Financials Credit Analyst

Hank Calenti, CFA

CreditContinuum

Credit

<a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/jpmorgan-chase-co" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:277:1" rel="noopener">JPMorgan Chase &amp; Co's (JPM US)</a> fortress foundation needs repair. Rather than a rock-solid balance sheet, JPM’s capital foundation needs to be strengthened to handle the leverage load. It has the lowest Supplementary Leverage Ratio (SLR) amongst the largest US banks and its Tier 1 securities suffer, in part, due to this. It is time to lighten the leverage exposure and add a layer of capital. This creates an investment opportunity.As the pandemic-induced economic crisis unfolded last year, we noted that JPM Tier 1 securities were over-bought relative to the leverage exposure risk at the institution. Please see: <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/compose/insight/49670/Bank%20Credit%20Weekly:%20US%20Capital%20Buffer%20Risk%20&amp;%20Q1%20Earnings%20Reports-%20JPMorgan%20Looks%20Slightly%20Overbought.%20Read%20more:%20https:/skr.ma/uQHaQ" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Bank Credit Weekly: US Capital Buffer Risk &amp; Q1 Earnings Reports- JPMorgan Looks Slightly Overbought.</a>The Fed exemption of Treasury securities and deposits with the central bank from the SLR bought JPM time. Fast forward one year later to the expiration of these exemptions and, despite ample opportunity, JPMorgan did not issue Tier 1 securities until only two weeks ago when it brought a $25 par security. In additional to raising needed capital, the firm recently threatened to stop taking deposits. It may price itself out of the deposit market, temporarily, but this is not a long-term strategy. The SLR is the binding capital constrain on the firm’s asset growth. JPM needs to obtain or retain more Tier 1 capital. We quantify this within.We believe that JPM could easily bring a 10-year Tier 1 bond to the market and find between US$2 to US$3bn in demand, thereby taking the total Tier 1 financing needs, or balance sheet optimization equivalent, down materially for the remainder of the year. Based on its recently issued Preferred, we believe JPM could achieve a price of Treasuries plus circa 300bps in a 10-year Tier 1 note.Aside from its SLR level, JPMorgan’s credit metrics are on-par with, if not superior to, most other large systemically important financial institutions. And yet, as we present within, JPM’s Tier 1 bonds trade at a discount to materially weaker banks located outside the US. Furthermore, we find that JPMorgan’s 2025 callable Tier 1 bond is at least 40bps oversold as, in our view, its call option is overvalued by the same amount.JPM faces an inflection point with respect to its capital adequacy. Concurrently, the Fed may re-adjust the SLR requirements before year-end; however, we believe it would be foolish of JPM not to take the opportunity to increase its SLR in an improving economic environment. It should re-enforce the foundation of its fortress balance sheet. We believe investors should pre-position for this eventuality. We recommend overweighting JPMorgan’s Tier 1 securities.

JPMorgan Chase &amp; Co's (JPM US) fortress foundation needs repair. Rather than a rock-solid balance sheet, JPM’s capital foundation needs to be strengthened to handle the leverage load. It has the lowest Supplementary Leverage Ratio (SLR) amongst the largest US banks and its Tier 1 securities suffer, in part, due to this. It is time to lighten the leverage exposure and add a layer of capital. This creates an investment opportunity.As the pandemic-induced economic crisis unfolded last year, we noted that JPM Tier 1 securities were over-bought relative to the leverage exposure risk at the institution. Please see: Bank Credit Weekly: US Capital Buffer Risk &amp; Q1 Earnings Reports- JPMorgan Looks Slightly Overbought.The Fed exemption of Treasury securities and deposits with the central bank from the SLR bought JPM time. Fast forward one year later to the expiration of these exemptions and, despite ample opportunity, JPMorgan did not issue Tier 1 securities until only two weeks ago when it brought a $25 par security. In additional to raising needed capital, the firm recently threatened to stop taking deposits. It may price itself out of the deposit market, temporarily, but this is not a long-term strategy. The SLR is the binding capital constrain on the firm’s asset growth. JPM needs to obtain or retain more Tier 1 capital. We quantify this within.We believe that JPM could easily bring a 10-year Tier 1 bond to the market and find between US$2 to US$3bn in demand, thereby taking the total Tier 1 financing needs, or balance sheet optimization equivalent, down materially for the remainder of the year. Based on its recently issued Preferred, we believe JPM could achieve a price of Treasuries plus circa 300bps in a 10-year Tier 1 note.Aside from its SLR level, JPMorgan’s credit metrics are on-par with, if not superior to, most other large systemically important financial institutions. And yet, as we present within, JPM’s Tier 1 bonds trade at a discount to materially weaker banks located outside the US. Furthermore, we find that JPMorgan’s 2025 callable Tier 1 bond is at least 40bps oversold as, in our view, its call option is overvalued by the same amount.JPM faces an inflection point with respect to its capital adequacy. Concurrently, the Fed may re-adjust the SLR requirements before year-end; however, we believe it would be foolish of JPM not to take the opportunity to increase its SLR in an improving economic environment. It should re-enforce the foundation of its fortress balance sheet. We believe investors should pre-position for this eventuality. We recommend overweighting JPMorgan’s Tier 1 securities.

