Financials Credit Analyst

Hank Calenti, CFA

CreditContinuum

Credit

<a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/jpmorgan-chase-co" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:277:1" rel="noopener">JPMorgan Chase &amp; Co's (JPM US)</a> fortress foundation needs repair. Rather than a rock-solid balance sheet, JPM’s capital foundation needs to be strengthened to handle the leverage load. It has the lowest Supplementary Leverage Ratio (SLR) amongst the largest US banks and its Tier 1 securities suffer, in part, due to this. It is time to lighten the leverage exposure and add a layer of capital. This creates an investment opportunity.As the pandemic-induced economic crisis unfolded last year, we noted that JPM Tier 1 securities were over-bought relative to the leverage exposure risk at the institution. Please see: <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/compose/insight/49670/Bank%20Credit%20Weekly:%20US%20Capital%20Buffer%20Risk%20&amp;%20Q1%20Earnings%20Reports-%20JPMorgan%20Looks%20Slightly%20Overbought.%20Read%20more:%20https:/skr.ma/uQHaQ" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Bank Credit Weekly: US Capital Buffer Risk &amp; Q1 Earnings Reports- JPMorgan Looks Slightly Overbought.</a>The Fed exemption of Treasury securities and deposits with the central bank from the SLR bought JPM time. Fast forward one year later to the expiration of these exemptions and, despite ample opportunity, JPMorgan did not issue Tier 1 securities until only two weeks ago when it brought a $25 par security. In additional to raising needed capital, the firm recently threatened to stop taking deposits. It may price itself out of the deposit market, temporarily, but this is not a long-term strategy. The SLR is the binding capital constrain on the firm’s asset growth. JPM needs to obtain or retain more Tier 1 capital. We quantify this within.We believe that JPM could easily bring a 10-year Tier 1 bond to the market and find between US$2 to US$3bn in demand, thereby taking the total Tier 1 financing needs, or balance sheet optimization equivalent, down materially for the remainder of the year. Based on its recently issued Preferred, we believe JPM could achieve a price of Treasuries plus circa 300bps in a 10-year Tier 1 note.Aside from its SLR level, JPMorgan’s credit metrics are on-par with, if not superior to, most other large systemically important financial institutions. And yet, as we present within, JPM’s Tier 1 bonds trade at a discount to materially weaker banks located outside the US. Furthermore, we find that JPMorgan’s 2025 callable Tier 1 bond is at least 40bps oversold as, in our view, its call option is overvalued by the same amount.JPM faces an inflection point with respect to its capital adequacy. Concurrently, the Fed may re-adjust the SLR requirements before year-end; however, we believe it would be foolish of JPM not to take the opportunity to increase its SLR in an improving economic environment. It should re-enforce the foundation of its fortress balance sheet. We believe investors should pre-position for this eventuality. We recommend overweighting JPMorgan’s Tier 1 securities.

JPMorgan Chase &amp; Co's (JPM US) fortress foundation needs repair. Rather than a rock-solid balance sheet, JPM’s capital foundation needs to be strengthened to handle the leverage load. It has the lowest Supplementary Leverage Ratio (SLR) amongst the largest US banks and its Tier 1 securities suffer, in part, due to this. It is time to lighten the leverage exposure and add a layer of capital. This creates an investment opportunity.As the pandemic-induced economic crisis unfolded last year, we noted that JPM Tier 1 securities were over-bought relative to the leverage exposure risk at the institution. Please see: Bank Credit Weekly: US Capital Buffer Risk &amp; Q1 Earnings Reports- JPMorgan Looks Slightly Overbought.The Fed exemption of Treasury securities and deposits with the central bank from the SLR bought JPM time. Fast forward one year later to the expiration of these exemptions and, despite ample opportunity, JPMorgan did not issue Tier 1 securities until only two weeks ago when it brought a $25 par security. In additional to raising needed capital, the firm recently threatened to stop taking deposits. It may price itself out of the deposit market, temporarily, but this is not a long-term strategy. The SLR is the binding capital constrain on the firm’s asset growth. JPM needs to obtain or retain more Tier 1 capital. We quantify this within.We believe that JPM could easily bring a 10-year Tier 1 bond to the market and find between US$2 to US$3bn in demand, thereby taking the total Tier 1 financing needs, or balance sheet optimization equivalent, down materially for the remainder of the year. Based on its recently issued Preferred, we believe JPM could achieve a price of Treasuries plus circa 300bps in a 10-year Tier 1 note.Aside from its SLR level, JPMorgan’s credit metrics are on-par with, if not superior to, most other large systemically important financial institutions. And yet, as we present within, JPM’s Tier 1 bonds trade at a discount to materially weaker banks located outside the US. Furthermore, we find that JPMorgan’s 2025 callable Tier 1 bond is at least 40bps oversold as, in our view, its call option is overvalued by the same amount.JPM faces an inflection point with respect to its capital adequacy. Concurrently, the Fed may re-adjust the SLR requirements before year-end; however, we believe it would be foolish of JPM not to take the opportunity to increase its SLR in an improving economic environment. It should re-enforce the foundation of its fortress balance sheet. We believe investors should pre-position for this eventuality. We recommend overweighting JPMorgan’s Tier 1 securities.

