Silver Point

Thomas J. Monaco

Independent Insight Provider

Silver Point is a boutique research firm that focuses on the broader financial services sector, with a particular focus on troubled institutions globally. 

Asia Ex Japan

Equity Bottom-Up

*Lakshmi Vilas Bank Problems Appear Bigger Than DBS Expects: By our calculation and based on LVB’s FY 2Q21 results, the company would appear to be insolvent by the amount of INR 39 bn – nearly 56% greater than the DBS Bank India capital infusion; LVB loses money on an operating basis prior to loss provisions, as revenues (no clarity on what is recurring) of INR 15.4 bn are less than operating expenses of INR 16.0 bn – or by 3.7% at FY 2Q21; et al;  and  *Cram-down Highlights That LVB’s Stated Numbers May Be Wrong:  Prior to the amalgamation, INR 318.2 bn (USD 43 mn) LVB Basel III-compliant Tier 2 bonds (Series VIII, Series IX, and Series X) were written down under the direction of the RBI. To the best of our knowledge, this would appear to be the first time that a cram-down procedure was applied in Asia. As a result, no investor should take any investment in a troubled Indian financial institution for granted. Ultimately, this will make the financial sector more efficient – but calls the sanctity of their audited results into questions as well.

*Lakshmi Vilas Bank Problems Appear Bigger Than DBS Expects: By our calculation and based on LVB’s FY 2Q21 results, the company would appear to be insolvent by the amount of INR 39 bn – nearly 56% greater than the DBS Bank India capital infusion; LVB loses money on an operating basis prior to loss provisions, as revenues (no clarity on what is recurring) of INR 15.4 bn are less than operating expenses of INR 16.0 bn – or by 3.7% at FY 2Q21; et al;  and  *Cram-down Highlights That LVB’s Stated Numbers May Be Wrong:  Prior to the amalgamation, INR 318.2 bn (USD 43 mn) LVB Basel III-compliant Tier 2 bonds (Series VIII, Series IX, and Series X) were written down under the direction of the RBI. To the best of our knowledge, this would appear to be the first time that a cram-down procedure was applied in Asia. As a result, no investor should take any investment in a troubled Indian financial institution for granted. Ultimately, this will make the financial sector more efficient – but calls the sanctity of their audited results into questions as well. 

Thematic (Sector/Industry)

*Adding To The Confusion Again: Just when we thought Indian banking couldn’t get any muddier, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) released its Report of the Internal Working Group (IWG) to Review Extant Ownership Guidelines and Corporate Structure for Indian Private Sector Banks which convened on June 12, 2020; and*Proposed Changes: The IWG has proposed: a) a higher promoter stake cap of 26% (from 15% currently); b) harmonization of corporate structures to non-operative financial holding companies (NOFHC); c) large corporates can be given a banking license subject to conditions and checks; and d) large non-bank financial companies (NBFCs) with assets greater than INR 500 bn can be considered for a banking license.

*Adding To The Confusion Again: Just when we thought Indian banking couldn’t get any muddier, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) released its Report of the Internal Working Group (IWG) to Review Extant Ownership Guidelines and Corporate Structure for Indian Private Sector Banks which convened on June 12, 2020; and*Proposed Changes: The IWG has proposed: a) a higher promoter stake cap of 26% (from 15% currently); b) harmonization of corporate structures to non-operative financial holding companies (NOFHC); c) large corporates can be given a banking license subject to conditions and checks; and d) large non-bank financial companies (NBFCs) with assets greater than INR 500 bn can be considered for a banking license.

