Pan-Asia Catalysts/Events, Quiddity Advisors

Travis Lundy

Pan-Asia Catalysts/Events

Quiddity Advisors

Event-Driven

<p>Friday morning, the Nikkei said there was a deal in the offing where Mitsui Fudosan would bid for <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/tokyo-dome-corp" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:6421:1" rel="noopener">Tokyo Dome Corp (9681 JP)</a>.  As someone concerned with the governance weakness shown too many times in Japanese takeover situations, I am almost automatically disappointed to see such headlines. It leads me to expect that later the same day I will be mumbling words at my monitor that I should not say aloud. </p>
<p>I did Friday.</p>
<p>My constant question is HOW can independent directors of companies with unique and valuable assets deign to sell them at such inexpensive prices? Often those unique and valuable assets are uniquely valuable items such as cash, portfolios of listed securities, and land and property assets with an easily external valuation. </p>
<p>Sometimes cash and securities get tossed into a DCF as being assets which need to be discounted 9-11% a year on their ability to throw off cash, never mind the fact that the equity holdings are purchased at cash flow yields of 2-3% and bonds are bought with yields of 0-1%. Real estate holdings are usually purchased at yields of 4-6%. So automatically, anything of any real value and inherently low cash-flow yield gets marked down for the friendly buyer. Extra cash is almost never dividended out, and there is never (with the one exception of the takeover of <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/asatsu-dk-inc" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:8715:1" rel="noopener">Asatsu Dk Inc (9747 JP)</a> a few years ago) any tally of what the non-operating assets are worth to create an Adjusted Enterprise Value. </p>
<p>This time is no different. </p>
<p>This is a big fat piece of land in central Tokyo, and a fair number of unique, quite unreplaceable assets and businesses which should command a moat. And earnings have been penalized for years by a total lack of effective maintenance and stewardship by management. </p>
<p>Oasis proposed buying the company at ¥1300/share in January but said the stock was worth well over ¥2000/share in its public <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5dd62b05f226644911c6d4e1/t/5efabd9b2d98f71482b79156/1593490878125/OASIS+-+A+Better+Tokyo+Dome+Presentation.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">presentation</a> at the same time. Mitsui Fudosan - a professional strategic owner of prime property assets - bid ¥1200/share earlier this month before being <em>asked</em> to bid ¥1350/share. They bid ¥1300/share.</p>
<p>I am not sure the conversation ends there.</p>
<p>My analysis continues below.</p>

Friday morning, the Nikkei said there was a deal in the offing where Mitsui Fudosan would bid for Tokyo Dome Corp (9681 JP).  As someone concerned with the governance weakness shown too many times in Japanese takeover situations, I am almost automatically disappointed to see such headlines. It leads me to expect that later the same day I will be mumbling words at my monitor that I should not say aloud. 
I did Friday.
My constant question is HOW can independent directors of companies with unique and valuable assets deign to sell them at such inexpensive prices? Often those unique and valuable assets are uniquely valuable items such as cash, portfolios of listed securities, and land and property assets with an easily external valuation. 
Sometimes cash and securities get tossed into a DCF as being assets which need to be discounted 9-11% a year on their ability to throw off cash, never mind the fact that the equity holdings are purchased at cash flow yields of 2-3% and bonds are bought with yields of 0-1%. Real estate holdings are usually purchased at yields of 4-6%. So automatically, anything of any real value and inherently low cash-flow yield gets marked down for the friendly buyer. Extra cash is almost never dividended out, and there is never (with the one exception of the takeover of Asatsu Dk Inc (9747 JP) a few years ago) any tally of what the non-operating assets are worth to create an Adjusted Enterprise Value. 
This time is no different. 
This is a big fat piece of land in central Tokyo, and a fair number of unique, quite unreplaceable assets and businesses which should command a moat. And earnings have been penalized for years by a total lack of effective maintenance and stewardship by management. 
Oasis proposed buying the company at ¥1300/share in January but said the stock was worth well over ¥2000/share in its public presentation at the same time. Mitsui Fudosan - a professional strategic owner of prime property assets - bid ¥1200/share earlier this month before being asked to bid ¥1350/share. They bid ¥1300/share.
I am not sure the conversation ends there.
My analysis continues below.