US Banks and the SLR Situation: Overweight JPM Tier 1 Securities

Silver Point

Thomas J. Monaco

Independent Insight Provider

Silver Point is a boutique research firm that focuses on the broader financial services sector, with a particular focus on troubled institutions globally. 

Asia Ex Japan

Equity Bottom-Up

*Greensill Tab Begins:Greensill Capital (Greensill) filed for insolvency in the United Kingdom after lawyers for had cited Greensill’s inability to repay a USD 140 mn bridge loan provided by Credit Suisse Group (CSGN.VX) [Credit Suisse]. In particular, the allegations of fraud by Bafin and the British Business Bank removing the British government guarantee on COVID-19 lending highlight the increased likelihood of substantially higher losses and other tail risk; and  *Credit Suisse Taking Steps: The hit parade continues. Credit Suisse has stated that the company’s Board is investigating its own ties with Greensill, replaced its asset management CEO, asset management will be segregated from international wealth management, and employee compensation could be subject to clawback.

*Greensill Tab Begins:Greensill Capital (Greensill) filed for insolvency in the United Kingdom after lawyers for had cited Greensill’s inability to repay a USD 140 mn bridge loan provided by Credit Suisse Group (CSGN.VX) [Credit Suisse]. In particular, the allegations of fraud by Bafin and the British Business Bank removing the British government guarantee on COVID-19 lending highlight the increased likelihood of substantially higher losses and other tail risk; and  *Credit Suisse Taking Steps: The hit parade continues. Credit Suisse has stated that the company’s Board is investigating its own ties with Greensill, replaced its asset management CEO, asset management will be segregated from international wealth management, and employee compensation could be subject to clawback. 

Credit Suisse Group – Greensill Fallout Continues

As the fallout from the Greensill affair continues, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/credit-suisse-group-ag-f4b24f0c-c294-40b3-b491-759f0cb277e9" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:27915:1" rel="noopener">Credit Suisse Group (CSGN SW)</a> acknowledged 3 items regarding this situation:First, the Pillar 2 capital buffer requirement may be impacted by the Greensill affair. This may have long lasting negative implications for the valuation of CS contingent capital Tier 1 bonds.Second, certain notes underlying the Supply Chain Finance (SCF) funds will not be repaid when they fall due. The nonpayment creates considerable uncertainty regarding the valuation of a significant part of the remaining US$6.9bn. of assets in the SCF funds.Third, certain investors have already threatened litigation and, CS also stated that it “might also suffer reputational harm associated with these matters that might cause client departures or loss of assets under management.” This is what we warned when the Greensill news broke two weeks ago. Please see <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/credit-suisse-greensill-sows-reputation-risks-underweight-cs-bonds" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:48839" rel="noopener">Credit Suisse: Greensill Sows Reputation Risks, Underweight CS Bonds</a> for more details. In the intervening time-period, CS equity and credit have materially underperformed their respective indexes.At this point, investors’ main concern should be the amount or level of additional Pillar 2 capital which the firm may need to retain. The is not currently factored into CS’ debt or equity valuations.To its credit, the bank is taking prompt corrective action in restructuring the leadership, transparency, and compensation of the Asset Management division. However, we remain skeptical with whether the worst is past in this affair. Alternative assets require greater oversight as they are harder to manage and value. Combining risk management and compliance functions across CS stills seems like a mistake when it comes to asset management. However, the segmental separation of the Asset Management division may be a first step to unloading the relatively undersized entity. Distancing the unit from the Wealth Management operations may limit client departures.We continue to believe that the pricing of Credit Suisse bonds does not fully reflect the risks, complexity, and low capitalization of the firms’ underlying business model; nor does it capture potential franchise impairment from increasing reputation risk. The recent suspension of redemptions from certain CS funds is at best an embarrassment and at worst a signal that controls remain in need of considerable attention. This is unfortunate, as CS is highly geared to the business cycle and could outperform peers, if it can get its house in order. However, CS’s long-dated Additional Tier 1 bonds already trade tight relative to the challenges facing the firm. Please see: <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/credit-suisse-perfection-priced-into-long-dated-at1" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:48461" rel="noopener">Credit Suisse – Perfection Priced into Long-Dated AT1</a> for more details.   We suspect that credit may continue to follow equity and underperform over the near term. Longer-term, Pillar 2 considerations suggest that an even lower capital buffer as a cushion for AT1 investors, unless hidden capital is realized, or shareholders receive less in returns. Taken together, we remain comfortable with our recommendation that investors underweight Credit Suisse.

