Head of Research, IPOs & Placements, Aequitas Research

Sumeet Singh

Head of Research, IPOs & Placements

IPOs and Placements coverage across Asia Pacific

Aequitas Research

We cover all listing across the Asia Pacific along with follow-up placements. As of Dec 2020, our team had covered 539 IPOs with a hit rate of 73.5% and 685 placements with a hit rate of 66.8%.

We combine fundamental bottom-up views with our proprietary quantitative framework to provide a holistic coverage across new listings and placements. Our coverage includes pre-IPO notes before the deal is launched, follow-up analysis once the deal is live and post-listing trading analysis as well.

Equity Bottom-Up

SBI Cards & Payment Services / Equity Bottom-Up

<div><a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/sbi-cards-payment-services-limited" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:28662:1" rel="noopener">SBI Cards (SBICARD IN)</a> is India's second largest credit card issuer with a market share of 18.7% in terms of number of cards outstanding. SBI Cards is a subsidiary of <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/state-bank-of-india" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:160:1" rel="noopener">State Bank Of India (SBIN IN)</a>, India’s largest commercial bank, and has Carlyle as its second largest share holder.</div><div>The stock made a tepid debut in the market in Mar 2020, owing to the timing being closely aligned with the COVID-19 onslaught. Its now trading above its listing price, and its operations are normalising. Furthermore, its largest competitor and the market leader in credit cards, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/hdfc-bank-ltd-4b6b7a92-9087-468d-9dbe-ab169e77f014" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:558:1" rel="noopener">HDFC Bank (HDFCB IN)</a> was recently barred by the banking regulator from issuing credit cards.</div>

SBI Cards (SBICARD IN) is India's second largest credit card issuer with a market share of 18.7% in terms of number of cards outstanding. SBI Cards is a subsidiary of State Bank Of India (SBIN IN), India’s largest commercial bank, and has Carlyle as its second largest share holder.The stock made a tepid debut in the market in Mar 2020, owing to the timing being closely aligned with the COVID-19 onslaught. Its now trading above its listing price, and its operations are normalising. Furthermore, its largest competitor and the market leader in credit cards, HDFC Bank (HDFCB IN) was recently barred by the banking regulator from issuing credit cards.

2021 High Conviction - SBI Cards & Payments - Multiple Tailwinds, Including Biggest Peers Recent Ban

Specialist in Indian Banking and Economic Research

Hemindra Hazari

Despite <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/icici-prudential-life-insurance" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:23608:1" rel="noopener">ICICI Prudential Life Insurance (IPRU IN)</a> (IPru Life) reporting improvement in long-term persistency ratios, there are worrying examples of brazen mis-selling of life insurance policies by the company through its corporate agent, Angel Financial Advisors and even its parent, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/icici-bank-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:547:1" rel="noopener">ICICI Bank Ltd (ICICIBC IN)</a>. The cases of two 21-year old customers reveal the state of underwriting at IPru Life: <a href="https://youtu.be/Qjyb0jYyouo" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Sachin Khilari</a> (the first of three policies mis-sold to him commenced in October 2014) in Sangli district, Maharashtra and <a href="https://youtu.be/K15zslPNMpI" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Krishnapal Singh Chauhan</a> (who was sold his first policy in February 2019 and a further 10 in 12 months) in Banswara, Rajasthan, both highlighted by <a href="http://www.insuranceangels.in/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Insurance Angels</a>. These cases illustrate the mis-selling of policies by violation of rules; non-compliance with anti-money laundering (AML) to determine source of funds of the policy holder; non-verification of income of customers; alleged <a href="https://twitter.com/insuranceangel/status/1333003681592205313?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener">forging</a>  of the signatures of policy holders; inflating of policy holders’ income on the forms; and the sale of multiple policies to an individual, where the collective premium exceeds the annual income of the policyholder. Each customer in a financial services company has a unique customer id where her/his Know Your Customer (KYC) protocols, proof of individual income and financial products sold are mapped. When multiple policies are sold by an insurance company to a single individual, it would show up on the customer’s profile. Prior to approving any further policies the underwriting team would examine whether the customer’s income can service the insurance premiums, and approve the sale. What is extremely alarming in these mis-selling cases is that when additional policies were sold to both Khilari and Chauhan, where the collective annual premiums were more than their annual incomes, the underwriters were readily approving the policies without verifying their income. Such professional misconduct completely exposes the underwriting system at IPru Life. The Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India (IRDAI), the regulator, and stakeholders in the company need to critically evaluate how such cases are bypassing IPru Life’s underwriting system.With such poor underwriting and basic protocol systems it is no surprise that ICICI Bank, IPru Life’s parent, has discontinued selling traditional life insurance policies for the last couple of years, even those of its subsidiary where senior ICICI Bank officials are deputed as CEOs. Anup Bagchi, executive director, ICICI Bank and non-executive director (nominated by ICICI Bank), ICICI Prudential Life Insurance, has gone on <a href="https://www.icicibank.com/managed-assets/docs/investor/quarterly-financial-results/2021/ICICI-Bank-Transcript-for-Analyst-Call-held-on-Oct-31-2020.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">record</a> on his apprehension that the low long-term persistency ratios in the industry could have an adverse impact on their own bank customers. That a parent company which has firm control on senior executive management at its subsidiary declines to sell the subsidiary’s traditional life insurance products, as it cannot ensure near 100% long-term persistency ratio, speaks volume of IPru Life’s capabilities.It is time stakeholders and the regulator look beyond the neat and tidy persistency ratios and closely evaluate individual customer mis-selling complaints to understand how life insurance is actually mis-sold on the ground to unsuspecting customers and how underwriting is done by companies like IPru Life.

