Specialist in Indian Banking and Economic Research

Hemindra Hazari

Government banks have been derided for indulging in ‘phone banking’ (being instructed on the telephone by ruling party politicians and civil bureaucrats to lend to specific unworthy companies). But what the Enforcement Directorate’s (ED) affidavit in the Delhi Court (as disclosed by the media -- <a href="https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/71-loans-given-in-kapoor-s-tenure-turned-bad-ed-101633976406867.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">here</a> and <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/banking/finance/enforcement-directorate-says-bank-loan-fraud-was-mutually-beneficial-to-avantha-yes-bank/articleshow/86699558.cms?from=mdr" target="_blank" rel="noopener">here</a>)  reveals is that senior executives from the private sector <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/yes-bank-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:767:1" rel="noopener">Yes Bank (YES IN)</a> were no different from their government counterparts. The only difference is that the concerned senior executives at Yes Bank were excessively paid, and were highly qualified persons from premier institutions, as compared with government bankers. The ED’s charge sheet alleges that senior executives at Yes Bank knowingly engaged in sham transactions, and the accused Yes Bank officials put the onus on the transactions on the now jailed Rana Kapoor, the erstwhile founder-Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Yes Bank. Despite their educational qualifications, previous work experience and the senior positions they held, they allowed themselves to  be reduced to being low-paid clerks – or worse, since the latter at least know enough not to engage in fraudulent transactions. The entire edifice of Yes Bank’s credit appraisal, independent risk management and board oversight was a myth, as nobody recorded strong objections to giving loans to a shell company and structuring a product whose sole objective was a spurious show of compliance with regulatory guidelines.   Stakeholders, media and analysts rarely get to see the inner working of a bank and how loans are appraised, independently evaluated by risk management and subsequently monitored. The ED’s affidavit, as reported by the media, provides such a rare inside knowledge view of how a poor quality loan for a dubious purpose was conceived, structured and approved by an over-qualified and overpaid team, solely on the basis of instructions from the CEO. What is equally disturbing, but also telling, is that three of the accused have left the bank, and have taken up fresh engagements with their new organisations – who, presumably, were impressed with these persons’ work credentials at Yes Bank, and wanted them to continue the same practices for their new employers.What is worrying is that Yes Bank’s practice of having senior executives with impressive qualifications, stellar resumes, and imposing titles, knowingly engaging in such transactions may not be the exception in the private financial sector. Regulatory agencies have investigated or are currently investigating similar transactions at <a href="https://hemindrahazari.com/2021/06/16/cg-power-loan-scandal-indusind-bank-pioneers-lending-without-documents-to-a-firm-with-no-assets/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Indusind Bank</a>, <a href="https://hemindrahazari.com/2021/06/23/aditya-birla-finances-loans-to-a-shell-company-another-reason-why-corporates-shouldnt-be-allowed-to-control-banks/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Aditya Birla Finance</a>, <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/prime/corporate-governance/how-an-eur44-million-loan-from-stanchart-put-murugappas-cg-power-between-sebi-and-a-hard-place/primearticleshow/83285540.cms" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Standard Chartered Bank</a> and <a href="https://hemindrahazari.com/2021/08/31/sebi-exposes-kotak-mahindra-mutual-funds-policy-of-investing-blindly/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Kotak Mahindra Mutual Fund</a>. This indicates that the situation may be systemic. It appears that, for all their experience and seniority, key senior executives in the private financial sector are paid inflated packages precisely for engaging in the intellectually undemanding task of ‘phone banking’. The valuations of private financial firms may need to be reassessed in the light of these disclosures.

