Ping An Digital Economic Research Center

Zheng Zeng

Ping An Digital Economic Research Center (DERC)

Ping An - DERC

Ping An Digital Economic Research Center (DERC) utilizes more than 50 TB of high frequency data points, more than 30 years of historical data and more than 1.5 billion data points to drive research on the “AI + Macro Forecast” and provide insights and methods towards precise macroeconomic trends. 

Ping An DERC is a research center for Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China, Ltd. (“Ping An”) is a world-leading technology-powered retail financial services group. With over 204 million retail customers and 534 million internet users, Ping An is one of the largest financial services companies in the world.

Macroeconomics

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<p><strong>China SME Financing Report Series Report II by Fudan-Ping An Research Institute for Macroeconomy</strong></p>
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<div>As the coronavirus pandemic keeps worsening outside China and sends shock waves across the global economy, <strong>the central government of China has increased financial support for micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs, or SME for short in this report) following the “Two Sessions” meeting</strong> in May. This includes: (1) reducing loan rates; (2) asking large state-owned banks to increase their lending to small businesses by no-less-than 40% this year; (3) using a re-lending program of RMB400 billion (US$5.8 billion) to incentivize local banks to make unsecured loans to small businesses; and (4) encouraging financial institutions to make concessions of RMB1.5 trillion to all types of companies.</div>
<div></div>
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<div>
<strong>However, difficulties in discerning the use of the loans and supervising post-lending funding have led to a dilemma when implementing these relief policies.</strong> On one hand, if SME loan policies are too generous with rates too low and covenants too loose, regulatory arbitrage may arise, with funds flowing to the real estate and capital markets, aggravating resource misallocation and encouraging a pivot away from the real economy. On the other hand, if SME funding costs are too high and issuing conditions too demanding, small businesses may be unwilling to borrow to maintain production and operations, and instead they will lay off employees and reduce investments to deal with the pandemic.</div>
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<div>Evidence suggests that：</div>
<div>
<ul>
<li>Some companies have used loan subsidies granted by local fiscal authorities to <strong>profit from interest margins</strong>.</li>
<li>
<div>Due to increased risks, small businesses are<strong> less willing to borrow</strong> to restore operations in the absence of low-cost loans. </div>
</li>
</ul>
<p>To ensure relief funds are funneled directly to small businesses in need, and to avoid<br>arbitrage and circular funding, we recommend that all local governments <strong>set up an indicator </strong><strong>system comprising 29 items under five dimensions</strong> to monitor local SME financing, and speed up data integration and information sharing based on the local small and medium enterprise financing platform, precisely measuring the SME financing gap and monitoring the flow of loan funds based on data from multiple sources.</p>
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<p></p>
<blockquote>
<p style="text-align: center;"><strong>Dilemma of SME financing relief policies in Charts</strong></p>
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China SME Financing Report Series Report II by Fudan-Ping An Research Institute for Macroeconomy

As the coronavirus pandemic keeps worsening outside China and sends shock waves across the global economy, the central government of China has increased financial support for micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs, or SME for short in this report) following the “Two Sessions” meeting in May. This includes: (1) reducing loan rates; (2) asking large state-owned banks to increase their lending to small businesses by no-less-than 40% this year; (3) using a re-lending program of RMB400 billion (US$5.8 billion) to incentivize local banks to make unsecured loans to small businesses; and (4) encouraging financial institutions to make concessions of RMB1.5 trillion to all types of companies.



However, difficulties in discerning the use of the loans and supervising post-lending funding have led to a dilemma when implementing these relief policies. On one hand, if SME loan policies are too generous with rates too low and covenants too loose, regulatory arbitrage may arise, with funds flowing to the real estate and capital markets, aggravating resource misallocation and encouraging a pivot away from the real economy. On the other hand, if SME funding costs are too high and issuing conditions too demanding, small businesses may be unwilling to borrow to maintain production and operations, and instead they will lay off employees and reduce investments to deal with the pandemic.


Evidence suggests that：


Some companies have used loan subsidies granted by local fiscal authorities to profit from interest margins.

Due to increased risks, small businesses are less willing to borrow to restore operations in the absence of low-cost loans. 


To ensure relief funds are funneled directly to small businesses in need, and to avoid arbitrage and circular funding, we recommend that all local governments set up an indicator system comprising 29 items under five dimensions to monitor local SME financing, and speed up data integration and information sharing based on the local small and medium enterprise financing platform, precisely measuring the SME financing gap and monitoring the flow of loan funds based on data from multiple sources.