US Banks and the SLR Situation: Overweight JPM Tier 1 Securities

Financials & FinTech research, Galliano’s Financials Research

Victor Galliano

Financials & FinTech research

Financials & FinTech, EM & Developed Markets

Galliano’s Financials Research

Galliano's Financials Research provides fundamental research in Emerging Markets financials, including FinTech, as well as financials in select Developed Markets.

The investment style applied is generally value oriented, although Growth At Reasonable Price (GARP) strategies can also be used where appropriate. 

Our investment research approach aim is often contrarian, looking to capitalise on overly sceptical or optimistic consensus views. In terms of valuation techniques, the focus is on PBV ratio to ROE, PE multiples and dividend yield, as well as the application of PEG ratios and, where appropriate, Sum of the Parts (SOTP) valuations.

Thematic (Sector/Industry)

<ul>
<li>The removal of the Central Bank governor by President Erdogan flies in the face of orthodox monetary policy</li>
<li>The TRY and Turkish assets are being hit hard; in this note, we focus on <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/banco-bilbao-vizcaya-argentari" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:21251:1" rel="noopener">Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentari (BBVA SM)</a> , <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/turkiye-garanti-bankasi-as" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:25026:1" rel="noopener">Turkiye Garanti Bankasi As (GARAN TI)</a> , <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/unicredit-spa" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:21234:1" rel="noopener">UniCredit SpA (UCG IM)</a> , <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/bnp-paribas" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:525:1" rel="noopener">BNP Paribas (BNP FP)</a> and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/hsbc-holdings-plc-a723bd63-0890-486f-aaa0-3bb9ad2b95ce" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:21976:1" rel="noopener">HSBC Holdings (HSBA LN)</a> </li>
<li>Garanti and its domestic peers could see worsening delinquency, especially on FX loan balances, as well as tougher terms for refinancing their FX funding needs</li>
<li>We look at the capital impacts of TRY depreciation, as well as the earnings exposure of the three international banks</li>
<li>In conclusion, we see limited impact on Unicredit and especially HSBC from the Turkish turbulence, with a clearly bigger adverse impact for BBVA, especially on earnings; the impact of TEB on BNP Paribas should be modest too</li>
<li>We reiterate our positive opinions on HSBC and Unicredit; we are more cautious on BBVA in the near term</li>
<li>Risks to our view include a further heavy depreciation of the TRY, resulting from any potential sharp cuts to the Turkish benchmark interest rate</li>
</ul>


The removal of the Central Bank governor by President Erdogan flies in the face of orthodox monetary policy
The TRY and Turkish assets are being hit hard; in this note, we focus on Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentari (BBVA SM) , Turkiye Garanti Bankasi As (GARAN TI) , UniCredit SpA (UCG IM) , BNP Paribas (BNP FP) and HSBC Holdings (HSBA LN) 
Garanti and its domestic peers could see worsening delinquency, especially on FX loan balances, as well as tougher terms for refinancing their FX funding needs
We look at the capital impacts of TRY depreciation, as well as the earnings exposure of the three international banks
In conclusion, we see limited impact on Unicredit and especially HSBC from the Turkish turbulence, with a clearly bigger adverse impact for BBVA, especially on earnings; the impact of TEB on BNP Paribas should be modest too
We reiterate our positive opinions on HSBC and Unicredit; we are more cautious on BBVA in the near term
Risks to our view include a further heavy depreciation of the TRY, resulting from any potential sharp cuts to the Turkish benchmark interest rate


Turkey – Erdogan Creates More Market Turbulence, Again

Silver Point

Thomas J. Monaco

Independent Insight Provider

Silver Point is a boutique research firm that focuses on the broader financial services sector, with a particular focus on troubled institutions globally. 

Asia Ex Japan

*Strong Man Strikes Again: Lighting has struck again, not five months since his hiring, Central Bank of Turkey (CBT) Governor Agbal has now been dismissed for raising interest rates. President Erdogan handpicked Sahap Kavcioglu as new CBT Governor. He is the fourth CBT Governor in two years, and a banking professor and newspaper columnist who has argued for lower interest rates, after serving a a lawmaker in Erdogan’s AKP party. We all know what happens when academics are in charge; and*Watch Your Risk: The TRL’s decline is troublesome, and the potential for a TRL gray market would NOT be of surprise at this stage. We continue to worry about counterparty risks should defaults rise. It’s probably not a bad time to start thinking about purchasing CDS protection on single name securities and on the Turkish sovereign.

