Pan-Asia Catalysts/Events, Quiddity Advisors

Travis Lundy

Pan-Asia Catalysts/Events

Quiddity Advisors

Event-Driven

<div>
<p><em>This insight covers a bit of history, a bit of teaching about how TOPIX works, a bit about the foreseeable events, and a bit of the fundamentals of the company. If you think you know all that, please don't hesitate to jump immediately to the bottom section where there is a Thin Red Line across the screen and a section titled Short &amp; Sweet Version. That is also the conclusions. </em></p>
<hr>
<h3>The Background</h3>
<p>At the end of March 2016, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/hitachi-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:7797:1" rel="noopener">Hitachi Ltd (6501 JP)</a>,  <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/hitachi-transport-system-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:2395:1" rel="noopener">Hitachi Transport System (9086 JP)</a>, and as-yet unlisted <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/sg-holdings-co-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:26070:1" rel="noopener">SG Holdings (9143 JP)</a>  <a href="https://www.hitachi.com/New/cnews/month/2016/03/f_160330a.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">announced</a> Hitachi Transport was going to spend ¥66.3bn to buy a 20% stake in the unlisted delivery subsidiary (Sagawa Express) of then still-unlisted <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/sg-holdings-co-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:26070:1" rel="noopener">SG Holdings (9143 JP)</a>, forming a capital and business tie-up looking to merge "within three years" (i.e. merger by 1 April 2019). <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/hitachi-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:7797:1" rel="noopener">Hitachi Ltd (6501 JP)</a> was going to sell a 29% stake (out of the 59% they owned) in Hitachi Transport for ¥87.5 billion to SG. They were both going to expand strongly outside of Asia.  HTS was known at the time for its 3PL and "Smart Logistics" capabilities to make customer supply chains more efficient, etc, whereas Sagawa was known as a top last-mile delivery business. The combined entity was set to overtake <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/yamato-holdings-co-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:2:1" rel="noopener">Yamato Holdings (9064 JP)</a> in terms of revenue and get closer to industry top dog <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/nippon-express-co-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:18582:1" rel="noopener">Nippon Express (9062 JP)</a>. It was supposed to help SG improve margins by doing more in B2B. </p>
</div><div>
<p>SG IPOed in late 2017. Three years came and went. Nothing happened. There were a few collaborative projects but it was slow-going, and there were signs of friction. In May 2019 a Medium Term Management Plan (with no mention of SG or Sagawa) was announced, and the Nikkei carried an interview with HTS President Nakatani who said, when asked about the integration..</p>
<blockquote><p>"I am aware that we are moving toward integration. I would like to harmonize future directions." [Nikkei: He showed a positive attitude...] "We have decided to discuss and consider the possibility of business integration, but we have not made any decisions, including any start to discussions."</p></blockquote>
<p>On September 25 last year, the Diamond Online let fly a scoop saying the capital and business tie-up between the two was going to be scrapped. HTS shares fell 10+%. </p>
<div>
<p>Hitachi Transport's first release to the exchange said the article wasn't based on information they announced and that it was not going to be a dissolution of the capital tie-up, just a re-arranging of the deckchairs and a board meeting was going on and there would be an announcement within the day. HTS shares - at that point down 7% on the day - bounced sharply (they closed down 4%).</p>
<p>The announcement after the close talked about a "partial modification" of the business and capital tie-up, but it involved HTS selling its 20% stake in Sagawa Express, and buying back 27.675mm of the 32.35mm shares of HTS SG held. It was almost a full unwind. SG managed to sell fewer than 27.675mm shares in the ToSTNeT-3 transaction as others also jumped in to sell. </p>