Tokyo Dome Sells Itself For the Wrong Price

Thematic (Sector/Industry)

<p>Japan's Corporate Governance Code was created in 2015 after years of behind-the-scenes pushing by large foreign investors and some largely unsung Japan-based agitators, and a desire by the TSE and FSA to have Japanese companies seen as standard-bearers for good governance rather than as a drag on multiples in an otherwise respectable capital markets environment. </p><p>It was, however, unburdened with measures to <em>bring</em> Japanese governance to a global standard. The JCGC <em>mostly</em> applied the lip service of governance principles to existing practices. Crossholdings were dealt with only perfunctorily, and the issue of financial competence towards shareholder interest was only vaguely addressed.</p><p>There have been notable issues. </p><p>The first after the JCGC launch was <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/73" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:73:1">Toyota Motor Corp (7203 JP)</a>'s decision to issue "Model AA Shares" (much discussed on Smartkarma at the time (see <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/model-aa-shares-good-governance-gone-bad" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:712">'Model AA' Shares - Good Governance Gone Bad?</a> and subsequent notes in the Insight Stream)) only to individual investors, offering voting rights on pref shares at financial terms to Toyota worse than a CB, diluting the vote of foreign investors after long-term domestic investors had sold. Toyota said this issuance was designed to support the governance code. It clearly was <em>not</em>. It <em>barely</em> passed after proxy advisor Glass Lewis, in a bewildering conclusion, supported the issuance. </p><p>Since then, numerous decisions by companies deciding merger ratios or takeover prices - especially of subsidiaries - have seen financial unfairness inflicted upon minority shareholders as independent financial advisors come up with mystifying DCF valuations which seem to value cash and securities holdings of target companies at levels far below balance sheet worth (valuing the "growth" input and "terminal value" of a large pile of cash, discounted at 8-9% will certainly hurt). I personally find it striking that directors are willing to impair their assets to such an extent in a merger ratio calculation but not impair them as assets prior to that. I remain shocked that so-called "financial advisors" can explain it. But function has been driven by form.</p><h2>A Fresh Wind Blowing</h2><p>At the end of March, the <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/11266" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:11266:1">Japan Exchange Group Inc (8697 JP)</a> announced that it would sell its ~5% stake in the SGX over a period of three years. In <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/japan-crossholdings-japan-exchange-s-sale-of-sgx-shares-sets-a-precedent-watch-closely" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:18986">Japan Crossholdings: Japan Exchange's Sale of SGX Shares Sets A Precedent - Watch Closely</a> I described how I thought this was worth watching closely.</p><p>The important part was not the sale. The important part was the model for corporate decision-making. </p><figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/054/083/original/Screen%20Shot%202018-06-02%20at%203.54.12%20PM.png?1527926086" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="54083"></figure><div style="text-align: left;" class="content-caption">excerpted from <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/japan-crossholdings-japan-exchange-s-sale-of-sgx-shares-sets-a-precedent-watch-closely" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:18986">Japan Crossholdings: Japan Exchange's Sale of SGX Shares Sets A Precedent - Watch Closely</a></div><p>My conclusions went further, but the point was that this SGX stake sale transaction was designed <em>in its announcement and execution</em> (read the piece for the details) to set the standard for Japanese corporate governance going forward in line with the revisions to the CGC which had been suggested by the Council of Experts, with those revisions being announced on the FSA's website earlier this spring.</p><p>At the time, I stated that my long-held view had been that...</p><div class="content-highlight"><p><strong>Japanese companies with cross-holdings are effectively OpCos with a long-short fund attached whereby the <em>Holder</em> Company is short its own shares and is long the shares of the <em>Holdee</em> Companies. </strong></p><p>The "shorting" involved is of course not explicit. It is the fact that in a zero state (without the shareholdings, and without the excess capital required to own those shareholdings), a Company would have to raise equity capital in order to purchase another company's shares.</p><p>A company with cross-holdings which chooses to hold those cross-holdings <em>rather than buy back their own shares</em> is effectively asserting they are better at allocating capital than managing their own company, and better at allocating capital than their own shareholders would be. </p><p>They are running a long-short fund in a giant, unapproved, side-pocket.