Reserve Bank of India – How Simple Becomes Really Complicated

Financials Credit Analyst

Hank Calenti, CFA

CreditContinuum

Credit

In this, the third of several short insights in our Yes Bank Deposit Run Anniversary Series, we incorporate deposits that are not captured in Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) reports to clear the miasma of really occurred at <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/yes-bank-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:767:1" rel="noopener">Yes Bank (YES IN)</a>.LCRs are based on a set of assumptions which may not prove to be valid during periods of stress, as recently occurred at Yes Bank. One major assumption is that only deposits which may be withdrawn on demand, or within the next 30 days are at risk of deposit flight. Only these deposits are captured in the LCR report. As such, we incorporate deposits that are not captured in LCR reports and compare these missing deposits to deposit costs. We then assess the “Missing Deposit” adjusted LCR ratio at each US$-issuing bank to see if this is priced-in from a credit perspective.Approximately one-year ago, India-headquartered Yes Bank began to experience a silent run on its deposits. To mark this inauspicious anniversary, we undertake a series of short insights to determine if the funding and liquidity lessons from Yes Bank are being applied at India-headquartered banks. Spoiler alert: they are not.As we noted in <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/india-bank-deposit-flight-risk-lessons-from-yes-bank" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:37617" rel="noopener">Lessons from Yes Bank</a>, India-headquartered bank funding franchises are more sensitive to potential deposit flight than displayed in their quarterly financial presentations. With an undue focus on the levels of current, savings and time deposits, the discussion neglects crucial factors which lead to a stable deposit franchise. At the same, undue reliance on Liquidity Coverage Ratios is not warranted.In our first insight on this matter, we derived the amount of stable deposits and compared this to deposit costs at each major India-headquartered bank. We then assessed these items relative to US$-denominated securities to see if they are priced-in, from a credit perspective. Please see <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/india-headquartered-banks-stable-deposits-and-costs-1-year-after-the-yes-bank-silent-run" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:43981" rel="noopener">Stable Deposits and Costs 1-Year After the Yes Bank Silent Run</a> for more details.In our second insight on this matter, we adjusted LCR assumptions regarding likely deposit flight to the reality of what occurred at Yes Bank to derive “Yes-stressed” resultant LCRs for each institution. We then assessed this Yes-Stressed LCR relative to US$-denominated securities to see if they are priced-in, from a credit perspective. Please see <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/india-headquartered-banks-yes-stressed-deposit-flight-simulation" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:44213" rel="noopener">Yes-Stressed Deposit Flight Simulation</a> for more details. In follow-up insights we further stress the reported LCRs for possible Covid-19 related payment delinquencies and then combined these elements for apocalypse scenario analysis.

In this, the third of several short insights in our Yes Bank Deposit Run Anniversary Series, we incorporate deposits that are not captured in Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) reports to clear the miasma of really occurred at Yes Bank (YES IN).LCRs are based on a set of assumptions which may not prove to be valid during periods of stress, as recently occurred at Yes Bank. One major assumption is that only deposits which may be withdrawn on demand, or within the next 30 days are at risk of deposit flight. Only these deposits are captured in the LCR report. As such, we incorporate deposits that are not captured in LCR reports and compare these missing deposits to deposit costs. We then assess the “Missing Deposit” adjusted LCR ratio at each US$-issuing bank to see if this is priced-in from a credit perspective.Approximately one-year ago, India-headquartered Yes Bank began to experience a silent run on its deposits. To mark this inauspicious anniversary, we undertake a series of short insights to determine if the funding and liquidity lessons from Yes Bank are being applied at India-headquartered banks. Spoiler alert: they are not.As we noted in Lessons from Yes Bank, India-headquartered bank funding franchises are more sensitive to potential deposit flight than displayed in their quarterly financial presentations. With an undue focus on the levels of current, savings and time deposits, the discussion neglects crucial factors which lead to a stable deposit franchise. At the same, undue reliance on Liquidity Coverage Ratios is not warranted.In our first insight on this matter, we derived the amount of stable deposits and compared this to deposit costs at each major India-headquartered bank. We then assessed these items relative to US$-denominated securities to see if they are priced-in, from a credit perspective. Please see Stable Deposits and Costs 1-Year After the Yes Bank Silent Run for more details.In our second insight on this matter, we adjusted LCR assumptions regarding likely deposit flight to the reality of what occurred at Yes Bank to derive “Yes-stressed” resultant LCRs for each institution. We then assessed this Yes-Stressed LCR relative to US$-denominated securities to see if they are priced-in, from a credit perspective. Please see Yes-Stressed Deposit Flight Simulation for more details. In follow-up insights we further stress the reported LCRs for possible Covid-19 related payment delinquencies and then combined these elements for apocalypse scenario analysis.

India-Headquartered Banks: Missing Deposit Miasma 1-Year After Yes Bank’s Silent Run

*Results Supported By Premature Provision Cut: State Bank of India (SBIN.IN) [SBI] reported FY 2Q21 results of INR 45.7 bn, increasing INR 3.8 bn (9.2%) linked quarter. Results were even better when we exclude the FY 1Q21 exceptional gain of INR 15.4 bn – increasing INR 19.2 bn or 72.6% linked quarter. Results were driven by three factors: a) net interest income improvement of INR 15.4 bn (5.8%) due primarily to NIM improvement of 8 bp to 2.96%; b) a loan loss provision decline of INR 18.1 bn (16.0%) despite much weaker credit metrics; and c) non-interest income improvement of INR 5.7 bn (7.2%); and* Credit Risk and Weak Cover: By our calculation, we find net new NPL growth of INR 144.0 bn or 44.4% on an annualized basis and that the annualized NCO rate of 66 bp – which are quite troublesome even for an SOE bank. We also find that reserves are light in the neighborbood of INR 1.1 tn  - nearly four years of pre-tax results or 61% of market-cap.

