Pan-Asia Catalysts/Events, Quiddity Advisors

David Blennerhassett

Pan-Asia Catalysts/Events

Quiddity Advisors

Event-Driven

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<p>In StubWorld this week ...</p>
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<p><a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/indofood-sukses-makmur-tbk-p" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:1053:1" rel="noopener"></a>Beleaguered <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/china-evergrande-group" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:479:1" rel="noopener">Evergrande Real Estate Group (3333 HK)</a>'s shares bounced after the company <a href="https://www1.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2021/0810/2021081001009.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">said</a> it is in talks to sell stakes in two of its units. But optimism over improved capital management appears naive. </p>
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<p>Preceding my comments on Evergrande are the weekly setup/unwind tables for Asia-Pacific Holdcos.</p>
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<p>These relationships trade with a minimum liquidity threshold of US$1mn on a 90-day moving average, and a % market capitalisation threshold - the $ value of the holding/opco held, over the parent’s market capitalisation, expressed in percent - of at least 20%.</p>
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<p>As always, more below the fold.</p>
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In StubWorld this week ...




Beleaguered Evergrande Real Estate Group (3333 HK)'s shares bounced after the company said it is in talks to sell stakes in two of its units. But optimism over improved capital management appears naive. 




Preceding my comments on Evergrande are the weekly setup/unwind tables for Asia-Pacific Holdcos.


These relationships trade with a minimum liquidity threshold of US$1mn on a 90-day moving average, and a % market capitalisation threshold - the $ value of the holding/opco held, over the parent’s market capitalisation, expressed in percent - of at least 20%.


As always, more below the fold.


Travis Lundy

<p>On Friday, it became known that S&amp;P Global ratings had lowered the ratings on Evergrande by two full notches, from B- to CCC, which is now four notches above Default. USD bonds issued by Scenery Journey were lowered from CCC+ to CCC-. </p><p>That was the second time in about ten days that S&amp;P had lowered rates (after the agency had lower rates after the Guangfa Bank account freezing episode, later resolved, and the issue in Shaoyang City which had accused Evergrande of not depositing pre-sale funds into the escrow accounts properly). </p><p>According to a Reuters article...</p><blockquote><p data-testid="paragraph-3">"We lowered the ratings because Evergrande's liquidity position is eroding more quickly and by more than we previously expected," the rating agency said.</p></blockquote><div><div><div><div><blockquote><div id="reuters_desktop_native_1">It added the firm's nonpayment risk is escalating not only for the substantial public bond maturities in 2022, but also for its bank and trust loans and other debt liabilities over the next 12 months.</div></blockquote></div></div></div></div><p>This move followed Fitch and Moody's which had both dinged the ratings at end June and again on 28 July and 2 August, respectively. </p><p>To possibly make it worse on the ratings agency front, as of Friday after the close, China's financial regulators are also on the case, trying to root out weakness in "construction of ratings methods and systems" (which could be taken to mean corruption). The PBOC (announcement <a href="http://www.pbc.gov.cn/goutongjiaoliu/113456/113469/4311502/index.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">link</a> in Chinese), in conjunction with the NDRC, the Ministry of Finance, the CBRC, and the CSRC, jointly issued the <em>"Notice on Promoting the Healthy Development of the Bond Market Credit Rating Industry"</em></p><p>On Friday, Caixin Media <a href="https://www.caixinglobal.com/2021-08-06/exclusive-one-court-will-handle-developer-evergrandes-multitude-of-debt-lawsuits-101751875.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">reported</a> that the Supreme People's Court - the top court in China - had directed that all cases involving debts owed by Evergrande and its related parties be transferred to the Guangzhou Intermediate People's Court. According to Caixin... </p><blockquote><p>A court insider said this kind of decision — known as “centralized jurisdiction” — is usually made when a company is involved in a large number of lawsuits across regions and the situation has the potential to cause a significant social impact.</p></blockquote><p>The article notes that other companies which have been subject to <em>centralized jurisdiction</em> include Peking University Founder Group, HNA Group - which have been put through bankruptcy and/or restructuring - and China Fortune Land Development which <a href="https://www.caixinglobal.com/2021-02-02/developer-china-fortune-defaults-on-53-billion-yuan-in-debt-101659497.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">defaulted</a> on repayment of debt in February, and <a href="https://www.caixinglobal.com/2021-03-10/developer-china-fortune-defaults-on-another-13-billion-in-debt-101673624.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">again</a> in March. </p><p>Vice Premier Liu He apparently apparently pointed out in a State Council meeting the week before last that Evergrande's problems are one of "liquidity stress" rather than an "insolvency" situation. I'd note that a MinNews <a href="https://min.news/en/economy/aff8aa102018d13ea3af930f62859bdb.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">article</a> quoting a REDD report says HNA Group, China Fortune Land Development, and China Minsheng Investment were also assessed as having liquidity stress and "non-insolvent debt"</p><p>Banks have been asked to curb lending and in May were asked to stress-test their Evergrande exposure. Evergrande affiliate Shengjing Bank was fined in May for illegally financing real estate projects.</p><p>It would appear that Evergrande has decreasing room for manoeuvre. And that room for manoeuvre depends on others' confidence in stability of outcome. </p>

