Pan-Asia Catalysts/Events, Quiddity Advisors

David Blennerhassett

Pan-Asia Catalysts/Events

Quiddity Advisors

Event-Driven

Last Week in Event SPACE: BHP, WH Group, Beijing Capital Land, China Life, Macau Gaming Concessions

<p>Back on 29th June 2001, BHP and Billiton merged by way of a dual-headed structure.  Shareholders continued to hold their pre-merger shares in BHP or Billiton, but with the same economic interest in the entire group, and dividends and capital distributions were equalised in accordance with a 1:1 equalisation ratio.</p>
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<ul style="list-style-type: disc;">
<li>This unique structure has faced investor criticism over the years.  Most recently, on the 10 April 2017,  <a href="http://www.elliottadvisors.hk/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Elliott Advisors (HK) Limited</a> issued a number of proposals via an <a href="https://fixingbhp.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/BHP-Letter-to-the-Directors.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">open letter</a> to the board of <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/147" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:147:1" rel="noopener">BHP Billiton Limited (BHP AU)</a>. This was discussed in greater detail in <em><a href="https://skr.ma/RYqo" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Elliott's Proposals Test BHP's Metal</a></em>.</li>
<li>Elliott argued the DLC structure was obsolete, hinders the ability of BHP to reach its full potential, and creates a long-term trading mismatch between Limited and PLC shares. </li>
<li>A key tenet from the Elliott side was providing greater access to BHP’s franking credits. Elliott proposed under the unified BHP, attaching franking credits to any dividends it makes, enabling all shareholders to participate via fungibility. A similar argument was made for buybacks.</li>
<li>BHP <a href="http://www.bhpbilliton.com/-/media/documents/media/reports-and-presentations/2017/170412_bhpbillitonreviewofelliottproposalpresentation.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">argued</a> the proposal would result in a wastage of franking credits, that unification is not required for off-market buybacks - indeed it would make off-market buybacks less attractive.</li>
<li>Elliott submitted a second letter on the <a href="https://fixingbhp.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/BHP-Press-Release-inc.-Letter-May-2017.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">16 May 2017</a>, reiterating its proposals, and notably singling out BHP's "flawed" unification costs. This letter went unanswered by BHP.</li>
<li>A third letter was issued on the <a href="https://live-fixing-bhp.pantheonsite.io/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Letter-to-Chairman-05.02.18.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">5 February 2018</a>. Using analysis from FTI Consulting, it considered the unification would deliver in excess of US$22bn, with unification costs of US$391mn - against the US$1.3bn estimate from BHP.</li>
<li>Elliott also noted that following the 2015 demerger of South32, Plc no longer generates sufficient income to fund dividends. This resulted in the DLC Dividend share proposal, which was designed to support the matching-dividend policy.  When BHP merged with Billiton, one of the fundamental requirements of the structure was that cash dividends would be equal for both the British and Australian lines, under the matching-dividend policy.</li>
<li>Elliott has not issued a follow-up letter in the past three and a half years - there is a website called <a href="https://fixingbhp.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Fixing BHP</a>. No doubt Elliott were somewhat mollified by BHP selling its US shale oil &amp; gas assets to BP in 2018 - a proposal advocated by Elliott - then announcing on <a href="https://www.asx.com.au/asxpdf/20181101/pdf/43zxbpdqnm2ltl.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">1 November 2018</a> a US$10.4bn (A$14.7bn) return to shareholders through a special dividend (fully franked) and <a href="https://www.asx.com.au/asxpdf/20181108/pdf/440368k1w0qd6n.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">share buyback</a>. </li>
</ul>
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<h3>But There ARE Fundamental Reasons for BHP’s Premium</h3>
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<ul>
<li>There exist strong tax arguments supporting a premium in the Australian line relating to dividends and off-market share buyback. The current premium (pre-announcement) is 19.4% (reflected in the ADRs) against a long-term average of 12.5%. </li>
</ul>
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<div style="text-align: left;" class="content-caption">Source: CapIQ</div>
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<ul style="list-style-type: disc;">
<li>
