Expert on Japan Retail and Consumer Markets, JapanConsuming

Michael Causton

Expert on Japan Retail and Consumer Markets

Real Insight on Japanese Consumer Markets

JapanConsuming

JapanConsuming is a specialist research firm producing intelligence on Japanese retail and consumer markets. Founded in 2000, JapanConsuming has become the leading provider of insights on Japanese retailers and consumer trends to retailers, brands, government agencies and investors. As well as a highly regarded monthly report on the market, JapanConsuming produces in-depth reports on retail sectors, seminars on key trends and telephone consulting to investors on trends and retailers.

JapanConsuming was founded by Michael Causton and Roy Larke. 

Thematic (Sector/Industry)

<ul>
<li>The latest figures show that Japanese incomes fell for the first time in five years in 2021. </li>
<li>But despite this, average monthly household expenditure recovered and then accelerated at the end of the year. Online spending grew significantly, and much of this was new growth</li>
<li>We detail below which retailers are likely to benefit from these shifts in consumption behaviour over the next few years.</li>
</ul>


The latest figures show that Japanese incomes fell for the first time in five years in 2021. 
But despite this, average monthly household expenditure recovered and then accelerated at the end of the year. Online spending grew significantly, and much of this was new growth
We detail below which retailers are likely to benefit from these shifts in consumption behaviour over the next few years.


Japanese Household Expenditure in 2021 and Beyond: Which Retailers Will Benefit?

<ul>
<li>Japanese are developing a growing love for frozen foods, creating new opportunities for food brands and retailers.  </li>
<li>Frozen foods were long overlooked within the supply chain because of a traditional emphasis on fresh foods but frozen </li>
<li>As supply has increased, consumer demand has grown to match and now, with the growth of e-commerce and home delivery, frozen foods offer key advantages to both consumers and retailers.</li>
</ul>


Japanese are developing a growing love for frozen foods, creating new opportunities for food brands and retailers.  
Frozen foods were long overlooked within the supply chain because of a traditional emphasis on fresh foods but frozen 
As supply has increased, consumer demand has grown to match and now, with the growth of e-commerce and home delivery, frozen foods offer key advantages to both consumers and retailers.


There were some fears that e-commerce growth would stall following massive consumer adoption after March 2020 but for <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/rakuten-inc" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:31:1" rel="noopener">Rakuten Inc (4755 JP)</a> at least, repeat customers have helped sustain momentum. <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/z-holdings-corp" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:19603:1" rel="noopener">Z Holdings (4689 JP)</a> had a trickier start to the year, however. Last year, excluding the big convenience stores, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/amazon-com-inc" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:409:1" rel="noopener">Amazon.com Inc (AMZN US)</a> overtook Fast Retailing to become Japan’s third largest retailer and one of just four with sales over ¥2 trillion and  accounted for 3.2% of all retail sales in Nikkei’s survey of 488 companies.Despite early, pessimistic forecasts for e-commerce in 2020, METI’s latest annual survey released in July shows that BtoC e-commerce surged 21.7% to ¥12.23 trillion.

There were some fears that e-commerce growth would stall following massive consumer adoption after March 2020 but for Rakuten Inc (4755 JP) at least, repeat customers have helped sustain momentum. Z Holdings (4689 JP) had a trickier start to the year, however. Last year, excluding the big convenience stores, Amazon.com Inc (AMZN US) overtook Fast Retailing to become Japan’s third largest retailer and one of just four with sales over ¥2 trillion and  accounted for 3.2% of all retail sales in Nikkei’s survey of 488 companies.Despite early, pessimistic forecasts for e-commerce in 2020, METI’s latest annual survey released in July shows that BtoC e-commerce surged 21.7% to ¥12.23 trillion.