Government banks have been derided for indulging in ‘phone banking’ (being instructed on the telephone by ruling party politicians and civil bureaucrats to lend to specific unworthy companies). But what the Enforcement Directorate’s (ED) affidavit in the Delhi Court (as disclosed by the media -- here and here)  reveals is that senior executives from the private sector Yes Bank (YES IN) were no different from their government counterparts. The only difference is that the concerned senior executives at Yes Bank were excessively paid, and were highly qualified persons from premier institutions, as compared with government bankers. The ED’s charge sheet alleges that senior executives at Yes Bank knowingly engaged in sham transactions, and the accused Yes Bank officials put the onus on the transactions on the now jailed Rana Kapoor, the erstwhile founder-Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Yes Bank. Despite their educational qualifications, previous work experience and the senior positions they held, they allowed themselves to  be reduced to being low-paid clerks – or worse, since the latter at least know enough not to engage in fraudulent transactions. The entire edifice of Yes Bank’s credit appraisal, independent risk management and board oversight was a myth, as nobody recorded strong objections to giving loans to a shell company and structuring a product whose sole objective was a spurious show of compliance with regulatory guidelines.   Stakeholders, media and analysts rarely get to see the inner working of a bank and how loans are appraised, independently evaluated by risk management and subsequently monitored. The ED’s affidavit, as reported by the media, provides such a rare inside knowledge view of how a poor quality loan for a dubious purpose was conceived, structured and approved by an over-qualified and overpaid team, solely on the basis of instructions from the CEO. What is equally disturbing, but also telling, is that three of the accused have left the bank, and have taken up fresh engagements with their new organisations – who, presumably, were impressed with these persons’ work credentials at Yes Bank, and wanted them to continue the same practices for their new employers.What is worrying is that Yes Bank’s practice of having senior executives with impressive qualifications, stellar resumes, and imposing titles, knowingly engaging in such transactions may not be the exception in the private financial sector. Regulatory agencies have investigated or are currently investigating similar transactions at Indusind Bank, Aditya Birla Finance, Standard Chartered Bank and Kotak Mahindra Mutual Fund. This indicates that the situation may be systemic. It appears that, for all their experience and seniority, key senior executives in the private financial sector are paid inflated packages precisely for engaging in the intellectually undemanding task of ‘phone banking’. The valuations of private financial firms may need to be reassessed in the light of these disclosures.

Yes Men at Yes Bank, and Elsewhere: ‘Phone Banking’ in the Private Sector

External broker reports(aggregated public sources), Edelweiss Broking Limited

Edelweiss

External broker reports(aggregated public sources)

Equity Bottom-Up

<h2>Business Overview</h2>IndusInd Bank (IIB) commenced its operations in 1994 and had transformational management change in 2008. Since management change, the bank has successfully completed three phases of planning cycle and is currently undergoing fourth phase of planning cycle. The market has consistently rewarded IIB for its delivery on improvement in profitability metrics – ROA, ROE. Currently bank caters to the needs of both consumer and corporate customers. It has a robust technology platform supporting multi-channel delivery capabilities. IndusInd Bank has 1,910 branches, and 2,700 plus ATMs spread across geographic locations of the country.<div class="content-highlight">Content is external broker report sourced from online content aggregator through publicly available sources and is displayed below for general informational purposes only. Refer full disclaimer below.</div>

Business OverviewIndusInd Bank (IIB) commenced its operations in 1994 and had transformational management change in 2008. Since management change, the bank has successfully completed three phases of planning cycle and is currently undergoing fourth phase of planning cycle. The market has consistently rewarded IIB for its delivery on improvement in profitability metrics – ROA, ROE. Currently bank caters to the needs of both consumer and corporate customers. It has a robust technology platform supporting multi-channel delivery capabilities. IndusInd Bank has 1,910 branches, and 2,700 plus ATMs spread across geographic locations of the country.Content is external broker report sourced from online content aggregator through publicly available sources and is displayed below for general informational purposes only. Refer full disclaimer below.

Silver Point

Thomas J. Monaco

Independent Insight Provider

Silver Point is a boutique research firm that focuses on the broader financial services sector, with a particular focus on troubled institutions globally. 