<strong>42% Dividend Tax Advantage</strong>. Australian investors have a highly tax-advantaged position when investing in the Australian line which provides them with a material advantage over other investors.
<ul style="list-style-type: circle;">
<li>Australian dividends are generally paid with a franking credit attached which can be used to offset the income tax liabilities of an Australian recipient.</li>
<li>The franking credit is equivalent to the corporate tax rate (currently 30%) which has been paid. In general, this means that a dollar received by a domestic investor in the Australian line is worth 42% (1/(1-30%)) more to them than an equivalent holding of the London line.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
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<figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/224/302/original/image_96891655851629189775822.png?1629189776" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="224302"></figure>
<p>Source: <a href="https://live-fixing-bhp.pantheonsite.io/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/FTI-Value-Release-from-Unification-at-BHP-Final.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Elliott</a> </p>
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<ul>
<li>Theoretically, there is no reason for the BHP/BLT spread to stop widening until it reaches the level of 42% where the most tax-advantaged investors exhaust the excess return - provided sufficient corporate tax has been paid in Australia to cover the franking element on the dividend.</li>
<li>
<strong>The Buyback tax advantage</strong>.  The Australian franking credit system also confers a capital gains tax benefit when BHP carries out off-market tender offers. This is because for tax purposes the transaction is partially treated as a dividend which means some recipients may receive more than the market value of their holding when the franking credits are taken into account.
<ul>
<li>For this reason, BHP can initiate tender offers in Australia struck at large discounts to the market price. In the last tender offer in <a href="https://www.asx.com.au/asxpdf/20181108/pdf/440368k1w0qd6n.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">2018</a>, the discount was capped at the legal maximum level (by the ATO) of 14%.</li>
<li>When the spread blows out to such a level (over 16% premium) as it has now, it compromises the ability to announce further buybacks in Australia as the spread exceeds the maximum legal tender discount level (of 14%). Meaning any Australian buyback would have to be at a premium to the London price. Therefore future buyback proposals will be forced to focus on the London line, in which the franking credits cannot be used.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<h3>Unilever's DLC Unification</h3>
<ul>
<li>Back on the 11 June 2020, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/unilever-nv" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:21141:1" rel="noopener">Unilever NV (UNA NA)</a> / <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/unilever-plc" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:22197:1" rel="noopener">Unilever PLC (ULVR LN)</a> <a href="https://www.unilever.com/news/press-releases/2020/unification-of-unilever-legal-structure.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">announced</a> it would (finally) unify its dual Anglo-Dutch corporate structure under a single parent company based in London, in an about-face to the 2018 unification attempt with a Dutch-headquartered holding company. This deal was discussed in <em><a href="https://skr.ma/PyquN" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Unilever: When Two Heads Are Not Better Than One. What About BHP's DLC?</a></em>.</li>
<li>This unification again renewed interest in BHP's structure.</li>
</ul>
<h3>The New News</h3>
<ul>
<li>BHP has now <a href="https://cdn-api.markitdigital.com/apiman-gateway/ASX/asx-research/1.0/file/2924-02407981-3A572982?access_token=83ff96335c2d45a094df02a206a39ff4" target="_blank" rel="noopener">announced</a> the unification of its corporate structure to make BHP "<em>simpler and more agile</em>", thus removing the complexity of managing the DLC.</li>
<li>BHP considers now is the appropriate time to unify as there has been a significant reduction in cost indications - US$400-500mn compared to ~US$1.6-1.7bn previously.</li>
<li>More importantly, the unification means no change to the dividend policy and the ability of the company to frank dividends.</li>
<li>BHP Plc shareholders would be entitled to receive one Ltd share for each Plc share they own.</li>
<li>As night follows day, expect the spread between the two lines to narrow.</li>
</ul>
<p>More below the fold.</p>
<p></p>
<p></p>
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Back on 29th June 2001, BHP and Billiton merged by way of a dual-headed structure.  Shareholders continued to hold their pre-merger shares in BHP or Billiton, but with the same economic interest in the entire group, and dividends and capital distributions were equalised in accordance with a 1:1 equalisation ratio.





