Senior Bank Analyst - Japanese Banks, Windamee Research

J. Brian Waterhouse

J. Brian Waterhouse has been covering the Japanese financial sector as an analyst continuously since 1976, working for CLSA, Japaninvest, Rabobank, HSBC Securities, James Capel, Marine Midland Bank of New York and National & Grindlays Bank.  He has been ranked No.1 overall in Japanese banks research in Japan by Asiamoney for 6 of the past 9 years and was runner-up in 2015.  He was awarded the coveted Starmine prize as top Japanese bank stock picker in 2012 and 2014 and was runner-up in 2013.  He frequently appears on TV, radio and in international print media as a commentator on Japanese banking.

Senior Bank Analyst - Japanese Banks

Hachijuni Bank (8359 JP):  Ahead of the Peloton

Hachijuni Bank (8359 JP): Cheap with Good Reason

Hachijuni Bank (8359 JP): No Reason To Get Excited

Japanese Banks:  Beyond the Ides of March

Windamee Research

Japanese Banks

Equity Bottom-Up

Prestidigitation, or sleight of hand, is what stage magicians use to create their illusions, to the delight of the onlookers who are beguiled into looking elsewhere at a crucial moment in the conjuring trick when they might otherwise spot what the ‘magician’ is really doing.FY3/2021 results for <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/hachijuni-bank-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:20244:1" rel="noopener">Hachijuni Bank (8359 JP)</a> are, at first glance, impressive.  In difficult trading conditions, consolidated net profits sailed past the bank’s guidance by over 24% to ¥22.3 billion (a +1.4% YoY improvement over FY3/2020).  Management has generously raised the final dividend by 33% from ¥6/share to ¥8/share. But this was simply continuing a dividend policy that management has practiced most years since FY3/2017: a ¥6/share interim dividend and an ¥8/share final dividend.  Let us not forget that guidance for FY3/2021 was withheld by management until 30 October 2020, so well into the financial year.  And bottom-line profits relied heavily on ¥6.3 billion in 2nd Half gains from  ‘selling the family silver’, namely realizing gains on part of the bank’s share portfolio as global stock markets fortuitously rose.  Moreover, trading gains of ¥9.9 billion were needed to offset a six-fold rise in credit costs from ¥1.4 billion to ¥9.3 billion because the bank’s collection of non-performing loans rose by 29.3% to ¥101.1 billion in a single year: primarily in loans in ‘high risk’ categories.  The quality of reported profits is indeed strained.In terms of balance-sheet efficiency, the bank’s return on assets (RoA) has deteriorated further to just 20bps, while its return on equity (RoE) is a risible 2.70%.  With flat profits being forecast for FY3/2022, and trading on an unremarkable PER of 8.1x, there are far better investments in the Japanese banking sector than this.  For those who are not yet holders of Hachijuni Bank stock but may have noticed the apparent strong recovery in the bank’s profitability according to its FY3/2021 financial statements, our position is clear: Caveat emptor! (May the buyer beware!)

Prestidigitation, or sleight of hand, is what stage magicians use to create their illusions, to the delight of the onlookers who are beguiled into looking elsewhere at a crucial moment in the conjuring trick when they might otherwise spot what the ‘magician’ is really doing.FY3/2021 results for Hachijuni Bank (8359 JP) are, at first glance, impressive.  In difficult trading conditions, consolidated net profits sailed past the bank’s guidance by over 24% to ¥22.3 billion (a +1.4% YoY improvement over FY3/2020).  Management has generously raised the final dividend by 33% from ¥6/share to ¥8/share. But this was simply continuing a dividend policy that management has practiced most years since FY3/2017: a ¥6/share interim dividend and an ¥8/share final dividend.  Let us not forget that guidance for FY3/2021 was withheld by management until 30 October 2020, so well into the financial year.  And bottom-line profits relied heavily on ¥6.3 billion in 2nd Half gains from  ‘selling the family silver’, namely realizing gains on part of the bank’s share portfolio as global stock markets fortuitously rose.  Moreover, trading gains of ¥9.9 billion were needed to offset a six-fold rise in credit costs from ¥1.4 billion to ¥9.3 billion because the bank’s collection of non-performing loans rose by 29.3% to ¥101.1 billion in a single year: primarily in loans in ‘high risk’ categories.  The quality of reported profits is indeed strained.In terms of balance-sheet efficiency, the bank’s return on assets (RoA) has deteriorated further to just 20bps, while its return on equity (RoE) is a risible 2.70%.  With flat profits being forecast for FY3/2022, and trading on an unremarkable PER of 8.1x, there are far better investments in the Japanese banking sector than this.  For those who are not yet holders of Hachijuni Bank stock but may have noticed the apparent strong recovery in the bank’s profitability according to its FY3/2021 financial statements, our position is clear: Caveat emptor! (May the buyer beware!)  

Hachijuni Bank (8359 JP):  A Case of Prestidigitation?