Asia Ex Japan

*No Substance: HDFC Bank (HDFCB.IN) [HDFCB] provided an investor update for FY 2Q22 ahead of its officially scheduled October 16, 2021 earnings release. The highlights were solely related to growth of lending and deposits; and*See No Evil: Nothing was discussed regarding HDFCB’s abysmal credit quality metrics from FY 1Q22, which likely will remain a true headache. At FY 1Q22, net new NPLs actually increased 153% on an annualized basis which is quite worrisome.  We would also be more comfortable if HDFCB was a bit more aggressive with its provisions. By our calculation, reserves are currently short by nearly INR 316 bn or nearly a year of operating results.

*No Substance: HDFC Bank (HDFCB.IN) [HDFCB] provided an investor update for FY 2Q22 ahead of its officially scheduled October 16, 2021 earnings release. The highlights were solely related to growth of lending and deposits; and*See No Evil: Nothing was discussed regarding HDFCB’s abysmal credit quality metrics from FY 1Q22, which likely will remain a true headache. At FY 1Q22, net new NPLs actually increased 153% on an annualized basis which is quite worrisome.  We would also be more comfortable if HDFCB was a bit more aggressive with its provisions. By our calculation, reserves are currently short by nearly INR 316 bn or nearly a year of operating results. 

A notable feature in <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/hdfc-bank-ltd-4b6b7a92-9087-468d-9dbe-ab169e77f014" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:558:1" rel="noopener">HDFC Bank (HDFCB IN)</a> and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/kotak-mahindra-bank-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:126:1" rel="noopener">Kotak Mahindra Bank (KMB IN)</a> (KMB) is the historical absence of any commercial banking expertise amongst the independent directors on the boards. The founders ( <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/housing-development-finance" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:252:1" rel="noopener">HDFC Limited (HDFC IN) </a>and Uday Kotak) and the Nomination and Remuneration Committee in both banks, as a deliberate strategy, have tried to ensure that only non-independent directors have commercial banking expertise. This is unusual, as other private sector banks such as <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/icici-bank-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:547:1" rel="noopener">ICICI Bank Ltd (ICICIBC IN)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/axis-bank-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:768:1" rel="noopener">Axis Bank Ltd (AXSB IN)</a>,  <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/indusind-bank-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:1558:1" rel="noopener">Indusind Bank (IIB IN)</a> and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/federal-bank-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:11784:1" rel="noopener">Federal Bank (FB IN)</a> have former commercial bankers as independent directors on their boards.Banking, being a specialised and highly regulated sector with an economy-wide systemic impact, needs that some directors have commercial banking expertise separate and distinct from the executive.The absence of such independent functional expertise on the board is a sign that the executive/controlling shareholders do not want to be challenged or to have close oversight in the banks’ core area of operations. HDFC Bank and KMB are poster banners for private sector banking in India, with a combined market capitalisation of US$ 159 bn. They have achieved this without the presence of former commercial bankers as independent directors. Both Aditya Puri (erstwhile HDFC Bank CEO) and Uday Kotak maintained an iron-clad grip on asset quality, which is visible in their track record of profitability and stock market valuation. However, banking should not be individual-based, but based on appropriate systems. A diversified board of directors, including those with commercial banking expertise independent of the executive, should be mandatory in all banks. Regardless of their track record and valuation, banks which deliberately exclude such critical functional expertise on their boards must be hauled up by the Reserve Bank of India, credit rating analysts and the capital markets. The fact that HDFC Bank and KMB have rewarded shareholders manifold without such independent expertise on their boards should not be an excuse for such an anomaly to continue, nor should it be replicated in other banks.

