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<h2>Business Overview</h2>IndusInd Bank (IIB) commenced its operations in 1994 and had transformational management change in 2008. Since management change, the bank has successfully completed three phases of planning cycle and is currently undergoing fourth phase of planning cycle. The market has consistently rewarded IIB for its delivery on improvement in profitability metrics – ROA, ROE. Currently bank caters to the needs of both consumer and corporate customers. It has a robust technology platform supporting multi-channel delivery capabilities. IndusInd Bank has 1,910 branches, and 2,700 plus ATMs spread across geographic locations of the country.<div class="content-highlight">Content is external broker report sourced from online content aggregator through publicly available sources and is displayed below for general informational purposes only. Refer full disclaimer below.</div>

Business OverviewIndusInd Bank (IIB) commenced its operations in 1994 and had transformational management change in 2008. Since management change, the bank has successfully completed three phases of planning cycle and is currently undergoing fourth phase of planning cycle. The market has consistently rewarded IIB for its delivery on improvement in profitability metrics – ROA, ROE. Currently bank caters to the needs of both consumer and corporate customers. It has a robust technology platform supporting multi-channel delivery capabilities. IndusInd Bank has 1,910 branches, and 2,700 plus ATMs spread across geographic locations of the country.Content is external broker report sourced from online content aggregator through publicly available sources and is displayed below for general informational purposes only. Refer full disclaimer below.

Silver Point

Thomas J. Monaco

Independent Insight Provider

Silver Point is a boutique research firm that focuses on the broader financial services sector, with a particular focus on troubled institutions globally. 

Asia Ex Japan

*No Substance: HDFC Bank (HDFCB.IN) [HDFCB] provided an investor update for FY 2Q22 ahead of its officially scheduled October 16, 2021 earnings release. The highlights were solely related to growth of lending and deposits; and*See No Evil: Nothing was discussed regarding HDFCB’s abysmal credit quality metrics from FY 1Q22, which likely will remain a true headache. At FY 1Q22, net new NPLs actually increased 153% on an annualized basis which is quite worrisome.  We would also be more comfortable if HDFCB was a bit more aggressive with its provisions. By our calculation, reserves are currently short by nearly INR 316 bn or nearly a year of operating results.

*No Substance: HDFC Bank (HDFCB.IN) [HDFCB] provided an investor update for FY 2Q22 ahead of its officially scheduled October 16, 2021 earnings release. The highlights were solely related to growth of lending and deposits; and*See No Evil: Nothing was discussed regarding HDFCB’s abysmal credit quality metrics from FY 1Q22, which likely will remain a true headache. At FY 1Q22, net new NPLs actually increased 153% on an annualized basis which is quite worrisome.  We would also be more comfortable if HDFCB was a bit more aggressive with its provisions. By our calculation, reserves are currently short by nearly INR 316 bn or nearly a year of operating results. 

Specialist in Indian Banking and Economic Research

Hemindra Hazari

A notable feature in <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/hdfc-bank-ltd-4b6b7a92-9087-468d-9dbe-ab169e77f014" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:558:1" rel="noopener">HDFC Bank (HDFCB IN)</a> and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/kotak-mahindra-bank-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:126:1" rel="noopener">Kotak Mahindra Bank (KMB IN)</a> (KMB) is the historical absence of any commercial banking expertise amongst the independent directors on the boards. The founders ( <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/housing-development-finance" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:252:1" rel="noopener">HDFC Limited (HDFC IN) </a>and Uday Kotak) and the Nomination and Remuneration Committee in both banks, as a deliberate strategy, have tried to ensure that only non-independent directors have commercial banking expertise. This is unusual, as other private sector banks such as <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/icici-bank-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:547:1" rel="noopener">ICICI Bank Ltd (ICICIBC IN)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/axis-bank-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:768:1" rel="noopener">Axis Bank Ltd (AXSB IN)</a>,  <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/indusind-bank-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:1558:1" rel="noopener">Indusind Bank (IIB IN)</a> and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/federal-bank-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:11784:1" rel="noopener">Federal Bank (FB IN)</a> have former commercial bankers as independent directors on their boards.Banking, being a specialised and highly regulated sector with an economy-wide systemic impact, needs that some directors have commercial banking expertise separate and distinct from the executive.The absence of such independent functional expertise on the board is a sign that the executive/controlling shareholders do not want to be challenged or to have close oversight in the banks’ core area of operations. HDFC Bank and KMB are poster banners for private sector banking in India, with a combined market capitalisation of US$ 159 bn. They have achieved this without the presence of former commercial bankers as independent directors. Both Aditya Puri (erstwhile HDFC Bank CEO) and Uday Kotak maintained an iron-clad grip on asset quality, which is visible in their track record of profitability and stock market valuation. However, banking should not be individual-based, but based on appropriate systems. A diversified board of directors, including those with commercial banking expertise independent of the executive, should be mandatory in all banks. Regardless of their track record and valuation, banks which deliberately exclude such critical functional expertise on their boards must be hauled up by the Reserve Bank of India, credit rating analysts and the capital markets. The fact that HDFC Bank and KMB have rewarded shareholders manifold without such independent expertise on their boards should not be an excuse for such an anomaly to continue, nor should it be replicated in other banks.

