Insight Provider, CrossASEAN Research

Nicolas Van Broekhoven

Insight Provider

CrossASEAN Research

At CrossASEAN Research we strive to produce unbiased and differentiated on the ground insights on companies across South East Asia. Our Research is produced for the most part after face to face meetings and conversations with company management to dig deep into the long term vision and strategy of the companies we cover. We seek to deliver investable and actionable themes on sectors and markets across SE Asia, often in collaboration with other Insight Providers across the region, pooling the vast experience of the analysts within the Smartkarma Ecosystem. We also offer bespoke work and tailor made trips for our clients. 

Insights across South East Asia

Equity Bottom-Up

Jardine Strategic Holdings / Equity Bottom-Up

Yesterday <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/jardine-strategic-holdings-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:15081:1" rel="noopener">Jardine Strategic Holdings (JS SP)</a> published its annual results in which it disclosed the NAV was 58.22 USD on 31/12/20. Contrast this with the 33 USD buyout offer tabled earlier this week. Something is seriously off here. Before one goes any further,<a href="https://www.jardines.com/assets/files/Investors/Reports/strategic/js-ar2019.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> please re-read the Corporate Governance (pages 136-141) of Jardine Strategic's 2019 annual report.</a> It will be good to contrast what is written there with what is happening in real-life.<figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/193/684/original/image_59443962741615508974779.png?1615508975" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="193684"></figure>The buzzword "du jour" for all investors is ESG. For the avoidance of doubt this stands for:Environmental, Social, and Governance.In the currently proposed buyout of <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/jardine-strategic-holdings-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:15081:1" rel="noopener">Jardine Strategic Holdings (JS SP)</a> by <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/jardine-matheson-holdings-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:19718:1" rel="noopener">Jardine Matheson Holdings (JM SP)</a> the entire board of both companies (largely the same people) is showing the investment community what it really thinks about the G in ESG. Given the transaction was advised by both <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/jpmorgan-chase-co" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:277:1" rel="noopener">JPMorgan Chase &amp; Co (JPM US)</a> and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/hsbc-holdings-plc" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:516:1" rel="noopener">HSBC Holdings (5 HK)</a> we now also know how "ingrained" the ESG ethos is in practice at those banks.Given the +/-85% ownership of Jardine Strategic by Matheson, one would expect that Matheson could not vote on the proposed transaction and only Jardine Strategic minorities would have an actual vote to deem this offer "fair and reasonable" and give it their thumbs up/down at an SGM. Not in this case. Matheson is intending to use its 85% votes to "ram" this offer across the finish line. Which explains why Matheson expects this deal to close by the end of April 2021. Some changes take decades at Jardine, others clearly don't.It is astonishing that not a single person in these large banking institutions has stood up to Jardine's board and challenged them on the "fairness", "correctness" and "governance" of its proposed 33 USD offer. It is not because you have found some loophole, as made clear by David Webb, in your byzantine listings between Bermuda-Singapore-London that you are required to put your "Gangster" hat on and use it. The "Governance" hat could have been used, a fair buyout of Strategic shareholders could have been chosen but...it was not. The 33 USD offer price might have been a 20% premium to last Friday's closing price but other than that it was a completely arbitrary number unrelated to its Net Asset Value.<figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/193/672/original/image_53585158121615504013720.png?1615504014" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="193672"></figure>Any ESG fund worth their name in salt should therefore shun Jardine and any of its subsidiaries as the directors at Jardine are mostly the same directors at <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/dairy-farm-intl-hldgs-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:7427:1" rel="noopener">Dairy Farm Intl Hldgs (DFI SP)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/mandarin-oriental-intl-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:4773:1" rel="noopener">Mandarin Oriental Intl (MAND SP)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/hongkong-land-holdings-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:15465:1" rel="noopener">Hongkong Land (HKL SP)</a>  and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/jardine-cycle-carriage-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:347:1" rel="noopener">Jardine Cycle &amp; Carriage (JCNC SP)</a>. If you do invest in any of the above know one thing: the ESG statements in their annual reports are not worth the paper they are written on. Buyer beware.

