Last Week in Event SPACE ...
- Plus, other events, CCASS movements and Mood Spins.
(This insight covers specific insights & comments involving Stubs, Pairs, Arbitrage, share Classifications, and Events - or SPACE - in the past week)
Never a dull moment. The company
announced that it was launching another buyback programme to buy back up to 135mn shares (6.7%) for up to ¥500bn. This is the first tranche of the ¥4.5tn Program to Repurchase Shares and Reduce Debt announced 23 March, and follows the first ¥500bn buyback started 10 days before that, which is as of last week's announcement only half complete. In other
news, after 13 years as a director, former Alibaba CEO and Chairman Jack Ma is leaving the board - the third resignation of a long-time director within the last twelve months. Softbank announced it would/had raise/d US$11.5bn by hedging Alibaba shares in a combined collar plus forward transaction which resembles, in risk terms, the METS transaction from a few years ago. Softbank may also look to sell its stake in
TMobile Us Inc (TMUS US) (or a significant part of its stake) to
Deutsche Telekom Ag (DTE GR) "
at a slight discount." And finally, the presentation deck has flying unicorns.
- Mio Kato is bearish. He believes Softbank is likely more liquidity-constrained than it tries to project and will remain so until it can demonstrate more skill with its investing. Then there are the governance concerns, not just for Softbank but also for Alibaba, and if something is amiss, the recent jawboning on US capital going into Chinese companies without proper accounting oversight should concern you. And there is the propensity for not just Softbank but for Son to borrow against the assets that they hold. Put together that is a volatile mix. One that can be rewarding to back in bull markets. Not so much if we enter a bear market.
- For Travis Lundy, we have clarity on some of the capital raise from asset sale. We await more clarity on TMUS. We also have some clarity on the next $7bn of buybacks which should take us a few months. If one models this out, assuming an end-state discount to NAV of 50% and a roughly 5% buyback of remaining shares in each stage of the buyback, one is left with net accretion of about 20%, and net share price increase of 32% but that model reduces Real World Float by about 50% over the next year. If the shares go up more because the impact is large, accretion will be a bit smaller, and the reduction in Real World Float will be smaller, which means less impact, but it leads to a higher price more quickly which is a high-quality problem.
- Travis reserves judgment on the "Asset Side" of the balance sheet. He thinks ARM is a good asset; and permanently reserves judgment on BABA because of the opacity of its metrics and accounting. Private company valuation marks, including ARM are questionable, to Mio. In his "plausible" downside case, he reckons ARM is worth half its listed US$25bn number. He also assigns zero for SVF, plus an assortment of other haircuts, and backs out a Holdco discount of ~29%. For a company with Softbank’s governance and transparency issues, the current discount doesn't appear egregious to him.
- Softbank Group announced towards the latter part of the week a sale of 240mn shares of Softbank Corp (9434 JP) - roughly 5.0% of shares outstanding - at a price of ¥1,306.5-1,320/ share (a discount of 4.0-5.0% to the close today of ¥1,375. Travis suggested a tilt to buying it for a short-term trade. It ended up pricing at ¥1,320/share.
Reliance announced further details of its Rights Offering. These rights are, in effect, in-the-money call options, providing a long maturity levered position for long holders. That means you can think of them as levered shares with an out-of-the-money put option embedded. They may trade cheap. The fact that they may not will likely flummox arbitrageurs. This is a BIG issue. The rights themselves will mean a total eventual weight increase in MSCI India of almost 1% of the index. The Reliance Rights Issue is more than twice as large as last year's Bharti Airtel (BHARTI IN) rights issue, and it is almost twice as large as the mammoth Singapore Airlines (SIA SP) rights offering taking place right now.
- The flip of the long/short dynamic of this rights issue is NOT like the Singapore Air Rights Issue discussed in Singapore Air Rights Entitlements - Flow Dynamics. In this case, there was almost no mechanism for a short squeeze, and relatively little near-term delta effect from a sell-down in terms of impact per market cap.