This unique structure has faced investor criticism over the years.  Most recently, on the 10 April 2017,  Elliott Advisors (HK) Limited issued a number of proposals via an open letter to the board of BHP Billiton Limited (BHP AU). This was discussed in greater detail in Elliott's Proposals Test BHP's Metal.
Elliott argued the DLC structure was obsolete, hinders the ability of BHP to reach its full potential, and creates a long-term trading mismatch between Limited and PLC shares. 
A key tenet from the Elliott side was providing greater access to BHP’s franking credits. Elliott proposed under the unified BHP, attaching franking credits to any dividends it makes, enabling all shareholders to participate via fungibility. A similar argument was made for buybacks.
BHP argued the proposal would result in a wastage of franking credits, that unification is not required for off-market buybacks - indeed it would make off-market buybacks less attractive.
Elliott submitted a second letter on the 16 May 2017, reiterating its proposals, and notably singling out BHP's "flawed" unification costs. This letter went unanswered by BHP.
A third letter was issued on the 5 February 2018. Using analysis from FTI Consulting, it considered the unification would deliver in excess of US$22bn, with unification costs of US$391mn - against the US$1.3bn estimate from BHP.
Elliott also noted that following the 2015 demerger of South32, Plc no longer generates sufficient income to fund dividends. This resulted in the DLC Dividend share proposal, which was designed to support the matching-dividend policy.  When BHP merged with Billiton, one of the fundamental requirements of the structure was that cash dividends would be equal for both the British and Australian lines, under the matching-dividend policy.
Elliott has not issued a follow-up letter in the past three and a half years - there is a website called Fixing BHP. No doubt Elliott were somewhat mollified by BHP selling its US shale oil &amp; gas assets to BP in 2018 - a proposal advocated by Elliott - then announcing on 1 November 2018 a US$10.4bn (A$14.7bn) return to shareholders through a special dividend (fully franked) and share buyback. 



But There ARE Fundamental Reasons for BHP’s Premium



There exist strong tax arguments supporting a premium in the Australian line relating to dividends and off-market share buyback. The current premium (pre-announcement) is 19.4% (reflected in the ADRs) against a long-term average of 12.5%. 






Source: CapIQ




42% Dividend Tax Advantage. Australian investors have a highly tax-advantaged position when investing in the Australian line which provides them with a material advantage over other investors.

Australian dividends are generally paid with a franking credit attached which can be used to offset the income tax liabilities of an Australian recipient.
The franking credit is equivalent to the corporate tax rate (currently 30%) which has been paid. In general, this means that a dollar received by a domestic investor in the Australian line is worth 42% (1/(1-30%)) more to them than an equivalent holding of the London line.






Source: Elliott 



Theoretically, there is no reason for the BHP/BLT spread to stop widening until it reaches the level of 42% where the most tax-advantaged investors exhaust the excess return - provided sufficient corporate tax has been paid in Australia to cover the franking element on the dividend.

The Buyback tax advantage.  The Australian franking credit system also confers a capital gains tax benefit when BHP carries out off-market tender offers. This is because for tax purposes the transaction is partially treated as a dividend which means some recipients may receive more than the market value of their holding when the franking credits are taken into account.

For this reason, BHP can initiate tender offers in Australia struck at large discounts to the market price. In the last tender offer in 2018, the discount was capped at the legal maximum level (by the ATO) of 14%.
When the spread blows out to such a level (over 16% premium) as it has now, it compromises the ability to announce further buybacks in Australia as the spread exceeds the maximum legal tender discount level (of 14%). Meaning any Australian buyback would have to be at a premium to the London price. Therefore future buyback proposals will be forced to focus on the London line, in which the franking credits cannot be used.



