placements with a hit rate of 66.8%.

We combine fundamental bottom-up views with our proprietary quantitative framework to provide a holistic coverage across new listings and placements. Our coverage includes pre-IPO notes before the deal is launched, follow-up analysis once the deal is live and post-listing trading analysis as well.

Equity Capital Markets

<ul>
<li>
<a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/mankind-pharma-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:36389:1" rel="noopener">Mankind Pharma</a>  is looking to raise about US$1bn in its upcoming India IPO.</li>
<li>MP is a pharmaceutical company engaged in developing, manufacturing and marketing a range of pharmaceutical formulations across various acute and chronic therapeutic areas, as well as several consumer healthcare products.</li>
<li>In this note, we talk about the positive aspects of the deal.</li>
</ul>



Mankind Pharma  is looking to raise about US$1bn in its upcoming India IPO.
MP is a pharmaceutical company engaged in developing, manufacturing and marketing a range of pharmaceutical formulations across various acute and chronic therapeutic areas, as well as several consumer healthcare products.
In this note, we talk about the positive aspects of the deal.


Mankind Pharma Pre-IPO - The Positives - Diverse Portfolio with Steady past Performance

Cisarua Mountain Dairy / Equity Capital Markets

<ul>
<li>PT Cisarua Mountain Dairy (CMD), a producer of dairy and consumer foods, raised around US$260m in its Indonesian IPO.</li>
<li>It is a market leader in the overall yogurt sub-category as well as in the spoonable and drinking yogurt segments with a market share of 53.2%, 71.9% and 50.3%, respectively. </li>
<li>In this note, we will talk about the trading dynamics and valuation.</li>
</ul>


PT Cisarua Mountain Dairy (CMD), a producer of dairy and consumer foods, raised around US$260m in its Indonesian IPO.
It is a market leader in the overall yogurt sub-category as well as in the spoonable and drinking yogurt segments with a market share of 53.2%, 71.9% and 50.3%, respectively. 
In this note, we will talk about the trading dynamics and valuation.