- Travis expects the Additional Equity Rights subscription will be of limited benefit to arbs who did not own the shares for the Record Date, but if you can avail yourself of the option because you already owned them, you should do so. He expects most market participants will.
- If the shares trade down sharply in the next ten days to about ₹1257/share, then it may look like there is no reason to exercise the rights, but you would be wrong. If you exercise the rights and the shares trade at exactly that price, you will own something which will have an intrinsic value of ₹314.25/share PLUS equity optionality above and beyond that. If you are agnostic on which one you hold, but you do not wish to increase your exposure, if the rights are trading expensive, sell those. If the shares are trading expensive to the rights, sell the shares and buy the rights.
- In the very short-term, Travis expects a little pressure on the shares as rights get sold by those who do not want to exercise their rights and prefer just getting the cash. The Reliance Rights are in effect, a US$2bn equity offering to the public. This is a very short-term call - a matter of a week or so.
In
Singapore Air - If You Are Long, Use the Rights, Travis revisits the last two trading days of
Singapore Airlines (SIA SP)'s rights. If you were long Singapore Air at the time of his report - long-only, long-short, or passive - this was the widest "100% safe" risk arb situation in the world extant in terms of annualised return at 86.2% (3.78% for 16 days). If you had borrowed the shares to do the rights arbitrage,
then was the time to use them. If you had no position but believe other airlines will also need to raise capital - especially flag carriers such as
Cathay Pacific Airways (293 HK) - you might go long Singapore Air vs Cathay Pacific. You can go long Cathay via the shares, or via the Rights (he suggested the rights if you could hold on for a few weeks)
Hong Kong and Weighted Voting Rights
As widely expected, Hang Seng Indexes Limited published the conclusions of the public consultation, and for the Hang Seng China Enterprises Index (HSCEI INDEX), WVRs and secondary listed companies from the Greater China region will be eligible for inclusion in the index. Individual constituent weighting of these securities will be subject to a 5% weighting cap. Changes will be implemented from the August 2020 review and a maximum of three changes for the HSCEI in August.
links to Brian's insight:
HSCEI Consultation on WVRs & Secondary Listings - All Proposals Get the Green Light
HSI Consultation on WVRs & Secondary Listings - BIG Flows
HSCEI Dividends - Pricing Is Bullish
A High Court date is set (
28 May) for considering MET's application for initial orders to call a meeting of shareholders to vote on the scheme plan contemplated by the SIA. In its 18 May
NSX announcement, MET considers there to be no lawful basis to terminate the SIA, namely that no MAC has occurred and that there have been no prescribed occurrences that would permit APVG to terminate the SIA. Interestingly, regardless of whether the MAC metrics are triggered, MET has said the MAC clause "does not apply because this would have been the result of changes in general economic conditions and/or changes in law, which are exclusions under the MAC clause".
- Back on the 26 March, MET announced that it is "now operating under the New Zealand Government’s COVID-19 Level 4 restrictions." APVG said they were not adequately informed on the Level 4 restrictions ahead of being implemented. MET has countered saying it gave APVG reasonable access to information about, kept APVG reasonably informed of, and consulted with APVG in relation to the steps Metlifecare took in response to the Level 4 lockdown restrictions.
- On the 21 May, MET announced that shareholders, representing one-third of shares out, have confirmed their support "for the actions taken by the Board to compel APVG to fulfil its contractual obligations under the SIA". Shareholders include the Guardians of the New Zealand Superannuation Fund, the Accident Compensation Corporation and overseas-based investors Maso Capital, Omni Partners and Westchester Capital, which together represent ownership exceeding 33.4%. These shareholders also confirmed that it was their current intention to vote in favour of the scheme plan if it is put to shareholders. There are reports that over half of the register now supports the court action.