</p></div><p>And investors have taken this too lightly. </p><p>But there is new news.</p><h2>The New News</h2><p>On Friday June 1st, the TSE announced a change to its Listing Regulations to include revisions to Japan's Corporate Governance Code which are effective June 1st. Your sources are below (click the robots):</p><table class="table table-striped"><tbody><tr><td colspan="3"><h2>Documents and Sources of the New Japan Corporate Governance Code</h2></td></tr><tr><td><strong>Document/Page</strong></td><td style="text-align: center;"><strong>Language</strong></td><td style="text-align: center;"><p><strong>Link</strong></p></td></tr><tr><td><h2><strong>TSE page on Japan Corporate Governance (this has EVERYthing)</strong></h2></td><td style="text-align: center;"><p><strong>English</strong></p></td><td style="text-align: center;"><h2><strong><a href="http://www.jpx.co.jp/english/equities/listing/cg/index.html" target="_blank">🤖</a></strong></h2></td></tr><tr><td>          The Japan Corporate Governance Code (revised)</td><td style="text-align: center;">English</td><td style="text-align: center;"><h2><a href="http://www.jpx.co.jp/english/equities/listing/cg/tvdivq0000008jdy-att/20180601.pdf" target="_blank">🤖</a></h2></td></tr><tr><td><h2>        The Japan Corporate Governance Code (with tracked changes)   - RECOMMENDED</h2></td><td style="text-align: center;"><strong>English</strong></td><td style="text-align: center;"><h2><a href="http://www.jpx.co.jp/english/news/1020/b5b4pj000000jvxr-att/20180602_en.pdf" target="_blank">🤖</a></h2></td></tr><tr><td colspan="3"><h2></h2></td></tr><tr><td><strong>FSA page on Guidelines for Investor and Company Engagement</strong></td><td style="text-align: center;">English</td><td style="text-align: center;"><h2><a href="https://www.fsa.go.jp/en/news/2018/follow-up/20180601.html" target="_blank">🤖</a></h2></td></tr><tr><td>FSA page on Guidelines for Investor and Company Engagement (some docs only in Japanese as of now)</td><td style="text-align: center;">Japanese</td><td style="text-align: center;"><h2><a href="https://www.fsa.go.jp/news/30/singi/20180601.html" target="_blank">🤖</a></h2></td></tr><tr><td>FSA March 26 meeting of the Council of Experts regarding Revision of the JCGC</td><td style="text-align: center;">English</td><td style="text-align: center;"><h2><a href="https://www.fsa.go.jp/en/news/2018/follow-up/20180330-1/01.pdf" target="_blank">🤖</a></h2></td></tr><tr><td>      JPX/TSE March 30 revision draft based on the Council of Experts review of opinions</td><td style="text-align: center;">English</td><td style="text-align: center;"><h2><a href="http://www.jpx.co.jp/english/rules-participants/public-comment/detail/d01/b5b4pj0000022v6o-att/20180330en.pdf" target="_blank">🤖</a></h2></td></tr></tbody></table><p>For a clear view of the changes, the <strong><a href="http://www.jpx.co.jp/english/news/1020/b5b4pj000000jvxr-att/20180602_en.pdf" target="_blank">JCGC with tracked changes</a></strong> is the best document.</p><p>One in particular I like is  Principle 1.4 on Cross-Shareholdings.</p><figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/054/084/original/Screen%20Shot%202018-06-02%20at%209.07.34%20PM.png?1527944924" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="54084"></figure><div style="text-align: left;" class="content-caption">excerpted from p7 of <a href="https://www.jpx.co.jp/english/news/1020/b5b4pj000000jvxr-att/20180602_en.pdf" target="_blank">Japan Corporate Governance Code 1 June 2018 Tracked Changes Version</a></div><p></p><p>This is Big News.</p><p>It means there is considerable friction, and explanatory embarrassment, in continuing to hold cross-holdings.</p><ul><li>Every year requires a reassessment of the financial benefits and the return on capital measured against the cost of capital. This will not be pretty. </li><li>Requiring a set of policies on voting shares probably means setting standards which would not be lesser than the standards they adhere to in their own business. And it would require the possibility they might vote against management. </li></ul><p>It would be much easier to just get rid of the Cross-Shareholdings. The boards of the major banks, which each hold hundreds of cross-shareholding positions, will need to reassess each of the positions on an economic basis and business basis <em>every single year</em>. </p><table class="table table-striped"><tbody><tr><td><h2>Expect this to change quickly. This is the perfect excuse for banks and corporates to say "Shō ga nai", and sell.</h2></td></tr></tbody></table><h2>Takeaways?</h2><p>There will be some significant moves in the cross-holding space, and this will lead to equity and capital changes. I expect it will lead to a LOT of buybacks. I expect it will lead to more takeovers of subsidiaries and establishment of equity affiliate relationships. </p><p>As always, there is more below the fold, but in the meantime, investors should take this as a signal to Japanese corporates that Fairy Mary is watching.</p><figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/054/087/original/tinkerbell%20gif.gif?1527945566" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="54087"></figure>