On Friday, it became known that S&amp;P Global ratings had lowered the ratings on Evergrande by two full notches, from B- to CCC, which is now four notches above Default. USD bonds issued by Scenery Journey were lowered from CCC+ to CCC-. That was the second time in about ten days that S&amp;P had lowered rates (after the agency had lower rates after the Guangfa Bank account freezing episode, later resolved, and the issue in Shaoyang City which had accused Evergrande of not depositing pre-sale funds into the escrow accounts properly). According to a Reuters article..."We lowered the ratings because Evergrande's liquidity position is eroding more quickly and by more than we previously expected," the rating agency said.It added the firm's nonpayment risk is escalating not only for the substantial public bond maturities in 2022, but also for its bank and trust loans and other debt liabilities over the next 12 months.This move followed Fitch and Moody's which had both dinged the ratings at end June and again on 28 July and 2 August, respectively. To possibly make it worse on the ratings agency front, as of Friday after the close, China's financial regulators are also on the case, trying to root out weakness in "construction of ratings methods and systems" (which could be taken to mean corruption). The PBOC (announcement link in Chinese), in conjunction with the NDRC, the Ministry of Finance, the CBRC, and the CSRC, jointly issued the "Notice on Promoting the Healthy Development of the Bond Market Credit Rating Industry"On Friday, Caixin Media reported that the Supreme People's Court - the top court in China - had directed that all cases involving debts owed by Evergrande and its related parties be transferred to the Guangzhou Intermediate People's Court. According to Caixin... A court insider said this kind of decision — known as “centralized jurisdiction” — is usually made when a company is involved in a large number of lawsuits across regions and the situation has the potential to cause a significant social impact.The article notes that other companies which have been subject to centralized jurisdiction include Peking University Founder Group, HNA Group - which have been put through bankruptcy and/or restructuring - and China Fortune Land Development which defaulted on repayment of debt in February, and again in March. Vice Premier Liu He apparently apparently pointed out in a State Council meeting the week before last that Evergrande's problems are one of "liquidity stress" rather than an "insolvency" situation. I'd note that a MinNews article quoting a REDD report says HNA Group, China Fortune Land Development, and China Minsheng Investment were also assessed as having liquidity stress and "non-insolvent debt"Banks have been asked to curb lending and in May were asked to stress-test their Evergrande exposure. Evergrande affiliate Shengjing Bank was fined in May for illegally financing real estate projects.It would appear that Evergrande has decreasing room for manoeuvre. And that room for manoeuvre depends on others' confidence in stability of outcome. 

