Silver Point

Thomas J. Monaco

Independent Insight Provider

Silver Point is a boutique research firm that focuses on the broader financial services sector, with a particular focus on troubled institutions globally. 

Asia Ex Japan

Thematic (Sector/Industry)

*Extending The Emergency Funding Plan: The Emergency Credit Line Guarantee Scheme (ECLGS) for Indian SMEs was launched in May 2020 under the Indian government’s ‘Atmanirbhar’ or self-sufficiency package in order to help offset the weakened economic conditions resultant of COVID-19. ECGLS was subsequently expanded in November 2020 to include 26 additional stressed sectors. In its latest attempt at forbearance, the Indian government just expanded its ECLGS from INR 3 tn to INR 4.5 tn; and *Kick That Can: Banks have already on-lent INR 2.7 tn under the ECLGS, and this recent announcement should further allow India to kick the can of stressed loans down the road. We remind the Indian government that if you’re extending, you are pretending.  That said, net new NPL growth should still accelerate through FYE 2022 given what appears to government crisis mismanagement which should extend the duration of the second COVID-19.

*Extending The Emergency Funding Plan: The Emergency Credit Line Guarantee Scheme (ECLGS) for Indian SMEs was launched in May 2020 under the Indian government’s ‘Atmanirbhar’ or self-sufficiency package in order to help offset the weakened economic conditions resultant of COVID-19. ECGLS was subsequently expanded in November 2020 to include 26 additional stressed sectors. In its latest attempt at forbearance, the Indian government just expanded its ECLGS from INR 3 tn to INR 4.5 tn; and *Kick That Can: Banks have already on-lent INR 2.7 tn under the ECLGS, and this recent announcement should further allow India to kick the can of stressed loans down the road. We remind the Indian government that if you’re extending, you are pretending.  That said, net new NPL growth should still accelerate through FYE 2022 given what appears to government crisis mismanagement which should extend the duration of the second COVID-19.

*New Regulation, New Loopholes: The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has finalized rules for non-bank financial company (NBFC) dividend payout ratios at a maximum of 50%. The methodology is predicated on the net NPL ratio and CAR. The new proposal is riddled with loopholes, as NBFCs can easily manipulate these ratios; and*Well-Placed NBFCs: Excluding LIC Housing Finance (LICHF.IN) and Shriram Transport (SHTF.IN), most large NBFCs are well placed to meet the proposed dividend cap if the guidelines are made applicable from the previous year.

*New Regulation, New Loopholes: The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has finalized rules for non-bank financial company (NBFC) dividend payout ratios at a maximum of 50%. The methodology is predicated on the net NPL ratio and CAR. The new proposal is riddled with loopholes, as NBFCs can easily manipulate these ratios; and*Well-Placed NBFCs: Excluding LIC Housing Finance (LICHF.IN) and Shriram Transport (SHTF.IN), most large NBFCs are well placed to meet the proposed dividend cap if the guidelines are made applicable from the previous year.

Reserve Bank of India – Wrong Rule At Wrong Time

Equity Bottom-Up

*Results Down, Credibility Continues To Increase: LIC Housing Finance (LICHF.IN) [LIC] reported FY 4Q21 bottom-line results of 4.0 bn, declining INR 3.5 bn (45.0%) linked quarter. Results were weaker primarily due to a massive loss provision increase of INR 7.9 bn (4.2x) over the period reflecting an increase of 16% in Stage 3 loans; and*Negative Credit Delta: Despite recoveries of INR 400 mn, net new NPLs at LIC skyrocketed to INR 12.6 bn or increasing 62.0% on an annualized basis during the period – quite the change from annualized net new NPL decline of 3.2% in FY 3Q21. By our calculation, if the large blip in credit continues, LIC management ought to think about adding another INR 22 bn to the reserve.

 *Results Down, Credibility Continues To Increase: LIC Housing Finance (LICHF.IN) [LIC] reported FY 4Q21 bottom-line results of 4.0 bn, declining INR 3.5 bn (45.0%) linked quarter. Results were weaker primarily due to a massive loss provision increase of INR 7.9 bn (4.2x) over the period reflecting an increase of 16% in Stage 3 loans; and*Negative Credit Delta: Despite recoveries of INR 400 mn, net new NPLs at LIC skyrocketed to INR 12.6 bn or increasing 62.0% on an annualized basis during the period – quite the change from annualized net new NPL decline of 3.2% in FY 3Q21. By our calculation, if the large blip in credit continues, LIC management ought to think about adding another INR 22 bn to the reserve. 

