Expert on Japan Retail and Consumer Markets, JapanConsuming

Michael Causton

Expert on Japan Retail and Consumer Markets

Real Insight on Japanese Consumer Markets

JapanConsuming

JapanConsuming is a specialist research firm producing intelligence on Japanese retail and consumer markets. Founded in 2000, JapanConsuming has become the leading provider of insights on Japanese retailers and consumer trends to retailers, brands, government agencies and investors. As well as a highly regarded monthly report on the market, JapanConsuming produces in-depth reports on retail sectors, seminars on key trends and telephone consulting to investors on trends and retailers.

JapanConsuming was founded by Michael Causton and Roy Larke. 

Thematic (Sector/Industry)

FY2020 was clearly a year when department store executives would have been better to live in an induced coma. Big city stores suffered especially because inbound tourists, their main growth driver of the past few years, disappeared and local shoppers stayed away, although some stores did manage to harness support from Japan’s expanding wealth market to offset the rout a little bit. The good news is that executives pushing for change in the last five years in the face of perennial intransigence are increasingly taking charge and the result should be a leaner, smaller and more clearly defined format that is more overtly upscale.

FY2020 was clearly a year when department store executives would have been better to live in an induced coma. Big city stores suffered especially because inbound tourists, their main growth driver of the past few years, disappeared and local shoppers stayed away, although some stores did manage to harness support from Japan’s expanding wealth market to offset the rout a little bit. The good news is that executives pushing for change in the last five years in the face of perennial intransigence are increasingly taking charge and the result should be a leaner, smaller and more clearly defined format that is more overtly upscale.

Japan's Department Stores: Radical Contraction Still to Come if Sector Is to Survive

Pan-Asia Catalysts/Events, Quiddity Advisors

Travis Lundy

Pan-Asia Catalysts/Events

Quiddity Advisors

Event-Driven

On 31 August, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/kansai-super-market-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:15519:1" rel="noopener">Kansai Super Market (9919 JP)</a> and its top shareholder (10.02% of shares out) <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/h2o-retailing-corp" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:17562:1" rel="noopener">H2 O Retailing (8242 JP)</a> (the parent of Hanshin Department Store and related companies) <a href="https://data.swcms.net/file/h2o-retailing/ja/news/auto_20210830491858/pdfFile.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">announced</a> a business merger whereby the H₂O would inject two supermarket businesses it owns - Izumiya and Hankyu Oasis - into a holding company with Kansai Super, receiving shares in a newly enlarged Kansai Super in exchange. H₂O would go from owning 10.66% to owning 58% of Kansai Super, and the 89.34% would own 42% of NEWCO. The merger was short-dated/accelerated, with the EGM to vote on this deal set for a Record Date on 15 September, the EGMs of all the related companies where an EGM was necessary (Kansai Super, Hankyu Oasis, and Izumiya (the latter two foregone conclusions because they are 100%-owned by H₂O) on 29 October, and the merger effective December 1st.The shares popped a bit, then fell back. At first glance, this seemed somewhat opportunistic for H₂O, and it meant that the 89.34% "minority" in Kansai Super would become a real minority without getting paid a premium or provided a chance to exit. Based on the net assets of the companies, it seemed like H₂O was getting a good deal. Based on the OP levels in the past year, it did not seem like H₂O was getting special treatment. A couple of days later, on 3 September, privately-held discount ("every day low price") supermarket chain OK Corp (primarily based in the Kanto area, but which had been aimed at expanding into the Kansai area), which was the second-largest single shareholder of Kansai Super (based originally in Osaka/Kansai) at 7.23%, stepped up and offered a <a href="https://ok-corporation.jp/media/001/202109/20210903_%E3%83%97%E3%83%AC%E3%82%B9%E3%83%AA%E3%83%AA%E3%83%BC%E3%82%B9.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">press release</a> which said that it would vote against the merger and if the merger were not approved, it would be willing to launch a Tender Offer to buy the shares of Kansai Super at ¥2,250/share (the highest price since listing and nearly vs ¥1,374/share the day before, and more than double the market price of Kansai Super in June when the proposal was made). On 3 Sep OK complained about their treatment, and noted that from the perspective of shareholder interest, their bid should be considered, but OK also had no intention of launching a hostile bid.The shares popped, moving limit up. Then limit up another day, and then the shares traded at JPY 2,200/share in considerable volume before drifting lower.<section class="figure"><figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/229/527/original/Screenshot+2021-09-13+at+8.10.54+PM.png?1631535065" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="229527"></figure></section>Today the shares fell back 7+% to just below JPY 2,000/share. There is some very long history between the founder of OK and Yuji Kitano the founder of Kansai Super, and they once worked together, with OK seconding employees to Kansai Super to learn the business of fresh grocery sales. Mr Kitano passed away in 2013, and OK Supermarket started buying shares in 2016, getting to just under 5%, then it peaked its head above and by the end of the fiscal year in February, owned 7.23%. Of course, that year in October (2016), Kansai Super entered into a business and capital alliance with H₂O Retailing, and H₂O bought about 10% of the shares out. Fast forward five years and it turns out that OK approached Kansai Super in April 2021, and proposed a capital and business alliance on 9 June, in writing. Kansai Super put this to an Independent Committee which then took its time, setting its first meeting with OK some 11 weeks later on 26 August. The Kansai Super <a href="http://www.kansaisuper.co.jp/upimages/irinfo/irnews_629.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">release</a> (Japanese only) on 31 August suggests there was a "third party tender offer approach" but then doesn't discuss it much while saying that intense discussions and due diligence was afforded to H₂O Retailing in the same timeframe.Five days after the first interview with OK, Kansai Super and H₂O announced their deal. This is a complicated deal and it begs the question of whether shareholder interests matter and how shareholders decide. More discussion below.