Evergrande's Room for Manoeuvre - A Question of Confidence

<p><a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/china-evergrande-group" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Evergrande Real Estate Group (3333 HK)</a> shares rallied enormously sharply in 2017, moving from the mid single digits to HK$30+ by Q3 that year. That year the float in Evergrande was also sharply reduced by the purchases of shares by <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/chinese-estates-holdings-limited" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Chinese Estates Holdings (127 HK)</a> and its owners. </p>
<p>When the shares fell back after getting squeezed, Evergrande conducted a buyback which got them within a hair's breadth of the residual minimum free float requirement mandated by the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. The shares stayed higher. </p>
<p>Eventually, Evergrande saw more of the employee share options with low exercise prices exercised which increased the share count and float so when shares fell in 2020, the company could buy back shares, and it did so after shares fell to new 3yr lows in the covid-crash. It bought shares back from May to June, again reducing float to within a hair's breadth of the free float limit, and in the period, shares rose about 50%. </p>
<p>Then at the start of H2, with a <a href="https://www1.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2020/0701/2020070100031.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">press release</a> about unaudited June sales results and how strong sales had been in H1, the shares popped 40% (from HK$20 to HK$28/share) in three days, then fell back over 6 weeks, going back below HK$20 when the company <a href="https://www1.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2020/0813/2020081301678.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">disclosed</a> it was pre-selling stakes in its property management unit before the IPO, and three days later Evergrande actually issued a <a href="https://www1.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2020/0816/2020081600097.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">profit warning</a>, just before releasing H1 results. </p>
<p>Also in August, but undisclosed at the time, was the fact that several major real estate developers, including Evergrande, had been called on the carpet to discuss their participation in the so-called Three Red Lines pilot program (the three red lines are a liability-to-asset ratio excluding advanced receipts of 70%, net debt-to-equity ratio of 100%, and cash to short-term debt ratio at 1x). Companies which crossed one of three red lines could not increase interest-bearing borrowing by more than 10% in a year. Cross two of them and they were capped at 5% growth. Cross all three of them and the developer could not increase debt at all. This is tough when funding at high single digits to 10+% interest rates are used to carry ever more non-interest-earning land bank. But Evergrande "met" all three so needed to reduce debt and raise cash, discussed in <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/evergrande-may-be-facing-a-funding-squeeze" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Evergrande May Be Facing a Funding Squeeze</a>. </p>
<p>There was a story about a "letter", later denied by the company, in September, discussing the importance of the local government helping Evergrande deal with its short-term funding issues, which included the issue of the buyback guarantee offered by Evergrande to minority shareholders of Evergrande's major onshore operating unit Hengda. Evergrande denied the <em>existence</em> of the letter, but despite the fact some Hengda shareholders reportedly wanted out as listing was unlikely, somehow, with the local government's help, Evergrande announced a new agreement meaning repayment in January 2021 was unnecessary. The shares rallied and two weeks later Evergrande raised some capital (discussed in <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/evergrande-equity-placement-musical-shares" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Evergrande Equity Placement - Musical Shares</a>).</p>
<p>I had my ideas about WHY those shares were placed, and it was not to raise equity to pay down debt. The capital raised was less than expected despite the large discount and the shares quickly fell below placement price.  So just 3 weeks after raising equity, it started <em>buying back</em> shares, reasonably quickly raising the price above where it had sold shares. This was discussed in <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/evergrande-equity-de-placement-musical-shares" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Evergrande Equity De-Placement: Musical Shares</a>. Then a couple weeks later, we saw <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/evergrande" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Evergrande Terminate Hengda's Backdoor Listing</a> so the story left was one of an optically "cheap" but heavily indebted developer, lowering selling prices to liquidate inventory, lower debt and raise cash levels, etc. There were sales of shares of recently listed subsidiaries. There were announcements of how much debt had been lowered. But shares fell. </p>
<p>There were stories in Chinese media and in social media about issues with the company's trade acceptance bills. An <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-07-09/china-urged-evergrande-founder-to-find-quick-fix-for-debt-woes" target="_blank" rel="noopener">article</a> on Bloomberg.com a week ago reported that while Evergrande chairman Hui Ka Yan was in Beijing for the 100th anniversary celebrations 1 July, he met with the Financial Stability and Development Committee, which urged him to solve his company's debt problems pronto. The article is worth reading. It suggested more worry at the top than thought, and even says FSDC officials had suggested bringing in strategic investors. Hui said he was speaking with local investors. </p>