*Strong Man Strikes Again: Lighting has struck again, not five months since his hiring, Central Bank of Turkey (CBT) Governor Agbal has now been dismissed for raising interest rates. President Erdogan handpicked Sahap Kavcioglu as new CBT Governor. He is the fourth CBT Governor in two years, and a banking professor and newspaper columnist who has argued for lower interest rates, after serving a a lawmaker in Erdogan’s AKP party. We all know what happens when academics are in charge; and*Watch Your Risk: The TRL’s decline is troublesome, and the potential for a TRL gray market would NOT be of surprise at this stage. We continue to worry about counterparty risks should defaults rise. It’s probably not a bad time to start thinking about purchasing CDS protection on single name securities and on the Turkish sovereign.

As the fallout from the Greensill affair continues, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/credit-suisse-group-ag-f4b24f0c-c294-40b3-b491-759f0cb277e9" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:27915:1" rel="noopener">Credit Suisse Group (CSGN SW)</a> acknowledged 3 items regarding this situation:First, the Pillar 2 capital buffer requirement may be impacted by the Greensill affair. This may have long lasting negative implications for the valuation of CS contingent capital Tier 1 bonds.Second, certain notes underlying the Supply Chain Finance (SCF) funds will not be repaid when they fall due. The nonpayment creates considerable uncertainty regarding the valuation of a significant part of the remaining US$6.9bn. of assets in the SCF funds.Third, certain investors have already threatened litigation and, CS also stated that it “might also suffer reputational harm associated with these matters that might cause client departures or loss of assets under management.” This is what we warned when the Greensill news broke two weeks ago. Please see <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/credit-suisse-greensill-sows-reputation-risks-underweight-cs-bonds" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:48839" rel="noopener">Credit Suisse: Greensill Sows Reputation Risks, Underweight CS Bonds</a> for more details. In the intervening time-period, CS equity and credit have materially underperformed their respective indexes.At this point, investors’ main concern should be the amount or level of additional Pillar 2 capital which the firm may need to retain. The is not currently factored into CS’ debt or equity valuations.To its credit, the bank is taking prompt corrective action in restructuring the leadership, transparency, and compensation of the Asset Management division. However, we remain skeptical with whether the worst is past in this affair. Alternative assets require greater oversight as they are harder to manage and value. Combining risk management and compliance functions across CS stills seems like a mistake when it comes to asset management. However, the segmental separation of the Asset Management division may be a first step to unloading the relatively undersized entity. Distancing the unit from the Wealth Management operations may limit client departures.We continue to believe that the pricing of Credit Suisse bonds does not fully reflect the risks, complexity, and low capitalization of the firms’ underlying business model; nor does it capture potential franchise impairment from increasing reputation risk. The recent suspension of redemptions from certain CS funds is at best an embarrassment and at worst a signal that controls remain in need of considerable attention. This is unfortunate, as CS is highly geared to the business cycle and could outperform peers, if it can get its house in order. However, CS’s long-dated Additional Tier 1 bonds already trade tight relative to the challenges facing the firm. Please see: <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/credit-suisse-perfection-priced-into-long-dated-at1" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:48461" rel="noopener">Credit Suisse – Perfection Priced into Long-Dated AT1</a> for more details.   We suspect that credit may continue to follow equity and underperform over the near term. Longer-term, Pillar 2 considerations suggest that an even lower capital buffer as a cushion for AT1 investors, unless hidden capital is realized, or shareholders receive less in returns. Taken together, we remain comfortable with our recommendation that investors underweight Credit Suisse.