*Another Awful Result: Punjab National Bank (PNB.IN) [PNB] reported FY 4Q21 net income of INR 5.9 bn, increasing INR 803 mn  (15.9%) linked quarter. Excluding the gains in the consecutive quarters, PNB’s core operating results would have been a negative INR 3.9 bn in FY 4Q21 and negative INR 7.4 bn in FY 3Q21. Not good, but operating losses did moderately decline – or did they? Bizarrely, as gross stated NPLs increased 10.5% linked quarter, PNB in its infinite wisdom decided to cut loss provisions INR 7.5 bn (13.7%) linked quarter which was substantially additive to what appears to be an overstated bottom-line; and*Accelerating Credit Risk Leads to Technical Insolvency: Inclusive of the INR 68 bn NCO, we find that PNB’s level of net new NPLs actually increased INR 167 bn or 70.7% on an annualized basis. While we have very little confidence in PNB’s reporting of problem assets at this stage, we take their word for current NPLs and find that loss reserves are now light by at minimum of INR 1.1 bn  - or approximately 124% of stated book value. This is without accounting for the delayed or backlog provisions associated fraud accounts and ageing provisions.

*Another Awful Result: Punjab National Bank (PNB.IN) [PNB] reported FY 4Q21 net income of INR 5.9 bn, increasing INR 803 mn  (15.9%) linked quarter. Excluding the gains in the consecutive quarters, PNB’s core operating results would have been a negative INR 3.9 bn in FY 4Q21 and negative INR 7.4 bn in FY 3Q21. Not good, but operating losses did moderately decline – or did they? Bizarrely, as gross stated NPLs increased 10.5% linked quarter, PNB in its infinite wisdom decided to cut loss provisions INR 7.5 bn (13.7%) linked quarter which was substantially additive to what appears to be an overstated bottom-line; and*Accelerating Credit Risk Leads to Technical Insolvency: Inclusive of the INR 68 bn NCO, we find that PNB’s level of net new NPLs actually increased INR 167 bn or 70.7% on an annualized basis. While we have very little confidence in PNB’s reporting of problem assets at this stage, we take their word for current NPLs and find that loss reserves are now light by at minimum of INR 1.1 bn  - or approximately 124% of stated book value. This is without accounting for the delayed or backlog provisions associated fraud accounts and ageing provisions.  

* Flummoxed: A competitor hosted a virtual conference with the management of the State Bank of India (SBIN.IN) [SBI]. To say the call was a disappointment would be an understatement. Nothing meaningful was stated on credit quality, and for some reason management is “comfortable” with capital; and *Reserve Challenges Should Lead To LARGE Capital Raise: Net new NPLs increased INR 193.2 bn or 65.9% on an annualized versus – accelerating over the awful FY 3Q21 result of INR 145.7 bn and 41.6%.  These figures are quite troublesome - even for an Indian SOE bank. Given the capital challenges even prior to the Yes Bank (YES.IN) risk, SBI needs to prepare for additional losses. By our calculation, we find that SBI’s reserves are short INR 1.2 tn - nearly four years of pre-tax results or 61% of market-cap.

* Flummoxed: A competitor hosted a virtual conference with the management of the State Bank of India (SBIN.IN) [SBI]. To say the call was a disappointment would be an understatement. Nothing meaningful was stated on credit quality, and for some reason management is “comfortable” with capital; and *Reserve Challenges Should Lead To LARGE Capital Raise: Net new NPLs increased INR 193.2 bn or 65.9% on an annualized versus – accelerating over the awful FY 3Q21 result of INR 145.7 bn and 41.6%.  These figures are quite troublesome - even for an Indian SOE bank. Given the capital challenges even prior to the Yes Bank (YES.IN) risk, SBI needs to prepare for additional losses. By our calculation, we find that SBI’s reserves are short INR 1.2 tn - nearly four years of pre-tax results or 61% of market-cap. 

State Bank of India – Lights On, No One Home

India

Indian Bank is a full service bank owned by the Government of India. The Bank offers a wide range of services including a foreign currency banking unit at Colombo and specialized overseas branches at Chennai, Bangalore, and Mumbai exclusively for handling foreign exchange  transactions arising out of export, import, remittances and non resident Indian business.

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Indian Bank (INBK IN)

India Financials – Plop Plop Fizz Fizz

INDIA FINANCIALS: ECLGS was launched in May 2020 to offset poor economic conditions. ECGLS has again been expanded from INR 3 tn to INR 4.5 tn....

Thomas J. Monaco

Reserve Bank of India – Wrong Rule At Wrong Time

RESERVE BANK OF INDIA: The RBI has finalized rules for NBFC dividend payout ratios at 50% - predicated on the net NPL ratio and CAR. The new...

Thomas J. Monaco

LIC Housing Finance – Hit With A Brick

LIC HOUSING FINANCE: LIC reported a poor FY 4Q21 bottom-line, declining 45.0% linked quarter due to a massive loss provision reflecting a 16%...

Thomas J. Monaco

Punjab National Bank – Cipher

PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK: PNB's operating results were a negative INR 3.9 bn in FY 4Q21. Bizarrely, as gross stated NPLs increased 10.5% linked...

Thomas J. Monaco

State Bank of India – Lights On, No One Home

STATE BANK OF INDIA: A competitor hosted a disappointing call with management. By our calculation, we find that SBI’s reserves are short INR 1.2 tn...

Thomas J. Monaco

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