Specialist in Indian Banking and Economic Research

Hemindra Hazari

Thematic (Sector/Industry)

A newly-appointed (on October 9, 2020) deputy governor of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has <a href="https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/BS_SpeechesView.aspx?Id=1101" target="_blank" rel="noopener">proposed</a>, for discussion, that large systemically-important non-bank finance companies (NBFCs) either convert themselves into banks, or that they contract assets, in order to protect financial stability. This proposal not only has major implications for prominent NBFCs some belonging to industrial houses, but also highlights the regulator’s present lack of capability to regulate such companies. Instead of arguing for the large NBFCs to either become banks or face an eventual demise by setting on a path to shrinking their size, the regulator should be examining how to improve its own regulation and supervision of large NBFCs. The collapses of IL&amp;FS (<a href="https://hemindrahazari.com/2019/01/31/ilfs-collapse-what-happens-when-infrastructure-development-is-privatised-hemindra-hazari/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">here</a>) and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/dewan-housing-finance-corp" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:8142:1" rel="noopener">Dewan Housing Finance (DEWH IN)</a> (<a href="https://hemindrahazari.com/2019/01/29/panel-discussion-on-cobrapost-expose-of-dhfl/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">here</a>) were not only a failure of corporate governance and the economic slowdown, but also the consequence of a severe shortfall in regulatory supervision.Financial deregulation and the entry of more players in the strategic financial sector require a more vigilant, intrusive regulator armed with the necessary systems, processes and human resource talent to effectively regulate and supervise the sector. Sadly, the total officer strength of the RBI is currently below the levels of 2015, and it needs to invest in more resources for regulating the NBFC sector instead of proposing to compel large NBFCs to become banks. NBFCs cater to specific needs of the economy which the banks, for whatever reasons, have been unable to address, and while some NBFCs may want to become banks, others owned by industrial houses may not even be permitted to get bank licenses, and some may not even want to become banks. In such a scenario it is imperative for the regulator to implement systems and processes to regulate large NBFCs instead of floating such proposals in the public domain.

A newly-appointed (on October 9, 2020) deputy governor of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has proposed, for discussion, that large systemically-important non-bank finance companies (NBFCs) either convert themselves into banks, or that they contract assets, in order to protect financial stability. This proposal not only has major implications for prominent NBFCs some belonging to industrial houses, but also highlights the regulator’s present lack of capability to regulate such companies. Instead of arguing for the large NBFCs to either become banks or face an eventual demise by setting on a path to shrinking their size, the regulator should be examining how to improve its own regulation and supervision of large NBFCs. The collapses of IL&amp;FS (here) and Dewan Housing Finance (DEWH IN) (here) were not only a failure of corporate governance and the economic slowdown, but also the consequence of a severe shortfall in regulatory supervision.Financial deregulation and the entry of more players in the strategic financial sector require a more vigilant, intrusive regulator armed with the necessary systems, processes and human resource talent to effectively regulate and supervise the sector. Sadly, the total officer strength of the RBI is currently below the levels of 2015, and it needs to invest in more resources for regulating the NBFC sector instead of proposing to compel large NBFCs to become banks. NBFCs cater to specific needs of the economy which the banks, for whatever reasons, have been unable to address, and while some NBFCs may want to become banks, others owned by industrial houses may not even be permitted to get bank licenses, and some may not even want to become banks. In such a scenario it is imperative for the regulator to implement systems and processes to regulate large NBFCs instead of floating such proposals in the public domain.

RBI Proposal to Convert Large NBFCs into Banks: No Solution to the Problem of Regulatory Failures

Silver Point

Thomas J. Monaco

Independent Insight Provider

Silver Point is a boutique research firm that focuses on the broader financial services sector, with a particular focus on troubled institutions globally. 

Asia Ex Japan

Equity Bottom-Up

*Results Supported By Premature Provision Cut: State Bank of India (SBIN.IN) [SBI] reported FY 2Q21 results of INR 45.7 bn, increasing INR 3.8 bn (9.2%) linked quarter. Results were even better when we exclude the FY 1Q21 exceptional gain of INR 15.4 bn – increasing INR 19.2 bn or 72.6% linked quarter. Results were driven by three factors: a) net interest income improvement of INR 15.4 bn (5.8%) due primarily to NIM improvement of 8 bp to 2.96%; b) a loan loss provision decline of INR 18.1 bn (16.0%) despite much weaker credit metrics; and c) non-interest income improvement of INR 5.7 bn (7.2%); and* Credit Risk and Weak Cover: By our calculation, we find net new NPL growth of INR 144.0 bn or 44.4% on an annualized basis and that the annualized NCO rate of 66 bp – which are quite troublesome even for an SOE bank. We also find that reserves are light in the neighborbood of INR 1.1 tn  - nearly four years of pre-tax results or 61% of market-cap.