Japan's Corporate Governance Code was created in 2015 after years of behind-the-scenes pushing by large foreign investors and some largely unsung Japan-based agitators, and a desire by the TSE and FSA to have Japanese companies seen as standard-bearers for good governance rather than as a drag on multiples in an otherwise respectable capital markets environment. It was, however, unburdened with measures to bring Japanese governance to a global standard. The JCGC mostly applied the lip service of governance principles to existing practices. Crossholdings were dealt with only perfunctorily, and the issue of financial competence towards shareholder interest was only vaguely addressed.There have been notable issues. The first after the JCGC launch was Toyota Motor Corp (7203 JP)'s decision to issue "Model AA Shares" (much discussed on Smartkarma at the time (see 'Model AA' Shares - Good Governance Gone Bad? and subsequent notes in the Insight Stream)) only to individual investors, offering voting rights on pref shares at financial terms to Toyota worse than a CB, diluting the vote of foreign investors after long-term domestic investors had sold. Toyota said this issuance was designed to support the governance code. It clearly was not. It barely passed after proxy advisor Glass Lewis, in a bewildering conclusion, supported the issuance. Since then, numerous decisions by companies deciding merger ratios or takeover prices - especially of subsidiaries - have seen financial unfairness inflicted upon minority shareholders as independent financial advisors come up with mystifying DCF valuations which seem to value cash and securities holdings of target companies at levels far below balance sheet worth (valuing the "growth" input and "terminal value" of a large pile of cash, discounted at 8-9% will certainly hurt). I personally find it striking that directors are willing to impair their assets to such an extent in a merger ratio calculation but not impair them as assets prior to that. I remain shocked that so-called "financial advisors" can explain it. But function has been driven by form.A Fresh Wind BlowingAt the end of March, the Japan Exchange Group Inc (8697 JP) announced that it would sell its ~5% stake in the SGX over a period of three years. In Japan Crossholdings: Japan Exchange's Sale of SGX Shares Sets A Precedent - Watch Closely I described how I thought this was worth watching closely.The important part was not the sale. The important part was the model for corporate decision-making. excerpted from Japan Crossholdings: Japan Exchange's Sale of SGX Shares Sets A Precedent - Watch CloselyMy conclusions went further, but the point was that this SGX stake sale transaction was designed in its announcement and execution (read the piece for the details) to set the standard for Japanese corporate governance going forward in line with the revisions to the CGC which had been suggested by the Council of Experts, with those revisions being announced on the FSA's website earlier this spring.At the time, I stated that my long-held view had been that...Japanese companies with cross-holdings are effectively OpCos with a long-short fund attached whereby the Holder Company is short its own shares and is long the shares of the Holdee Companies. The "shorting" involved is of course not explicit. It is the fact that in a zero state (without the shareholdings, and without the excess capital required to own those shareholdings), a Company would have to raise equity capital in order to purchase another company's shares.A company with cross-holdings which chooses to hold those cross-holdings rather than buy back their own shares is effectively asserting they are better at allocating capital than managing their own company, and better at allocating capital than their own shareholders would be. They are running a long-short fund in a giant, unapproved, side-pocket.And investors have taken this too lightly. But there is new news.The New NewsOn Friday June 1st, the TSE announced a change to its Listing Regulations to include revisions to Japan's Corporate Governance Code which are effective June 1st. Your sources are below (click the robots):Documents and Sources of the New Japan Corporate Governance CodeDocument/PageLanguageLinkTSE page on Japan Corporate Governance (this has EVERYthing)English🤖          The Japan Corporate Governance Code (revised)English🤖        The Japan Corporate Governance Code (with tracked changes)   - RECOMMENDEDEnglish🤖FSA page on Guidelines for Investor and Company EngagementEnglish🤖FSA page on Guidelines for Investor and Company Engagement (some docs only in Japanese as of now)Japanese🤖FSA March 26 meeting of the Council of Experts regarding Revision of the JCGCEnglish🤖      JPX/TSE March 30 revision draft based on the Council of Experts review of opinionsEnglish🤖For a clear view of the changes, the JCGC with tracked changes is the best document.One in particular I like is  Principle 1.4 on Cross-Shareholdings.excerpted from p7 of Japan Corporate Governance Code 1 June 2018 Tracked Changes VersionThis is Big News.It means there is considerable friction, and explanatory embarrassment, in continuing to hold cross-holdings.Every year requires a reassessment of the financial benefits and the return on capital measured against the cost of capital. This will not be pretty. Requiring a set of policies on voting shares probably means setting standards which would not be lesser than the standards they adhere to in their own business. And it would require the possibility they might vote against management. It would be much easier to just get rid of the Cross-Shareholdings. The boards of the major banks, which each hold hundreds of cross-shareholding positions, will need to reassess each of the positions on an economic basis and business basis every single year. Expect this to change quickly. This is the perfect excuse for banks and corporates to say "Shō ga nai", and sell.Takeaways?There will be some significant moves in the cross-holding space, and this will lead to equity and capital changes. I expect it will lead to a LOT of buybacks. I expect it will lead to more takeovers of subsidiaries and establishment of equity affiliate relationships. As always, there is more below the fold, but in the meantime, investors should take this as a signal to Japanese corporates that Fairy Mary is watching.