<p>My conclusion was to NOT sell that despite the opportunity to be able to do so in size. My conclusion was bullish HTS and basically bearish SG. </p>
<section class="figure"><figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/226/591/original/Screenshot+2021-08-28+at+4.14.40+PM.png?1630138493" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="226591"></figure></section><p>That didn't work so well in the first ten weeks, with the share price ratio falling 20% from 1.252 to 1.00 by 1 December 2020. </p>
<p>When the TSE announced its new listing criteria for TSE Prime, there was going to be trouble. There had to be 35% of shares "tradable" and by that time, the register looked as follows:</p>
<section class="figure"><figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/226/604/original/Screenshot+2021-08-28+at+5.41.44+PM.png?1630143753" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="226604"></figure><p></p></section><p>It did not clear the 35%v threshold (it would have been fine but for the large number of public sellers in the 28 September ToSTNeT-3 transaction.) </p>
<p>By early February 2020, the HTS/SG ratio had reached the ratio of that fateful day announcing the split and by mid-June, the ratio was 26% higher in 9 months. So I am now happier with that call from the past.</p>
<section class="figure"><figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/226/603/original/Screenshot+2021-08-28+at+5.35.44+PM.png?1630143372" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="226603"></figure><p></p></section><p>On 20 April 2021, SG Holdings announced they had sold 4.6mm shares (at JPY 3,119.5). And on 20 May (the yellow dot on the blue line in the chart above), HTS <a href="https://www.hitachi-transportsystem.com/en/news/pdf/20210520_Cancellation%20of%20Treasury%20Shares.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">announced</a> it would cancel 6,975,786 shares (6.2% of shs out) in order to put tradable shares back above 35%. In fact, the sale by SG had done that, and the market did not react. But it was a start, and it kept Hitachi Transport in the TSE Prime section and therefore the TOPIX Index when it launches in April 2022 because tradable shares were back above 35%. </p>
<section class="figure"><section class="figure"><figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/226/605/original/Screenshot+2021-08-28+at+5.42.00+PM.png?1630143772" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="226605"></figure><p></p></section></section><p>But there were still a lot of Treasury Shares, which as per the 6 May <a href="https://www.hitachi-transportsystem.com/en/ir/library/presentations/pdf/Presentation%20Material%20of%20financial%20results%20for%20FY2020.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Results Presentation</a>, included the use of stock (and cash) for alliance and M&amp;A. </p>
<section class="figure"><figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/226/594/original/Screenshot+2021-08-28+at+4.29.03+PM.png?1630139904" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="226594"></figure></section><p>With the shares rallying, on 19 August, the company <a href="https://www.hitachi-transportsystem.com/en/news/pdf/20210819_Cancellation%20of%20Treasury%20Shares.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">announced</a> that on 3 September, they would cancel 20,699,214 shares out (19.8% of total shares out), leaving treasury shares of 228,308. That would put Hitachi to just under 40% (where there is no question of consolidation if Hitachi Transport doesn't want), it puts SG Holdings to 9.8% (i.e. still below 10%), and puts the public at greater than 50%. </p>
<section class="figure"><section class="figure"><figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/226/606/original/Screenshot+2021-08-28+at+5.42.15+PM.png?1630143788" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="226606"></figure><p></p></section><p>The shares reacted well to that too. </p></section><div class="content-highlight">
<p><strong>But all this creates a curious problem. </strong></p>
<p>The float is now 50%, vs 41% pre-selldown, and 33.6% post-dealbreak, and the stock will stay in Prime.</p>
<p>But there is selling to come. </p>
</div>
<p>More below the fold. </p>
<p></p>
</div>
</div>