- MET said it will make a request for an expedited court timetable, such that if the judge gives the go-ahead, it anticipates holding the shareholder meeting to consider the scheme plan in late June or early July. I argued (unsuccessfully to date) it would be challenging for APVG/EQT to get out of the MAC carve-out. I expect the judge to side with MET and move to put the scheme to a shareholder vote. Time to get long.
(link to my insight: Metlifecare: Down But Not Out - Get Long)
Sony Financial Holdings (8729 JP) (Mkt Cap: $10.5bn; Liquidity: $24mn)
Coming with a Sony Corp (6758 JP) Corporate Strategy Meeting, there was an announcement of a couple of Executive Changes based on a New Organizational Structure which, for strategic reasons, means that Sony is obliged to announce a Tender Offer to take full control of Sony Financial. So.... Sony takes out Sony Financial. This is an event which special situations investors/analysts/traders have speculated on for years, but this takeover is extremely opportunistic. The 60-page document and proliferation of parties ready to declare this deal "fair" will not please many holders. But it is at least better than the first offered price.
- This deal requires that 1.62% of shares outstanding tender in. That is about 2 days worth of ADV and two-thirds of that can be found at two friendly holders. It is a big deal. Minorities own roughly ¥400bn of shares or about 152mm shares. Roughly 40-50 million of those shares are passively-held. When the passive holders sell for index deletion reasons, there will be a big trade.
- If you are an arbitrageur, note the longer-than-normal tender offer. It is a full two months from Start Date to Cash Receipt. It will trade on 20 May 2020 just after 9am local time. There should be blocks available from time to time. If you are a long-only holder, figure that the discount to terms multiplied by 6 is the annual return you are giving up. You are replacing that annualized return by going long something else you think will outperform that number. If you are bullish the market, sell quickly and move on. If you are quite bearish the market in the next two months, hold on.
- The most interesting trade related to this will be the Nikkei 225 replacement trade. Something will go in. Early speculation is on SBI Holdings (8473 JP), Seven Bank Ltd (8410 JP), or Japan Post Insurance (7181 JP). Of these three, JPI is the big winner in terms of impact as far as Travis can tell. He'd own some borrow right now on principle. Watch also the possible early results of the Extraordinary Replacement Rules of the Nikkei 225 which was launched last week. If they arrive at an early result, it is possible that they change the rules by the time the Tender Offer is finished. In that case, watch for a VERY rapid change in the Nikkei 225 Average which would advantage owners of Japan Post Insurance even more.
Wheelock (20 HK) (Mkt Cap: $14.7bn; Liquidity: $10mn)
As previously flagged by the company, the Scheme Document was despatched on the 20 May. The Court Meeting will be held on the 16 June, and if all goes to plan, WREIC and Wharf shares are to be dispatched to Scheme shareholders on (or around) the 22 July, to commence trading on the 23 July. Cheques for the Scheme consideration ($12/share) are to be dispatched on (or before) the 3 August. Voting conditions to the Scheme are standard: at least 75% of Scheme Shares held by Disinterested Shareholders voting for FOR the Scheme resolution & not more than 10% of ALL Disinterested Shares against. Disinterested shareholders comprise 626.2mn shares, or 30.50% of shares out. Therefore the blocking stake at the Scheme Meeting is 3.05% of shares out.
- After de-consolidating out WREIC and Wharf - which is the correct way to approach this - the IFA (Anglo Chinese) derived a reassessed NAV of HK$12.22/share for the rump as at 31 March 2020 (page 70 of the Scheme Doc), implying the Scheme Consideration of HK$12.00/share represents a discount of 7.7%. The discount was 1.8% to the adjusted de-consolidated NAV/share of HK$13.00 as at 31 December. Not surprisingly, the IFA view this as fair.
- The push-back is that the book value encompasses development property assets, and perhaps does not entirely represent value to be unlocked, implying minorities may gain less from the deal. But there is no arguing the fact that a ~8% discount to NAV is a good deal for investors. This deal looks done.