<p>Bonds have traded lower and lower and the 2024-2025 maturity bonds appear to be trading in the 60s, with shorter-dated bonds trading at 30+% yield to maturity. Wednesday, the shares closed at HK$8.91 - lowest in four years. </p>
<h3>Yesterday, there was new news. </h3>
<p>The company announced a board meeting for 27 July where the Board would consider a special dividend. </p>
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<p>My first reaction was, I admit, one of surprise, but on second thought it should not be THAT surprising.</p>
<p>The immediate public comments I have seen suggested an attempt to squeeze shorts. According to data from the SFC, shorts have risen from levels near-matching covid-crash lows, and now stand at roughly 2.1% of shares out (a bit under 10% of float), but that would not do it.</p>
<p>The single most indebted real estate company in the world, with short-term bonds yielding risk-free-rate plus.... [checks notes] 30+%, where the chairman gets called onto the carpet of the highest financial regulator in China - not the PBOC, CSRC, or CBIRC - above them - urging him to <em>Do Something</em> - sell assets, lower debt, raise equity - deciding to pay a special dividend to its equity holders? </p>
<p>I expect Hui Ka Yan has his reasons, and I expect those reasons do not include rewarding long-suffering minority shareholders. Or squeezing shorts. </p>
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Evergrande Real Estate Group (3333 HK) shares rallied enormously sharply in 2017, moving from the mid single digits to HK$30+ by Q3 that year. That year the float in Evergrande was also sharply reduced by the purchases of shares by Chinese Estates Holdings (127 HK) and its owners. 
When the shares fell back after getting squeezed, Evergrande conducted a buyback which got them within a hair's breadth of the residual minimum free float requirement mandated by the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. The shares stayed higher. 
Eventually, Evergrande saw more of the employee share options with low exercise prices exercised which increased the share count and float so when shares fell in 2020, the company could buy back shares, and it did so after shares fell to new 3yr lows in the covid-crash. It bought shares back from May to June, again reducing float to within a hair's breadth of the free float limit, and in the period, shares rose about 50%. 
Then at the start of H2, with a press release about unaudited June sales results and how strong sales had been in H1, the shares popped 40% (from HK$20 to HK$28/share) in three days, then fell back over 6 weeks, going back below HK$20 when the company disclosed it was pre-selling stakes in its property management unit before the IPO, and three days later Evergrande actually issued a profit warning, just before releasing H1 results. 
Also in August, but undisclosed at the time, was the fact that several major real estate developers, including Evergrande, had been called on the carpet to discuss their participation in the so-called Three Red Lines pilot program (the three red lines are a liability-to-asset ratio excluding advanced receipts of 70%, net debt-to-equity ratio of 100%, and cash to short-term debt ratio at 1x). Companies which crossed one of three red lines could not increase interest-bearing borrowing by more than 10% in a year. Cross two of them and they were capped at 5% growth. Cross all three of them and the developer could not increase debt at all. This is tough when funding at high single digits to 10+% interest rates are used to carry ever more non-interest-earning land bank. But Evergrande "met" all three so needed to reduce debt and raise cash, discussed in Evergrande May Be Facing a Funding Squeeze. 
There was a story about a "letter", later denied by the company, in September, discussing the importance of the local government helping Evergrande deal with its short-term funding issues, which included the issue of the buyback guarantee offered by Evergrande to minority shareholders of Evergrande's major onshore operating unit Hengda. Evergrande denied the existence of the letter, but despite the fact some Hengda shareholders reportedly wanted out as listing was unlikely, somehow, with the local government's help, Evergrande announced a new agreement meaning repayment in January 2021 was unnecessary. The shares rallied and two weeks later Evergrande raised some capital (discussed in Evergrande Equity Placement - Musical Shares).
I had my ideas about WHY those shares were placed, and it was not to raise equity to pay down debt. The capital raised was less than expected despite the large discount and the shares quickly fell below placement price.  So just 3 weeks after raising equity, it started buying back shares, reasonably quickly raising the price above where it had sold shares. This was discussed in Evergrande Equity De-Placement: Musical Shares. Then a couple weeks later, we saw Evergrande Terminate Hengda's Backdoor Listing so the story left was one of an optically "cheap" but heavily indebted developer, lowering selling prices to liquidate inventory, lower debt and raise cash levels, etc. There were sales of shares of recently listed subsidiaries. There were announcements of how much debt had been lowered. But shares fell. 
There were stories in Chinese media and in social media about issues with the company's trade acceptance bills. An article on Bloomberg.com a week ago reported that while Evergrande chairman Hui Ka Yan was in Beijing for the 100th anniversary celebrations 1 July, he met with the Financial Stability and Development Committee, which urged him to solve his company's debt problems pronto. The article is worth reading. It suggested more worry at the top than thought, and even says FSDC officials had suggested bringing in strategic investors. Hui said he was speaking with local investors. 
Bonds have traded lower and lower and the 2024-2025 maturity bonds appear to be trading in the 60s, with shorter-dated bonds trading at 30+% yield to maturity. Wednesday, the shares closed at HK$8.91 - lowest in four years. 
Yesterday, there was new news. 
The company announced a board meeting for 27 July where the Board would consider a special dividend. 