Dilemma of SME financing relief policies in Charts




China: Speeding up Data Integration to Solve the Dilemma of SME Financing Relief Policies

Rates Strategist, Bondcritic

Sumit Gupta

Rates Strategist

Asian Fixed Income/Frontier Market Research

Bondcritic

Bondcritic, established in 2009, is designed to be an independent credit research voice that helps investors gain insights and unbiased analyses on Asian fixed income market. Our mission is to discover deep-value Asian high-yield and distressed bonds with a bottom-up approach, together with the help of our proprietary ESG (Environmental, Social Development, and Governance) model. At the same time, we focus on bringing investment cases of unrated and unloved issuers to the general public.

FX & Rates

<ul>
<li><strong><em>Digital currencies are gaining regulators' attention. Bank of England Governor Mark Carney’s speech at the Jackson Hole Symposium is one acknowledgement of a need for a new economic order where virtual currencies could provide a solution.</em></strong></li>
<li><strong><em>Digital currencies help overcome the zero lower bound problem which interest rate markets face today, in our view. Though this requires the phasing out of cash, it is easier said than done. The development of the e-Krona in Sweden offers an interesting case study.</em></strong></li>
<li><strong><em>With the introduction of the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) digital currency, we expect the debate between privately-owned and central bank-owned digital currencies to gain steam. In our view, central banks will have to overcome the baggage of traditional finance to make a meaningful dent in the digital currency space, which is not easy. On the other hand, there is no known mechanism to control private crypto currency inflation.</em></strong></li>
<li><strong><em>The world is looking for a new monetary order. Virtual currencies are likely to find a way in there, we believe. </em></strong></li>
</ul>


Digital currencies are gaining regulators' attention. Bank of England Governor Mark Carney’s speech at the Jackson Hole Symposium is one acknowledgement of a need for a new economic order where virtual currencies could provide a solution.
Digital currencies help overcome the zero lower bound problem which interest rate markets face today, in our view. Though this requires the phasing out of cash, it is easier said than done. The development of the e-Krona in Sweden offers an interesting case study.
With the introduction of the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) digital currency, we expect the debate between privately-owned and central bank-owned digital currencies to gain steam. In our view, central banks will have to overcome the baggage of traditional finance to make a meaningful dent in the digital currency space, which is not easy. On the other hand, there is no known mechanism to control private crypto currency inflation.
The world is looking for a new monetary order. Virtual currencies are likely to find a way in there, we believe. 


The Growing Weight of Digital Currencies in Mainstream Finance

Research and consultancy, Tabbush Report

Daniel Tabbush

Research and consultancy

Tabbush Report

We provide research and consultancy on Asian banks. Our focus is on what we call “Asian bank research, without the noise.” We are interested in the most critical swing-factors for banks, the NPL and credit cycle, and where we believe there is a gap between perception and reality. We often focus on the less studied components of bank financial statements.  Our research is highly thematic, sometimes examining unlisted banks and companies as a window on mainstream banks. 

Being independent allows us to look at smaller banks, often overlooked by others. Analysis of BIS bank guidelines in the context of Asia, is also a focal point, while we also analyze global banks operating in the region. We use what we believe is the most comprehensive, reliable financials database, SNL Financial. S&P Capital IQ augments our database, with corporate data and CEIC, with economics. 

Asian bank research, without the noise.

Equity Bottom-Up

<p><a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/bank-of-jinzhou-co-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:21014:1" rel="noopener">Bank Of Jinzhou (416 HK)</a> announced that it would post a loss for full year 2018 and also for 1H19. This is interesting for a few reasons. It is one of several banks that did not have current financial statements available, like with two recently nationalized banks. Also, the bank expanded its loans faster than most any bank in Asia from 2016 through 1H18.  This can be a good lead indicator of future NPL formation. While in the past, few banks would ever report losses in China, this is  changing, suggesting that the distress can not be fully concealed indefinitely or that it's getting worse. Or both. </p>

Bank Of Jinzhou (416 HK) announced that it would post a loss for full year 2018 and also for 1H19. This is interesting for a few reasons. It is one of several banks that did not have current financial statements available, like with two recently nationalized banks. Also, the bank expanded its loans faster than most any bank in Asia from 2016 through 1H18.  This can be a good lead indicator of future NPL formation. While in the past, few banks would ever report losses in China, this is  changing, suggesting that the distress can not be fully concealed indefinitely or that it's getting worse. Or both. 