As the fallout from the Greensill affair continues, Credit Suisse Group (CSGN SW) acknowledged 3 items regarding this situation:First, the Pillar 2 capital buffer requirement may be impacted by the Greensill affair. This may have long lasting negative implications for the valuation of CS contingent capital Tier 1 bonds.Second, certain notes underlying the Supply Chain Finance (SCF) funds will not be repaid when they fall due. The nonpayment creates considerable uncertainty regarding the valuation of a significant part of the remaining US$6.9bn. of assets in the SCF funds.Third, certain investors have already threatened litigation and, CS also stated that it “might also suffer reputational harm associated with these matters that might cause client departures or loss of assets under management.” This is what we warned when the Greensill news broke two weeks ago. Please see Credit Suisse: Greensill Sows Reputation Risks, Underweight CS Bonds for more details. In the intervening time-period, CS equity and credit have materially underperformed their respective indexes.At this point, investors’ main concern should be the amount or level of additional Pillar 2 capital which the firm may need to retain. The is not currently factored into CS’ debt or equity valuations.To its credit, the bank is taking prompt corrective action in restructuring the leadership, transparency, and compensation of the Asset Management division. However, we remain skeptical with whether the worst is past in this affair. Alternative assets require greater oversight as they are harder to manage and value. Combining risk management and compliance functions across CS stills seems like a mistake when it comes to asset management. However, the segmental separation of the Asset Management division may be a first step to unloading the relatively undersized entity. Distancing the unit from the Wealth Management operations may limit client departures.We continue to believe that the pricing of Credit Suisse bonds does not fully reflect the risks, complexity, and low capitalization of the firms’ underlying business model; nor does it capture potential franchise impairment from increasing reputation risk. The recent suspension of redemptions from certain CS funds is at best an embarrassment and at worst a signal that controls remain in need of considerable attention. This is unfortunate, as CS is highly geared to the business cycle and could outperform peers, if it can get its house in order. However, CS’s long-dated Additional Tier 1 bonds already trade tight relative to the challenges facing the firm. Please see: Credit Suisse – Perfection Priced into Long-Dated AT1 for more details.   We suspect that credit may continue to follow equity and underperform over the near term. Longer-term, Pillar 2 considerations suggest that an even lower capital buffer as a cushion for AT1 investors, unless hidden capital is realized, or shareholders receive less in returns. Taken together, we remain comfortable with our recommendation that investors underweight Credit Suisse. 

Credit Suisse: Greensill's Capital Implications Outweigh Asset Management Corrective Action