Yesterday Jardine Strategic Holdings (JS SP) published its annual results in which it disclosed the NAV was 58.22 USD on 31/12/20. Contrast this with the 33 USD buyout offer tabled earlier this week. Something is seriously off here. Before one goes any further, please re-read the Corporate Governance (pages 136-141) of Jardine Strategic's 2019 annual report. It will be good to contrast what is written there with what is happening in real-life.The buzzword "du jour" for all investors is ESG. For the avoidance of doubt this stands for:Environmental, Social, and Governance.In the currently proposed buyout of Jardine Strategic Holdings (JS SP) by Jardine Matheson Holdings (JM SP) the entire board of both companies (largely the same people) is showing the investment community what it really thinks about the G in ESG. Given the transaction was advised by both JPMorgan Chase &amp; Co (JPM US) and HSBC Holdings (5 HK) we now also know how "ingrained" the ESG ethos is in practice at those banks.Given the +/-85% ownership of Jardine Strategic by Matheson, one would expect that Matheson could not vote on the proposed transaction and only Jardine Strategic minorities would have an actual vote to deem this offer "fair and reasonable" and give it their thumbs up/down at an SGM. Not in this case. Matheson is intending to use its 85% votes to "ram" this offer across the finish line. Which explains why Matheson expects this deal to close by the end of April 2021. Some changes take decades at Jardine, others clearly don't.It is astonishing that not a single person in these large banking institutions has stood up to Jardine's board and challenged them on the "fairness", "correctness" and "governance" of its proposed 33 USD offer. It is not because you have found some loophole, as made clear by David Webb, in your byzantine listings between Bermuda-Singapore-London that you are required to put your "Gangster" hat on and use it. The "Governance" hat could have been used, a fair buyout of Strategic shareholders could have been chosen but...it was not. The 33 USD offer price might have been a 20% premium to last Friday's closing price but other than that it was a completely arbitrary number unrelated to its Net Asset Value.Any ESG fund worth their name in salt should therefore shun Jardine and any of its subsidiaries as the directors at Jardine are mostly the same directors at Dairy Farm Intl Hldgs (DFI SP), Mandarin Oriental Intl (MAND SP), Hongkong Land (HKL SP)  and Jardine Cycle &amp; Carriage (JCNC SP). If you do invest in any of the above know one thing: the ESG statements in their annual reports are not worth the paper they are written on. Buyer beware.

G Stands for Governance: When Jardine Makes a Mockery of ESG; JS Publishes 58.22 USD NAV on 31/12/20

Silver Point

Thomas J. Monaco

Independent Insight Provider

Silver Point is a boutique research firm that focuses on the broader financial services sector, with a particular focus on troubled institutions globally. 

Asia Ex Japan

*Gross Operating Revenues Do NOT Cover Recurring Costs At HSBCNA: HSBC Holdings plc’s (HSBC) [5.HK/HSBA.LN] US subsidiary, HSBC North America (US only) [HSBCNA], reported yet another troubling set of results for 4Q20, losing USD 152.6 mn – down USD 312.6 mn (195.4%) on a linked quarter basis. Excluding non-recurring items, core operating income declined USD 313.6 mn (230.1%) for a loss of USD 177.3 mn over the same period. As it stands again, HSBCNA’s operating costs exceed recurring revenues; *HSBCNA Is Evolving Into An Indian State Bank: Given the credit weakness, we find that NPL/TL and problem assets/TL ratios significantly worsened 92 bp and 160 bp linked quarter, respectively, to 2.82% and 5.01%. By our calculation, we note that net new problem loan growth is a scary USD 867.9 mn  - for an annualized rate of growth of 155.4% - in line with the Indian state banks. By our calculation, HSBCNA’s reserves are light by USD 3.8 bn or 17.6% of HSBCNA’s stated equity. We would have compared the reserve shortfall to PBT, but HSBCNA simply loses money on an operating basis; and*HSBCNA Should Be Dumped At Any Price: HSBCNA is a chronic mess, and there is absolutely no need for HSBC to maintain a full commercial/retail banking presence in the US. It cannot earn a positive return under its current structure; credit is again about to fall off a cliff; does not earning; NIMs are among the lowest in the USA; and capital is shortly about to fall below regulatory guidance. Further, the bad acquisitions and regulatory headaches should spur management to cut and run in the US. We look forward to Group results on February 23rd, and the clarity we will receive on its hot mess in the US.