Despite ICICI Prudential Life Insurance (IPRU IN) (IPru Life) reporting improvement in long-term persistency ratios, there are worrying examples of brazen mis-selling of life insurance policies by the company through its corporate agent, Angel Financial Advisors and even its parent, ICICI Bank Ltd (ICICIBC IN). The cases of two 21-year old customers reveal the state of underwriting at IPru Life: Sachin Khilari (the first of three policies mis-sold to him commenced in October 2014) in Sangli district, Maharashtra and Krishnapal Singh Chauhan (who was sold his first policy in February 2019 and a further 10 in 12 months) in Banswara, Rajasthan, both highlighted by Insurance Angels. These cases illustrate the mis-selling of policies by violation of rules; non-compliance with anti-money laundering (AML) to determine source of funds of the policy holder; non-verification of income of customers; alleged forging  of the signatures of policy holders; inflating of policy holders’ income on the forms; and the sale of multiple policies to an individual, where the collective premium exceeds the annual income of the policyholder. Each customer in a financial services company has a unique customer id where her/his Know Your Customer (KYC) protocols, proof of individual income and financial products sold are mapped. When multiple policies are sold by an insurance company to a single individual, it would show up on the customer’s profile. Prior to approving any further policies the underwriting team would examine whether the customer’s income can service the insurance premiums, and approve the sale. What is extremely alarming in these mis-selling cases is that when additional policies were sold to both Khilari and Chauhan, where the collective annual premiums were more than their annual incomes, the underwriters were readily approving the policies without verifying their income. Such professional misconduct completely exposes the underwriting system at IPru Life. The Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India (IRDAI), the regulator, and stakeholders in the company need to critically evaluate how such cases are bypassing IPru Life’s underwriting system.With such poor underwriting and basic protocol systems it is no surprise that ICICI Bank, IPru Life’s parent, has discontinued selling traditional life insurance policies for the last couple of years, even those of its subsidiary where senior ICICI Bank officials are deputed as CEOs. Anup Bagchi, executive director, ICICI Bank and non-executive director (nominated by ICICI Bank), ICICI Prudential Life Insurance, has gone on record on his apprehension that the low long-term persistency ratios in the industry could have an adverse impact on their own bank customers. That a parent company which has firm control on senior executive management at its subsidiary declines to sell the subsidiary’s traditional life insurance products, as it cannot ensure near 100% long-term persistency ratio, speaks volume of IPru Life’s capabilities.It is time stakeholders and the regulator look beyond the neat and tidy persistency ratios and closely evaluate individual customer mis-selling complaints to understand how life insurance is actually mis-sold on the ground to unsuspecting customers and how underwriting is done by companies like IPru Life.

Brazen Mis-Selling by IPru Life: When Even the Parent Keeps a Distance, Something Surely Stinks