This insight covers a bit of history, a bit of teaching about how TOPIX works, a bit about the foreseeable events, and a bit of the fundamentals of the company. If you think you know all that, please don't hesitate to jump immediately to the bottom section where there is a Thin Red Line across the screen and a section titled Short &amp; Sweet Version. That is also the conclusions. 

The Background
At the end of March 2016, Hitachi Ltd (6501 JP),  Hitachi Transport System (9086 JP), and as-yet unlisted SG Holdings (9143 JP)  announced Hitachi Transport was going to spend ¥66.3bn to buy a 20% stake in the unlisted delivery subsidiary (Sagawa Express) of then still-unlisted SG Holdings (9143 JP), forming a capital and business tie-up looking to merge "within three years" (i.e. merger by 1 April 2019). Hitachi Ltd (6501 JP) was going to sell a 29% stake (out of the 59% they owned) in Hitachi Transport for ¥87.5 billion to SG. They were both going to expand strongly outside of Asia.  HTS was known at the time for its 3PL and "Smart Logistics" capabilities to make customer supply chains more efficient, etc, whereas Sagawa was known as a top last-mile delivery business. The combined entity was set to overtake Yamato Holdings (9064 JP) in terms of revenue and get closer to industry top dog Nippon Express (9062 JP). It was supposed to help SG improve margins by doing more in B2B. 

SG IPOed in late 2017. Three years came and went. Nothing happened. There were a few collaborative projects but it was slow-going, and there were signs of friction. In May 2019 a Medium Term Management Plan (with no mention of SG or Sagawa) was announced, and the Nikkei carried an interview with HTS President Nakatani who said, when asked about the integration..
"I am aware that we are moving toward integration. I would like to harmonize future directions." [Nikkei: He showed a positive attitude...] "We have decided to discuss and consider the possibility of business integration, but we have not made any decisions, including any start to discussions."
On September 25 last year, the Diamond Online let fly a scoop saying the capital and business tie-up between the two was going to be scrapped. HTS shares fell 10+%. 

Hitachi Transport's first release to the exchange said the article wasn't based on information they announced and that it was not going to be a dissolution of the capital tie-up, just a re-arranging of the deckchairs and a board meeting was going on and there would be an announcement within the day. HTS shares - at that point down 7% on the day - bounced sharply (they closed down 4%).
The announcement after the close talked about a "partial modification" of the business and capital tie-up, but it involved HTS selling its 20% stake in Sagawa Express, and buying back 27.675mm of the 32.35mm shares of HTS SG held. It was almost a full unwind. SG managed to sell fewer than 27.675mm shares in the ToSTNeT-3 transaction as others also jumped in to sell. 
My conclusion was to NOT sell that despite the opportunity to be able to do so in size. My conclusion was bullish HTS and basically bearish SG. 
That didn't work so well in the first ten weeks, with the share price ratio falling 20% from 1.252 to 1.00 by 1 December 2020. 
When the TSE announced its new listing criteria for TSE Prime, there was going to be trouble. There had to be 35% of shares "tradable" and by that time, the register looked as follows:
It did not clear the 35%v threshold (it would have been fine but for the large number of public sellers in the 28 September ToSTNeT-3 transaction.) 
By early February 2020, the HTS/SG ratio had reached the ratio of that fateful day announcing the split and by mid-June, the ratio was 26% higher in 9 months. So I am now happier with that call from the past.
On 20 April 2021, SG Holdings announced they had sold 4.6mm shares (at JPY 3,119.5). And on 20 May (the yellow dot on the blue line in the chart above), HTS announced it would cancel 6,975,786 shares (6.2% of shs out) in order to put tradable shares back above 35%. In fact, the sale by SG had done that, and the market did not react. But it was a start, and it kept Hitachi Transport in the TSE Prime section and therefore the TOPIX Index when it launches in April 2022 because tradable shares were back above 35%. 
But there were still a lot of Treasury Shares, which as per the 6 May Results Presentation, included the use of stock (and cash) for alliance and M&amp;A. 
With the shares rallying, on 19 August, the company announced that on 3 September, they would cancel 20,699,214 shares out (19.8% of total shares out), leaving treasury shares of 228,308. That would put Hitachi to just under 40% (where there is no question of consolidation if Hitachi Transport doesn't want), it puts SG Holdings to 9.8% (i.e. still below 10%), and puts the public at greater than 50%. 
The shares reacted well to that too. 
But all this creates a curious problem. 
The float is now 50%, vs 41% pre-selldown, and 33.6% post-dealbreak, and the stock will stay in Prime.
But there is selling to come. 

