Silver Point

Thomas J. Monaco

Independent Insight Provider

Silver Point is a boutique research firm that focuses on the broader financial services sector, with a particular focus on troubled institutions globally. 

Asia Ex Japan

Equity Bottom-Up

*Poor 2Q21 Result: DBS Group Holdings (DBS.SP) [DBS] reported 2Q21 results of SGD 1.7 bn, decreasing SGD 304  mn (15.1%) on a linked quarter basis. The weaker results were driven primarily by an overall revenue decline, a loan provision increase, and a higher tax rate;*Watch Your Credit: We struggle continue to believe that DBS’ due diligence had actually caught all of LVB’s risk (see discussion below), and remain unconvinced that the moratorium exits are anything more than additional reliance on government schemes and relief programs. DBS has disclosed absolutely nothing about Shenzhen Rural Commercial Bank’s (SRCB) fundamentals. By our calculation, and given the NCOs of SGD 69 mn, we find that net new NPLs have re-accelerated – up SGD 266 mn or increasing 18.0% annualized versus SGD 85 mn or 5.6% in 1Q21. We feel that reserves should be shored up in the neighborhood of SGD 2.5bn – amounting now to about two quarters of operating results; and *Deal Distractions Mount:  While SRCB dos not appear to be riddled with problems the way LVB is, no doubt there will be issues to contend with.  DBS apparently isn’t done with its shopping spree, being in the running for parts of Citigroup's (C.US) consumer business in Asia. Frankly, DBS needs to focus on improving its own legacy issues before it starts both taking on those of other financial institutions.

*Poor 2Q21 Result: DBS Group Holdings (DBS.SP) [DBS] reported 2Q21 results of SGD 1.7 bn, decreasing SGD 304  mn (15.1%) on a linked quarter basis. The weaker results were driven primarily by an overall revenue decline, a loan provision increase, and a higher tax rate;*Watch Your Credit: We struggle continue to believe that DBS’ due diligence had actually caught all of LVB’s risk (see discussion below), and remain unconvinced that the moratorium exits are anything more than additional reliance on government schemes and relief programs. DBS has disclosed absolutely nothing about Shenzhen Rural Commercial Bank’s (SRCB) fundamentals. By our calculation, and given the NCOs of SGD 69 mn, we find that net new NPLs have re-accelerated – up SGD 266 mn or increasing 18.0% annualized versus SGD 85 mn or 5.6% in 1Q21. We feel that reserves should be shored up in the neighborhood of SGD 2.5bn – amounting now to about two quarters of operating results; and *Deal Distractions Mount:  While SRCB dos not appear to be riddled with problems the way LVB is, no doubt there will be issues to contend with.  DBS apparently isn’t done with its shopping spree, being in the running for parts of Citigroup's (C.US) consumer business in Asia. Frankly, DBS needs to focus on improving its own legacy issues before it starts both taking on those of other financial institutions.

Research and consultancy, Tabbush Report

Daniel Tabbush

Research and consultancy

Tabbush Report

We provide research and consultancy on Asian banks. Our focus is on what we call “Asian bank research, without the noise.” We are interested in the most critical swing-factors for banks, the NPL and credit cycle, and where we believe there is a gap between perception and reality. We often focus on the less studied components of bank financial statements.  Our research is highly thematic, sometimes examining unlisted banks and companies as a window on mainstream banks. 

Being independent allows us to look at smaller banks, often overlooked by others. Analysis of BIS bank guidelines in the context of Asia, is also a focal point, while we also analyze global banks operating in the region. We use what we believe is the most comprehensive, reliable financials database, SNL Financial. S&P Capital IQ augments our database, with corporate data and CEIC, with economics. 

Asian bank research, without the noise.

Thematic (Sector/Industry)

With full data out from Singapore’s banks, it is becoming even clearer, how loan mix can impact net interest income, and margins. It is also a stark reminder of the inherent relative weakness at HSBC.

With full data out from Singapore’s banks, it is becoming even clearer, how loan mix can impact net interest income, and margins. It is also a stark reminder of the inherent relative weakness at HSBC.

*Challenging Result: Oversea Chinese Banking Corp. (OCBC.SP) [OCBC] reported 2Q21 net profit of SGD 1.2 bn, a SGD 341 mn (22.7%) decrease on a linked quarter basis. OCBC’s bottom-line weakness was primarily attributable to two factors: 1) SGD 71 mn (44.1%) increase in the loss provision, which is well justified given the re-acceleration in net new NPL growth; and 2) SGD 362 mn (24.6%) decrease in overall fee revenues, driven primarily by weaker attributable Great Eastern (GE.SP) earnings which likely will be here to stay; and  *Credit Breaking Down After Reprieve:  By our calculation, we find that net new NPL growth has re-acclerated to SGD 771 mn or 78.3% on an annualized basis versus a negative SGD 78 mn or 8.0% for 1Q21. Given the increase in net new NPLs, reserve would appear to now be wanting by SGD 3.1 bn or just under three quarters of bottom-line results.

