Independent Asian Credit Research, Bondcritic

Warut Promboon

Independent Asian Credit Research

Asian Fixed Income/Frontier Market Research

Bondcritic

Bondcritic, established in 2009, is designed to be an independent credit research voice that helps investors gain insights and unbiased analyses on Asian fixed income market. Our mission is to discover deep-value Asian high-yield and distressed bonds with a bottom-up approach, together with the help of our proprietary ESG (Environmental, Social Development, and Governance) model. At the same time, we focus on bringing investment cases of unrated and unloved issuers to the general public.

Credit

Here we summarize frequently asked questions (FAQ) we were asked in our recent press interviews during the past 2-3 weeks on <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/china-evergrande-group" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:479:1" rel="noopener">Evergrande Real Estate Group (3333 HK)</a> or China Evergrande Group (Evergrande) and our prediction for the bondholders of the EVERRE complex.Our view is that Evergrande is never grand and those who have analyzed the company are not surprised on what happened. Rather, the crisis has involved from investors’ assumptions on Evergrande that evolved from presumption that the Chinese government will step in to support the company on the basis of systemic importance to the Chinese economy. The lesson from the Evergrande saga is similar to <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/hna-group-co-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:25987:1" rel="noopener">HNA Group (HNAGRZ CH)</a> (HNA)’s where a presumption of government support should not be the assumption.The EVERRE complex prices have dropped to as low as 22 cents on the dollar. We understand there are distressed funds which will see the complex as attractive once the bonds are in the low 20s. However, we do not believe the market really knows the true recovery value of Evergrande based on its off-balance sheet liabilities and account payables, some of which should have been classified as debt. We then see bottom fishing in the 20s as a gamble and cannot recommend the bonds. As such, our UNDERWEIGHT recommendation on the EVERRE complex remains.

Here we summarize frequently asked questions (FAQ) we were asked in our recent press interviews during the past 2-3 weeks on Evergrande Real Estate Group (3333 HK) or China Evergrande Group (Evergrande) and our prediction for the bondholders of the EVERRE complex.Our view is that Evergrande is never grand and those who have analyzed the company are not surprised on what happened. Rather, the crisis has involved from investors’ assumptions on Evergrande that evolved from presumption that the Chinese government will step in to support the company on the basis of systemic importance to the Chinese economy. The lesson from the Evergrande saga is similar to HNA Group (HNAGRZ CH) (HNA)’s where a presumption of government support should not be the assumption.The EVERRE complex prices have dropped to as low as 22 cents on the dollar. We understand there are distressed funds which will see the complex as attractive once the bonds are in the low 20s. However, we do not believe the market really knows the true recovery value of Evergrande based on its off-balance sheet liabilities and account payables, some of which should have been classified as debt. We then see bottom fishing in the 20s as a gamble and cannot recommend the bonds. As such, our UNDERWEIGHT recommendation on the EVERRE complex remains.

Chief Economist & Political Strategist, CrossASEAN Research

Prasenjit K. Basu

Chief Economist & Political Strategist

CrossASEAN Research

At CrossASEAN Research we strive to produce unbiased and differentiated on the ground insights on companies across South East Asia. Our Research is produced for the most part after face to face meetings and conversations with company management to dig deep into the long term vision and strategy of the companies we cover. We seek to deliver investable and actionable themes on sectors and markets across SE Asia, often in collaboration with other Insight Providers across the region, pooling the vast experience of the analysts within the Smartkarma Ecosystem. We also offer bespoke work and tailor made trips for our clients. 

Insights across South East Asia

Cross Asset Strategy

13 months after its introduction, China's "Three Red Lines" (TRL) policy initiative (to reduce leverage, improve debt coverage and increase liquidity) for property companies is beginning to have a serious impact. A key contributory factor is that TSF (total social financing) has increased by a more moderate RMB21.68 trillion in Jan-Aug 2021 than last year (RMB25.97 trillion in Jan-Aug 2020), which still implies 10.3% YoY growth in the stock of TSF (to RMB306.83 trillion, or US$47.5 trillion), which is near the slowest-ever pace since TSF began to be published. The stock of M2, bank credit and TSF in China are at historic highs never reached by any other country, and the growth of all these aggregates continues, albeit at a marginally slower pace.Despite the abundance of liquidity (and the cut in RRR in mid-July), real GDP is growing barely over 5% YoY in 3Q 2021, with retail sales decelerating to 2.5% YoY growth and industrial production to 5.3% YoY growth in August 2021. The latter was largely export-driven (helped by a surge in global trade), as FAI (fixed asset investment) declined 2.1% YoY in May-August 2021. Such an economic deceleration in the year before an important leadership transition (i.e., rubber-stamping of continuity for Xi, change for others around him) will be met by further monetary easing in October 2021. That half of the 10 largest residential-property developers are Guangdong-based (a province traditionally known for both entrepreneurship and rebellion) makes them particularly vulnerable to the political crackdown on capitalists. The focus increasingly will be on cutting the costs of property, healthcare and education, not just tech titans.  However, moral hazard will be tightly managed. Onshore (local currency) bond holders will bear relatively few losses on high-profile names like Evergrande (although there will be credit events for bank loans), while offshore foreign-currency bond holders are likely to feel considerable pain (i.e., the partial end of the "moral hazard play"). The political crackdown on sundry capitalists -- tech titans, others seeking overseas listings, property developers, gaming companies -- will persist, adding more to the China Premium. We would recommend staying Underweight China equities amid the uncertainty generated by this political instability, which will result in a new equilibrium discount on Chinese valuations emerging by early 2022.

