APAC IPOs & Placements, Aequitas Research

Ethan Aw

APAC IPOs & Placements

IPOs and Placements coverage across Asia Pacific

Aequitas Research

We cover all listing across the Asia Pacific along with follow-up placements. As of Dec 2020, our team had covered 539 IPOs with a hit rate of 73.5% and 685 placements with a hit rate of 66.8%.

We combine fundamental bottom-up views with our proprietary quantitative framework to provide a holistic coverage across new listings and placements. Our coverage includes pre-IPO notes before the deal is launched, follow-up analysis once the deal is live and post-listing trading analysis as well.

Equity Capital Markets

Fusion Micro Finance / Equity Capital Markets

<ul>
<li>
<a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/fusion-micro-finance-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:36450:1" rel="noopener">Fusion Micro Finance Ltd (1053199D IN)</a> is looking to raise about US$250m in its upcoming India IPO. </li>
<li>Fusion Micro Finance (FMF) is a non-banking financial company - microfinance institution (NBFC-MFI) that provides financial services to unserved and underserved women in rural and peri-rural areas across India.</li>
<li>In this note, we talk about the not-so-positive aspects of the deal. </li>
</ul>



Fusion Micro Finance Ltd (1053199D IN) is looking to raise about US$250m in its upcoming India IPO. 
Fusion Micro Finance (FMF) is a non-banking financial company - microfinance institution (NBFC-MFI) that provides financial services to unserved and underserved women in rural and peri-rural areas across India.
In this note, we talk about the not-so-positive aspects of the deal. 


Fusion Micro Finance Pre-IPO - The Negatives - Much Less Inspiring as a Business

Silver Point

Thomas J. Monaco

Independent Insight Provider

Silver Point is a boutique research firm that focuses on the broader financial services sector, with a particular focus on troubled institutions globally. 

Asia Ex Japan

Equity Bottom-Up

*Negative Jaws:  Oversea Chinese Banking Corp. (OCBC.SP) [OCBC] reported 4Q20 net profit of SGD 1.1 bn, a SGD 102 mn (9.9%) increase on a linked quarter basis. Were it not for the 0.7% tax rate as opposed to the 12.2% tax rate during 3Q20, OCBC’s bottom-line performance would have come in at SGD 994 mn  - down SGD 34 mn (3.3%). In addition, OCBC continues to suffer from negative operating jaws, with revenues declining 2.6% and costs increasing 2.3%;*Credit Improving In Reality: We have become more optimistic. By our calculation, we find that net new NPL growth continued to be negative on an annualized basis at SGD 78 mn or 8.0% annualized (versus 2.3% annualized).  We also find that reserves are now where they need to be, which is a far cry from where currently DBS Group Holdings (DBS.SP) is; and*Insurance Weakness: Great Eastern Holdings (GE.SP) [Great Eastern] reported 2H20 bottom-line results of SGD 688.5 mn, improving SGD 348.6 mn (102.5%) HOH. However, when we exclude 2H20’s net gains on sale of SGD 3.8 bn, core operating results were far from impressive at a loss of SGD 3.1 bn versus operating income SGD 217.3 mn in 1H20.

*Negative Jaws:  Oversea Chinese Banking Corp. (OCBC.SP) [OCBC] reported 4Q20 net profit of SGD 1.1 bn, a SGD 102 mn (9.9%) increase on a linked quarter basis. Were it not for the 0.7% tax rate as opposed to the 12.2% tax rate during 3Q20, OCBC’s bottom-line performance would have come in at SGD 994 mn  - down SGD 34 mn (3.3%). In addition, OCBC continues to suffer from negative operating jaws, with revenues declining 2.6% and costs increasing 2.3%;*Credit Improving In Reality: We have become more optimistic. By our calculation, we find that net new NPL growth continued to be negative on an annualized basis at SGD 78 mn or 8.0% annualized (versus 2.3% annualized).  We also find that reserves are now where they need to be, which is a far cry from where currently DBS Group Holdings (DBS.SP) is; and*Insurance Weakness: Great Eastern Holdings (GE.SP) [Great Eastern] reported 2H20 bottom-line results of SGD 688.5 mn, improving SGD 348.6 mn (102.5%) HOH. However, when we exclude 2H20’s net gains on sale of SGD 3.8 bn, core operating results were far from impressive at a loss of SGD 3.1 bn versus operating income SGD 217.3 mn in 1H20. 

