Pan-Asia Catalysts/Events, Quiddity Advisors

Travis Lundy

Pan-Asia Catalysts/Events

Quiddity Advisors

Event-Driven

On 31 August, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/kansai-super-market-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:15519:1" rel="noopener">Kansai Super Market (9919 JP)</a> and its top shareholder (10.02% of shares out) <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/h2o-retailing-corp" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:17562:1" rel="noopener">H2 O Retailing (8242 JP)</a> (the parent of Hanshin Department Store and related companies) <a href="https://data.swcms.net/file/h2o-retailing/ja/news/auto_20210830491858/pdfFile.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">announced</a> a business merger whereby the H₂O would inject two supermarket businesses it owns - Izumiya and Hankyu Oasis - into a holding company with Kansai Super, receiving shares in a newly enlarged Kansai Super in exchange. H₂O would go from owning 10.66% to owning 58% of Kansai Super, and the 89.34% would own 42% of NEWCO. The merger was short-dated/accelerated, with the EGM to vote on this deal set for a Record Date on 15 September, the EGMs of all the related companies where an EGM was necessary (Kansai Super, Hankyu Oasis, and Izumiya (the latter two foregone conclusions because they are 100%-owned by H₂O) on 29 October, and the merger effective December 1st.The shares popped a bit, then fell back. At first glance, this seemed somewhat opportunistic for H₂O, and it meant that the 89.34% "minority" in Kansai Super would become a real minority without getting paid a premium or provided a chance to exit. Based on the net assets of the companies, it seemed like H₂O was getting a good deal. Based on the OP levels in the past year, it did not seem like H₂O was getting special treatment. A couple of days later, on 3 September, privately-held discount ("every day low price") supermarket chain OK Corp (primarily based in the Kanto area, but which had been aimed at expanding into the Kansai area), which was the second-largest single shareholder of Kansai Super (based originally in Osaka/Kansai) at 7.23%, stepped up and offered a <a href="https://ok-corporation.jp/media/001/202109/20210903_%E3%83%97%E3%83%AC%E3%82%B9%E3%83%AA%E3%83%AA%E3%83%BC%E3%82%B9.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">press release</a> which said that it would vote against the merger and if the merger were not approved, it would be willing to launch a Tender Offer to buy the shares of Kansai Super at ¥2,250/share (the highest price since listing and nearly vs ¥1,374/share the day before, and more than double the market price of Kansai Super in June when the proposal was made). On 3 Sep OK complained about their treatment, and noted that from the perspective of shareholder interest, their bid should be considered, but OK also had no intention of launching a hostile bid.The shares popped, moving limit up. Then limit up another day, and then the shares traded at JPY 2,200/share in considerable volume before drifting lower.<section class="figure"><figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/229/527/original/Screenshot+2021-09-13+at+8.10.54+PM.png?1631535065" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="229527"></figure></section>Today the shares fell back 7+% to just below JPY 2,000/share. There is some very long history between the founder of OK and Yuji Kitano the founder of Kansai Super, and they once worked together, with OK seconding employees to Kansai Super to learn the business of fresh grocery sales. Mr Kitano passed away in 2013, and OK Supermarket started buying shares in 2016, getting to just under 5%, then it peaked its head above and by the end of the fiscal year in February, owned 7.23%. Of course, that year in October (2016), Kansai Super entered into a business and capital alliance with H₂O Retailing, and H₂O bought about 10% of the shares out. Fast forward five years and it turns out that OK approached Kansai Super in April 2021, and proposed a capital and business alliance on 9 June, in writing. Kansai Super put this to an Independent Committee which then took its time, setting its first meeting with OK some 11 weeks later on 26 August. The Kansai Super <a href="http://www.kansaisuper.co.jp/upimages/irinfo/irnews_629.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">release</a> (Japanese only) on 31 August suggests there was a "third party tender offer approach" but then doesn't discuss it much while saying that intense discussions and due diligence was afforded to H₂O Retailing in the same timeframe.Five days after the first interview with OK, Kansai Super and H₂O announced their deal. This is a complicated deal and it begs the question of whether shareholder interests matter and how shareholders decide. More discussion below.