13 months after its introduction, China's "Three Red Lines" (TRL) policy initiative (to reduce leverage, improve debt coverage and increase liquidity) for property companies is beginning to have a serious impact. A key contributory factor is that TSF (total social financing) has increased by a more moderate RMB21.68 trillion in Jan-Aug 2021 than last year (RMB25.97 trillion in Jan-Aug 2020), which still implies 10.3% YoY growth in the stock of TSF (to RMB306.83 trillion, or US$47.5 trillion), which is near the slowest-ever pace since TSF began to be published. The stock of M2, bank credit and TSF in China are at historic highs never reached by any other country, and the growth of all these aggregates continues, albeit at a marginally slower pace.Despite the abundance of liquidity (and the cut in RRR in mid-July), real GDP is growing barely over 5% YoY in 3Q 2021, with retail sales decelerating to 2.5% YoY growth and industrial production to 5.3% YoY growth in August 2021. The latter was largely export-driven (helped by a surge in global trade), as FAI (fixed asset investment) declined 2.1% YoY in May-August 2021. Such an economic deceleration in the year before an important leadership transition (i.e., rubber-stamping of continuity for Xi, change for others around him) will be met by further monetary easing in October 2021. That half of the 10 largest residential-property developers are Guangdong-based (a province traditionally known for both entrepreneurship and rebellion) makes them particularly vulnerable to the political crackdown on capitalists. The focus increasingly will be on cutting the costs of property, healthcare and education, not just tech titans.  However, moral hazard will be tightly managed. Onshore (local currency) bond holders will bear relatively few losses on high-profile names like Evergrande (although there will be credit events for bank loans), while offshore foreign-currency bond holders are likely to feel considerable pain (i.e., the partial end of the "moral hazard play"). The political crackdown on sundry capitalists -- tech titans, others seeking overseas listings, property developers, gaming companies -- will persist, adding more to the China Premium. We would recommend staying Underweight China equities amid the uncertainty generated by this political instability, which will result in a new equilibrium discount on Chinese valuations emerging by early 2022.  

Head of Research, IPOs & Placements, Aequitas Research

Sumeet Singh

Head of Research, IPOs & Placements

IPOs and Placements coverage across Asia Pacific

Aequitas Research

We cover all listing across the Asia Pacific along with follow-up placements. As of Dec 2020, our team had covered 539 IPOs with a hit rate of 73.5% and 685 placements with a hit rate of 66.8%.

We combine fundamental bottom-up views with our proprietary quantitative framework to provide a holistic coverage across new listings and placements. Our coverage includes pre-IPO notes before the deal is launched, follow-up analysis once the deal is live and post-listing trading analysis as well.

Equity Capital Markets

SF Real Estate Investment Trust (SFREIT), a logistics-focused REIT, aims to raise around US$300m in its Hong Kong IPO. SF REIT is sponsored by SF Holdings, listed in Shenzhen.At the time of listing, SFREIT will own three properties located in Hong Kong, Foshan and Wuhu, all of which are modern logistics properties. The assets have an aggregated gross lettable area of approximately 307,617.5 sqm with an appraised value of HK$6.1bn, as at Mar 2021. The average occupancy of the properties was 95.3%, with a weighted average age of 3.5 years and weighted average remaining land tenure of 37.9 years.

SF Real Estate Investment Trust (SFREIT), a logistics-focused REIT, aims to raise around US$300m in its Hong Kong IPO. SF REIT is sponsored by SF Holdings, listed in Shenzhen.At the time of listing, SFREIT will own three properties located in Hong Kong, Foshan and Wuhu, all of which are modern logistics properties. The assets have an aggregated gross lettable area of approximately 307,617.5 sqm with an appraised value of HK$6.1bn, as at Mar 2021. The average occupancy of the properties was 95.3%, with a weighted average age of 3.5 years and weighted average remaining land tenure of 37.9 years.