A notable feature in HDFC Bank (HDFCB IN) and Kotak Mahindra Bank (KMB IN) (KMB) is the historical absence of any commercial banking expertise amongst the independent directors on the boards. The founders ( HDFC Limited (HDFC IN) and Uday Kotak) and the Nomination and Remuneration Committee in both banks, as a deliberate strategy, have tried to ensure that only non-independent directors have commercial banking expertise. This is unusual, as other private sector banks such as ICICI Bank Ltd (ICICIBC IN), Axis Bank Ltd (AXSB IN),  Indusind Bank (IIB IN) and Federal Bank (FB IN) have former commercial bankers as independent directors on their boards.Banking, being a specialised and highly regulated sector with an economy-wide systemic impact, needs that some directors have commercial banking expertise separate and distinct from the executive.The absence of such independent functional expertise on the board is a sign that the executive/controlling shareholders do not want to be challenged or to have close oversight in the banks’ core area of operations. HDFC Bank and KMB are poster banners for private sector banking in India, with a combined market capitalisation of US$ 159 bn. They have achieved this without the presence of former commercial bankers as independent directors. Both Aditya Puri (erstwhile HDFC Bank CEO) and Uday Kotak maintained an iron-clad grip on asset quality, which is visible in their track record of profitability and stock market valuation. However, banking should not be individual-based, but based on appropriate systems. A diversified board of directors, including those with commercial banking expertise independent of the executive, should be mandatory in all banks. Regardless of their track record and valuation, banks which deliberately exclude such critical functional expertise on their boards must be hauled up by the Reserve Bank of India, credit rating analysts and the capital markets. The fact that HDFC Bank and KMB have rewarded shareholders manifold without such independent expertise on their boards should not be an excuse for such an anomaly to continue, nor should it be replicated in other banks.

HDFC Bank and KMB Carefully Select Independent Directors - For Their Lack of Banking Knowledge

*Another Abysmal Result: Bank of Baroda (BOB.IN) [BOB] reported FY 1Q22 results of INR 12.1 bn, improving from the loss of INR 10.5 bn in FY 4Q21. However, on an operating basis, we note that linked quarter results improved to INR 2.6 bn versus a loss of INR 1,4 bn in FY 4Q21; and *Poor Reserve Cover Worsens:  Net new NPLs accelerated to INR 25.7 bn or 15.4% annualized versus INR 13.5 bn or 11.2% annualized at FY 4Q21. By our calculation, however, BOB’s reserves still remain light by INR 300 bn or nearly six years of FY 1Q22 earnings.

*Another Abysmal Result: Bank of Baroda (BOB.IN) [BOB] reported FY 1Q22 results of INR 12.1 bn, improving from the loss of INR 10.5 bn in FY 4Q21. However, on an operating basis, we note that linked quarter results improved to INR 2.6 bn versus a loss of INR 1,4 bn in FY 4Q21; and *Poor Reserve Cover Worsens:  Net new NPLs accelerated to INR 25.7 bn or 15.4% annualized versus INR 13.5 bn or 11.2% annualized at FY 4Q21. By our calculation, however, BOB’s reserves still remain light by INR 300 bn or nearly six years of FY 1Q22 earnings.

India

IndusInd Bank Limited is a Mumbai-based Indian new generation bank established in 1994. The Bank provides a range of banking and financial services including  wholesale banking, credit monitoring, risk management, tele-banking, investment banking and commercial lending. IndusInd Bank operates branches throughout India as well as an office in Dubai and London.

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Indusind Bank (IIB IN)

Yes Men at Yes Bank, and Elsewhere: ‘Phone Banking’ in the Private Sector

It appears that, for all their experience & seniority, key senior executives in the pvt financial sector are paid inflated packages precisely for...

Hemindra Hazari

Pick of the Week - Indusind Bank

IndusInd Bank (IIB) commenced its operations in 1994 and had transformational management change in 2008. Since management change the bank has...

Edelweiss

HDFC Bank – No Credit

HDFC BANK: HDFCB provided a balance sheet growth update for FY 2Q22. Nothing was discussed regarding HDFCB’s challenged credit quality nor its low...

Thomas J. Monaco

HDFC Bank and KMB Carefully Select Independent Directors - For Their Lack of Banking Knowledge

The absence of independent commercial banking expertise on the board is a sign that the executive do not want to be challenged or to have close...

Hemindra Hazari

Bank of Baroda – More Capital Please

BANK OF BARODA: BOB reported FY 1Q22 operating results of INR 2.6 bn versus a loss of INR 1.4 bn in FY 4Q21. Net new NPLs accelerated to 15.4%...

Thomas J. Monaco

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