Japan's Corporate Governance Code Amendments - A Much Bigger Stick for Activists and Stewards

Doing bespoke work since 2002....., Custom Products Group

Patrick Hansen

Doing bespoke work since 2002.....

Custom Products Group

Custom Products was started 14 years ago at Lehman Brothers by current co-founder Patrick Hansen, CFA. After 3 years at Lehman, Patrick moved the team to Macquarie Securities where Simon Rigney (co-founder) joined. 3 years ago we took Custom Products independent. 

Our core strength can be summed up three words. 1- Customization - we have very little off the shelf products and most work is done on a one on one bespoke basis. 2- Speed - We pride ourselves in our ability to get requests back to the client very quickly. 3- Confidentiality - We do not redistribute. There is no grace period where we wait a week and then mass blast. Any request stops with that client.

<p>With Earning Season upon us we looked back over the last 3 weeks to see which names have had a good increase in volume. At the top of the list was <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/209" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:209:1">Kobe Steel Ltd (5406 JP)</a>, but we do not need to get into that. We basically screened for names with a greater than 1 standard deviation spike in volume over the last 3 weeks relative to the 1-year average.</p><h2>Screen Results (Recent spike in Volume)</h2><figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/036/623/original/2.png?1509047483" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="36623"></figure><div class="content-caption">Source: Custom Products</div><p>Volume for <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/21018" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:21018:1">Tsubaki Nakashima Co Ltd (6464 JP)</a> is up 2 standard deviation over the last…</p>

With Earning Season upon us we looked back over the last 3 weeks to see which names have had a good increase in volume. At the top of the list was Kobe Steel Ltd (5406 JP), but we do not need to get into that. We basically screened for names with a greater than 1 standard deviation spike in volume over the last 3 weeks relative to the 1-year average.Screen Results (Recent spike in Volume)Source: Custom ProductsVolume for Tsubaki Nakashima Co Ltd (6464 JP) is up 2 standard deviation over the last…

Names with Increased Volume Leading into Earnings Season....

Japan TMT Analyst

Pelham Smithers

Market Intel on Asian Tech with a Japan focus

Pelham Smithers Associates

Founded in 2009, Pelham Smithers Associates (PSA) provides market intelligence on Asian technology, focusing in particular on Japan. The industries covered by our team of specialists are: consumer electronics, telecomms, pharmaceuticals, internet, electronic parts and materials, automotive technology, retail and capital goods. 

Research is provided by the following:
Pelham Smithers: Macro, consumer electronics, telecoms & pharma
Joel Scheiman: Electronics materials / components
Julie Boote: Autos
Will Nestuk: Capital goods, machinery & transportation equipment parts