Treasuries may have seen the worst of their sell-off and, if not, the moves higher from here may be less violent. This would create the foundation for improved risk asset performance. While bond yields moved abruptly higher on Friday, the more significant development was the modest bearish reaction by risk assets.The Fed’s FOMC will meet on Wednesday and expectations are rising that members may signal earlier rate hikes in the infamous Dot Plot survey. We are set-up for two potentially disappointing outcomes which could create buying opportunities. We outline these within.Concurrently, we believe the US economy would be better off without a Treasury security exemption in calculating the SLR. Impacted banks could easily issue Preferred Securities or other AT1 notes rather than be forced sellers in the Treasury market. This would also re-align US banks towards making loans again.Financials remain the sweet spot in Asia credit. Levered to the economy and rising rates, this is the place to be at this point in the market cycle. Nonetheless, total returns in Asia’s financial and HY indexes were negative week-on-week.   European AT1 outperformed Asia’s financial sector indexes and generated positive total returns. This outperformance was driven by the European Central Bank’s (ECB) announcement that it would front-load additional asset purchases over the next few months.In Asia, short duration bank bonds keep pace with Treasury weakness to end the week unchanged on a total return basis. In index terms, only Asia’s AT1 tightened by an amount sufficient to offset the weakness in Treasuries.In the rating world, Moody’s Investors Service placed <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/hsbc-holdings-plc-a723bd63-0890-486f-aaa0-3bb9ad2b95ce" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:21976:1" rel="noopener">HSBC Holdings (HSBA LN)</a> on review for a potential downgrade last week. We think this is mistaken. HSBC has underperformed similarly rated institutions for years, while its capital levels have remained at or above these peers. As such, we do not believe the rating agency should prejudge HSBC’s recently updated strategy to increase focus on wealth management and financing opportunities in China’s Greater Bay area.  Fortunately, the credit market seems to agree with us. Please see <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/hsbc-on-review-for-downgrade-buy-the-dips" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:48993" rel="noopener">HSBC: On Review for Downgrade, Buy the Dips</a> for more details.Rather than lower HSBC’s fundamental rating, we believe Moody’s should revisit its recent decision to upgrade <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/credit-suisse-group-ag" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:22253:1" rel="noopener">Credit Suisse Groups'  (CSGN VX)</a> fundamental score. The recent Greensill scandal raises serious questions regarding risk and oversight in Credit Suisse’s asset management operations. These may have long term capital, revenue and bond value implications. Please see: <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/credit-suisse-greensill-sows-reputation-risks-underweight-cs-bonds" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:48839" rel="noopener">Credit Suisse: Greensill Sows Reputation Risks, Underweight CS Bonds</a> for more details.Market Outlook: The US economy may run very hot before we see a change in Fed policy regarding short-term interest rates and the US dollar should remain stronger than analysts forecasted at year-end. Broadly, this is not Emerging Market (EM) friendly; however, a strong US economic rebound should benefit EM and European financials.

Treasuries may have seen the worst of their sell-off and, if not, the moves higher from here may be less violent. This would create the foundation for improved risk asset performance. While bond yields moved abruptly higher on Friday, the more significant development was the modest bearish reaction by risk assets.The Fed’s FOMC will meet on Wednesday and expectations are rising that members may signal earlier rate hikes in the infamous Dot Plot survey. We are set-up for two potentially disappointing outcomes which could create buying opportunities. We outline these within.Concurrently, we believe the US economy would be better off without a Treasury security exemption in calculating the SLR. Impacted banks could easily issue Preferred Securities or other AT1 notes rather than be forced sellers in the Treasury market. This would also re-align US banks towards making loans again.Financials remain the sweet spot in Asia credit. Levered to the economy and rising rates, this is the place to be at this point in the market cycle. Nonetheless, total returns in Asia’s financial and HY indexes were negative week-on-week.   European AT1 outperformed Asia’s financial sector indexes and generated positive total returns. This outperformance was driven by the European Central Bank’s (ECB) announcement that it would front-load additional asset purchases over the next few months.In Asia, short duration bank bonds keep pace with Treasury weakness to end the week unchanged on a total return basis. In index terms, only Asia’s AT1 tightened by an amount sufficient to offset the weakness in Treasuries.In the rating world, Moody’s Investors Service placed HSBC Holdings (HSBA LN) on review for a potential downgrade last week. We think this is mistaken. HSBC has underperformed similarly rated institutions for years, while its capital levels have remained at or above these peers. As such, we do not believe the rating agency should prejudge HSBC’s recently updated strategy to increase focus on wealth management and financing opportunities in China’s Greater Bay area.  Fortunately, the credit market seems to agree with us. Please see HSBC: On Review for Downgrade, Buy the Dips for more details.Rather than lower HSBC’s fundamental rating, we believe Moody’s should revisit its recent decision to upgrade Credit Suisse Groups'  (CSGN VX) fundamental score. The recent Greensill scandal raises serious questions regarding risk and oversight in Credit Suisse’s asset management operations. These may have long term capital, revenue and bond value implications. Please see: Credit Suisse: Greensill Sows Reputation Risks, Underweight CS Bonds for more details.Market Outlook: The US economy may run very hot before we see a change in Fed policy regarding short-term interest rates and the US dollar should remain stronger than analysts forecasted at year-end. Broadly, this is not Emerging Market (EM) friendly; however, a strong US economic rebound should benefit EM and European financials.