Pan-Asia Catalysts/Events, Quiddity Advisors

Travis Lundy

Pan-Asia Catalysts/Events

Quiddity Advisors

Event-Driven

On 31 August, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/kansai-super-market-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:15519:1" rel="noopener">Kansai Super Market (9919 JP)</a> and its top shareholder (10.02% of shares out) <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/h2o-retailing-corp" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:17562:1" rel="noopener">H2 O Retailing (8242 JP)</a> (the parent of Hanshin Department Store and related companies) <a href="https://data.swcms.net/file/h2o-retailing/ja/news/auto_20210830491858/pdfFile.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">announced</a> a business merger whereby the H₂O would inject two supermarket businesses it owns - Izumiya and Hankyu Oasis - into a holding company with Kansai Super, receiving shares in a newly enlarged Kansai Super in exchange. H₂O would go from owning 10.66% to owning 58% of Kansai Super, and the 89.34% would own 42% of NEWCO. The merger was short-dated/accelerated, with the EGM to vote on this deal set for a Record Date on 15 September, the EGMs of all the related companies where an EGM was necessary (Kansai Super, Hankyu Oasis, and Izumiya (the latter two foregone conclusions because they are 100%-owned by H₂O) on 29 October, and the merger effective December 1st.The shares popped a bit, then fell back. At first glance, this seemed somewhat opportunistic for H₂O, and it meant that the 89.34% "minority" in Kansai Super would become a real minority without getting paid a premium or provided a chance to exit. Based on the net assets of the companies, it seemed like H₂O was getting a good deal. Based on the OP levels in the past year, it did not seem like H₂O was getting special treatment. A couple of days later, on 3 September, privately-held discount ("every day low price") supermarket chain OK Corp (primarily based in the Kanto area, but which had been aimed at expanding into the Kansai area), which was the second-largest single shareholder of Kansai Super (based originally in Osaka/Kansai) at 7.23%, stepped up and offered a <a href="https://ok-corporation.jp/media/001/202109/20210903_%E3%83%97%E3%83%AC%E3%82%B9%E3%83%AA%E3%83%AA%E3%83%BC%E3%82%B9.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">press release</a> which said that it would vote against the merger and if the merger were not approved, it would be willing to launch a Tender Offer to buy the shares of Kansai Super at ¥2,250/share (the highest price since listing and nearly vs ¥1,374/share the day before, and more than double the market price of Kansai Super in June when the proposal was made). On 3 Sep OK complained about their treatment, and noted that from the perspective of shareholder interest, their bid should be considered, but OK also had no intention of launching a hostile bid.The shares popped, moving limit up. Then limit up another day, and then the shares traded at JPY 2,200/share in considerable volume before drifting lower.<section class="figure"><figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/229/527/original/Screenshot+2021-09-13+at+8.10.54+PM.png?1631535065" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="229527"></figure></section>Today the shares fell back 7+% to just below JPY 2,000/share. There is some very long history between the founder of OK and Yuji Kitano the founder of Kansai Super, and they once worked together, with OK seconding employees to Kansai Super to learn the business of fresh grocery sales. Mr Kitano passed away in 2013, and OK Supermarket started buying shares in 2016, getting to just under 5%, then it peaked its head above and by the end of the fiscal year in February, owned 7.23%. Of course, that year in October (2016), Kansai Super entered into a business and capital alliance with H₂O Retailing, and H₂O bought about 10% of the shares out. Fast forward five years and it turns out that OK approached Kansai Super in April 2021, and proposed a capital and business alliance on 9 June, in writing. Kansai Super put this to an Independent Committee which then took its time, setting its first meeting with OK some 11 weeks later on 26 August. The Kansai Super <a href="http://www.kansaisuper.co.jp/upimages/irinfo/irnews_629.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">release</a> (Japanese only) on 31 August suggests there was a "third party tender offer approach" but then doesn't discuss it much while saying that intense discussions and due diligence was afforded to H₂O Retailing in the same timeframe.Five days after the first interview with OK, Kansai Super and H₂O announced their deal. This is a complicated deal and it begs the question of whether shareholder interests matter and how shareholders decide. More discussion below.