Cisarua Mountain Dairy  (Cimory) IPO Trading - Appears to Be Nearly Fully Priced

Pan-Asia Catalysts/Events, Quiddity Advisors

David Blennerhassett

Pan-Asia Catalysts/Events

Quiddity Advisors

Event-Driven

<p>Back on 29th June 2001, BHP and Billiton merged by way of a dual-headed structure.  Shareholders continued to hold their pre-merger shares in BHP or Billiton, but with the same economic interest in the entire group, and dividends and capital distributions were equalised in accordance with a 1:1 equalisation ratio.</p>
<div>
<figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/224/287/original/image?1629186949" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="224287"></figure>
</div>
<div>
<ul style="list-style-type: disc;">
<li>This unique structure has faced investor criticism over the years.  Most recently, on the 10 April 2017,  <a href="http://www.elliottadvisors.hk/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Elliott Advisors (HK) Limited</a> issued a number of proposals via an <a href="https://fixingbhp.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/BHP-Letter-to-the-Directors.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">open letter</a> to the board of <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/147" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:147:1" rel="noopener">BHP Billiton Limited (BHP AU)</a>. This was discussed in greater detail in <em><a href="https://skr.ma/RYqo" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Elliott's Proposals Test BHP's Metal</a></em>.</li>
<li>Elliott argued the DLC structure was obsolete, hinders the ability of BHP to reach its full potential, and creates a long-term trading mismatch between Limited and PLC shares. </li>
<li>A key tenet from the Elliott side was providing greater access to BHP’s franking credits. Elliott proposed under the unified BHP, attaching franking credits to any dividends it makes, enabling all shareholders to participate via fungibility. A similar argument was made for buybacks.</li>
<li>BHP <a href="http://www.bhpbilliton.com/-/media/documents/media/reports-and-presentations/2017/170412_bhpbillitonreviewofelliottproposalpresentation.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">argued</a> the proposal would result in a wastage of franking credits, that unification is not required for off-market buybacks - indeed it would make off-market buybacks less attractive.</li>
<li>Elliott submitted a second letter on the <a href="https://fixingbhp.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/BHP-Press-Release-inc.-Letter-May-2017.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">16 May 2017</a>, reiterating its proposals, and notably singling out BHP's "flawed" unification costs. This letter went unanswered by BHP.</li>
<li>A third letter was issued on the <a href="https://live-fixing-bhp.pantheonsite.io/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Letter-to-Chairman-05.02.18.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">5 February 2018</a>. Using analysis from FTI Consulting, it considered the unification would deliver in excess of US$22bn, with unification costs of US$391mn - against the US$1.3bn estimate from BHP.</li>
<li>Elliott also noted that following the 2015 demerger of South32, Plc no longer generates sufficient income to fund dividends. This resulted in the DLC Dividend share proposal, which was designed to support the matching-dividend policy.  When BHP merged with Billiton, one of the fundamental requirements of the structure was that cash dividends would be equal for both the British and Australian lines, under the matching-dividend policy.</li>
<li>Elliott has not issued a follow-up letter in the past three and a half years - there is a website called <a href="https://fixingbhp.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Fixing BHP</a>. No doubt Elliott were somewhat mollified by BHP selling its US shale oil &amp; gas assets to BP in 2018 - a proposal advocated by Elliott - then announcing on <a href="https://www.asx.com.au/asxpdf/20181101/pdf/43zxbpdqnm2ltl.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">1 November 2018</a> a US$10.4bn (A$14.7bn) return to shareholders through a special dividend (fully franked) and <a href="https://www.asx.com.au/asxpdf/20181108/pdf/440368k1w0qd6n.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">share buyback</a>. </li>
</ul>
</div>
<div>
<h3>But There ARE Fundamental Reasons for BHP’s Premium</h3>
</div>
<div>
<ul>
<li>There exist strong tax arguments supporting a premium in the Australian line relating to dividends and off-market share buyback. The current premium (pre-announcement) is 19.4% (reflected in the ADRs) against a long-term average of 12.5%. </li>
</ul>
</div>
<div>
<figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/224/291/original/image_62648945021629187712421.png?1629187713" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="224291"></figure>
</div>
<div>
<div style="text-align: left;" class="content-caption">Source: CapIQ</div>
</div>
<div>
<ul style="list-style-type: disc;">
<li>
<strong>42% Dividend Tax Advantage</strong>. Australian investors have a highly tax-advantaged position when investing in the Australian line which provides them with a material advantage over other investors.
<ul style="list-style-type: circle;">
<li>Australian dividends are generally paid with a franking credit attached which can be used to offset the income tax liabilities of an Australian recipient.</li>
<li>The franking credit is equivalent to the corporate tax rate (currently 30%) which has been paid. In general, this means that a dollar received by a domestic investor in the Australian line is worth 42% (1/(1-30%)) more to them than an equivalent holding of the London line.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
</div>
<div class="content-caption">
<figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/224/302/original/image_96891655851629189775822.png?1629189776" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="224302"></figure>
<p>Source: <a href="https://live-fixing-bhp.pantheonsite.io/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/FTI-Value-Release-from-Unification-at-BHP-Final.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Elliott</a> </p>
</div>
<div>
<ul>
<li>Theoretically, there is no reason for the BHP/BLT spread to stop widening until it reaches the level of 42% where the most tax-advantaged investors exhaust the excess return - provided sufficient corporate tax has been paid in Australia to cover the franking element on the dividend.</li>
<li>
<strong>The Buyback tax advantage</strong>.  The Australian franking credit system also confers a capital gains tax benefit when BHP carries out off-market tender offers. This is because for tax purposes the transaction is partially treated as a dividend which means some recipients may receive more than the market value of their holding when the franking credits are taken into account.
<ul>
<li>For this reason, BHP can initiate tender offers in Australia struck at large discounts to the market price. In the last tender offer in <a href="https://www.asx.com.au/asxpdf/20181108/pdf/440368k1w0qd6n.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">2018</a>, the discount was capped at the legal maximum level (by the ATO) of 14%.</li>
<li>When the spread blows out to such a level (over 16% premium) as it has now, it compromises the ability to announce further buybacks in Australia as the spread exceeds the maximum legal tender discount level (of 14%). Meaning any Australian buyback would have to be at a premium to the London price. Therefore future buyback proposals will be forced to focus on the London line, in which the franking credits cannot be used.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<h3>Unilever's DLC Unification</h3>
<ul>
<li>Back on the 11 June 2020, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/unilever-nv" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:21141:1" rel="noopener">Unilever NV (UNA NA)</a> / <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/unilever-plc" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:22197:1" rel="noopener">Unilever PLC (ULVR LN)</a> <a href="https://www.unilever.com/news/press-releases/2020/unification-of-unilever-legal-structure.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">announced</a> it would (finally) unify its dual Anglo-Dutch corporate structure under a single parent company based in London, in an about-face to the 2018 unification attempt with a Dutch-headquartered holding company. This deal was discussed in <em><a href="https://skr.ma/PyquN" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Unilever: When Two Heads Are Not Better Than One. What About BHP's DLC?</a></em>.</li>
<li>This unification again renewed interest in BHP's structure.</li>
</ul>
<h3>The New News</h3>
<ul>
<li>BHP has now <a href="https://cdn-api.markitdigital.com/apiman-gateway/ASX/asx-research/1.0/file/2924-02407981-3A572982?access_token=83ff96335c2d45a094df02a206a39ff4" target="_blank" rel="noopener">announced</a> the unification of its corporate structure to make BHP "<em>simpler and more agile</em>", thus removing the complexity of managing the DLC.</li>
<li>BHP considers now is the appropriate time to unify as there has been a significant reduction in cost indications - US$400-500mn compared to ~US$1.6-1.7bn previously.</li>
<li>More importantly, the unification means no change to the dividend policy and the ability of the company to frank dividends.</li>
<li>BHP Plc shareholders would be entitled to receive one Ltd share for each Plc share they own.</li>
<li>As night follows day, expect the spread between the two lines to narrow.</li>
</ul>
<p>More below the fold.</p>
<p></p>
<p></p>
</div>

