Silver Point

Thomas J. Monaco

Independent Insight Provider

Silver Point is a boutique research firm that focuses on the broader financial services sector, with a particular focus on troubled institutions globally. 

Asia Ex Japan

Equity Bottom-Up

*Quarter Highlighted By Weak Credit: Ping An Bank (000001.CH) [PAB], the Ping An Insurance (2318.HK) [Ping An] banking subsidiary, reported 3Q21 results of CNY 11.7 bn – increasing CNY 4.1 bn (55.0%). Don’t shoot off the streamers just yet, credit quality was abysmal and Ping An is seemingly pulling on its bank lever to offset what looks to be another quarter self-inflicted harm  within its investment portfolio;  and *Credit Challenges: By our analysis, we find that credit remains incredibly challenged as net new NPLs are now accelerating at Indian bank pace of CNY 12.4 bn or 159.8% annualized.  Assuming the accelerated credit break in the PAB portfolio continues to remain at its current level, we find that PAB’s reserves remain CNY 19 bn light.

*Quarter Highlighted By Weak Credit: Ping An Bank (000001.CH) [PAB], the Ping An Insurance (2318.HK) [Ping An] banking subsidiary, reported 3Q21 results of CNY 11.7 bn – increasing CNY 4.1 bn (55.0%). Don’t shoot off the streamers just yet, credit quality was abysmal and Ping An is seemingly pulling on its bank lever to offset what looks to be another quarter self-inflicted harm  within its investment portfolio;  and *Credit Challenges: By our analysis, we find that credit remains incredibly challenged as net new NPLs are now accelerating at Indian bank pace of CNY 12.4 bn or 159.8% annualized.  Assuming the accelerated credit break in the PAB portfolio continues to remain at its current level, we find that PAB’s reserves remain CNY 19 bn light.

*Shenjing Fell Apart Before Evergrande Heated Up: Even prior to the China Evergrande Group (3333.HK) debacle, Shenjing Bank was (2066.HK) [Shenjing] struggling: 1) core operating earnings (excluding gains) were a negative CNY 1.1 tn at 1H21, by our calculation; and 2) short-term liquidity deteriorated at an unprecedented pace. With Evergrande’s risk, we calculate Shenjing’s NPLs are now closer to a whopping 24.4% - and solvency is called into question; and  *Evergrande’s Smartest Move Ever: The rest of the financial system figured out that Shenjing was an accident waiting to happen, with the interbank market cutting their risk. Despite this, Shengjing Finance Holdings (SFH) purchased Evergrande’s 19.93% stake – becoming the bank’s largest shareholder. For USD 1.55 bn, SFH has now absolved Evergrande of being a liquidity and capital backstop. Well done!

*Shenjing Fell Apart Before Evergrande Heated Up: Even prior to the China Evergrande Group (3333.HK) debacle, Shenjing Bank was (2066.HK) [Shenjing] struggling: 1) core operating earnings (excluding gains) were a negative CNY 1.1 tn at 1H21, by our calculation; and 2) short-term liquidity deteriorated at an unprecedented pace. With Evergrande’s risk, we calculate Shenjing’s NPLs are now closer to a whopping 24.4% - and solvency is called into question; and  *Evergrande’s Smartest Move Ever: The rest of the financial system figured out that Shenjing was an accident waiting to happen, with the interbank market cutting their risk. Despite this, Shengjing Finance Holdings (SFH) purchased Evergrande’s 19.93% stake – becoming the bank’s largest shareholder. For USD 1.55 bn, SFH has now absolved Evergrande of being a liquidity and capital backstop. Well done! 

China Evergrande Group – Shoes Dropping At Shenjing

*Worries In Both Hong Kong and Mainland China: The Hong Kong retail portfolio's rental reversion rate continued to be challenged YOY in FY 1H22, albeit slightly improving from a negative 1.8% in FY 2H21 to a barely positive low single digits. Not surprisingly, this weakness would appear to be with us for an extended period - especially given the continued border closures amid the COVID-19 disruption.  The mainland Chinese expansion remains worrisome, given the likely carry-on impact of stress seen in the broader mainland Chinese property market and its lenders; and*Poor Capital Management Becoming A Big Problem: Link REIT (823.HK) [Link] management also appears hell-bent on destroying shareholder value with deals which make little financial sense. Link recently announced the acquisition of Happy Valley Shopping Mall in Guangzhou where the current annualized NPI yield barely covering the project’s cost of funding. In order to improve occupancy, it would appear that Link would likely need to offer significant tenant enticements, and investment massively in asset enhancement. Bizarrely instead of weighing buybacks return versus new investment ROI, management views share buybacks as a mechanism to defend shares against short-selling.

*Worries In Both Hong Kong and Mainland China: The Hong Kong retail portfolio's rental reversion rate continued to be challenged YOY in FY 1H22, albeit slightly improving from a negative 1.8% in FY 2H21 to a barely positive low single digits. Not surprisingly, this weakness would appear to be with us for an extended period - especially given the continued border closures amid the COVID-19 disruption.  The mainland Chinese expansion remains worrisome, given the likely carry-on impact of stress seen in the broader mainland Chinese property market and its lenders; and*Poor Capital Management Becoming A Big Problem: Link REIT (823.HK) [Link] management also appears hell-bent on destroying shareholder value with deals which make little financial sense. Link recently announced the acquisition of Happy Valley Shopping Mall in Guangzhou where the current annualized NPI yield barely covering the project’s cost of funding. In order to improve occupancy, it would appear that Link would likely need to offer significant tenant enticements, and investment massively in asset enhancement. Bizarrely instead of weighing buybacks return versus new investment ROI, management views share buybacks as a mechanism to defend shares against short-selling. 