My first reaction was, I admit, one of surprise, but on second thought it should not be THAT surprising.
The immediate public comments I have seen suggested an attempt to squeeze shorts. According to data from the SFC, shorts have risen from levels near-matching covid-crash lows, and now stand at roughly 2.1% of shares out (a bit under 10% of float), but that would not do it.
The single most indebted real estate company in the world, with short-term bonds yielding risk-free-rate plus.... [checks notes] 30+%, where the chairman gets called onto the carpet of the highest financial regulator in China - not the PBOC, CSRC, or CBIRC - above them - urging him to Do Something - sell assets, lower debt, raise equity - deciding to pay a special dividend to its equity holders? 
I expect Hui Ka Yan has his reasons, and I expect those reasons do not include rewarding long-suffering minority shareholders. Or squeezing shorts. 
  

Evergrande's Very Special... Special Dividend?

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<p>A double-dose of StubWorld this week ...</p>
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<p><a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/hang-lung-group-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:50:1" rel="noopener">Hang Lung (10 HK)</a>'s is coming up expensive on my monitor,  yet at 0.3x P/B, against 0.47x for a basket of peers, HLG is one of the cheapest property plays in Hong Kong.</p>
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<p>Preceding my comments on Hang Lung are the weekly setup/unwind tables for Asia-Pacific Holdcos.</p>
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<p>These relationships trade with a minimum liquidity threshold of US$1mn on a 90-day moving average, and a % market capitalisation threshold - the $ value of the holding/opco held, over the parent’s market capitalisation, expressed in percent - of at least 20%.</p>
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A double-dose of StubWorld this week ...



Hang Lung (10 HK)'s is coming up expensive on my monitor,  yet at 0.3x P/B, against 0.47x for a basket of peers, HLG is one of the cheapest property plays in Hong Kong.

Preceding my comments on Hang Lung are the weekly setup/unwind tables for Asia-Pacific Holdcos.



These relationships trade with a minimum liquidity threshold of US$1mn on a 90-day moving average, and a % market capitalisation threshold - the $ value of the holding/opco held, over the parent’s market capitalisation, expressed in percent - of at least 20%.



StubWorld: Hang Lung Group Is Still Cheap

Equity Bottom-Up

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<p>This week in StubWorld ...</p>
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<p><a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/china-evergrande-group" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:479:1" rel="noopener">Evergrande Real Estate Group (3333 HK)</a> plumbs a new discount to NAV low after <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/china-evergrande-new-energy-vehicle-group-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:713:1" rel="noopener">Evergrande Auto (708 HK)</a>'s meteoric post-placement gain; <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/pccw-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:873:1" rel="noopener">PCCW Ltd (8 HK)</a> discount to NAV retraces, as expected; and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/lg-corp" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:6653:1" rel="noopener">LG Corp (003550 KS)</a> still look cheap versus its sum of parts.</p>
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<p>Preceding my comments on these holdcos are the weekly setup/unwind tables for Asia-Pacific Holdcos.</p>
</div>
<div>
<p>These relationships trade with a minimum liquidity threshold of US$1mn on a 90-day moving average, and a % market capitalisation threshold - the $ value of the holding/opco held, over the parent’s market capitalisation, expressed in percent - of at least 20%.</p>
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This week in StubWorld ...

Evergrande Real Estate Group (3333 HK) plumbs a new discount to NAV low after Evergrande Auto (708 HK)'s meteoric post-placement gain; PCCW Ltd (8 HK) discount to NAV retraces, as expected; and LG Corp (003550 KS) still look cheap versus its sum of parts.




Preceding my comments on these holdcos are the weekly setup/unwind tables for Asia-Pacific Holdcos.


These relationships trade with a minimum liquidity threshold of US$1mn on a 90-day moving average, and a % market capitalisation threshold - the $ value of the holding/opco held, over the parent’s market capitalisation, expressed in percent - of at least 20%.


StubWorld: Evergrande Auto, PCCW, LG Corp

Hong Kong

Chinese Estates Holdings Limited, through its subsidiaries, invests in and develops real estate properties.  The Company also invests in securities and provides brokerage and money lending services.

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Chinese Estates Holdings (127 HK)

StubWorld: What To Do With Evergrande?

Evergrande Auto is not worth what its market cap suggests to an independent third party; and Property Services may or may not be worth what people...

David Blennerhassett

Evergrande's Room for Manoeuvre - A Question of Confidence

Evergrande bad news again chips away at the bonds. Late last week saw the 2nd downgrade by S&P in 10 days, and a "centralisation of jurisdiction"...

Travis Lundy

Evergrande's Very Special... Special Dividend?

Evergrande has been in a world of hurt, actively selling down assets. It has repaid some short-term bonds, but commercial bills remain an issue. So...

Travis Lundy

StubWorld: Hang Lung Group Is Still Cheap

I cannot envisage HLG privatising HLP given the pricing (P/B) disparity. I think Ronnie Chan should follow the Woo/Wheelock (20 HK) template, and...

David Blennerhassett

StubWorld: Evergrande Auto, PCCW, LG Corp

Chine Evergrande (3333 HK) looks "cheap" and Evergrande Auto (708 HK) frothy, suggesting a set-up here. Personally, I would avoid both.

David Blennerhassett

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