Financials Credit Analyst

Hank Calenti, CFA

CreditContinuum

Credit

In this, the fourth of several short insights in our Yes Bank Deposit Run Anniversary Series, we adjust Liquidity Coverage Ratios (LCR) for anticipated cash inflows which may not materialize in the current COVID-19 environment. We then append this result to deposits that are not captured in LCR reports derive a COVID-19 adjusted LCR.LCRs are based on a set of assumptions which may not prove to be valid during periods of stress, as recently occurred at <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/yes-bank-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:767:1" rel="noopener">Yes Bank (YES IN)</a>. One of the many assumptions is that cash inflows from performing loans can offset projected deposit outflows in a stressed situation. However, in an environment of widespread payment moratoriums or interest-only repayments, projected cashflow may be materially overstated. This could result in misleadingly higher LCR ratios. At the same time, some banks report non-lending related cash inflows at higher levels than projected loan-related amounts. This is surprising. As such, we remove all cash inflows to derive a cash inflow adjusted LCR. We also incorporate deposits that are not captured by the LCR report to derive a COVID-19 stressed LCR ratio and assess this ratio to see if this is priced-in from a credit perspective.Approximately one-year ago, India-headquartered Yes Bank began to experience a silent run on its deposits. To mark this inauspicious anniversary, we undertake a series of short insights to determine if the funding and liquidity lessons from Yes Bank are being applied at India-headquartered banks. Spoiler alert: they are not.As we noted in <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/india-bank-deposit-flight-risk-lessons-from-yes-bank" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:37617" rel="noopener">Lessons from Yes Bank</a>, India-headquartered bank funding franchises are more sensitive to potential deposit flight than displayed in their quarterly financial presentations. With an undue focus on the levels of current, savings and time deposits, the discussion neglects crucial factors which lead to a stable deposit franchise. At the same, undue reliance on Liquidity Coverage Ratios is not warranted as per recent experience.In our first insight, we derived the amount of stable deposits at each major India-headquartered bank and determined if a stable deposit franchise is priced-in, from a credit perspective. Please see <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/india-headquartered-banks-stable-deposits-and-costs-1-year-after-the-yes-bank-silent-run" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:43981" rel="noopener">Stable Deposits and Costs 1-Year After the Yes Bank Silent Run</a>. In our second, we adjusted deposit flight assumption to the reality of what occurred at Yes Bank. We then determined if this “Yes-stressed” LCR is priced-in. Please see <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/india-headquartered-banks-yes-stressed-deposit-flight-simulation" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:44213" rel="noopener">Yes-Stressed Deposit Flight Simulation</a>.   In our third insight, we incorporated deposits that are not captured in LCR reports. This is the analysis required to understand what broke Yes Bank. We then determined if the Missing Deposit LCR is priced-in from a credit perspective. Please see <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/india-headquartered-banks-missing-deposit-miasma-1-year-after-yes-bank-s-silent-run" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:45438" rel="noopener">Missing Deposit Miasma 1-Year After Yes Bank’s Silent Run</a>.  In follow-up insights we intend to assess extraordinary government actions that recently inflated LCR ratios and then adjust for all of these elements for apocalyptic scenario analysis.

In this, the fourth of several short insights in our Yes Bank Deposit Run Anniversary Series, we adjust Liquidity Coverage Ratios (LCR) for anticipated cash inflows which may not materialize in the current COVID-19 environment. We then append this result to deposits that are not captured in LCR reports derive a COVID-19 adjusted LCR.LCRs are based on a set of assumptions which may not prove to be valid during periods of stress, as recently occurred at Yes Bank (YES IN). One of the many assumptions is that cash inflows from performing loans can offset projected deposit outflows in a stressed situation. However, in an environment of widespread payment moratoriums or interest-only repayments, projected cashflow may be materially overstated. This could result in misleadingly higher LCR ratios. At the same time, some banks report non-lending related cash inflows at higher levels than projected loan-related amounts. This is surprising. As such, we remove all cash inflows to derive a cash inflow adjusted LCR. We also incorporate deposits that are not captured by the LCR report to derive a COVID-19 stressed LCR ratio and assess this ratio to see if this is priced-in from a credit perspective.Approximately one-year ago, India-headquartered Yes Bank began to experience a silent run on its deposits. To mark this inauspicious anniversary, we undertake a series of short insights to determine if the funding and liquidity lessons from Yes Bank are being applied at India-headquartered banks. Spoiler alert: they are not.As we noted in Lessons from Yes Bank, India-headquartered bank funding franchises are more sensitive to potential deposit flight than displayed in their quarterly financial presentations. With an undue focus on the levels of current, savings and time deposits, the discussion neglects crucial factors which lead to a stable deposit franchise. At the same, undue reliance on Liquidity Coverage Ratios is not warranted as per recent experience.In our first insight, we derived the amount of stable deposits at each major India-headquartered bank and determined if a stable deposit franchise is priced-in, from a credit perspective. Please see Stable Deposits and Costs 1-Year After the Yes Bank Silent Run. In our second, we adjusted deposit flight assumption to the reality of what occurred at Yes Bank. We then determined if this “Yes-stressed” LCR is priced-in. Please see Yes-Stressed Deposit Flight Simulation.   In our third insight, we incorporated deposits that are not captured in LCR reports. This is the analysis required to understand what broke Yes Bank. We then determined if the Missing Deposit LCR is priced-in from a credit perspective. Please see Missing Deposit Miasma 1-Year After Yes Bank’s Silent Run.  In follow-up insights we intend to assess extraordinary government actions that recently inflated LCR ratios and then adjust for all of these elements for apocalyptic scenario analysis.

India-Headquartered Banks: COVID-19 Adjusted Liquidity Coverage Ratios

Silver Point

Thomas J. Monaco

Independent Insight Provider

Silver Point is a boutique research firm that focuses on the broader financial services sector, with a particular focus on troubled institutions globally. 