On 31 August, Kansai Super Market (9919 JP) and its top shareholder (10.02% of shares out) H2 O Retailing (8242 JP) (the parent of Hanshin Department Store and related companies) announced a business merger whereby the H₂O would inject two supermarket businesses it owns - Izumiya and Hankyu Oasis - into a holding company with Kansai Super, receiving shares in a newly enlarged Kansai Super in exchange. H₂O would go from owning 10.66% to owning 58% of Kansai Super, and the 89.34% would own 42% of NEWCO. The merger was short-dated/accelerated, with the EGM to vote on this deal set for a Record Date on 15 September, the EGMs of all the related companies where an EGM was necessary (Kansai Super, Hankyu Oasis, and Izumiya (the latter two foregone conclusions because they are 100%-owned by H₂O) on 29 October, and the merger effective December 1st.The shares popped a bit, then fell back. At first glance, this seemed somewhat opportunistic for H₂O, and it meant that the 89.34% "minority" in Kansai Super would become a real minority without getting paid a premium or provided a chance to exit. Based on the net assets of the companies, it seemed like H₂O was getting a good deal. Based on the OP levels in the past year, it did not seem like H₂O was getting special treatment. A couple of days later, on 3 September, privately-held discount ("every day low price") supermarket chain OK Corp (primarily based in the Kanto area, but which had been aimed at expanding into the Kansai area), which was the second-largest single shareholder of Kansai Super (based originally in Osaka/Kansai) at 7.23%, stepped up and offered a press release which said that it would vote against the merger and if the merger were not approved, it would be willing to launch a Tender Offer to buy the shares of Kansai Super at ¥2,250/share (the highest price since listing and nearly vs ¥1,374/share the day before, and more than double the market price of Kansai Super in June when the proposal was made). On 3 Sep OK complained about their treatment, and noted that from the perspective of shareholder interest, their bid should be considered, but OK also had no intention of launching a hostile bid.The shares popped, moving limit up. Then limit up another day, and then the shares traded at JPY 2,200/share in considerable volume before drifting lower.Today the shares fell back 7+% to just below JPY 2,000/share. There is some very long history between the founder of OK and Yuji Kitano the founder of Kansai Super, and they once worked together, with OK seconding employees to Kansai Super to learn the business of fresh grocery sales. Mr Kitano passed away in 2013, and OK Supermarket started buying shares in 2016, getting to just under 5%, then it peaked its head above and by the end of the fiscal year in February, owned 7.23%. Of course, that year in October (2016), Kansai Super entered into a business and capital alliance with H₂O Retailing, and H₂O bought about 10% of the shares out. Fast forward five years and it turns out that OK approached Kansai Super in April 2021, and proposed a capital and business alliance on 9 June, in writing. Kansai Super put this to an Independent Committee which then took its time, setting its first meeting with OK some 11 weeks later on 26 August. The Kansai Super release (Japanese only) on 31 August suggests there was a "third party tender offer approach" but then doesn't discuss it much while saying that intense discussions and due diligence was afforded to H₂O Retailing in the same timeframe.Five days after the first interview with OK, Kansai Super and H₂O announced their deal. This is a complicated deal and it begs the question of whether shareholder interests matter and how shareholders decide. More discussion below. 

David Blennerhassett

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This insight provides a quick summary of gross/annualised (where possible) spreads (on deals discussed on Smartkarma) across Asia-Pacific as at the last trading date, and how those spreads have changed over the last week; plus the next hard events over the coming weeks.
</div>
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I number 37, mostly firm, deals around the region.
</div>
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More below the fold.
</div>


This insight provides a quick summary of gross/annualised (where possible) spreads (on deals discussed on Smartkarma) across Asia-Pacific as at the last trading date, and how those spreads have changed over the last week; plus the next hard events over the coming weeks.


I number 37, mostly firm, deals around the region.


More below the fold.


Asia-Pac Weekly Risk Arb Summary: China Logistics, Kerry Logistics, China Youzan

Pan-Asia Index Flows & Special Situations, Quiddity Advisors

Janaghan Jeyakumar, CFA

Pan-Asia Index Flows & Special Situations

<div>Tachiaigai Bunbai Offerings are the most common "Pre-event" indicators for TOPIX Inclusion Events. </div><div>
A tachiaigai bunbai Offering is where a company sells newly issued or secondary shares (usually from a controlling shareholder) to the public (Off-market), with a limit placed on the maximum quantity per subscriber, most often with the intention of increasing the number of shareholders, public float percentage, and/or the market capitalization of the public float in order to meet TSE1 Section Transfer requirements. They are announced as taking place in a period a week or two later, then confirmed on the eve of the offer on pricing date - usually at a 2-4% discount - and the offer takes place pre-open the next day.
I have discussed such offerings previously in <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/topix-inclusion-pre-events-recent-tachiaigai-bunbai-round-up" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:40509" rel="noopener">TOPIX Inclusion Pre-Events: Recent "Tachiaigai Bunbai" Round-Up</a> in June 2020 and in <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/topix-inclusion-pre-events-recent-tachiaigai-bunbai-round-up-october-2020-two-stocks-to-buy" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:43984" rel="noopener">TOPIX Inclusion Pre-Events: Recent “Tachiaigai Bunbai” Round-Up (October 2020) - Two Stocks To Buy</a> in October 2020.  
Below is a closer look at the recent history of such tachiaigai bunbai offerings and a discussion on the potential of these candidates to get promoted to TSE1 in the near future. 
</div>