(link to my insight: Wheelock's Scheme Document Despatched)
Towngas China (1083 HK) (Mkt Cap: $1.5bn; Liquidity: $2mn)
Rumours are circulating of Hong Kong & China Gas (3 HK) taking gas distributor Towngas, currently 67.76%-held, private. Towngas is trading at a multi-year low for what is a relatively stable business. HKCG already controls and consolidates Towngas. The motivation to privatise, should that be the case, appears two-fold: to take advantage of Towngas' depressed pricing; and to increase its exposure to an emerging market China gas utility business to complement its developed market gas utility business in Hong Kong.
- IF an Offer is tabled, it would more likely unfold as a Scheme. HKCG would be required to abstain from voting, therefore the blocking stake at the Court Meeting would be ~3.23% of shares out. Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group has 6.98%. Towngas is Cayman incorporated, so the headcount test would apply.
- An in-specie distribution of HKCG's shareholding in Towngas, similar to what has been proposed by Wheelock (20 HK), is possible. Henderson Land Development (12 HK) holds ~41.56% in HKCG, and therefore would hold a little over 28% in Towngas subsequent to an in-specie distribution, a shade under the 30% GO threshold. But would Henderson want to hold stakes directly in Towngas AND HKCG? One of the reasons Henderson has maintained its stake in HKCG, is that it benefits from the dividend stream. That reason hasn't changed. A more likely outcome is that HKCG takes full control of Towngas.
- Or alternatively, HKCG sells its stake and cashes out of its PRC exposure. The political environment in Hong Kong is in a state of flux at present. Although HKCG (and, in turn, Lee Shau Kee), control Towngas, a full takeover of a gas transmission business in China by one of Hong Kong's tycoons may not be straightforward.
(link to my insight: Towngas (1083 HK): A HKCG Privatisation?)
Diageo reportedly has an eye on taking United private. Diageo already holds a stake of 55.94% in United Spirits and India contributes around a fifth of Diageo's global sales. Since it first purchased a stake in United in 2012, Diageo has kept increasing its shareholding. The steady increase in shareholding could be indicative of Diageo's willingness to take the company private. With positive changes to the company over the last few years and with the stock trading near its lowest forward price to book, the time may be right to take United Spirits private.
- At current market prices, Diageo would need to pay minority shareholders £2.11bn. At a price of INR 700 a share (near the highs over the last 5 years, decent premium to VWAP over multiple periods, and close to the INR 693.25 that Diageo paid for 0.7% of the company in February 2020), the cash outlay would be £2.425bn. Diageo can fund the buyout through a reduction in or cancellation of its final dividend or an increase in its debt that would still be manageable at 3.6 times EBITDA.
- The delisting would occur via a reverse book building process with the clearing level being the price where Diageo crosses 90% ownership of the company. Any residual shareholders have 12 months from de-listing to tender their shares to the promoter at the clearing price.
- Expect that the MTO settles on or about Transaction Close + 50. It appears from the press releases by all parties that the SPA transactions closed on a T+0 basis, starting the clock ticking. Travis currently expects the the MTO Information Disclosure in the paper by the end of May, and settlement by 12 July 2020. Expect a timeline of about 7-8 weeks from now.
- With 5.6% spread (at the time of Travis' insight), that is north of 33% annualized. That's pretty good for a deal which has no deal risk. He is bullish that this gets done and thinks it should trade tighter.
- THE TRADE: Own already, or own now below IDR 1300 for a quick two-month trade. USDIDR hedge friction means you need an extra 1+% but don't be overly greedy. This one gets done quickly.
- UPDATE: All three transactional counterparties have now announced the sale. The BBL announcement is the most informative. The Permata announcement is also informative.