Unilever's DLC Unification

Back on the 11 June 2020, Unilever NV (UNA NA) / Unilever PLC (ULVR LN) announced it would (finally) unify its dual Anglo-Dutch corporate structure under a single parent company based in London, in an about-face to the 2018 unification attempt with a Dutch-headquartered holding company. This deal was discussed in Unilever: When Two Heads Are Not Better Than One. What About BHP's DLC?.
This unification again renewed interest in BHP's structure.

The New News

BHP has now announced the unification of its corporate structure to make BHP "simpler and more agile", thus removing the complexity of managing the DLC.
BHP considers now is the appropriate time to unify as there has been a significant reduction in cost indications - US$400-500mn compared to ~US$1.6-1.7bn previously.
More importantly, the unification means no change to the dividend policy and the ability of the company to frank dividends.
BHP Plc shareholders would be entitled to receive one Ltd share for each Plc share they own.
As night follows day, expect the spread between the two lines to narrow.

More below the fold.




Asset Allocation & Fund Positioning, Copley Fund Research

Steven Holden

Asset Allocation & Fund Positioning

Copley Fund Research

Copley Fund Research provide research and data on asset allocation among Global and Emerging Market equity funds.  The analysis details absolute and relative positioning across countries, sectors and industries together with highly granular data on single stock and single fund allocations.  The data is updated monthly with time series going back to January 2011.

Global Research - Analysis of 165 prominent Global equity funds, combined AUM $335bn
GEM Research - Analysis of 127 prominent global EM equity funds, combined AUM $250bn

Asset Allocation - Global and GEM Equity

Thematic (Sector/Industry)

<p>Metals and Mining stock exposure among active Global funds is at a 7-year high, but only just.  In an almost reluctant move higher, average weights hit a new multi-year peak of 1.64%, with cash flows moderately higher and funds invested moving off the lows of August last year.</p><p>The cyclical nature of investment among Global managers has mirrored that of Metals and Mining sector performance over the last decade.   The massive sector underperformance between 2011-2015 correlated to an exodus from the sector among active global managers.  Over that 4-year period, the percentage of funds with investment in Metals and Mining stocks fell from 87.5% to 53.6%.  For the MSCI AC Metals and Mining index to make up the massive performance deficit of the last decade, it has to win back many of the funds that remain uninvested, for now.</p><div>
<p>We highlight <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/anglo-american-plc" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:21798:1" rel="noopener">Anglo American (AAL LN)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/fortescue-metals-group-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:41:1" rel="noopener">Fortescue Metals (FMG AU)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/rio-tinto-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:13:1" rel="noopener">Rio Tinto Ltd (RIO AU)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/reliance-steel-aluminum" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:8080:1" rel="noopener">Reliance Steel &amp; Aluminum (RS US)</a> and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/vale-sa" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:23731:1" rel="noopener">Vale SA (VALE US)</a><a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/baoshan-iron-steel-co-a" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:3891:1" rel="noopener"></a> as stocks towards the higher end of their ownership ranges whilst also seeing ownership levels increase among active Global investors.  </p>
<p>Previously well held Stocks such as <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/bhp-billiton-ltd-adr" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:5424:1" rel="noopener">BHP Billiton (ADR) (BHP US)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/freeport-mcmoran-inc" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:12491:1" rel="noopener">Freeport Mcmoran (FCX US)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/voestalpine-ag" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:22565:1" rel="noopener">voestalpine AG (VOE AV)</a> and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/norsk-hydro-asa" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:22240:1" rel="noopener">Norsk Hydro ASA (NHY NO)</a><a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/hyundai-steel-company" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:963:1" rel="noopener"></a> are starting to attract growing interest from Global active managers.</p>
<p><em>Analysis taken from our Global fund research, covering 383 active Global strategies with combined AUM of $1.05tr</em></p>
</div>