Back on 29th June 2001, BHP and Billiton merged by way of a dual-headed structure.  Shareholders continued to hold their pre-merger shares in BHP or Billiton, but with the same economic interest in the entire group, and dividends and capital distributions were equalised in accordance with a 1:1 equalisation ratio.





This unique structure has faced investor criticism over the years.  Most recently, on the 10 April 2017,  Elliott Advisors (HK) Limited issued a number of proposals via an open letter to the board of BHP Billiton Limited (BHP AU). This was discussed in greater detail in Elliott's Proposals Test BHP's Metal.
Elliott argued the DLC structure was obsolete, hinders the ability of BHP to reach its full potential, and creates a long-term trading mismatch between Limited and PLC shares. 
A key tenet from the Elliott side was providing greater access to BHP’s franking credits. Elliott proposed under the unified BHP, attaching franking credits to any dividends it makes, enabling all shareholders to participate via fungibility. A similar argument was made for buybacks.
BHP argued the proposal would result in a wastage of franking credits, that unification is not required for off-market buybacks - indeed it would make off-market buybacks less attractive.
Elliott submitted a second letter on the 16 May 2017, reiterating its proposals, and notably singling out BHP's "flawed" unification costs. This letter went unanswered by BHP.
A third letter was issued on the 5 February 2018. Using analysis from FTI Consulting, it considered the unification would deliver in excess of US$22bn, with unification costs of US$391mn - against the US$1.3bn estimate from BHP.
Elliott also noted that following the 2015 demerger of South32, Plc no longer generates sufficient income to fund dividends. This resulted in the DLC Dividend share proposal, which was designed to support the matching-dividend policy.  When BHP merged with Billiton, one of the fundamental requirements of the structure was that cash dividends would be equal for both the British and Australian lines, under the matching-dividend policy.
Elliott has not issued a follow-up letter in the past three and a half years - there is a website called Fixing BHP. No doubt Elliott were somewhat mollified by BHP selling its US shale oil &amp; gas assets to BP in 2018 - a proposal advocated by Elliott - then announcing on 1 November 2018 a US$10.4bn (A$14.7bn) return to shareholders through a special dividend (fully franked) and share buyback. 



But There ARE Fundamental Reasons for BHP’s Premium



There exist strong tax arguments supporting a premium in the Australian line relating to dividends and off-market share buyback. The current premium (pre-announcement) is 19.4% (reflected in the ADRs) against a long-term average of 12.5%. 