Village Roadshow (VRL AU) (Mkt Cap: $0.3bn; Liquidity: $1mn)
Aussie theme parks and movie theater operator VRL has entered into exclusive talks with BGH Capital after the PE outfit returned to the table with a revised, and (not surprisingly) lower Offer of A$2.10-$2.40/share vs. the initial indicative Offer price of A$4. That upper end of the range is subject to the reopening of Sea World and Movie World, AND the majority of its cinemas. The high-end of the range represents a 36% premium to last close. Shareholders will be provided the option of taking shares in an unlisted vehicle, subject to scale-back.
- FIRB processing time? As announced by the Treasurer on 29 March 2020, the standard processing time for applications will be increased from 30 days to six months. Presumably, BGH submitted its application at the time of its initial Offer in January, and is not beholden to a six-month processing timeline.
- This remains a non-binding, caveat-heavy proposal, amidst a very uncertain backdrop. But the fact BGH has returned to the table, with a possible cash/scrip transaction, would suggest there is a better than even chance a formal Offer unfolds.
- Assuming four to five months to wrap this up, and using the base Offer price under Structure A (A$2.20), shares are trading at a gross/annualised spread of 3.3%/8.9%. That's okay, but I would not chase it further. This is not a firm Offer. And PEP? No word, as yet. (As an aside, Travis reckons this a big avoid)
(link to my insight: Village Roadshow: And ... Action! As BGH Returns)
In January this year,
Shimachu Co Ltd (8184 JP) made an
announcement of a buyback of up to ¥10bn, buying back up to 4.2mm shares which was 9.9% of the company over the next seven months. Four months and small change after the announcement, the company
announced it had completed the buyback. In
Shimachu's Buyback Is Done But The Trade Is Not Done, Travis looked at what happened, where we are left, and what comes next. With the 5 days left to go in the post-buyback completion section, the recommended TOPIX-hedged trade is up 7.9% since January. The trade against a Comp Basket is up twice as much. The
Q2 results announced April 20 showed a sharp increase in SG&A costs and non-SG&A personnel costs against higher revenues and rental income. That led to lower OP vs last year. That is not great. Based on the breakdown of the increase in SG&A, one should not expect that higher cost drag to dissipate. That would be enough reason to keep the short position on for a little while longer.
At a 29.7% discount to NAV for Naspers, and a 24.2% discount to NAV for Prosus, I estimate the Naspers look-through at a 46%. On the 7 April, Naspers announced it had completed a ZAR 22.4bn share purchase program, acquiring, since 12 January, 9.156mn Naspers N ordinary shares, or around 2.06% of shares out. On the 22 January, Naspers sold 22mn N ordinary shares in Prosus or ~1.4% of the issued Prosus N ordinary shares, generating proceeds of ~€1.5 billion for Naspers or ~ZAR 29.8bn. At the time, Naspers agreed to a 90-day lock-up period with respect to its remaining interest in the Prosus N ordinary shares. That has now expired.
- There are just eight months to go (March 2021) before Prosus can sell down its stake in Tencent. It is questionable whether Prosus will self-impose another 3-year moratorium on selling shares. The current level suggests buying Naspers vs Prosus (or Naspers vs Tencent), although this is a somewhat low conviction trade as this is more premised on a range trade idea, as opposed to a hard catalyst.
After an extension, the ban on short-selling in France was lifted just before midnight on 18 May. Many will want to set up the Worldline / Ingenico Group Sa (ING FP) spread. Prior to the current market turmoil, the gross spread traded between 0.5% and 2.5%, clearly indicating that many gained comfort with all the closing conditions. In Ingenico (ING FP) / Worldline (WLN FP): Thoughts on Price Dynamics After the Short Ban. A Redux!, Patryk Basiewicz updated his analysis, why the deal still makes sense at current terms, and provides additional analysis surrounding the value creation implicit in the transaction. The analysis is also a useful guide for trading unhedged Worldline going forward.