Metals and Mining stock exposure among active Global funds is at a 7-year high, but only just.  In an almost reluctant move higher, average weights hit a new multi-year peak of 1.64%, with cash flows moderately higher and funds invested moving off the lows of August last year.The cyclical nature of investment among Global managers has mirrored that of Metals and Mining sector performance over the last decade.   The massive sector underperformance between 2011-2015 correlated to an exodus from the sector among active global managers.  Over that 4-year period, the percentage of funds with investment in Metals and Mining stocks fell from 87.5% to 53.6%.  For the MSCI AC Metals and Mining index to make up the massive performance deficit of the last decade, it has to win back many of the funds that remain uninvested, for now.
We highlight Anglo American (AAL LN), Fortescue Metals (FMG AU), Rio Tinto Ltd (RIO AU), Reliance Steel &amp; Aluminum (RS US) and Vale SA (VALE US) as stocks towards the higher end of their ownership ranges whilst also seeing ownership levels increase among active Global investors.  
Previously well held Stocks such as BHP Billiton (ADR) (BHP US), Freeport Mcmoran (FCX US), voestalpine AG (VOE AV) and Norsk Hydro ASA (NHY NO) are starting to attract growing interest from Global active managers.
Analysis taken from our Global fund research, covering 383 active Global strategies with combined AUM of $1.05tr


Global Metals and Mining:  Reluctantly Grinding Higher

Travis Lundy

<p><a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/vedanta-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:514:1" rel="noopener">Vedanta Ltd (VEDL IN)</a> has, for the last year, been subject to dramatic corporate actions which have roiled the share price, and expectations. </p><p>The launch last May of a Delisting Proposal by the promoters when the shares were trading sub Rs. 90/share led to a rally in the shares which could not even track peer stock performance, and when the Delisting Proposal failed, shares dropped to a dramatically low level, despite the fact that Vedanta owned its shareholders a substantial dividend from the pay-through of dividends from <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/hindustan-zinc-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:8688:1" rel="noopener">Hindustan Zinc (HZ IN)</a>. As commodity prices continued to rally, and VEDL paid a big dividend in October 2020, it looked like the time to double-up. Everyone "knew" the promoters were willing to pay 40-50% than the post-Delisting Proposal failure to take the whole thing private. I expected a buyback. 10 days after the CEO said "we have no plans to buy more shares" we got an off-market block purchase of 5% by the promoters in December at Rs 160, followed a couple of weeks later by a proposed Open Offer to buy another 10%, which was later upsized and up-priced - by 47%, and still the Promoters could only get 10% of the 17.5% they sought to buy. </p><p>A month on from that and the shares are nearly 10% higher than the Open Offer Price while a Peer Basket is largely unchanged from two months back. </p><p>This means VEDL shares are again (as they were just before  at their high point against Peers since pre-pandemic. The current situation of covid-19 and variant spread in India is terrible and one could imagine that some drastic measures may still be taken to contain the spread, which could slow down the economy dramatically. </p><p>The 70% catchup vs peers to reach the December 2019 level (as of post-Delisting Proposal failure) has now been caught up. The VEDL 2-3yr forward EV/EBIT ratio is now less than 1 turn from its long-term average spread to peers. </p><p>More below the fold.  </p>