As the fallout from the Greensill affair continues, Credit Suisse Group (CSGN SW) acknowledged 3 items regarding this situation:First, the Pillar 2 capital buffer requirement may be impacted by the Greensill affair. This may have long lasting negative implications for the valuation of CS contingent capital Tier 1 bonds.Second, certain notes underlying the Supply Chain Finance (SCF) funds will not be repaid when they fall due. The nonpayment creates considerable uncertainty regarding the valuation of a significant part of the remaining US$6.9bn. of assets in the SCF funds.Third, certain investors have already threatened litigation and, CS also stated that it “might also suffer reputational harm associated with these matters that might cause client departures or loss of assets under management.” This is what we warned when the Greensill news broke two weeks ago. Please see Credit Suisse: Greensill Sows Reputation Risks, Underweight CS Bonds for more details. In the intervening time-period, CS equity and credit have materially underperformed their respective indexes.At this point, investors’ main concern should be the amount or level of additional Pillar 2 capital which the firm may need to retain. The is not currently factored into CS’ debt or equity valuations.To its credit, the bank is taking prompt corrective action in restructuring the leadership, transparency, and compensation of the Asset Management division. However, we remain skeptical with whether the worst is past in this affair. Alternative assets require greater oversight as they are harder to manage and value. Combining risk management and compliance functions across CS stills seems like a mistake when it comes to asset management. However, the segmental separation of the Asset Management division may be a first step to unloading the relatively undersized entity. Distancing the unit from the Wealth Management operations may limit client departures.We continue to believe that the pricing of Credit Suisse bonds does not fully reflect the risks, complexity, and low capitalization of the firms’ underlying business model; nor does it capture potential franchise impairment from increasing reputation risk. The recent suspension of redemptions from certain CS funds is at best an embarrassment and at worst a signal that controls remain in need of considerable attention. This is unfortunate, as CS is highly geared to the business cycle and could outperform peers, if it can get its house in order. However, CS’s long-dated Additional Tier 1 bonds already trade tight relative to the challenges facing the firm. Please see: Credit Suisse – Perfection Priced into Long-Dated AT1 for more details.   We suspect that credit may continue to follow equity and underperform over the near term. Longer-term, Pillar 2 considerations suggest that an even lower capital buffer as a cushion for AT1 investors, unless hidden capital is realized, or shareholders receive less in returns. Taken together, we remain comfortable with our recommendation that investors underweight Credit Suisse. 

Credit Suisse: Greensill's Capital Implications Outweigh Asset Management Corrective Action

Technical Analyst, Vermilion Research

Joe Jasper

Technical Analyst

Technical and Quantitative Research

Vermilion Research

Vermilion’s objective is to deliver timely, actionable, and unique technical research to professional investors through the application of our various technical indicators.

Our research strategists seek to highlight securities which we believe are at major inflection points, based on our various technical and quantitative indicators, and offer asymmetric risk/return profiles. Our unique research methodology, centered on relative strength, enables our strategists to deliver superior investment recommendations.

Our process begins by organizing the universe of actively traded stocks into discrete sectors, then into industry groups. We then apply our technical and quantitative tools to identify developing price trends. Once attractive trends are identified within a selected sector or group, we screen for individual stocks which we believe offer the best risk/reward profile. We provide a historical perspective that often reveals, through our long-term charts, how price patterns often repeat themselves over time.

Technical Analysis

As long as market dynamics remain largely positive and the MSCI ACWI (ACWI-US), ACWI ex-US (ACWX-US), and EM (EEM-US) indexes are above their respective intermediate-term support levels we believe a constructive outlook is warranted. To reiterate, support levels to watch include $90 on ACWI-US, $53 on ACWX-US, and $52 on EEM-US. Open the attached file to read our complete International Strategy document, and to find links to detailed comments and recommendations for each of our 12 Sectors.

As long as market dynamics remain largely positive and the MSCI ACWI (ACWI-US), ACWI ex-US (ACWX-US), and EM (EEM-US) indexes are above their respective intermediate-term support levels we believe a constructive outlook is warranted. To reiterate, support levels to watch include $90 on ACWI-US, $53 on ACWX-US, and $52 on EEM-US. Open the attached file to read our complete International Strategy document, and to find links to detailed comments and recommendations for each of our 12 Sectors.

Global Equity Strategy: Constructive Pullback; Overweight Value

France

BNP Paribas S.A. attracts deposits and offers commercial, retail, investment, private and corporate banking services.  The Bank also provides asset management and investment advisory services to institutions and individuals in Europe, the United States, Asia and the Emerging Markets.

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BNP Paribas (BNP FP)

US Banks and the SLR Situation: Overweight JPM Tier 1 Securities

JPM’s fortress foundation needs repair. It has the lowest SLR buffer, and its Tier 1 suffers from this. Leverage slimming and a deeper capital...

Hank Calenti, CFA

Turkey – Erdogan Creates More Market Turbulence, Again

Central bank chief removal heightens market risk with the TRY and Turkish assets being hit. For the banks, we feel there are mitigating factors...

Victor Galliano

Turkey - YELP!

TURKEY: Not five months since his hiring, the CBT Governor has been replaced. The TRL’s decline is troublesome, and a TRL gray market would NOT be...

Thomas J. Monaco

Credit Suisse: Greensill's Capital Implications Outweigh Asset Management Corrective Action

Additional Pillar 2 capital requirements are not currently factored into valuations. CS bonds do not reflect the risks, complexity, and low...

Hank Calenti, CFA

Global Equity Strategy: Constructive Pullback; Overweight Value

As long as the MSCI ACWI (ACWI-US), ACWI ex-US (ACWX-US), and EM (EEM-US) indexes are above their respective intermediate-term support levels we...

Vermilion Research

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