Source: CapIQ




42% Dividend Tax Advantage. Australian investors have a highly tax-advantaged position when investing in the Australian line which provides them with a material advantage over other investors.

Australian dividends are generally paid with a franking credit attached which can be used to offset the income tax liabilities of an Australian recipient.
The franking credit is equivalent to the corporate tax rate (currently 30%) which has been paid. In general, this means that a dollar received by a domestic investor in the Australian line is worth 42% (1/(1-30%)) more to them than an equivalent holding of the London line.






Source: Elliott 



Theoretically, there is no reason for the BHP/BLT spread to stop widening until it reaches the level of 42% where the most tax-advantaged investors exhaust the excess return - provided sufficient corporate tax has been paid in Australia to cover the franking element on the dividend.

The Buyback tax advantage.  The Australian franking credit system also confers a capital gains tax benefit when BHP carries out off-market tender offers. This is because for tax purposes the transaction is partially treated as a dividend which means some recipients may receive more than the market value of their holding when the franking credits are taken into account.

For this reason, BHP can initiate tender offers in Australia struck at large discounts to the market price. In the last tender offer in 2018, the discount was capped at the legal maximum level (by the ATO) of 14%.
When the spread blows out to such a level (over 16% premium) as it has now, it compromises the ability to announce further buybacks in Australia as the spread exceeds the maximum legal tender discount level (of 14%). Meaning any Australian buyback would have to be at a premium to the London price. Therefore future buyback proposals will be forced to focus on the London line, in which the franking credits cannot be used.



Unilever's DLC Unification

Back on the 11 June 2020, Unilever NV (UNA NA) / Unilever PLC (ULVR LN) announced it would (finally) unify its dual Anglo-Dutch corporate structure under a single parent company based in London, in an about-face to the 2018 unification attempt with a Dutch-headquartered holding company. This deal was discussed in Unilever: When Two Heads Are Not Better Than One. What About BHP's DLC?.
This unification again renewed interest in BHP's structure.

The New News

BHP has now announced the unification of its corporate structure to make BHP "simpler and more agile", thus removing the complexity of managing the DLC.
BHP considers now is the appropriate time to unify as there has been a significant reduction in cost indications - US$400-500mn compared to ~US$1.6-1.7bn previously.
More importantly, the unification means no change to the dividend policy and the ability of the company to frank dividends.
BHP Plc shareholders would be entitled to receive one Ltd share for each Plc share they own.
As night follows day, expect the spread between the two lines to narrow.

More below the fold.




European Event-Driven Analyst

Jesus Rodriguez Aguilar

<p><a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/royal-dutch-shell-plc-48d2d58c-023d-485f-887d-f13ca5f049f6" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:25197:1" rel="noopener">Royal Dutch Shell (RDSA NA)</a> retains <strong>two main listings</strong> in both London and Amsterdam, both are also traded at the NYSE as ADR:</p>
<ul>
<li>RDSA NA/RDSA LN, more liquid in Amsterdam
<ul>
<li>A shares, converted from Royal Dutch Petroleum, subject to Dutch withholding tax (15%).</li>
<li>Primarily listed in Amsterdam, with a secondary listing in London. </li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>RDSB NA/RDSB LN more liquid in London.
<ul>
<li>B shares, converted from Shell Transport &amp; Trading.</li>
<li>There is no Dutch withholding tax on dividends paid on Royal Dutch Shell Class B ordinary shares or Class B ADSs provided that such dividends are paid on the Dividend Access Share pursuant to the Dividend Access Mechanism.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<p>“B” shares trade in New York at a discount of <strong>approximately 5%</strong> with respect to the “A” shares.</p>
<ul>
<li>
<p>The reason is the effect of Dutch withholding taxes and the tax arrangements, which also create complexity for share buybacks, which could make up a larger proportion of distributions in the future.</p>
</li>
</ul>
<p>Shell has acknowledged over the last years that it might like to combine both  shares, should tax treatments allow it.</p>
<ul>
<li>Oil majors are building renewables/low carbon businesses. In this scenario, they could part-list the pure play, retaining the operational synergies with the wider group but crystallising valuation, which would allow accessing new capital pools and providing investors with greater optionality.</li>
</ul>
<p>RDSB ADR is trading at a 5% discount to RDSA ADR, well above the 10-year average, which is a 2% premium to the B shares. I regard that discount level as attractive.</p>
<p>Trade: <strong>LONG RDSB ADR/SHORT RDSA ADR</strong>. Target: 2% premium.</p>