More below the fold. 




Hitachi Transport Uncoupled - TSE Prime, Price Popping, And Supply To Come

Senior Bank Analyst - Japanese Banks, Windamee Research

J. Brian Waterhouse

Senior Bank Analyst - Japanese Banks

Windamee Research

Japanese Banks

Equity Bottom-Up

Mizuho Financial Group / Equity Bottom-Up

<p>On Monday 23 August, Mizuho Bank suffered its 6<sup>th</sup> systems failure so far this year.  This time, some 130 of its around 5,300 ATMs stopped working for about an hour just after noon.  This comes in the wake of last Friday’s <em>débâcle</em>, when the bank opened its doors for business at 09:00am but none of the computer terminals at its counters nationwide would function properly.  Are these repeated systems failures simply a hardware problem, a software problem, or is the fundamental problem a more human one?</p>
<p>While management searches for solutions, and the inevitable finger-pointing continues, the bank’s reputation erodes.  The damage to the share price of parent company Mizuho Financial Group (8411 JP) has so far been comparatively light, but for how much longer?  MHFG has markedly underperformed its two megabank rivals <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/mitsubishi-ufj-financial-group" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:218:1" rel="noopener">Mitsubishi UFJ Financial (MUFG) (8306 JP)</a> and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/sumitomo-mitsui-financial-group-inc" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:217:1" rel="noopener">Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group (8316 JP)</a> so far this year in a rising market, with its stock price up just +6.5% YoY against MUFG’s +34.6% and SMFG’s +21.3%, respectively.  Foreign investors still own in aggregate over 22% of MHFG’s stock, but their patience is being sorely tested.  Further revelations of systems mishaps, or punitive actions by the FSA against MHFG, may well lead to a swift exit by some shareholders; a sell-off cannot be ruled out.</p>
<p><em>Caveat Emptor!</em> (May the Buyer Beware!) remains our advice to would-be investors in this enormous but highly volatile banking group.</p>

On Monday 23 August, Mizuho Bank suffered its 6th systems failure so far this year.  This time, some 130 of its around 5,300 ATMs stopped working for about an hour just after noon.  This comes in the wake of last Friday’s débâcle, when the bank opened its doors for business at 09:00am but none of the computer terminals at its counters nationwide would function properly.  Are these repeated systems failures simply a hardware problem, a software problem, or is the fundamental problem a more human one?
While management searches for solutions, and the inevitable finger-pointing continues, the bank’s reputation erodes.  The damage to the share price of parent company Mizuho Financial Group (8411 JP) has so far been comparatively light, but for how much longer?  MHFG has markedly underperformed its two megabank rivals Mitsubishi UFJ Financial (MUFG) (8306 JP) and Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group (8316 JP) so far this year in a rising market, with its stock price up just +6.5% YoY against MUFG’s +34.6% and SMFG’s +21.3%, respectively.  Foreign investors still own in aggregate over 22% of MHFG’s stock, but their patience is being sorely tested.  Further revelations of systems mishaps, or punitive actions by the FSA against MHFG, may well lead to a swift exit by some shareholders; a sell-off cannot be ruled out.
Caveat Emptor! (May the Buyer Beware!) remains our advice to would-be investors in this enormous but highly volatile banking group.

Mizuho Financial Group (8411 JP):  Systemic Failures - A Human Factor?

Head of Research, IPOs & Placements, Aequitas Research

Sumeet Singh

Head of Research, IPOs & Placements

IPOs and Placements coverage across Asia Pacific

Aequitas Research

We cover all listing across the Asia Pacific along with follow-up placements. As of Dec 2020, our team had covered 539 IPOs with a hit rate of 73.5% and 685 placements with a hit rate of 66.8%.

We combine fundamental bottom-up views with our proprietary quantitative framework to provide a holistic coverage across new listings and placements. Our coverage includes pre-IPO notes before the deal is launched, follow-up analysis once the deal is live and post-listing trading analysis as well.