On 31 August, Kansai Super Market (9919 JP) and its top shareholder (10.02% of shares out) H2 O Retailing (8242 JP) (the parent of Hanshin Department Store and related companies) announced a business merger whereby the H₂O would inject two supermarket businesses it owns - Izumiya and Hankyu Oasis - into a holding company with Kansai Super, receiving shares in a newly enlarged Kansai Super in exchange. H₂O would go from owning 10.66% to owning 58% of Kansai Super, and the 89.34% would own 42% of NEWCO. The merger was short-dated/accelerated, with the EGM to vote on this deal set for a Record Date on 15 September, the EGMs of all the related companies where an EGM was necessary (Kansai Super, Hankyu Oasis, and Izumiya (the latter two foregone conclusions because they are 100%-owned by H₂O) on 29 October, and the merger effective December 1st.The shares popped a bit, then fell back. At first glance, this seemed somewhat opportunistic for H₂O, and it meant that the 89.34% "minority" in Kansai Super would become a real minority without getting paid a premium or provided a chance to exit. Based on the net assets of the companies, it seemed like H₂O was getting a good deal. Based on the OP levels in the past year, it did not seem like H₂O was getting special treatment. A couple of days later, on 3 September, privately-held discount ("every day low price") supermarket chain OK Corp (primarily based in the Kanto area, but which had been aimed at expanding into the Kansai area), which was the second-largest single shareholder of Kansai Super (based originally in Osaka/Kansai) at 7.23%, stepped up and offered a press release which said that it would vote against the merger and if the merger were not approved, it would be willing to launch a Tender Offer to buy the shares of Kansai Super at ¥2,250/share (the highest price since listing and nearly vs ¥1,374/share the day before, and more than double the market price of Kansai Super in June when the proposal was made). On 3 Sep OK complained about their treatment, and noted that from the perspective of shareholder interest, their bid should be considered, but OK also had no intention of launching a hostile bid.The shares popped, moving limit up. Then limit up another day, and then the shares traded at JPY 2,200/share in considerable volume before drifting lower.Today the shares fell back 7+% to just below JPY 2,000/share. There is some very long history between the founder of OK and Yuji Kitano the founder of Kansai Super, and they once worked together, with OK seconding employees to Kansai Super to learn the business of fresh grocery sales. Mr Kitano passed away in 2013, and OK Supermarket started buying shares in 2016, getting to just under 5%, then it peaked its head above and by the end of the fiscal year in February, owned 7.23%. Of course, that year in October (2016), Kansai Super entered into a business and capital alliance with H₂O Retailing, and H₂O bought about 10% of the shares out. Fast forward five years and it turns out that OK approached Kansai Super in April 2021, and proposed a capital and business alliance on 9 June, in writing. Kansai Super put this to an Independent Committee which then took its time, setting its first meeting with OK some 11 weeks later on 26 August. The Kansai Super release (Japanese only) on 31 August suggests there was a "third party tender offer approach" but then doesn't discuss it much while saying that intense discussions and due diligence was afforded to H₂O Retailing in the same timeframe.Five days after the first interview with OK, Kansai Super and H₂O announced their deal. This is a complicated deal and it begs the question of whether shareholder interests matter and how shareholders decide. More discussion below. 

Equity Bottom-Up

Last year saw the launch of a new netsuper by <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/amazon-com-inc" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:409:1" rel="noopener">Amazon.com Inc (AMZN US)</a> and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/life-corp" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:1743:1" rel="noopener">Life Corp (8194 JP)</a>. The combination of the leading e-commerce retailer and the country’s top supermarket chain makes this one of the strongest contenders in the race for online food sales, particularly as Life is under the control of <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/mitsubishi-corp" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:20668:1" rel="noopener">Mitsubishi Corp (8058 JP)</a> – although <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/rakuten-inc" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:31:1" rel="noopener">Rakuten Inc (4755 JP)</a> and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/z-holdings-corp" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:19603:1" rel="noopener">Z Holdings (4689 JP)</a> aren’t standing still.
Amazon is now expanding its tie-up with Life and plans to bring in Valor as a new partner later this year and is highly likely to add further partnerships going forward.

Last year saw the launch of a new netsuper by Amazon.com Inc (AMZN US) and Life Corp (8194 JP). The combination of the leading e-commerce retailer and the country’s top supermarket chain makes this one of the strongest contenders in the race for online food sales, particularly as Life is under the control of Mitsubishi Corp (8058 JP) – although Rakuten Inc (4755 JP) and Z Holdings (4689 JP) aren’t standing still.
Amazon is now expanding its tie-up with Life and plans to bring in Valor as a new partner later this year and is highly likely to add further partnerships going forward.

Amazon Adds Partnership with Valor in Race for Japan Online Food Retail Leadership

Japan

VALOR HOLDINGS CO., LTD. is a chain store operator which handles perishables, general foods, and daily-use sundry goods.  The Company is active to diversify into new business including home centers, restaurants, fitness clubs, and pet shops. Valor is based in Gifu area and moving into Aichi, Kanagawa, and Tokyo.

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Valor Holdings (9956 JP)

Japanese Household Expenditure in 2021 and Beyond: Which Retailers Will Benefit?

Japanese spent more on homes and less on clothes in the last two years but they also added to their savings. This insight analyses the key...

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Japan's New Food Boom: Frozen Food

Frozen food sales have boomed during the pandemic but the new enthusiasm for all things frozen is a long-term trend and some retailers and...

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Japanese E-Commerce Growth Continues

Japan is well-known for lagging some markets in e-commerce penetration but sales surged last year to more than 20%. Only Rakuten and Amazon seem to...

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The Kansai Super (9919) Conundrum

Kansai Super has Two Suitors - H2O Retailing and Kansai Super have ironed out a deal, and OK Corp objects. This creates a conundrum. But solving it...

Travis Lundy

Amazon Adds Partnership with Valor in Race for Japan Online Food Retail Leadership

Amazon is reaching out to the leading supermarkets in each region to create a network of supply and delivery points for its online supermarket in...

Michael Causton

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