Bank Credit Weekly: Inflection Point or Fed Disappoint?

*Greensill Bankruptcy: Greensill Capital (Greensill) has filed for insolvency in the United Kingdom today after Apollo Global Management’s (APO.US) [Apollo] walked away from this deal. Lawyers for Greensill cited Greensill’s inability to repay a USD 140 mn bridge loan provided by Credit Suisse Group (CSGN.VX) [Credit Suisse]. In addition, Greensill allegedly has USD 5 bn in risk outstanding to  GFG Alliance Group (GFG) – a company owned by Sanjeev Gupta, who appears to be at the center of this debacle; and*Further Tail Risk: Credit Suisse , GAM Holdings (GAM.VX), Tokio Marine Holdings (8766.JP), SoftBank Group (9984.JP) amongst others are likely to see additional weakness given the growing uncertainties with Greemsill and GFG Alliance. In particular, the allegations of fraud by Bafin and the British Business Bank removing UK government guarantee on COVID-19 lending highlight the increased likelihood of substantially higher losses and other tail risk. With the UK and European Central Bank (ECB) asking their institutions for their Greensill and GFG exposures, no doubt the hit parade will continue.

*Greensill Bankruptcy: Greensill Capital (Greensill) has filed for insolvency in the United Kingdom today after Apollo Global Management’s (APO.US) [Apollo] walked away from this deal. Lawyers for Greensill cited Greensill’s inability to repay a USD 140 mn bridge loan provided by Credit Suisse Group (CSGN.VX) [Credit Suisse]. In addition, Greensill allegedly has USD 5 bn in risk outstanding to  GFG Alliance Group (GFG) – a company owned by Sanjeev Gupta, who appears to be at the center of this debacle; and*Further Tail Risk: Credit Suisse , GAM Holdings (GAM.VX), Tokio Marine Holdings (8766.JP), SoftBank Group (9984.JP) amongst others are likely to see additional weakness given the growing uncertainties with Greemsill and GFG Alliance. In particular, the allegations of fraud by Bafin and the British Business Bank removing UK government guarantee on COVID-19 lending highlight the increased likelihood of substantially higher losses and other tail risk. With the UK and European Central Bank (ECB) asking their institutions for their Greensill and GFG exposures, no doubt the hit parade will continue.

Switzerland

Credit Suisse Group AG operates as a wealth management firm. The Company specializes in investment banking and offers wealth management activities aiming to capitalize on both the large pool of wealth within mature markets, as well as the significant growth in wealth in Asia Pacific and other emerging markets. Credit Suisse Group serves customers worldwide.

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Credit Suisse Group (CSGN SW)

US Banks and the SLR Situation: Overweight JPM Tier 1 Securities

JPM’s fortress foundation needs repair. It has the lowest SLR buffer, and its Tier 1 suffers from this. Leverage slimming and a deeper capital...

Hank Calenti, CFA

Credit Suisse Group – Greensill Fallout Continues

CREDIT SUISSE GROUP: The hits continue at CS. The Board is investigating ties with Greensill, replaced its AM CEO, AM will be segregated, and...

Thomas J. Monaco

Credit Suisse: Greensill's Capital Implications Outweigh Asset Management Corrective Action

Additional Pillar 2 capital requirements are not currently factored into valuations. CS bonds do not reflect the risks, complexity, and low...

Hank Calenti, CFA

Bank Credit Weekly: Inflection Point or Fed Disappoint?

We are set-up for 2 disappointing Fed outcomes which could create buying opportunities. Meanwhile, Treasuries may have seen the worst of their sell...

Hank Calenti, CFA

Credit Suisse – Greensill Goes BK

CREDIT SUISSE: Greensill has filed for insolvency. Lawyers for Greensill cited its inability to repay a USD 140 mn bridge loan from Credit Suisse...

Thomas J. Monaco

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