A notable feature in HDFC Bank (HDFCB IN) and Kotak Mahindra Bank (KMB IN) (KMB) is the historical absence of any commercial banking expertise amongst the independent directors on the boards. The founders ( HDFC Limited (HDFC IN) and Uday Kotak) and the Nomination and Remuneration Committee in both banks, as a deliberate strategy, have tried to ensure that only non-independent directors have commercial banking expertise. This is unusual, as other private sector banks such as ICICI Bank Ltd (ICICIBC IN), Axis Bank Ltd (AXSB IN),  Indusind Bank (IIB IN) and Federal Bank (FB IN) have former commercial bankers as independent directors on their boards.Banking, being a specialised and highly regulated sector with an economy-wide systemic impact, needs that some directors have commercial banking expertise separate and distinct from the executive.The absence of such independent functional expertise on the board is a sign that the executive/controlling shareholders do not want to be challenged or to have close oversight in the banks’ core area of operations. HDFC Bank and KMB are poster banners for private sector banking in India, with a combined market capitalisation of US$ 159 bn. They have achieved this without the presence of former commercial bankers as independent directors. Both Aditya Puri (erstwhile HDFC Bank CEO) and Uday Kotak maintained an iron-clad grip on asset quality, which is visible in their track record of profitability and stock market valuation. However, banking should not be individual-based, but based on appropriate systems. A diversified board of directors, including those with commercial banking expertise independent of the executive, should be mandatory in all banks. Regardless of their track record and valuation, banks which deliberately exclude such critical functional expertise on their boards must be hauled up by the Reserve Bank of India, credit rating analysts and the capital markets. The fact that HDFC Bank and KMB have rewarded shareholders manifold without such independent expertise on their boards should not be an excuse for such an anomaly to continue, nor should it be replicated in other banks.

HDFC Bank and KMB Carefully Select Independent Directors - For Their Lack of Banking Knowledge

*Another Abysmal Result: Bank of Baroda (BOB.IN) [BOB] reported FY 1Q22 results of INR 12.1 bn, improving from the loss of INR 10.5 bn in FY 4Q21. However, on an operating basis, we note that linked quarter results improved to INR 2.6 bn versus a loss of INR 1,4 bn in FY 4Q21; and *Poor Reserve Cover Worsens:  Net new NPLs accelerated to INR 25.7 bn or 15.4% annualized versus INR 13.5 bn or 11.2% annualized at FY 4Q21. By our calculation, however, BOB’s reserves still remain light by INR 300 bn or nearly six years of FY 1Q22 earnings.

*Another Abysmal Result: Bank of Baroda (BOB.IN) [BOB] reported FY 1Q22 results of INR 12.1 bn, improving from the loss of INR 10.5 bn in FY 4Q21. However, on an operating basis, we note that linked quarter results improved to INR 2.6 bn versus a loss of INR 1,4 bn in FY 4Q21; and *Poor Reserve Cover Worsens:  Net new NPLs accelerated to INR 25.7 bn or 15.4% annualized versus INR 13.5 bn or 11.2% annualized at FY 4Q21. By our calculation, however, BOB’s reserves still remain light by INR 300 bn or nearly six years of FY 1Q22 earnings.

Most private sector banks withhold the remuneration details of senior executives in the annual reports. However, shareholders can specifically request this <a href="https://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/NCARules_Chapter13.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">disclosure</a> from companies. The remuneration disclosure provides valuable information on the quantum of monetary compensation, revealing how senior managers have been appraised and compensated. In <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/indusind-bank-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:1558:1" rel="noopener">Indusind Bank (IIB IN)</a>, the scale of remuneration reveals how <a href="https://www.indusind.com/iblogs/bloggers/mr-ramaswamy-meyyappan/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Ramaswamy Meyyappan</a> (Chief Risk Officer) and the corporate credit team (initially led by <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/suhailchander/?originalSubdomain=in" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Suhail Chander</a> and subsequently by <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/roopa-satish-847139121/?originalSubdomain=in" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Roopa Satish</a>) were handsomely rewarded (FY2017-FY2019) for doing high-risk, poor quality loans to companies like <a href="https://hemindrahazari.com/2021/06/16/cg-power-loan-scandal-indusind-bank-pioneers-lending-without-documents-to-a-firm-with-no-assets/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">CG Middle East</a>   (US$ 40 mn in FY2018; the loan is being  investigated by the Securities and Exchange Board of India),  <a href="https://hemindrahazari.com/2019/04/25/indusind-bank-one-more-disturbing-lapse-of-judgment-by-the-banker-of-the-year/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Sprit Infrapower</a> (Rs 5 bn loan to unlisted company of founders of Zee media in FY2019) and <a href="https://hemindrahazari.com/2018/10/17/are-indusind-banks-credit-and-risk-departments-run-by-financial-illiterates/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">IL&amp;FS</a>  (Rs 20 bn bridge loan in FY2019). Thereafter their remuneration declined in FY2020, and for some it recovered in FY2021. Indusind Bank has declined to provide any clarity on the reasons for the increase and decrease in individual remuneration. When corporate banking’s credit costs in FY2019 shot up by 4.6x and Profit Before Tax (PBT) of the division declined by 60% to Rs 6.6 bn, Roopa Satish, the Country Head – Corporate, Institutions and Investment Banking, remuneration increased by 16% to Rs 52.3 mn. In FY2020 her remuneration declined by 37% to Rs 32.9 mn.  More importantly, despite the significant financial and reputational loss to the bank from dodgy corporate loans, none of the concerned executives was sacked; the only apparent punishment was a reduction in their already inflated remuneration. These events demonstrate poor oversight by the important sub-committees of the board of directors such as Committee of Directors (CoD), Risk Management and the Nomination and Remuneration (NRC). The coterie, consisting of mainly former ABN AMRO Bank colleagues, are well protected from getting the axe.The lesson to stakeholders is that, when times are good, senior executives will be richly rewarded, and when times turn sour on account of their incompetence and/or complicity, they will still retain their jobs. The only punishment will be a reduction in their remuneration. As long as such individuals are blessed by the CEO, their jobs are secure, and there is negligible accountability for their disastrous acts which result in losses to the bank and to shareholders.