*Results Supported By Premature Provision Cut: State Bank of India (SBIN.IN) [SBI] reported FY 2Q21 results of INR 45.7 bn, increasing INR 3.8 bn (9.2%) linked quarter. Results were even better when we exclude the FY 1Q21 exceptional gain of INR 15.4 bn – increasing INR 19.2 bn or 72.6% linked quarter. Results were driven by three factors: a) net interest income improvement of INR 15.4 bn (5.8%) due primarily to NIM improvement of 8 bp to 2.96%; b) a loan loss provision decline of INR 18.1 bn (16.0%) despite much weaker credit metrics; and c) non-interest income improvement of INR 5.7 bn (7.2%); and* Credit Risk and Weak Cover: By our calculation, we find net new NPL growth of INR 144.0 bn or 44.4% on an annualized basis and that the annualized NCO rate of 66 bp – which are quite troublesome even for an SOE bank. We also find that reserves are light in the neighborbood of INR 1.1 tn  - nearly four years of pre-tax results or 61% of market-cap. 

State Bank of India – Credit Continues To Fall Off A Cliff

*All Good: Housing Development Finance Corp. (HDFC.IN) [HDFC] reported FY 2Q21 bottom-line results of INR 33.7 bn - increasing INR 3.8 bn (12.6%) linked quarter. From a core operating perspective, we note that HDFC came in at INR 32.0 bn, a whopping INR 15.5 bn (93.4%) increase over FY 1Q21.*Credit Risk Decelerating: The trend in annualized NCOs has declined, by our calculation, to 16 bp from 21 bp in the previous quarter. In addition, the level of net new NPLs has also decelerated to INR 3.6 bn or 14.2% on an annualized basis versus 46.6% in FY 1Q21. We would have preferred that HDFC remained more vigilant given the continued uncertainty with COVID-19. As such, we still find that HDFC’s reserve still needs shoring up by another INR 68 bn or just over two quarters of core operating results; and*Positive Operating Jaws: . Key to core operating result performance was: a) net interest income improvement of INR 2.8 bn (8.3%) led by both linked quarter loan growth of 2.0% and NIM improvement of 17 bp to 2.75%; b) an INT 306 mn (7.7%) decline in operating expenses which pushed HDFC’s C/I ratio even lower by 160 bp to 9.2%.

*All Good: Housing Development Finance Corp. (HDFC.IN) [HDFC] reported FY 2Q21 bottom-line results of INR 33.7 bn - increasing INR 3.8 bn (12.6%) linked quarter. From a core operating perspective, we note that HDFC came in at INR 32.0 bn, a whopping INR 15.5 bn (93.4%) increase over FY 1Q21.*Credit Risk Decelerating: The trend in annualized NCOs has declined, by our calculation, to 16 bp from 21 bp in the previous quarter. In addition, the level of net new NPLs has also decelerated to INR 3.6 bn or 14.2% on an annualized basis versus 46.6% in FY 1Q21. We would have preferred that HDFC remained more vigilant given the continued uncertainty with COVID-19. As such, we still find that HDFC’s reserve still needs shoring up by another INR 68 bn or just over two quarters of core operating results; and*Positive Operating Jaws: . Key to core operating result performance was: a) net interest income improvement of INR 2.8 bn (8.3%) led by both linked quarter loan growth of 2.0% and NIM improvement of 17 bp to 2.75%; b) an INT 306 mn (7.7%) decline in operating expenses which pushed HDFC’s C/I ratio even lower by 160 bp to 9.2%.