*Gross Operating Revenues Do NOT Cover Recurring Costs At HSBCNA: HSBC Holdings plc’s (HSBC) [5.HK/HSBA.LN] US subsidiary, HSBC North America (US only) [HSBCNA], reported yet another troubling set of results for 4Q20, losing USD 152.6 mn – down USD 312.6 mn (195.4%) on a linked quarter basis. Excluding non-recurring items, core operating income declined USD 313.6 mn (230.1%) for a loss of USD 177.3 mn over the same period. As it stands again, HSBCNA’s operating costs exceed recurring revenues; *HSBCNA Is Evolving Into An Indian State Bank: Given the credit weakness, we find that NPL/TL and problem assets/TL ratios significantly worsened 92 bp and 160 bp linked quarter, respectively, to 2.82% and 5.01%. By our calculation, we note that net new problem loan growth is a scary USD 867.9 mn  - for an annualized rate of growth of 155.4% - in line with the Indian state banks. By our calculation, HSBCNA’s reserves are light by USD 3.8 bn or 17.6% of HSBCNA’s stated equity. We would have compared the reserve shortfall to PBT, but HSBCNA simply loses money on an operating basis; and*HSBCNA Should Be Dumped At Any Price: HSBCNA is a chronic mess, and there is absolutely no need for HSBC to maintain a full commercial/retail banking presence in the US. It cannot earn a positive return under its current structure; credit is again about to fall off a cliff; does not earning; NIMs are among the lowest in the USA; and capital is shortly about to fall below regulatory guidance. Further, the bad acquisitions and regulatory headaches should spur management to cut and run in the US. We look forward to Group results on February 23rd, and the clarity we will receive on its hot mess in the US.     

HSBC Holdings Plc –American Result Intimates Group Miss

China and US Equity Analyst

Roger Xie

<ul>
<li>
<a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/hong-kong-exchanges-clearing" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:490:1" rel="noopener">HKEX (388 HK)</a> just announced the appointment of Mr. Nicolas Aguzin as its next CEO effective May 24, which concluded the 9-month CEO searching process. Mr. Aguzin held the post of CEO for JP Morgan's International private Bank before the announcement. Based in Hong Kong, Mr. Aguzin had extensive banking experience in Asian and international market. He had spent around thirty years at <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/jpmorgan-chase-co" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:277:1" rel="noopener">JPMorgan Chase &amp; Co (JPM US)</a>. We applaud HKEx board's decision and believe Mr. Aguzin can bring diversity and deal-making to HKEx.</li>
<li>With outgoing CEO Mr. Charles Li under HKEx helm for 11 years, the transformation of HKEx is impressive. The ADT (Average Daily Turnover) has jumped almost two-fold from HK$60 billion to HK$140 billion. It is not surprised to see HKEx share price generates 230% return in past 5 years, compared with a mere 65% return on Heng Seng Index. We believe Mr. Aguzin will take over HKEx with strong momentum. His high priority is to try exploring business diversification in our opinion. Cash trading accounts majority of HKEx fee and clearing.  Expanding business into more lucrative derivative trading might be high on his agenda. We expect to see the launch of MSCI China A-share future index and gaining business from other major Asian index future business. </li>
<li>
<a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/hong-kong-exchanges-clearing" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:490:1" rel="noopener">HKEX (388 HK)</a> January ADT (Average Daily Turnover) remains very strong, delivering amazing 136% year-over-year growth in the month. We maintain our sanguine view on <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/hong-kong-exchanges-clearing" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:490:1" rel="noopener">HKEX (388 HK)</a>: 1) Hong Kong market becomes de facto choice for China new economy companies for IPO and fund raising; 2) HKEx Northbound trading has become an increasing important factor as the gateway to invest in China A-share; 3) MSCI index products will continue to gain market share. We forecast Securities ADT of HK$240bn in FY 21 (Hong Kong and Stock Connect Northbound) and raise HKEx TP HKD 550. </li>
</ul>