Oversea Chinese Banking Corp. – Mixed Bag, But AQ Improving

*Lakshmi Vilas Bank Problems Appear Bigger Than DBS Expects: By our calculation and based on LVB’s FY 2Q21 results, the company would appear to be insolvent by the amount of INR 39 bn – nearly 56% greater than the DBS Bank India capital infusion; LVB loses money on an operating basis prior to loss provisions, as revenues (no clarity on what is recurring) of INR 15.4 bn are less than operating expenses of INR 16.0 bn – or by 3.7% at FY 2Q21; et al;  and  *Cram-down Highlights That LVB’s Stated Numbers May Be Wrong:  Prior to the amalgamation, INR 318.2 bn (USD 43 mn) LVB Basel III-compliant Tier 2 bonds (Series VIII, Series IX, and Series X) were written down under the direction of the RBI. To the best of our knowledge, this would appear to be the first time that a cram-down procedure was applied in Asia. As a result, no investor should take any investment in a troubled Indian financial institution for granted. Ultimately, this will make the financial sector more efficient – but calls the sanctity of their audited results into questions as well.

*Lakshmi Vilas Bank Problems Appear Bigger Than DBS Expects: By our calculation and based on LVB’s FY 2Q21 results, the company would appear to be insolvent by the amount of INR 39 bn – nearly 56% greater than the DBS Bank India capital infusion; LVB loses money on an operating basis prior to loss provisions, as revenues (no clarity on what is recurring) of INR 15.4 bn are less than operating expenses of INR 16.0 bn – or by 3.7% at FY 2Q21; et al;  and  *Cram-down Highlights That LVB’s Stated Numbers May Be Wrong:  Prior to the amalgamation, INR 318.2 bn (USD 43 mn) LVB Basel III-compliant Tier 2 bonds (Series VIII, Series IX, and Series X) were written down under the direction of the RBI. To the best of our knowledge, this would appear to be the first time that a cram-down procedure was applied in Asia. As a result, no investor should take any investment in a troubled Indian financial institution for granted. Ultimately, this will make the financial sector more efficient – but calls the sanctity of their audited results into questions as well. 

*Third Indian Bank Failure In 15 Months: For the third time in 15 months, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) took over a failing regional bank - announcing that it would limit deposit withdrawals and replace the board of directors at Lakshm Vilas Bank (LVB.IN) due to a "serious deterioration" in its finances. After the failure of Punjab and Maharashtra Co-operative Bank and Yes Bank (YES.IN); and 12 consecutive quarters of posting losses it should come as no surprise that the RBI placed LVB under moratorium through December 16, 2020; and*Not Letting Cash Burn A Hole In Its Pocket: On Novenber 17, 2020, the RBI also announced a draft scheme to merge LVB with DBS Bank India Limited, the 100%-owned subsidiary of DBS Bank Holdings (DBS.SP), which will infuse INR 25 bn into its subsidiary to absorb and recapitalize LVB. This transaction is riddled with problems and will certainly cost DBS far greater than its initial investment.

*Third Indian Bank Failure In 15 Months: For the third time in 15 months, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) took over a failing regional bank - announcing that it would limit deposit withdrawals and replace the board of directors at Lakshm Vilas Bank (LVB.IN) due to a "serious deterioration" in its finances. After the failure of Punjab and Maharashtra Co-operative Bank and Yes Bank (YES.IN); and 12 consecutive quarters of posting losses it should come as no surprise that the RBI placed LVB under moratorium through December 16, 2020; and*Not Letting Cash Burn A Hole In Its Pocket: On Novenber 17, 2020, the RBI also announced a draft scheme to merge LVB with DBS Bank India Limited, the 100%-owned subsidiary of DBS Bank Holdings (DBS.SP), which will infuse INR 25 bn into its subsidiary to absorb and recapitalize LVB. This transaction is riddled with problems and will certainly cost DBS far greater than its initial investment.  