Vedanta Ltd (VEDL IN) has, for the last year, been subject to dramatic corporate actions which have roiled the share price, and expectations. The launch last May of a Delisting Proposal by the promoters when the shares were trading sub Rs. 90/share led to a rally in the shares which could not even track peer stock performance, and when the Delisting Proposal failed, shares dropped to a dramatically low level, despite the fact that Vedanta owned its shareholders a substantial dividend from the pay-through of dividends from Hindustan Zinc (HZ IN). As commodity prices continued to rally, and VEDL paid a big dividend in October 2020, it looked like the time to double-up. Everyone "knew" the promoters were willing to pay 40-50% than the post-Delisting Proposal failure to take the whole thing private. I expected a buyback. 10 days after the CEO said "we have no plans to buy more shares" we got an off-market block purchase of 5% by the promoters in December at Rs 160, followed a couple of weeks later by a proposed Open Offer to buy another 10%, which was later upsized and up-priced - by 47%, and still the Promoters could only get 10% of the 17.5% they sought to buy. A month on from that and the shares are nearly 10% higher than the Open Offer Price while a Peer Basket is largely unchanged from two months back. This means VEDL shares are again (as they were just before  at their high point against Peers since pre-pandemic. The current situation of covid-19 and variant spread in India is terrible and one could imagine that some drastic measures may still be taken to contain the spread, which could slow down the economy dramatically. The 70% catchup vs peers to reach the December 2019 level (as of post-Delisting Proposal failure) has now been caught up. The VEDL 2-3yr forward EV/EBIT ratio is now less than 1 turn from its long-term average spread to peers. More below the fold.  

Vedanta Now Caught Up With Peers - A Different Skew Ahead

Technical Analyst, Vermilion Research

Joe Jasper

Technical Analyst

Technical and Quantitative Research

Vermilion Research

Vermilion’s objective is to deliver timely, actionable, and unique technical research to professional investors through the application of our various technical indicators.

Our research strategists seek to highlight securities which we believe are at major inflection points, based on our various technical and quantitative indicators, and offer asymmetric risk/return profiles. Our unique research methodology, centered on relative strength, enables our strategists to deliver superior investment recommendations.

Our process begins by organizing the universe of actively traded stocks into discrete sectors, then into industry groups. We then apply our technical and quantitative tools to identify developing price trends. Once attractive trends are identified within a selected sector or group, we screen for individual stocks which we believe offer the best risk/reward profile. We provide a historical perspective that often reveals, through our long-term charts, how price patterns often repeat themselves over time.

Technical Analysis

<p>The S&amp;P 500, Nasdaq 100 (QQQ), and Russell 2000 (IWM) have all rallied to logical resistance; if they are able to break above and stay above their respective resistance levels it would signal the end of the current consolidation phase. In today’s report we highlight attractive Groups and stocks within Materials and Financials:</p>

The S&amp;P 500, Nasdaq 100 (QQQ), and Russell 2000 (IWM) have all rallied to logical resistance; if they are able to break above and stay above their respective resistance levels it would signal the end of the current consolidation phase. In today’s report we highlight attractive Groups and stocks within Materials and Financials:

U.S. Equity Strategy: Testing Key Resistance; Downgrading Health Care

Australia

Rio Tinto Limited is an international mining company.  The Company has interests in mining for aluminum, borax, coal, copper, gold, iron ore, lead, silver, tin, uranium, zinc, titanium dioxide feedstock, diamonds, talc and zircon. Dually-listed company with RIO LN.

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Rio Tinto Ltd (RIO AU)

Last Week in Event SPACE: BHP, WH Group, Beijing Capital Land, China Life, Macau Gaming Concessions

The weekend is here! Pour yourself a coffee, grab a comfortable seat, and sift through a brief summary of insights on various events discussed...

David Blennerhassett

BHP Limited (BHP AU): DLC Reunification

BHP Plc shareholders will be entitled to receive one Ltd share for each Plc share they own. As night follows day, expect the spread between the two...

David Blennerhassett

Global Metals and Mining: Reluctantly Grinding Higher

Metals and Mining stock exposure among active Global funds is at a 7-year high. Average weights hit a new multi-year peak of 1.64%, with cash...

Steven Holden

Vedanta Now Caught Up With Peers - A Different Skew Ahead

VEDL has been a rocket the last several months. And it still "owes" dividends of ~Rs 24/share to its shareholders. HZL results were salutary, but...

Travis Lundy

U.S. Equity Strategy: Testing Key Resistance; Downgrading Health Care

The S&P 500, Nasdaq 100 (QQQ), and Russell 2000 (IWM) have all rallied to logical resistance; a break above their respective resistance levels...

Vermilion Research

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