On 31 August, Kansai Super Market (9919 JP) and its top shareholder (10.02% of shares out) H2 O Retailing (8242 JP) (the parent of Hanshin Department Store and related companies) announced a business merger whereby the H₂O would inject two supermarket businesses it owns - Izumiya and Hankyu Oasis - into a holding company with Kansai Super, receiving shares in a newly enlarged Kansai Super in exchange. H₂O would go from owning 10.66% to owning 58% of Kansai Super, and the 89.34% would own 42% of NEWCO. The merger was short-dated/accelerated, with the EGM to vote on this deal set for a Record Date on 15 September, the EGMs of all the related companies where an EGM was necessary (Kansai Super, Hankyu Oasis, and Izumiya (the latter two foregone conclusions because they are 100%-owned by H₂O) on 29 October, and the merger effective December 1st.The shares popped a bit, then fell back. At first glance, this seemed somewhat opportunistic for H₂O, and it meant that the 89.34% "minority" in Kansai Super would become a real minority without getting paid a premium or provided a chance to exit. Based on the net assets of the companies, it seemed like H₂O was getting a good deal. Based on the OP levels in the past year, it did not seem like H₂O was getting special treatment. A couple of days later, on 3 September, privately-held discount ("every day low price") supermarket chain OK Corp (primarily based in the Kanto area, but which had been aimed at expanding into the Kansai area), which was the second-largest single shareholder of Kansai Super (based originally in Osaka/Kansai) at 7.23%, stepped up and offered a press release which said that it would vote against the merger and if the merger were not approved, it would be willing to launch a Tender Offer to buy the shares of Kansai Super at ¥2,250/share (the highest price since listing and nearly vs ¥1,374/share the day before, and more than double the market price of Kansai Super in June when the proposal was made). On 3 Sep OK complained about their treatment, and noted that from the perspective of shareholder interest, their bid should be considered, but OK also had no intention of launching a hostile bid.The shares popped, moving limit up. Then limit up another day, and then the shares traded at JPY 2,200/share in considerable volume before drifting lower.Today the shares fell back 7+% to just below JPY 2,000/share. There is some very long history between the founder of OK and Yuji Kitano the founder of Kansai Super, and they once worked together, with OK seconding employees to Kansai Super to learn the business of fresh grocery sales. Mr Kitano passed away in 2013, and OK Supermarket started buying shares in 2016, getting to just under 5%, then it peaked its head above and by the end of the fiscal year in February, owned 7.23%. Of course, that year in October (2016), Kansai Super entered into a business and capital alliance with H₂O Retailing, and H₂O bought about 10% of the shares out. Fast forward five years and it turns out that OK approached Kansai Super in April 2021, and proposed a capital and business alliance on 9 June, in writing. Kansai Super put this to an Independent Committee which then took its time, setting its first meeting with OK some 11 weeks later on 26 August. The Kansai Super release (Japanese only) on 31 August suggests there was a "third party tender offer approach" but then doesn't discuss it much while saying that intense discussions and due diligence was afforded to H₂O Retailing in the same timeframe.Five days after the first interview with OK, Kansai Super and H₂O announced their deal. This is a complicated deal and it begs the question of whether shareholder interests matter and how shareholders decide. More discussion below. 