Equity Capital Markets

Resonac Holdings  / Equity Capital Markets

<p><a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/showa-denko-k-k" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:1496:1" rel="noopener">Showa Denko K.K. (4004 JP)</a> aims to raise around US$745m via a global follow-on offering. Proceeds from the placement will be used to finance its planned capex across its different business segments.</p><p>In this note, we will talk about the deal dynamics and run the deal through our ECM framework.</p>

Showa Denko K.K. (4004 JP) aims to raise around US$745m via a global follow-on offering. Proceeds from the placement will be used to finance its planned capex across its different business segments.In this note, we will talk about the deal dynamics and run the deal through our ECM framework.

Showa Denko Placement - Relatively Large Deal, past Deal Didn’t Do Well

<p><em>Gotōbi</em> (or 五十日 in Japanese) is any date with a ‘5’ or a ‘0’ in it.  In Japan, traditionally, it is a day when money owed is collected and accounts due are settled.  Fridays are always busy days commercially, but when Friday is also a <em>gotōbi</em> things get particularly hectic.  It is a busy day for the banks, too, with a noticeable rise in customer visits to branches and a surge in across-counter transactions, especially in cash and securities.</p><p>Last Friday, 20<sup>th</sup> August 2021, was a <em>gotōbi.</em> Imagine, then, the horror that seized bank staff at all 450+ branches of Mizuho Bank (not to mention at its sister organisation Mizuho Trust Bank, where the same thing happened), as 09:00am bank opening time approached, customers were queuing up, and they realised that none of the computer terminals at their counters were working.  None of them; nationwide.</p><p>Curiously, all the ATMs (source of two previous systems failures) were working normally, as was Mizuho Bank’s Internet banking platform, ‘Mizuho Direct’.  By 10:00am on Friday, most operations were back up and running (except for some foreign currency remittances) and by midday all systems appear to have returned to normal operation.  Management is still trying to establish the cause of the glitch.</p><p>This now makes the 5<sup>th</sup> time in 2021 that Mizuho Bank, the principal commercial banking subsidiary of megabank holding company <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/mizuho-financial-group-inc" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:219:1" rel="noopener">Mizuho Financial Group (8411 JP)</a> (MHFG), has had a systems failure.  That it happened on a <em>gotōbi</em> was embarrassing enough in view of the inconvenience to the many customers visiting the bank’s branches at the time.  Doubly embarrassing for management, inspectors from the Financial Services Agency (FSA) were in the process of winding-up their detailed and long inspection of the bank over the four previous systems malfunctions, with a view to deciding whether the bank should be disciplined for the successive failures through the issuance of a Business Correction Order.  That issuance would now seem to be an inevitability.  A formal demand for a detailed report into the incident (報告微求命令 or <em>hōkoku bikyū meirei</em> in Japanese) has already been issued by the FSA to Mizuho Trust Bank as well as to the parent MHFG.</p><p>Senior management clearly has much to do in the wake of this latest incident to restore Mizuho’s reputation among customers as a brand that is synonymous with reliability.</p><p>As we have said in past Smartkarma Insights, MHFG’s lack of consistency, either in profit generation or management execution, makes this a difficult stock to recommend on fundamentals.  This latest systems <em>débâcle </em>will not improve its already battered reputation.  MHFG has time and again promised much but then has either failed to deliver or has surprised the market with sudden sweeping changes in strategy, requiring long time-horizons for implementation and where ultimately delivering value remains frustratingly elusive.</p><p><em>Caveat Emptor!</em> (May the Buyer Beware!) remains our advice to would-be investors in this enormous but highly volatile banking group.</p>