Most private sector banks withhold the remuneration details of senior executives in the annual reports. However, shareholders can specifically request this disclosure from companies. The remuneration disclosure provides valuable information on the quantum of monetary compensation, revealing how senior managers have been appraised and compensated. In Indusind Bank (IIB IN), the scale of remuneration reveals how Ramaswamy Meyyappan (Chief Risk Officer) and the corporate credit team (initially led by Suhail Chander and subsequently by Roopa Satish) were handsomely rewarded (FY2017-FY2019) for doing high-risk, poor quality loans to companies like CG Middle East   (US$ 40 mn in FY2018; the loan is being  investigated by the Securities and Exchange Board of India),  Sprit Infrapower (Rs 5 bn loan to unlisted company of founders of Zee media in FY2019) and IL&amp;FS  (Rs 20 bn bridge loan in FY2019). Thereafter their remuneration declined in FY2020, and for some it recovered in FY2021. Indusind Bank has declined to provide any clarity on the reasons for the increase and decrease in individual remuneration. When corporate banking’s credit costs in FY2019 shot up by 4.6x and Profit Before Tax (PBT) of the division declined by 60% to Rs 6.6 bn, Roopa Satish, the Country Head – Corporate, Institutions and Investment Banking, remuneration increased by 16% to Rs 52.3 mn. In FY2020 her remuneration declined by 37% to Rs 32.9 mn.  More importantly, despite the significant financial and reputational loss to the bank from dodgy corporate loans, none of the concerned executives was sacked; the only apparent punishment was a reduction in their already inflated remuneration. These events demonstrate poor oversight by the important sub-committees of the board of directors such as Committee of Directors (CoD), Risk Management and the Nomination and Remuneration (NRC). The coterie, consisting of mainly former ABN AMRO Bank colleagues, are well protected from getting the axe.The lesson to stakeholders is that, when times are good, senior executives will be richly rewarded, and when times turn sour on account of their incompetence and/or complicity, they will still retain their jobs. The only punishment will be a reduction in their remuneration. As long as such individuals are blessed by the CEO, their jobs are secure, and there is negligible accountability for their disastrous acts which result in losses to the bank and to shareholders.

CEO’s Coterie: IndusInd’s High Flying High Risk Takers Reap Rich Rewards But Negligible Penalties

India

IndusInd Bank Limited is a Mumbai-based Indian new generation bank established in 1994. The Bank provides a range of banking and financial services including  wholesale banking, credit monitoring, risk management, tele-banking, investment banking and commercial lending. IndusInd Bank operates branches throughout India as well as an office in Dubai and London.

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Indusind Bank (IIB IN)

Pick of the Week - Indusind Bank

IndusInd Bank (IIB) commenced its operations in 1994 and had transformational management change in 2008. Since management change the bank has...

Edelweiss

HDFC Bank – No Credit

HDFC BANK: HDFCB provided a balance sheet growth update for FY 2Q22. Nothing was discussed regarding HDFCB’s challenged credit quality nor its low...

Thomas J. Monaco

HDFC Bank and KMB Carefully Select Independent Directors - For Their Lack of Banking Knowledge

The absence of independent commercial banking expertise on the board is a sign that the executive do not want to be challenged or to have close...

Hemindra Hazari

Bank of Baroda – More Capital Please

BANK OF BARODA: BOB reported FY 1Q22 operating results of INR 2.6 bn versus a loss of INR 1.4 bn in FY 4Q21. Net new NPLs accelerated to 15.4%...

Thomas J. Monaco

CEO’s Coterie: IndusInd’s High Flying High Risk Takers Reap Rich Rewards But Negligible Penalties

The lesson to stakeholders: when times are good, senior executives will be richly rewarded, and when times turn sour on account of their...

Hemindra Hazari

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