Tachiaigai Bunbai Offerings are the most common "Pre-event" indicators for TOPIX Inclusion Events. 
A tachiaigai bunbai Offering is where a company sells newly issued or secondary shares (usually from a controlling shareholder) to the public (Off-market), with a limit placed on the maximum quantity per subscriber, most often with the intention of increasing the number of shareholders, public float percentage, and/or the market capitalization of the public float in order to meet TSE1 Section Transfer requirements. They are announced as taking place in a period a week or two later, then confirmed on the eve of the offer on pricing date - usually at a 2-4% discount - and the offer takes place pre-open the next day.
I have discussed such offerings previously in TOPIX Inclusion Pre-Events: Recent "Tachiaigai Bunbai" Round-Up in June 2020 and in TOPIX Inclusion Pre-Events: Recent “Tachiaigai Bunbai” Round-Up (October 2020) - Two Stocks To Buy in October 2020.  
Below is a closer look at the recent history of such tachiaigai bunbai offerings and a discussion on the potential of these candidates to get promoted to TSE1 in the near future. 


TOPIX Inclusion Pre-Events: Recent “Tachiaigai Bunbai” Round-Up (August 2021)

Expert on Japan Retail and Consumer Markets, JapanConsuming

Michael Causton

Expert on Japan Retail and Consumer Markets

Real Insight on Japanese Consumer Markets

JapanConsuming

JapanConsuming is a specialist research firm producing intelligence on Japanese retail and consumer markets. Founded in 2000, JapanConsuming has become the leading provider of insights on Japanese retailers and consumer trends to retailers, brands, government agencies and investors. As well as a highly regarded monthly report on the market, JapanConsuming produces in-depth reports on retail sectors, seminars on key trends and telephone consulting to investors on trends and retailers.

JapanConsuming was founded by Michael Causton and Roy Larke. 

Itochu's plans for Familymart are about a lot more than control – it has had effective control for years anyway.
There is a much bigger story: the fact that food is the one last hold out of traditional distribution practices with multiple layers of importers, wholesalers and a fragmented retail sector, resulting in gross inefficiencies. 
Japan's biggest trading companies, particularly <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/itochu-corp" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:18448:1" rel="noopener">Itochu Corp (8001 JP)</a> and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/mitsubishi-corp" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:20668:1" rel="noopener">Mitsubishi Corp (8058 JP),</a> have been major beneficiaries of this system, capturing margins at all stages of the channel, from raw material imports to retail. 
Pressure on the food sector to modernise has been building for a decade and this is now happening in the form of retailers building to national scale to finally take on this supply-side dominance and also learning to source direct, cutting out wholesalers. The trading companies know this and are themselves beginning to build what are in effect vertically integrated food distribution businesses, at the same time as pivoting themselves as the main suppliers to Japan's biggest food-based retailers.
Itochu and Mitsubishi are spearheading this change. This rivalry in the food sector between the two venerable trading firms is as important as the rivalry between their proxies in convenience store retailing, Familymart and Lawson.
Absorbing Familymart is the basis for a much bigger consolidation of Itochu's interests which include stakes in numerous food retailers as well as role as the biggest food wholesaler when all its subsidiaries are taking into account.
Sadly, current Familymart shareholders won't benefit from this consolidation nor the likely spike in operating margins as some of the fat in food distribution is finally cut.
In Japan, where food prices have been kept so high for so long by entrenched interests (Japanese love food but the 24% of consumption budgets spent on food (much, much higher than most  equivalent markets) is much more about high prices than being a gourmet nation), the potential to cut costs is staggeringly large.
Even within CVS retailing, Itochu will likely benefit from the continued growth of the big three retailers – despite format saturation.
For the sector as a whole, 2019 saw the highest average daily sales per store so far of ¥590,794, a 12.1% increase on 2010. In the same decade, total store numbers increased by 33.4%, but total sales increased by 50.2%.
CVS have not just expanded in number, but their position and ability to exploit the market have improved dramatically too. Based on METI figures, CVS market share of retailing has expanded from 6% to 8.4% in the same period.
In other words, saturation is important but not that important because CVS are finding new ways to expand both their share of retailing and influence.