Thao Nguyen: eCommerce, internet content, marketing & advertising

<p>One of the really extraordinary features of the discussion over the <strong><a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/8715" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:8715:1">Asatsu DK (9747 JP)</a></strong> bid is the lack of discussion about a counter bid by <strong><a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/22213" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:22213:1">WPP (WPP LN)</a></strong>, arguably the most acquisitive firm the creative industry has ever seen. Presumably there are terms in the original agreement that prevent such a bid, but with Asatsu terminating the agreement, it isn't easy to see how the terms can be enforced (assuming that Asatsu's move does prove to be legal).</p><p>The only article that I have seen that even…</p>

One of the really extraordinary features of the discussion over the Asatsu DK (9747 JP) bid is the lack of discussion about a counter bid by WPP (WPP LN), arguably the most acquisitive firm the creative industry has ever seen. Presumably there are terms in the original agreement that prevent such a bid, but with Asatsu terminating the agreement, it isn't easy to see how the terms can be enforced (assuming that Asatsu's move does prove to be legal).The only article that I have seen that even…

Asatsu (9747) - Are Chances of a Counter Bid Being Underplayed?

<p>On October 2nd, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/8715" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:8715:1">Asatsu Dk Inc (9747 JP)</a> (hereafter "ADK") announced it had decided to terminate its 19-year Alliance with <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/22213" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:22213:1">WPP PLC (WPP LN)</a> and had sent a termination letter; ADK also announced the cancellation of its dividend, a new corporate strategy, the hedging of what appears to be most or all of its position in WPP shares, that Bain Capital would launch a tender offer at ¥3,660/share to purchase 50.1% or more of ADK, and that the board of directors recommended the Bain Capital Tender Offer.</p><p>…</p>

On October 2nd, Asatsu Dk Inc (9747 JP) (hereafter "ADK") announced it had decided to terminate its 19-year Alliance with WPP PLC (WPP LN) and had sent a termination letter; ADK also announced the cancellation of its dividend, a new corporate strategy, the hedging of what appears to be most or all of its position in WPP shares, that Bain Capital would launch a tender offer at ¥3,660/share to purchase 50.1% or more of ADK, and that the board of directors recommended the Bain Capital Tender Offer.…

Bain's Bid for ADK: Silchester and WPP Both Say "Undervalued" But Not Clear Why

Japan

ASATSU-DK INC. is an advertising agency which places advertisement in magazines, newspapers, TV, and radio.  The Company also plans and produces events such as sales promotions.  Asatsu-DK also publishes magazines and books.

Price Gauge
52-week Range	0.00 - 0.00
Market Cap (USDm)	0.00
P/E	0.00
Dividend (Yield)	0.00