Asia Ex Japan

*Lakshmi Vilas Bank Problems Appear Bigger Than DBS Expects: By our calculation and based on LVB’s FY 2Q21 results, the company would appear to be insolvent by the amount of INR 39 bn – nearly 56% greater than the DBS Bank India capital infusion; LVB loses money on an operating basis prior to loss provisions, as revenues (no clarity on what is recurring) of INR 15.4 bn are less than operating expenses of INR 16.0 bn – or by 3.7% at FY 2Q21; et al;  and  *Cram-down Highlights That LVB’s Stated Numbers May Be Wrong:  Prior to the amalgamation, INR 318.2 bn (USD 43 mn) LVB Basel III-compliant Tier 2 bonds (Series VIII, Series IX, and Series X) were written down under the direction of the RBI. To the best of our knowledge, this would appear to be the first time that a cram-down procedure was applied in Asia. As a result, no investor should take any investment in a troubled Indian financial institution for granted. Ultimately, this will make the financial sector more efficient – but calls the sanctity of their audited results into questions as well.

*Lakshmi Vilas Bank Problems Appear Bigger Than DBS Expects: By our calculation and based on LVB’s FY 2Q21 results, the company would appear to be insolvent by the amount of INR 39 bn – nearly 56% greater than the DBS Bank India capital infusion; LVB loses money on an operating basis prior to loss provisions, as revenues (no clarity on what is recurring) of INR 15.4 bn are less than operating expenses of INR 16.0 bn – or by 3.7% at FY 2Q21; et al;  and  *Cram-down Highlights That LVB’s Stated Numbers May Be Wrong:  Prior to the amalgamation, INR 318.2 bn (USD 43 mn) LVB Basel III-compliant Tier 2 bonds (Series VIII, Series IX, and Series X) were written down under the direction of the RBI. To the best of our knowledge, this would appear to be the first time that a cram-down procedure was applied in Asia. As a result, no investor should take any investment in a troubled Indian financial institution for granted. Ultimately, this will make the financial sector more efficient – but calls the sanctity of their audited results into questions as well. 

Thematic (Sector/Industry)

*Adding To The Confusion Again: Just when we thought Indian banking couldn’t get any muddier, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) released its Report of the Internal Working Group (IWG) to Review Extant Ownership Guidelines and Corporate Structure for Indian Private Sector Banks which convened on June 12, 2020; and*Proposed Changes: The IWG has proposed: a) a higher promoter stake cap of 26% (from 15% currently); b) harmonization of corporate structures to non-operative financial holding companies (NOFHC); c) large corporates can be given a banking license subject to conditions and checks; and d) large non-bank financial companies (NBFCs) with assets greater than INR 500 bn can be considered for a banking license.

*Adding To The Confusion Again: Just when we thought Indian banking couldn’t get any muddier, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) released its Report of the Internal Working Group (IWG) to Review Extant Ownership Guidelines and Corporate Structure for Indian Private Sector Banks which convened on June 12, 2020; and*Proposed Changes: The IWG has proposed: a) a higher promoter stake cap of 26% (from 15% currently); b) harmonization of corporate structures to non-operative financial holding companies (NOFHC); c) large corporates can be given a banking license subject to conditions and checks; and d) large non-bank financial companies (NBFCs) with assets greater than INR 500 bn can be considered for a banking license.

Reserve Bank of India – How Simple Becomes Really Complicated

India

ICICI Bank Limited operates as a bank. The Bank offers saving accounts, loans, debit, credit cards, insurance, investments, mortgages, and online banking services. ICICI Bank serves customers worldwide.

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ICICI Bank Ltd (ICICIBC IN)

2021 High Conviction - SBI Cards & Payments - Multiple Tailwinds, Including Biggest Peers Recent Ban

SBI Cards is India's second largest credit card issuer with a market share of 18.7%. SBI Cards is a subsidiary of State Bank Of India (SBIN IN)...

Sumeet Singh

Brazen Mis-Selling by IPru Life: When Even the Parent Keeps a Distance, Something Surely Stinks

Stakeholders need to look beyond the persistency ratios and evaluate individual customer mis-selling complaints to evaluate the state of...

Hemindra Hazari

India-Headquartered Banks: COVID-19 Adjusted Liquidity Coverage Ratios

COVID-19 adjusted LCRs exhibit an almost perfectly negative correlation with India-headquartered bank bond spreads. This is the 4’th of several...

Hank Calenti, CFA

DBS Group Holdings – The LVB Cram Down

DBS GROUP HOLDINGS: The LVB Cram-down Raises Significant Questions Over Potential Cost For DBS, Raises Significant Concerns Over Audited Financial...

Thomas J. Monaco

Reserve Bank of India – How Simple Becomes Really Complicated

RESERVE BANK OF INDIA: New Just when we thought Indian banking couldn’t get any muddier, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) released its Report of the...

Thomas J. Monaco

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