*Results Supported By Premature Provision Cut: State Bank of India (SBIN.IN) [SBI] reported FY 2Q21 results of INR 45.7 bn, increasing INR 3.8 bn (9.2%) linked quarter. Results were even better when we exclude the FY 1Q21 exceptional gain of INR 15.4 bn – increasing INR 19.2 bn or 72.6% linked quarter. Results were driven by three factors: a) net interest income improvement of INR 15.4 bn (5.8%) due primarily to NIM improvement of 8 bp to 2.96%; b) a loan loss provision decline of INR 18.1 bn (16.0%) despite much weaker credit metrics; and c) non-interest income improvement of INR 5.7 bn (7.2%); and* Credit Risk and Weak Cover: By our calculation, we find net new NPL growth of INR 144.0 bn or 44.4% on an annualized basis and that the annualized NCO rate of 66 bp – which are quite troublesome even for an SOE bank. We also find that reserves are light in the neighborbood of INR 1.1 tn  - nearly four years of pre-tax results or 61% of market-cap. 

State Bank of India – Credit Continues To Fall Off A Cliff

*All Good: Housing Development Finance Corp. (HDFC.IN) [HDFC] reported FY 2Q21 bottom-line results of INR 33.7 bn - increasing INR 3.8 bn (12.6%) linked quarter. From a core operating perspective, we note that HDFC came in at INR 32.0 bn, a whopping INR 15.5 bn (93.4%) increase over FY 1Q21.*Credit Risk Decelerating: The trend in annualized NCOs has declined, by our calculation, to 16 bp from 21 bp in the previous quarter. In addition, the level of net new NPLs has also decelerated to INR 3.6 bn or 14.2% on an annualized basis versus 46.6% in FY 1Q21. We would have preferred that HDFC remained more vigilant given the continued uncertainty with COVID-19. As such, we still find that HDFC’s reserve still needs shoring up by another INR 68 bn or just over two quarters of core operating results; and*Positive Operating Jaws: . Key to core operating result performance was: a) net interest income improvement of INR 2.8 bn (8.3%) led by both linked quarter loan growth of 2.0% and NIM improvement of 17 bp to 2.75%; b) an INT 306 mn (7.7%) decline in operating expenses which pushed HDFC’s C/I ratio even lower by 160 bp to 9.2%.

*All Good: Housing Development Finance Corp. (HDFC.IN) [HDFC] reported FY 2Q21 bottom-line results of INR 33.7 bn - increasing INR 3.8 bn (12.6%) linked quarter. From a core operating perspective, we note that HDFC came in at INR 32.0 bn, a whopping INR 15.5 bn (93.4%) increase over FY 1Q21.*Credit Risk Decelerating: The trend in annualized NCOs has declined, by our calculation, to 16 bp from 21 bp in the previous quarter. In addition, the level of net new NPLs has also decelerated to INR 3.6 bn or 14.2% on an annualized basis versus 46.6% in FY 1Q21. We would have preferred that HDFC remained more vigilant given the continued uncertainty with COVID-19. As such, we still find that HDFC’s reserve still needs shoring up by another INR 68 bn or just over two quarters of core operating results; and*Positive Operating Jaws: . Key to core operating result performance was: a) net interest income improvement of INR 2.8 bn (8.3%) led by both linked quarter loan growth of 2.0% and NIM improvement of 17 bp to 2.75%; b) an INT 306 mn (7.7%) decline in operating expenses which pushed HDFC’s C/I ratio even lower by 160 bp to 9.2%.

Housing Development Finance Corp. – “Great Quarter Guys”

India

IndusInd Bank Limited is a Mumbai-based Indian new generation bank established in 1994. The Bank provides a range of banking and financial services including  wholesale banking, credit monitoring, risk management, tele-banking, investment banking and commercial lending. IndusInd Bank operates branches throughout India as well as an office in Dubai and London.

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Indusind Bank (IIB IN)

DBS Group Holdings – The LVB Cram Down

DBS GROUP HOLDINGS: The LVB Cram-down Raises Significant Questions Over Potential Cost For DBS, Raises Significant Concerns Over Audited Financial...

Thomas J. Monaco

Reserve Bank of India – How Simple Becomes Really Complicated

RESERVE BANK OF INDIA: New Just when we thought Indian banking couldn’t get any muddier, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) released its Report of the...

Thomas J. Monaco

India-Headquartered Banks: Missing Deposit Miasma 1-Year After Yes Bank’s Silent Run

Deposits not captured in Liquidity Coverage Ratio reports broke Yes Bank. We stress India-headquartered banks for this miasma in the 3’rd insight...

Hank Calenti, CFA

State Bank of India – Credit Continues To Fall Off A Cliff

STATE BANK OF INDIA: Costs Increasing, Credit Deteriorating, Reserve Cover Declining. This Is A Recipe For A Massive Capital Raise.

Thomas J. Monaco

Housing Development Finance Corp. – “Great Quarter Guys”

HOUSING DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORP: Positive Operating Jaws Were Just An Outgrowth Of This Well Oiled Machine. Credit Risk Too Substantially...

Thomas J. Monaco

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