China Banks - Jinzhou’s Loss Is Illustrative

China, Emerging Markets

Ryan Soh 苏祥发

Thematic (Sector/Industry)

<p>A full translation of an article measuring the progress of deleveraging from a People's Bank of China mouthpiece website at the end of last month yields interesting results for those otherwise used to relying on intermediaries for partial summaries and interpretations.</p><p>The article summarises the initial results obtained from deleveraging, acknowledges the unbalanced structure of enterprise debt, sees deleveraging as an opportunity for reform of state-owned enterprises, and contemplates the creation of a debt-to-equity swap market by 'qualified implementation agencies'. </p><p>The full translation is included as an attachment.  </p>

A full translation of an article measuring the progress of deleveraging from a People's Bank of China mouthpiece website at the end of last month yields interesting results for those otherwise used to relying on intermediaries for partial summaries and interpretations.The article summarises the initial results obtained from deleveraging, acknowledges the unbalanced structure of enterprise debt, sees deleveraging as an opportunity for reform of state-owned enterprises, and contemplates the creation of a debt-to-equity swap market by 'qualified implementation agencies'. The full translation is included as an attachment.  

Independent Asian Credit Research, Bondcritic

Warut Promboon

Independent Asian Credit Research

<div><p>Moody's 24-May downgrade of China's local currency and foreign currency senior unsecured debt rating to A1 (from Aa3) confirms what we wrote back on 1-May that China's economic improvement will not be fast enough to outpace its debt problems. We believe Moody's downgrade is the first of a few more downgrades for China (including S&amp;P to react on its negative outlook and follow Moody's to downgrade China's credit ratings in the near term). Credit ratings of Chinese state-owned enterprises are supported by an implicit support by the Chinese government and, therefore, all deserve a one-notch downgrade, in our view. This wholesale downgrade event will likely cause a repricing event for Chinese credits, as a result.</p><p>Rating downgrade risk poses asymmetric downside risk for Chinese-related assets, including USD bonds issued by Chinese issuers. Rising market conviction on China's potential debt detonation will quicken the capital outflow and worsen the situation, in our view. </p><p>We maintain our neutral recommendation on China's USD bond universe as we believe the worst case scenario for China will be a "muddle-through" case where its real GDP growth will be suppressed for a long time (similar to Japan's lost decade). Any sell-off on rating downgrades is always a headline risk removal and, therefore, exposes value for credits that are more closely-related and/or more economically-important to the Chinese government. Credit selections on Chinese-related bonds therefore remain more crucial than ever.</p></div>

Moody's 24-May downgrade of China's local currency and foreign currency senior unsecured debt rating to A1 (from Aa3) confirms what we wrote back on 1-May that China's economic improvement will not be fast enough to outpace its debt problems. We believe Moody's downgrade is the first of a few more downgrades for China (including S&amp;P to react on its negative outlook and follow Moody's to downgrade China's credit ratings in the near term). Credit ratings of Chinese state-owned enterprises are supported by an implicit support by the Chinese government and, therefore, all deserve a one-notch downgrade, in our view. This wholesale downgrade event will likely cause a repricing event for Chinese credits, as a result.Rating downgrade risk poses asymmetric downside risk for Chinese-related assets, including USD bonds issued by Chinese issuers. Rising market conviction on China's potential debt detonation will quicken the capital outflow and worsen the situation, in our view. We maintain our neutral recommendation on China's USD bond universe as we believe the worst case scenario for China will be a "muddle-through" case where its real GDP growth will be suppressed for a long time (similar to Japan's lost decade). Any sell-off on rating downgrades is always a headline risk removal and, therefore, exposes value for credits that are more closely-related and/or more economically-important to the Chinese government. Credit selections on Chinese-related bonds therefore remain more crucial than ever.

Asian Credit Monitor: Moody's Downgrade on China Is the First Domino to Fall

China

The People's Bank of China is the central bank of the People's Republic of China. The Company formulates and implements monetary policy and supervises and regulates the financial industry. The People's Bank of China conducts business in China.

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People’s Bank Of China (PBCZ CH)

China: Speeding up Data Integration to Solve the Dilemma of SME Financing Relief Policies

Fudan-Ping An Research Institute for Macroeconomy

Ping An - DERC

The Growing Weight of Digital Currencies in Mainstream Finance

Digital currencies are gaining regulators' attention. Bank of England Governor Mark Carney’s speech at the Jackson Hole Symposium is one...

Bondcritic

China Banks - Jinzhou’s Loss Is Illustrative

Bank Of Jinzhou (416 HK) announced that it would post a loss for full year 2018 and also for 1H19. This is interesting for a few reasons. It is one...

Daniel Tabbush

Deleveraging in China: A Translation

A full translation of an article measuring the progress of deleveraging from a People's Bank of China mouthpiece website at the end of last month...

Ryan Soh 苏祥发

Asian Credit Monitor: Moody's Downgrade on China Is the First Domino to Fall

Moody's 24-May downgrade of China's local currency and foreign currency senior unsecured debt rating to A1 (from Aa3) confirms what we wrote back...

Warut Promboon

Price Gauge

52-week Range

Market Cap (USDm)

P/E

Dividend (Yield)