*Much Better Than Expected: Oversea Chinese Banking Corp. (OCBC.SP) [OCBC] posted 3Q20 net profit of SGD 1.0 bn, an SGD 298 mn (40.8%) increase on a linked quarter basis – well ahead of consensus. Two factors pushed the outperformance: 1) a somewhat justifiable SGD 400 mn (53.3%) decline in loss provisions (unlike DBS Group Holdings [DBS.SP]), as OCBC witnessed “negative”growth in net new NPLs; and 2) a 290 bp decline in its tax rate to 13.1%, which was additive to the bottom-line by SGD 36 mn or 3.6%;*Credit Improving In Reality: By our calculation, given the SGD 99 mn in net recoveries, we find that new new NPL growth was actually negative on an annualized basis at 2.3%. While we are ecstatic to see negative growth in net new NPLs on the back of strong net recoveries of previously charged off loans, we continue to believe that credit risk will remain elevated. As such, we find that reserves should be bolstered by SGD 288 mn – 25% of pre-tax results, which is a far cry from where currently DBS is; and*Insurance Weakness: Great Eastern Holdings (GE.SP) [Great Eastern] reported 3Q20 bottom-line results of SGD 287.9 mn, declining SGD 9.6 mn (3.2%) linked quarter. On an operating basis excluding market-related gains, the decline in profits was even more pronounced at SGD 24.6 mn or 9.4% over the period due to new business strain. New Business Embedded Value (NBEV) margins continued their descent to 37.0%  - down 1.1% linked quarter due a weaker Malaysian component. Management’s confidence is low and it anticipates the weaker economic environment to pose continued headwinds, and will reassess the dividend.

*Much Better Than Expected: Oversea Chinese Banking Corp. (OCBC.SP) [OCBC] posted 3Q20 net profit of SGD 1.0 bn, an SGD 298 mn (40.8%) increase on a linked quarter basis – well ahead of consensus. Two factors pushed the outperformance: 1) a somewhat justifiable SGD 400 mn (53.3%) decline in loss provisions (unlike DBS Group Holdings [DBS.SP]), as OCBC witnessed “negative”growth in net new NPLs; and 2) a 290 bp decline in its tax rate to 13.1%, which was additive to the bottom-line by SGD 36 mn or 3.6%;*Credit Improving In Reality: By our calculation, given the SGD 99 mn in net recoveries, we find that new new NPL growth was actually negative on an annualized basis at 2.3%. While we are ecstatic to see negative growth in net new NPLs on the back of strong net recoveries of previously charged off loans, we continue to believe that credit risk will remain elevated. As such, we find that reserves should be bolstered by SGD 288 mn – 25% of pre-tax results, which is a far cry from where currently DBS is; and*Insurance Weakness: Great Eastern Holdings (GE.SP) [Great Eastern] reported 3Q20 bottom-line results of SGD 287.9 mn, declining SGD 9.6 mn (3.2%) linked quarter. On an operating basis excluding market-related gains, the decline in profits was even more pronounced at SGD 24.6 mn or 9.4% over the period due to new business strain. New Business Embedded Value (NBEV) margins continued their descent to 37.0%  - down 1.1% linked quarter due a weaker Malaysian component. Management’s confidence is low and it anticipates the weaker economic environment to pose continued headwinds, and will reassess the dividend.

Thailand

UOB Kay Hian Securities (Thailand) Public Company Limited operates a securities business.  The Company is licensed to conduct securities brokerage, securities trading, investment advisory, and securities underwriting.  UOB Kay is also licensed to provide financial advisory and unit trusts agency.

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UOB Kay Hian Securities Thai (UOBKH TB)

Fusion Micro Finance Pre-IPO - The Negatives - Much Less Inspiring as a Business

Fusion Micro Finance Ltd (1053199D IN) is looking to raise about US$250m in its upcoming India IPO. In this note, we talk about the not-so-positive...

Ethan Aw

Oversea Chinese Banking Corp. – Mixed Bag, But AQ Improving

OVERSEA CHINESE BANKING CORP: Were it not for the 0.7% tax rate as opposed to the 12.2% tax rate during 3Q20, OCBC’s bottom-line would've declined...

Thomas J. Monaco

DBS Group Holdings – The LVB Cram Down

DBS GROUP HOLDINGS: The LVB Cram-down Raises Significant Questions Over Potential Cost For DBS, Raises Significant Concerns Over Audited Financial...

Thomas J. Monaco

DBS Group Holdings – Dumb India Deal

DBS GROUP HOLDINGS: Transaction For Lakshmi Vilas Bank In India At INR 25 BN Is Way Too Pricey For Risk DBS Is Taking On. Price Will Ultimately Be...

Thomas J. Monaco

Oversea Chinese Banking Corp. – Solid

OVERSEA CHINESE BANKING CORP.: Credit Showing Signs Of Recovery With Negative NPL Growth - Offsetting Weakness In NIMs and Insurance.

Thomas J. Monaco

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