*Challenging Result: Oversea Chinese Banking Corp. (OCBC.SP) [OCBC] reported 2Q21 net profit of SGD 1.2 bn, a SGD 341 mn (22.7%) decrease on a linked quarter basis. OCBC’s bottom-line weakness was primarily attributable to two factors: 1) SGD 71 mn (44.1%) increase in the loss provision, which is well justified given the re-acceleration in net new NPL growth; and 2) SGD 362 mn (24.6%) decrease in overall fee revenues, driven primarily by weaker attributable Great Eastern (GE.SP) earnings which likely will be here to stay; and  *Credit Breaking Down After Reprieve:  By our calculation, we find that net new NPL growth has re-acclerated to SGD 771 mn or 78.3% on an annualized basis versus a negative SGD 78 mn or 8.0% for 1Q21. Given the increase in net new NPLs, reserve would appear to now be wanting by SGD 3.1 bn or just under three quarters of bottom-line results.

Oversea Chinese Banking Corp. – Re-Accelerating Credit Risk

*Credibility Gap Widens: LIC Housing Finance (LICHF.IN) [LIC] reported FY 1Q22 bottom-line results of INR 1.5 bn, declining INR 2.5 bn (61.5%) linked quarter. Negative operating jaws, were the culprit, as costs increased INR 469 mn (21.1%) whilst revenues declined INR 2.6 bn (16.7%); and*Very Negative Credit Delta: Despite the limited NCOs, net new NPLs at LIC still skyrocketed INR 44.7 bn or 190.3% on an annualized basis linked quarter significantly accelerating from a very high INR 12.6 bn (62.0%) during FY 4Q21. By our calculation, if the large blip in credit continues, LIC management ought to think about adding another INR 158 bn to the reserve – which amounts to 78% of stated equity at just 50% cover of NPLs.

*Credibility Gap Widens: LIC Housing Finance (LICHF.IN) [LIC] reported FY 1Q22 bottom-line results of INR 1.5 bn, declining INR 2.5 bn (61.5%) linked quarter. Negative operating jaws, were the culprit, as costs increased INR 469 mn (21.1%) whilst revenues declined INR 2.6 bn (16.7%); and*Very Negative Credit Delta: Despite the limited NCOs, net new NPLs at LIC still skyrocketed INR 44.7 bn or 190.3% on an annualized basis linked quarter significantly accelerating from a very high INR 12.6 bn (62.0%) during FY 4Q21. By our calculation, if the large blip in credit continues, LIC management ought to think about adding another INR 158 bn to the reserve – which amounts to 78% of stated equity at just 50% cover of NPLs.

LIC Housing Finance – Unmitigated Disaster

There are stark differences in how loan loss provisioning levels have changed since late 2019 to early 2021. This can have implications for relative credit costs during FY21. STAN does not fare well, Mizuho looks best.

There are stark differences in how loan loss provisioning levels have changed since late 2019 to early 2021. This can have implications for relative credit costs during FY21. STAN does not fare well, Mizuho looks best. 

Singapore

DBS Group Holdings Limited and its subsidiaries provide a variety of financial services.  The Company offers services including mortgage financing, lease and hire purchase financing, nominee and trustee, funds management, corporate advisory and brokerage .  DBS Group also acts as the primary dealer in Singapore government securities.

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DBS (DBS SP)

DBS Group Holdings – Bad Print

DBS: DBS QOQ 2Q21 results declined 15.1% due to poor revenues and higher provisions. We worry that DBS has not caught the LVB risk, net new NPLs re...

Thomas J. Monaco

Banks – Margins

With full data out from Singapore’s banks, it is becoming even clearer, how loan mix can impact net interest income, and margins. It is also a...

Daniel Tabbush

Oversea Chinese Banking Corp. – Re-Accelerating Credit Risk

OVERSEA CHINESE BANKING: OCBC reported a QOQ 2Q21 net profit decline of 22.7% driven by higher provisions and weaker associate income. Net new NPLs...

Thomas J. Monaco

LIC Housing Finance – Unmitigated Disaster

LIC HOUSING: LIC's FY 1Q22 bottom-line results declined 61.5% linked quarter due to negative operating jaws. Net new NPLs skyrocketed 190.3%...

Thomas J. Monaco

Banks – Provisioning

There are stark differences in how provisioning levels changed since 4Q29 to early 2021. This can have implications for relative credit costs...

Daniel Tabbush

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