HKEX (388 HK) just announced the appointment of Mr. Nicolas Aguzin as its next CEO effective May 24, which concluded the 9-month CEO searching process. Mr. Aguzin held the post of CEO for JP Morgan's International private Bank before the announcement. Based in Hong Kong, Mr. Aguzin had extensive banking experience in Asian and international market. He had spent around thirty years at JPMorgan Chase &amp; Co (JPM US). We applaud HKEx board's decision and believe Mr. Aguzin can bring diversity and deal-making to HKEx.
With outgoing CEO Mr. Charles Li under HKEx helm for 11 years, the transformation of HKEx is impressive. The ADT (Average Daily Turnover) has jumped almost two-fold from HK$60 billion to HK$140 billion. It is not surprised to see HKEx share price generates 230% return in past 5 years, compared with a mere 65% return on Heng Seng Index. We believe Mr. Aguzin will take over HKEx with strong momentum. His high priority is to try exploring business diversification in our opinion. Cash trading accounts majority of HKEx fee and clearing.  Expanding business into more lucrative derivative trading might be high on his agenda. We expect to see the launch of MSCI China A-share future index and gaining business from other major Asian index future business. 

HKEX (388 HK) January ADT (Average Daily Turnover) remains very strong, delivering amazing 136% year-over-year growth in the month. We maintain our sanguine view on HKEX (388 HK): 1) Hong Kong market becomes de facto choice for China new economy companies for IPO and fund raising; 2) HKEx Northbound trading has become an increasing important factor as the gateway to invest in China A-share; 3) MSCI index products will continue to gain market share. We forecast Securities ADT of HK$240bn in FY 21 (Hong Kong and Stock Connect Northbound) and raise HKEx TP HKD 550. 


Research and consultancy, Tabbush Report

Daniel Tabbush

Research and consultancy

Tabbush Report

We provide research and consultancy on Asian banks. Our focus is on what we call “Asian bank research, without the noise.” We are interested in the most critical swing-factors for banks, the NPL and credit cycle, and where we believe there is a gap between perception and reality. We often focus on the less studied components of bank financial statements.  Our research is highly thematic, sometimes examining unlisted banks and companies as a window on mainstream banks. 

Being independent allows us to look at smaller banks, often overlooked by others. Analysis of BIS bank guidelines in the context of Asia, is also a focal point, while we also analyze global banks operating in the region. We use what we believe is the most comprehensive, reliable financials database, SNL Financial. S&P Capital IQ augments our database, with corporate data and CEIC, with economics. 

Asian bank research, without the noise.

Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group (Sponsored Adr) / Equity Bottom-Up

Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group (Sponsored Adr)

We all know that credit costs are down, and we believe this can continue. What may surprise though is how much provision expenses SMFG has taken compared with its far lower increase in reported loan loss reserves.

We all know that credit costs are down, and we believe this can continue. What may surprise though is how much provision expenses SMFG has taken compared with its far lower increase in reported loan loss reserves. 

We have all seen how credit costs have come down for US banks. While the theme is relevant globally, the delta can vary dramatically. A closer look at banks with exposure to oil may give insights to how DBS will model its provisions during the final quarter of 2020.

We have all seen how credit costs have come down for US banks. While the theme is relevant globally, the delta can vary dramatically. A closer look at banks with exposure to oil may give insights to how DBS will model its provisions during the final quarter of 2020. 

United States

JPMorgan Chase & Co. provides global financial services and retail banking. The Company provides services such as investment banking, treasury and securities services, asset management, private banking, card member services, commercial banking, and home finance. JP Morgan Chase serves business enterprises, institutions, and individuals.

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JPMorgan Chase & Co (JPM US)

G Stands for Governance: When Jardine Makes a Mockery of ESG; JS Publishes 58.22 USD NAV on 31/12/20

ESG is the buzzword "du jour". When the G in ESG gets put to the test in the recent Jardine Strategic buyout the 33 USD offer price looks extremely...

Nicolas Van Broekhoven

HSBC Holdings Plc –American Result Intimates Group Miss

HSBC HOLDINGS PLC: HSBCNA reported troubling results in 4Q20 - declining 195% linked quarter, as operating costs exceed recurring revenues. This...

Thomas J. Monaco

HKEx (388.HK): New CEO, New Beginning

HKEX (388 HK) just announced the appointment of Mr. Nicolas Aguzin as its next CEO effective May 24. We believe Mr. Aguzin can bring diversity and...

Roger Xie

SMFG – High Claw Back Potential

SMFG has taken far more credit costs than its loan loss reserve rise, suggesting high write-offs and thereby, a high potential for reversals. It...

Daniel Tabbush

DBS – Modeling Provisions

We have all seen how credit costs have come down for US banks. DBS can see a significant decline in credit costs, with meaningful gas and energy...

Daniel Tabbush

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