*Fintech Hits Are Coming: Regulators have forced the capitulation of internet anti-competitive behavior. Most recently, both Alibaba (BABA.US) [Alibaba} and Tencent (700.HK) [Tencent] have stopped blocking rivals’ links which prevented users to purchase goods using competitor payment apps. This is a big deal, given that FinTech represented a growing 30.3% of revenue for Tencent at 2Q21. The more Tencent relies on Fintech to support growth, the more alarming the moves by Alibaba and other competitors are; and*Prior To The War On Gaming, Tencent’s Results Have Already Deteriorated: Tencent’s 2Q21 GAAP net income declined CNY 5.2 bn (10.8%) linked quarter – and were of poor quality. Results were challenged by: cost of revenue increase; operating expense increase; losses in associates; higher impairment charges; and weaker online games. Were it not for the artificially lower tax rate, results would have been even more challenged. We can't wait to see what the impact of mainland China’s latest regulatory maneuvers will have on Tencent’s 3Q21 results out on November 10th.

*Fintech Hits Are Coming: Regulators have forced the capitulation of internet anti-competitive behavior. Most recently, both Alibaba (BABA.US) [Alibaba} and Tencent (700.HK) [Tencent] have stopped blocking rivals’ links which prevented users to purchase goods using competitor payment apps. This is a big deal, given that FinTech represented a growing 30.3% of revenue for Tencent at 2Q21. The more Tencent relies on Fintech to support growth, the more alarming the moves by Alibaba and other competitors are; and*Prior To The War On Gaming, Tencent’s Results Have Already Deteriorated: Tencent’s 2Q21 GAAP net income declined CNY 5.2 bn (10.8%) linked quarter – and were of poor quality. Results were challenged by: cost of revenue increase; operating expense increase; losses in associates; higher impairment charges; and weaker online games. Were it not for the artificially lower tax rate, results would have been even more challenged. We can't wait to see what the impact of mainland China’s latest regulatory maneuvers will have on Tencent’s 3Q21 results out on November 10th.  

Tencent Holdings – Under Severe Pressure

*A50 Challenges From HKEx: On October 18, 2021, the Hong Kong Exchange &amp; Clearing (388.HK) [HKEx] is set to launch a derivative product (China A50 contract), which is predicated on the new MSCI A50 Index. Unfortunately, this new product will be in direct competition with Singapore Exchange’s (SGX.SP) [SGX]  FTSE A50 contract, which represents approximately 10% of company revenue or close to 20% of PBT - not to mention 53% of its equity derivatives volume. HKEx has a very broad range of liquid Hong Kong-China linked products, with the new A50 contract being linked to the northbound Stock Connect – on top of a better fee offering; and*Time For Massive Strategic Move: As SGX needs to contend with a greater than expected impact from the earlier-than-expected launch of HKEX's MSCI China A50 index futures – on top of weaker equity volumes and fees, it continues to do numerous tiny bolt-on deals which appear to be more of a distraction than their worth. SGX must consider significant strategic alternatives if it is to avoid being hollowed out over the longer-term.

*A50 Challenges From HKEx: On October 18, 2021, the Hong Kong Exchange &amp; Clearing (388.HK) [HKEx] is set to launch a derivative product (China A50 contract), which is predicated on the new MSCI A50 Index. Unfortunately, this new product will be in direct competition with Singapore Exchange’s (SGX.SP) [SGX]  FTSE A50 contract, which represents approximately 10% of company revenue or close to 20% of PBT - not to mention 53% of its equity derivatives volume. HKEx has a very broad range of liquid Hong Kong-China linked products, with the new A50 contract being linked to the northbound Stock Connect – on top of a better fee offering; and*Time For Massive Strategic Move: As SGX needs to contend with a greater than expected impact from the earlier-than-expected launch of HKEX's MSCI China A50 index futures – on top of weaker equity volumes and fees, it continues to do numerous tiny bolt-on deals which appear to be more of a distraction than their worth. SGX must consider significant strategic alternatives if it is to avoid being hollowed out over the longer-term.

Singapore Exchange – 50 Hits To Bottom-Line

China

iShares FTSE A50 China Index ETF is an exchanged-traded fund established in Hong Kong. The investment objective of the iShares FTSE A50 China Index ETF is to provide investment results that, before fees and expenses, closely correspond to the performance of A50 Index.

iShares FTSE/Xinhua A50 China (2823 HK)

Ping An Insurance – Breaking The Bank

PING AN: PAB reported 3Q21 QOQ growth of 55.0%. Credit quality was abysmal and Ping An is pulling on its bank lever to offset another quarter self...

Thomas J. Monaco

China Evergrande Group – Shoes Dropping At Shenjing

EVERGRANDE: Before the Evergrande debacle, Shenjing posted core operating losses and liquidity stress. Despite this, Shengjing Finance absolved...

Thomas J. Monaco

Link REIT – Looking For Handouts

LINK REIT: The Hong Kong's rental reversion rate remained challenged in FY 1H22 at positive single digits. Mainland expansion likely will be...

Thomas J. Monaco

Tencent Holdings – Under Severe Pressure

TENCENT: Alibaba and Tencent have begun unblocking rivals’ app links. Prior to impact of the new regulations, Tencent’s results were already stressed.

Thomas J. Monaco

Singapore Exchange – 50 Hits To Bottom-Line

SGX: On October 18th HKEx is set to launch its own China A50 contract, which will be in direct competition with SGX FTSE A50 contract. SGX's A50...

Thomas J. Monaco