Housing Development Finance Corp. – “Great Quarter Guys”

*Manufactured Improvement: IndusInd Bank (IIB.IB) [IndusInd] reported FY 2Q21 bottom-line results of INR 6.5 bn, improving INR 1.9 bn (40.5%) linked quarter. Like most other banks in India, IndusInd cut its loan loss provision INR 2.9 bn or 13.0% on a linked quarter basis – driving FY2Q21 bottom-line – a bizarre move given the accelerated levels of NPL creation which no doubt will be reversed going forward; and*Credit Weaker, Not Better: You can dress IndusInd up and put as much make-up on as you like but at the end of the day – credit is ugly. NCOs of INR 18.4 bn amount to 3.72% on an annualized basis, while net new NPLs are increasing at a 117.5%. From our vantage point, we find that IndusInd’s reserve needs to be more than tripled with a shortfall of INR 75.7 bn – representing nine quarters of pre-tax results if you believe the FY 2Q21 result wasn’t manufactured – or 17.0% of market cap. This is a problem, as IndusInd’s CET 1 at 14.5% is substantially still lower than the CET 1 ratio of the large private banks (18% on an average).

*Manufactured Improvement: IndusInd Bank (IIB.IB) [IndusInd] reported FY 2Q21 bottom-line results of INR 6.5 bn, improving INR 1.9 bn (40.5%) linked quarter. Like most other banks in India, IndusInd cut its loan loss provision INR 2.9 bn or 13.0% on a linked quarter basis – driving FY2Q21 bottom-line – a bizarre move given the accelerated levels of NPL creation which no doubt will be reversed going forward; and*Credit Weaker, Not Better: You can dress IndusInd up and put as much make-up on as you like but at the end of the day – credit is ugly. NCOs of INR 18.4 bn amount to 3.72% on an annualized basis, while net new NPLs are increasing at a 117.5%. From our vantage point, we find that IndusInd’s reserve needs to be more than tripled with a shortfall of INR 75.7 bn – representing nine quarters of pre-tax results if you believe the FY 2Q21 result wasn’t manufactured – or 17.0% of market cap. This is a problem, as IndusInd’s CET 1 at 14.5% is substantially still lower than the CET 1 ratio of the large private banks (18% on an average).

IndusInd Bank – Now Dealing With Negative Operating Jaws

India Financials

Saumya Agarwal

HDFC Ltd reported its Q2FY21 results today.  As the largest financer of home loans, the performance of HDFC ‘s Housing portfolio is indicative of the underlying trends in the housing finance market. While HDFC's home loan growth is still moderate at ~5% y-t-d, disbursements have been gaining traction.

HDFC Ltd reported its Q2FY21 results today.  As the largest financer of home loans, the performance of HDFC ‘s Housing portfolio is indicative of the underlying trends in the housing finance market. While HDFC's home loan growth is still moderate at ~5% y-t-d, disbursements have been gaining traction.

HDFC Q2FY21 – Home Loan Disbursals Gain Traction But Profit Declines 28% Y-O-Y Due to One-Offs

India

Housing Development Finance Corporation Ltd. HDFC provides housing finance company. The Company provides wide range of housing loans, loan for home improvement, extensions, top ups, and non housing loans and loans for non resident Indian (NRI). HDFC serves customers in India, kuwait, Singapore, Oman, UAE, and the United Kingdom.

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HDFC Limited (HDFC IN)

RBI Proposal to Convert Large NBFCs into Banks: No Solution to the Problem of Regulatory Failures

Instead of forcible conversion to banks the RBI should ensure that it improves the regulation of important NBFCs so as to ensure that these...

Hemindra Hazari

State Bank of India – Credit Continues To Fall Off A Cliff

STATE BANK OF INDIA: Costs Increasing, Credit Deteriorating, Reserve Cover Declining. This Is A Recipe For A Massive Capital Raise.

Thomas J. Monaco

Housing Development Finance Corp. – “Great Quarter Guys”

HOUSING DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORP: Positive Operating Jaws Were Just An Outgrowth Of This Well Oiled Machine. Credit Risk Too Substantially...

Thomas J. Monaco

IndusInd Bank – Now Dealing With Negative Operating Jaws

INDUSIND BANK: IndusInd Remains Challenged With Accelerating NPL Formation, And Poor Coverage. However, Negative Operating Jaws Are Now A New Twist.

Thomas J. Monaco

HDFC Q2FY21 – Home Loan Disbursals Gain Traction But Profit Declines 28% Y-O-Y Due to One-Offs

As the largest financer of home loans, HDFC's loan growth is indicative of the underlying trends in the housing market. Home loan disbursements...

Saumya Agarwal

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