SF REIT Pre-IPO - One Trick Pony, Who’s Not Doing the Trick

Asia Fixed Income Analyst

Derek Silva

Since their introduction less than a decade ago, there has been much discussion and little evidence about the enforceability of the ‘keepwell’ deed in many Chinese USD corporate bonds. And, given that the biggest issuer of keepwell bonds in 2020 is Evergrande’s Hengda Real Estate, it remains as relevant as ever. Until recently, the structure had yet to be put to the test in any prominent distressed cases.  A high-profile case in 2020 seemed to have changed that. In recent months, investors and analysts have closely followed the situation with PKFounder, a distressed issuer with a keepwell bond. And it didn’t look good for keepwell bondholders: The<a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/china-bond-keepwell/administrator-for-chinas-pufg-rejects-keepwell-deed-for-300-mln-bond-redd-idINL4N2FP01J" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> judgement rejected the bondholders' claims</a>, seemingly solidifying the argument for those who said the structure was little more than a gentleman’s agreement and provided a false sense of security.  But now there’s been a new legal decision from a smaller case that contradicts the PKFounder decision. Which brings to mind something important to remember: the concept of legal precedent is not as powerful in China as it is elsewhere. In the other case, Mainland company CEFC had an offshore subsidiary which also issued keepwell bonds and, this month, the Shanghai Financial Court ordered the company to pay a bondholder on account of the keepwell deed. In the following sections, we take a closer look at the specifics. And, while there is no firm conclusion about the enforceability of a keepwell deed, the latest news shows that the situation is not cut-and-dry and the keepwell feature in bonds might not be worthless after all.<section class="figure"><section class="figure"><figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/171/416/original/Screenshot%202020-11-14%20at%2011.21.07.png?1605330171" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="171416"></figure><div class="content-caption">Source: https://events.debtwire.com/apchart-of-the-week-keepwells-back-19-of-chinese-hy-bonds-ytd-while-pkfounder-cefc-bring-structure-on-focus</div></section></section>

Since their introduction less than a decade ago, there has been much discussion and little evidence about the enforceability of the ‘keepwell’ deed in many Chinese USD corporate bonds. And, given that the biggest issuer of keepwell bonds in 2020 is Evergrande’s Hengda Real Estate, it remains as relevant as ever. Until recently, the structure had yet to be put to the test in any prominent distressed cases.  A high-profile case in 2020 seemed to have changed that. In recent months, investors and analysts have closely followed the situation with PKFounder, a distressed issuer with a keepwell bond. And it didn’t look good for keepwell bondholders: The judgement rejected the bondholders' claims, seemingly solidifying the argument for those who said the structure was little more than a gentleman’s agreement and provided a false sense of security.  But now there’s been a new legal decision from a smaller case that contradicts the PKFounder decision. Which brings to mind something important to remember: the concept of legal precedent is not as powerful in China as it is elsewhere. In the other case, Mainland company CEFC had an offshore subsidiary which also issued keepwell bonds and, this month, the Shanghai Financial Court ordered the company to pay a bondholder on account of the keepwell deed. In the following sections, we take a closer look at the specifics. And, while there is no firm conclusion about the enforceability of a keepwell deed, the latest news shows that the situation is not cut-and-dry and the keepwell feature in bonds might not be worthless after all.Source: https://events.debtwire.com/apchart-of-the-week-keepwells-back-19-of-chinese-hy-bonds-ytd-while-pkfounder-cefc-bring-structure-on-focus

Keepwells: Not Dead Yet - There Might Be Some Protection After All?

We saw Trump's signing of the Hong Kong Human Rights Act as a part of the trade war negotiation. The signing of the act led to China's vow to retaliate but we see this as the US' leverage to further negotiate with China. At any rate, our prediction that the trade war will linger and last beyond Trump presidency (if he fails to get re-elected) remains unchanged.

We saw Trump's signing of the Hong Kong Human Rights Act as a part of the trade war negotiation. The signing of the act led to China's vow to retaliate but we see this as the US' leverage to further negotiate with China. At any rate, our prediction that the trade war will linger and last beyond Trump presidency (if he fails to get re-elected) remains unchanged.

Bondcritic Market Monitor (2-Dec): All Quiet Before the Storms

China

Dalian Wanda Commercial Management Group Co., Ltd. operates as a commercial property developer, owner, and operator. The Company develops and manages mixed-use property projects including retail, office, hotel, residential, restaurant, entertainment, and other projects. Dalian Wanda Commercial Management Group conducts businesses in China.

Dalian Wanda Commercial Properties (1567411D HK)

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Dalian Wanda Commercial Properties (1567411D HK)

China Evergrande Group: Never Grand

Here are FAQs we have been asked on Evergrande during the past 2-3 weeks. There is nothing surprising about the situation which have evolved in the...

Bondcritic

China: The End of the Moral Hazard Play?

Moral hazard will be managed, not ended. Offshore bonds, local loans will bear pain. Property, health, education costs must fall. We recommend...

Prasenjit K. Basu

SF REIT Pre-IPO - One Trick Pony, Who’s Not Doing the Trick

SF Real Estate Investment Trust (SFREIT), a logistics-focused REIT, aims to raise around US$300m in its Hong Kong IPO. SF REIT is sponsored by SF...

Sumeet Singh

Keepwells: Not Dead Yet - There Might Be Some Protection After All?

Investors increasingly believe Keepwell deeds are worthless after the PKFounder legal decision this year. But a more recent case seems to...

Derek Silva

Bondcritic Market Monitor (2-Dec): All Quiet Before the Storms

We saw Trump's signing of the Hong Kong Human Rights Act as a part of the trade war negotiation. The signing of the act led to China's vow to...

Bondcritic

Price Gauge

52-week Range

Market Cap (USDm)

P/E

Dividend (Yield)