Royal Dutch Shell (RDSA NA) retains two main listings in both London and Amsterdam, both are also traded at the NYSE as ADR:

RDSA NA/RDSA LN, more liquid in Amsterdam

A shares, converted from Royal Dutch Petroleum, subject to Dutch withholding tax (15%).
Primarily listed in Amsterdam, with a secondary listing in London. 


RDSB NA/RDSB LN more liquid in London.

B shares, converted from Shell Transport &amp; Trading.
There is no Dutch withholding tax on dividends paid on Royal Dutch Shell Class B ordinary shares or Class B ADSs provided that such dividends are paid on the Dividend Access Share pursuant to the Dividend Access Mechanism.



“B” shares trade in New York at a discount of approximately 5% with respect to the “A” shares.


The reason is the effect of Dutch withholding taxes and the tax arrangements, which also create complexity for share buybacks, which could make up a larger proportion of distributions in the future.


Shell has acknowledged over the last years that it might like to combine both  shares, should tax treatments allow it.

Oil majors are building renewables/low carbon businesses. In this scenario, they could part-list the pure play, retaining the operational synergies with the wider group but crystallising valuation, which would allow accessing new capital pools and providing investors with greater optionality.

RDSB ADR is trading at a 5% discount to RDSA ADR, well above the 10-year average, which is a 2% premium to the B shares. I regard that discount level as attractive.
Trade: LONG RDSB ADR/SHORT RDSA ADR. Target: 2% premium.

Unilever on the Verge of Unification, So... What About Royal Dutch Shell?

<div>
<p>With this report, I continue the monthly series on some of the main European holding companies that I deem interesting to long/short clients.</p>
</div>
<div>
<p>The discounts to NAV of Industrivärden and Kinnevik have considerably tightened. It is time to unwind them, and wait for the discounts to widen before setting up the trades again.</p>
</div>
<div>
<p>The most compelling situations in this report are GBL and Investor AB. The spread in Unilever is less than okay, but safe. It should close in a month as a result of the share unification.</p>
</div>


With this report, I continue the monthly series on some of the main European holding companies that I deem interesting to long/short clients.


The discounts to NAV of Industrivärden and Kinnevik have considerably tightened. It is time to unwind them, and wait for the discounts to widen before setting up the trades again.


The most compelling situations in this report are GBL and Investor AB. The spread in Unilever is less than okay, but safe. It should close in a month as a result of the share unification.


Selected European Holdcos and DLCs: October Report

Netherlands

Unilever N.V. manufactures branded and packaged consumer goods, including food, detergents, fragrances, home, and personal care products. Dually-listed company with ULVR LN.

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Unilever NV (UNIA NA)

Mankind Pharma Pre-IPO - The Positives - Diverse Portfolio with Steady past Performance

Mankind Pharma is looking to raise about US$1bn in its upcoming India IPO. In this note, we talk about the positive aspects of the deal.

Sumeet Singh

Cisarua Mountain Dairy (Cimory) IPO Trading - Appears to Be Nearly Fully Priced

PT Cisarua Mountain Dairy (CMD), a producer of dairy and consumer foods, raised around US$260m in its Indonesian IPO. In this we will talk about...

Sumeet Singh

BHP Limited (BHP AU): DLC Reunification

BHP Plc shareholders will be entitled to receive one Ltd share for each Plc share they own. As night follows day, expect the spread between the two...

David Blennerhassett

Unilever on the Verge of Unification, So... What About Royal Dutch Shell?

RDSB ADR is trading at a 5% discount to RDSA ADR, well above the 10-year average. I regard that discount level as attractive. Trade: Long RDSB ADR ...

Jesus Rodriguez Aguilar

Selected European Holdcos and DLCs: October Report

The most compelling situations in this report are GBL and Investor AB. The spread in Unilever is less than okay, but safe. It should close in a...

Jesus Rodriguez Aguilar

Price Gauge

52-week Range

Market Cap (USDm)

P/E

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