The following is an in-depth review of Japanese retail in the last 18 months covering all the main formats and categories, providing a quick way to see an overview of all the key trends and winners and losers in Japanese retailing now and going forward.FY2020 was an anomaly and one that businesses everywhere will want to forget and never repeat. There was more than enough pain among Japan’s top retailers last year, but equally some formats did surprisingly well given the circumstances.For most, work-from-home was the single most important factor in determining a chain’s fortunes. City-centre stores and shopping centres offering mostly discretionary shopping have been hit hard, as have convenience stores.But those chains selling essentials, healthcare, electronics and, most importantly, food, all saw their fortunes improve. The pandemic has also revealed the strong, dynamic players and exposed the weaker ones. Oh, and everyone needs to be online.

The following is an in-depth review of Japanese retail in the last 18 months covering all the main formats and categories, providing a quick way to see an overview of all the key trends and winners and losers in Japanese retailing now and going forward.FY2020 was an anomaly and one that businesses everywhere will want to forget and never repeat. There was more than enough pain among Japan’s top retailers last year, but equally some formats did surprisingly well given the circumstances.For most, work-from-home was the single most important factor in determining a chain’s fortunes. City-centre stores and shopping centres offering mostly discretionary shopping have been hit hard, as have convenience stores.But those chains selling essentials, healthcare, electronics and, most importantly, food, all saw their fortunes improve. The pandemic has also revealed the strong, dynamic players and exposed the weaker ones. Oh, and everyone needs to be online.

The Polarising Pandemic in Japanese Retail

After more than a year of negotiations and preparation, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/matsumotokiyoshi-holdings-co-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:2259:1" rel="noopener">Matsumotokiyoshi Holdings Co., Ltd. (3088 JP)</a> and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/cocokara-fine-inc" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:15447:1" rel="noopener">Cocokara Fine (3098 JP)</a> finally confirmed their agreement to merge in October this year. The new company will be by far the largest in the drugstore sector.A lot of work has been done already to consolidate operations and the aim is to complete integration by 2023. The combined company will target sales of ¥1.5 trillion by 2026.Private brands will be a crucial competitive weapon for the merged chain and also provide opportunities to offer wholesale toiletries and cosmetics floors at supermarkets.The growing competitiveness in the sector amidst increased saturation demands greater scale and will spur the leading players like <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/welcia-holdings-co-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:20895:1" rel="noopener">Welcia Holdings (3141 JP)</a> and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/tsuruha-holdings-inc" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:9536:1" rel="noopener">Tsuruha Holdings (3391 JP)</a> to make further acquisitions to catch up with the new leader.

After more than a year of negotiations and preparation, Matsumotokiyoshi Holdings Co., Ltd. (3088 JP) and Cocokara Fine (3098 JP) finally confirmed their agreement to merge in October this year. The new company will be by far the largest in the drugstore sector.A lot of work has been done already to consolidate operations and the aim is to complete integration by 2023. The combined company will target sales of ¥1.5 trillion by 2026.Private brands will be a crucial competitive weapon for the merged chain and also provide opportunities to offer wholesale toiletries and cosmetics floors at supermarkets.The growing competitiveness in the sector amidst increased saturation demands greater scale and will spur the leading players like Welcia Holdings (3141 JP) and Tsuruha Holdings (3391 JP) to make further acquisitions to catch up with the new leader. 

Matsukiyo-Cocokara Merger Heralds New Era for Drugstores

'Quantamental' Japan Specialist, LightStream Research

Campbell Gunn

'Quantamental' Japan Specialist

Long-Short Analysis on Japan, Asia and the World

LightStream Research

LightStream conducts quantitatively rigorous and data-driven analysis with a focus on Japan and Asia.

We consistently cover the Tech, Consumer and Industrial sectors, and provide ECM and Events coverage more broadly.

We supplement traditional qualitative insights from company relationships with a robust quantitative foundation that examines as much historical data as is available.
We further refine the accuracy of our insights and calls through the use of alternative data to flesh out current trends, and through a valuation framework that emphasises non-superficial peer group selection and a proper attempt to understand the metrics and changes that have driven security valuations in the past.

<figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/139/255/original/2020-06-11_08-36-54.png?1591832240" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="139255"></figure><div class="content-caption">Source: Japan Analytics</div>STRESS TESTS - This Insight is the first in a series that will use a variety of standard and less-frequently used 'stress-tests' to look through the current euphoria and assess where business risk is concentrated among larger Japanese companies. According to Tokyo Shoko Research, 171 listed Japanese firms have raised nearly ¥10 trillion in new funds to weather COVID-19.ALTMAN Z-SCORES - The first Insight will update our earlier Who's<a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/japan-who-s-swimming-naked-part-2-altman-z-score" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:37316" rel="noopener"> Swimming Naked?</a> Insight and focus on the Altman Z-Score as updated for the most recent quarterly results for both manufacturing and non-manufacturing companies.  In each category, ee will look at both the companies that are below Altman's 'distress' levels and those companies that have the most significant negative deviation from their seven-year average score. Only six of the bottom-thirty manufacturing and five of the bottom-thirty manufacturing companies have outperformed over one year. Many are already Oversold and offer potential value opportunities -as with <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/nissan-motor-co-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:72:1" rel="noopener">Nissan Motor (7201 JP)</a> which is now as distressed as when Carlos Ghosn first arrived.  QUASI-FINANCIAL FIRMS - The Z-Score methodology does not work for financial firms. Accordingly, five non-financial companies which have significant financial subsidiaries -  <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/rakuten-inc" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:31:1" rel="noopener">Rakuten (4755 JP)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/z-holdings-corp" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:19603:1" rel="noopener">Z Holdings (4689 JP)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/japan-post-holdings-co-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:359:1" rel="noopener">Japan Post (6178 JP)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/softbank-group-corp" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:315:1" rel="noopener">Softbank Group (9984 JP)</a> and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/sony-corp" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:563:1" rel="noopener">Sony (6758 JP)</a>- have been excluded from this analysis.

Source: Japan AnalyticsSTRESS TESTS - This Insight is the first in a series that will use a variety of standard and less-frequently used 'stress-tests' to look through the current euphoria and assess where business risk is concentrated among larger Japanese companies. According to Tokyo Shoko Research, 171 listed Japanese firms have raised nearly ¥10 trillion in new funds to weather COVID-19.ALTMAN Z-SCORES - The first Insight will update our earlier Who's Swimming Naked? Insight and focus on the Altman Z-Score as updated for the most recent quarterly results for both manufacturing and non-manufacturing companies.  In each category, ee will look at both the companies that are below Altman's 'distress' levels and those companies that have the most significant negative deviation from their seven-year average score. Only six of the bottom-thirty manufacturing and five of the bottom-thirty manufacturing companies have outperformed over one year. Many are already Oversold and offer potential value opportunities -as with Nissan Motor (7201 JP) which is now as distressed as when Carlos Ghosn first arrived.  QUASI-FINANCIAL FIRMS - The Z-Score methodology does not work for financial firms. Accordingly, five non-financial companies which have significant financial subsidiaries -  Rakuten (4755 JP), Z Holdings (4689 JP), Japan Post (6178 JP), Softbank Group (9984 JP) and Sony (6758 JP)- have been excluded from this analysis. 

🇯🇵 JAPAN - Stress Tests Part 1 - Altman Z-Scores

Japan

H2O RETAILING CORPORATION founded in Osaka in 1929, operates railway terminal department stores.  The Company's main store is located at Hankyu terminal in Umeda (Osaka) and sells clothing, foods, sundry goods, furniture, and household utensils.  H2O Retailing also operates restaurants and coffee shops.

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H2O Retailing (8242 JP)

Japan's Department Stores: Radical Contraction Still to Come if Sector Is to Survive

Japan's department stores are in trouble and were well before the pandemic but their outlook is much worse now. Major changes are required, not...

Michael Causton

The Kansai Super (9919) Conundrum

Kansai Super has Two Suitors - H2O Retailing and Kansai Super have ironed out a deal, and OK Corp objects. This creates a conundrum. But solving it...

Travis Lundy

The Polarising Pandemic in Japanese Retail

A complete review of the Japanese retail sector in the last 18 months, format by format, category by category, providing key trends and winners &...

Michael Causton

Matsukiyo-Cocokara Merger Heralds New Era for Drugstores

The merger of Matsukiyo and Cocokara will force further consolidation through M&A in the drugstore sector as regional powerhouses begin to clash as...

Michael Causton

🇯🇵 JAPAN - Stress Tests Part 1 - Altman Z-Scores

STRESS TESTS - This Insight is the first in a series that will use a variety of standard and less-frequently used 'stress-tests' to look through...

Campbell Gunn

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