FULL CIRCULATION OF H-SHARES
Guidance on the "
full circulation of H shares" - which would allow the conversion of domestic shares into H shares, which would then be eligible to be listed and traded on Hong Kong's stock exchange - may be on the agenda at the 2020 National People's Congress and Chinese People's Political Consultative annual session. Full conversion provides the means for investors (founders, SOEs) to exit or reduce their holdings, and in turn, improve the liquidity of the listed companies. The NPC meetings may provide greater clarity on full circulation; but the fact the converted shares will ultimately be sold offshore, any new development is expected to be implemented at a glacial pace. In this insight, I touched on the initial, three pilot companies under this scheme -
Legend Holdings Corp H (3396 HK),
Avichina Industry & Tech H (2357 HK), and
Shandong Weigao Group Medical Polymer Co (1066 HK) - and nine more companies seeking conversion of their domestic (& unlisted foreign shares).
When Stocks listed on JASDAQ, MOTHERS, and the Second Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange aim at the big leagues and apply for reassignment to the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, when accepted, it causes significant events to occur.
- The reassignment to the First Section of the TSE triggers inclusion into the TOPIX Index which means passive funds tracking TOPIX need to buy on an inclusion event. This sounds minor, and technical, and horribly un-fundamental, but making money in the markets is often about choosing price and time and liquidity. These events present several interesting trading opportunities.
- In Historical TOPIX Inclusions: What Flavor Performs Best?, Janaghan Jeyakumar provides a thematic guide to help investors understand how the index inclusion parameters influence stock returns. In addition he provides opinions on how to use inclusion parameters to identify situations with above-average return/risk characteristics.
OTHER M&A & EVENT UPDATES
As at the first Close, the Offeror holds 87.35% in Clear Media Ltd (100 HK). The Offer has been extended until the 1 June in the hope of achieving 90% so as to move to compulsory delist the company.
Leyou Technologies (1089 HK) announced the exclusivity period has been extended.
Northeast Pharmaceutical A (000597 CH)'s partial Tender Offer period is from the 25 May to 23 June (30 days). This suggests payment on or around 3 July (based on precedents), ahead of my earlier timetable. The Tender Offer price is now RMB5.19/share. This has been adjusted from the earlier RM7.72 after Northeast increased its outstanding shares to 1.351bn from 907mn, subsequent to the initial announcement. The Tender Offer is still for 10% of shares out, or 135.15mn as is the case now.
- NASDAQ has just told Luckin Coffee (LK US) that it must delist. This is quite a rapid response compared to previous examples. Luckin resumed trading on the 20 May. While Luckin will take its appeal to NASDAQ in 4-6 weeks, it is not clear whether it will escape the guillotine, and it would move to pink sheets or OTC. Do not expect any rebound of the stock until new numbers are out and there is more clarity on what the business really looks like.
- Tokushu Tokai Paper (3708 JP) announced that it would buy back 600,000 shares or 4.32% of shares out tomorrow morning at today's closing price of ¥4,145/share. This is a decent-sized buyback.
- KKR was rumoured to be considering a US$1.0bn deal to invest in Reliance Industries (RIL IN)'s Jio Platforms along with Facebook Inc A (FB US) and three other PE funds. The news is out that it is US$1.5bn.
- Daito Gyorui (8044 JP) announced the results of the Tender Offer conducted by Maruha Nichiro (1333 JP). Maruha Nichiro now owns 90.11% after having bought 1,807,751 shares in the Tender Offer. This now goes easily through the second step.
CCASS
My ongoing series flags large moves (~10%) in CCASS holdings over the past week or so, moves which are often outside normal market transactions. These may be indicative of share pledges. Or potential takeovers - as is the case for Global Mastermind Capital (905 HK) below. Or simply help understand volume swings.
Often these moves can easily be explained - the placement of new shares, rights issue, movements subsequent to a takeover, lock-up expiry, amongst others. For those mentioned below, I could not find an obvious reason for the CCASS move.
The following large movement(s) concern recently listed companies, and therefore are (likely) lock-up related.