Itochu's plans for Familymart are about a lot more than control – it has had effective control for years anyway.
There is a much bigger story: the fact that food is the one last hold out of traditional distribution practices with multiple layers of importers, wholesalers and a fragmented retail sector, resulting in gross inefficiencies. 
Japan's biggest trading companies, particularly Itochu Corp (8001 JP) and Mitsubishi Corp (8058 JP), have been major beneficiaries of this system, capturing margins at all stages of the channel, from raw material imports to retail. 
Pressure on the food sector to modernise has been building for a decade and this is now happening in the form of retailers building to national scale to finally take on this supply-side dominance and also learning to source direct, cutting out wholesalers. The trading companies know this and are themselves beginning to build what are in effect vertically integrated food distribution businesses, at the same time as pivoting themselves as the main suppliers to Japan's biggest food-based retailers.
Itochu and Mitsubishi are spearheading this change. This rivalry in the food sector between the two venerable trading firms is as important as the rivalry between their proxies in convenience store retailing, Familymart and Lawson.
Absorbing Familymart is the basis for a much bigger consolidation of Itochu's interests which include stakes in numerous food retailers as well as role as the biggest food wholesaler when all its subsidiaries are taking into account.
Sadly, current Familymart shareholders won't benefit from this consolidation nor the likely spike in operating margins as some of the fat in food distribution is finally cut.
In Japan, where food prices have been kept so high for so long by entrenched interests (Japanese love food but the 24% of consumption budgets spent on food (much, much higher than most  equivalent markets) is much more about high prices than being a gourmet nation), the potential to cut costs is staggeringly large.
Even within CVS retailing, Itochu will likely benefit from the continued growth of the big three retailers – despite format saturation.
For the sector as a whole, 2019 saw the highest average daily sales per store so far of ¥590,794, a 12.1% increase on 2010. In the same decade, total store numbers increased by 33.4%, but total sales increased by 50.2%.
CVS have not just expanded in number, but their position and ability to exploit the market have improved dramatically too. Based on METI figures, CVS market share of retailing has expanded from 6% to 8.4% in the same period.
In other words, saturation is important but not that important because CVS are finding new ways to expand both their share of retailing and influence.

Keeping It in the Family: Why Familymart Is Worth so Much More to Itochu

Equity Bottom-Up

<a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/18448" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:18448:1">Itochu Corp (8001 JP)</a>'s recent decision to spend ¥120 billion acquiring a majority stake in <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/320" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:320:1">FamilyMart UNY Holdings (8028 JP)</a> has been a long time coming. Itochu has effectively run Familymart since acquiring its initial stake in 1999, setting off a string of retail acquisitions by trading firms since. Now, having brokered the deal that merged Familymart with Uny in 2016, it is increasing its take from 41.45% of the new holding company to 50.1%. The reasoning behind the move is to gain…

Itochu Corp (8001 JP)'s recent decision to spend ¥120 billion acquiring a majority stake in FamilyMart UNY Holdings (8028 JP) has been a long time coming. Itochu has effectively run Familymart since acquiring its initial stake in 1999, setting off a string of retail acquisitions by trading firms since. Now, having brokered the deal that merged Familymart with Uny in 2016, it is increasing its take from 41.45% of the new holding company to 50.1%. The reasoning behind the move is to gain…

Itochu Building Japan's First End-To-End Food Chain Through Familymart Uny

Japan

KANSAI SUPER MARKET LTD. is a food supermarket chain operator which mainly deals in foodstuffs, daily products, and miscellaneous goods.  The Company has markets in Hyogo and Osaka areas.

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Kansai Super Market (9919 JP)

The Kansai Super (9919) Conundrum

Kansai Super has Two Suitors - H2O Retailing and Kansai Super have ironed out a deal, and OK Corp objects. This creates a conundrum. But solving it...

Travis Lundy

Asia-Pac Weekly Risk Arb Summary: China Logistics, Kerry Logistics, China Youzan

This insight provides a summary of gross/annualised spreads (on deals discussed on Smartkarma) across Asia-Pacific as at the last trading date, and...

David Blennerhassett

TOPIX Inclusion Pre-Events: Recent “Tachiaigai Bunbai” Round-Up (August 2021)

Tachiaigai Bunbai Offerings are the most common "Pre-event" indicators for TOPIX Inclusion Events. In this insight, I have handpicked a few...

Janaghan Jeyakumar, CFA

Keeping It in the Family: Why Familymart Is Worth so Much More to Itochu

Itochu's plans for Familymart are about a lot more than control – it has had effective control for years anyway. There is a much bigger story: the...

Michael Causton

Itochu Building Japan's First End-To-End Food Chain Through Familymart Uny

Itochu Corp (8001 JP)'s recent decision to spend ¥120 billion acquiring a majority stake in FamilyMart UNY Holdings (8028 JP) has been a long time...

Michael Causton

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