Gotōbi (or 五十日 in Japanese) is any date with a ‘5’ or a ‘0’ in it.  In Japan, traditionally, it is a day when money owed is collected and accounts due are settled.  Fridays are always busy days commercially, but when Friday is also a gotōbi things get particularly hectic.  It is a busy day for the banks, too, with a noticeable rise in customer visits to branches and a surge in across-counter transactions, especially in cash and securities.Last Friday, 20th August 2021, was a gotōbi. Imagine, then, the horror that seized bank staff at all 450+ branches of Mizuho Bank (not to mention at its sister organisation Mizuho Trust Bank, where the same thing happened), as 09:00am bank opening time approached, customers were queuing up, and they realised that none of the computer terminals at their counters were working.  None of them; nationwide.Curiously, all the ATMs (source of two previous systems failures) were working normally, as was Mizuho Bank’s Internet banking platform, ‘Mizuho Direct’.  By 10:00am on Friday, most operations were back up and running (except for some foreign currency remittances) and by midday all systems appear to have returned to normal operation.  Management is still trying to establish the cause of the glitch.This now makes the 5th time in 2021 that Mizuho Bank, the principal commercial banking subsidiary of megabank holding company Mizuho Financial Group (8411 JP) (MHFG), has had a systems failure.  That it happened on a gotōbi was embarrassing enough in view of the inconvenience to the many customers visiting the bank’s branches at the time.  Doubly embarrassing for management, inspectors from the Financial Services Agency (FSA) were in the process of winding-up their detailed and long inspection of the bank over the four previous systems malfunctions, with a view to deciding whether the bank should be disciplined for the successive failures through the issuance of a Business Correction Order.  That issuance would now seem to be an inevitability.  A formal demand for a detailed report into the incident (報告微求命令 or hōkoku bikyū meirei in Japanese) has already been issued by the FSA to Mizuho Trust Bank as well as to the parent MHFG.Senior management clearly has much to do in the wake of this latest incident to restore Mizuho’s reputation among customers as a brand that is synonymous with reliability.As we have said in past Smartkarma Insights, MHFG’s lack of consistency, either in profit generation or management execution, makes this a difficult stock to recommend on fundamentals.  This latest systems débâcle will not improve its already battered reputation.  MHFG has time and again promised much but then has either failed to deliver or has surprised the market with sudden sweeping changes in strategy, requiring long time-horizons for implementation and where ultimately delivering value remains frustratingly elusive.Caveat Emptor! (May the Buyer Beware!) remains our advice to would-be investors in this enormous but highly volatile banking group.

Mizuho Financial Group (8411 JP):  Gotohbi Gremlins

Japan/Asia Long-Short, LightStream Research

Mio Kato

Japan/Asia Long-Short

Long-Short Analysis on Japan, Asia and the World

LightStream Research

LightStream conducts quantitatively rigorous and data-driven analysis with a focus on Japan and Asia.

We consistently cover the Tech, Consumer and Industrial sectors, and provide ECM and Events coverage more broadly.

We supplement traditional qualitative insights from company relationships with a robust quantitative foundation that examines as much historical data as is available.
We further refine the accuracy of our insights and calls through the use of alternative data to flesh out current trends, and through a valuation framework that emphasises non-superficial peer group selection and a proper attempt to understand the metrics and changes that have driven security valuations in the past.

Hitachi Construction Machinery / Equity Bottom-Up

<p>HCM announced slightly concerning 1Q results yesterday as despite a strong revenue beat (12% above consensus), OP missed by 10%. This is a result of gross margin continuing to undershoot and it is unclear when this issue might be resolved.</p>

HCM announced slightly concerning 1Q results yesterday as despite a strong revenue beat (12% above consensus), OP missed by 10%. This is a result of gross margin continuing to undershoot and it is unclear when this issue might be resolved.

Japan

Hitachi, Ltd. manufactures communications and electronic equipment, heavy electrical and industrial machinery, and consumer electronics.  The Company's diverse product line ranges from nuclear power systems to kitchen appliances. Hitachi also operates subsidiaries in the wire and cable, metal, and chemical industries.

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Hitachi Ltd (6501 JP)

Hitachi Transport Uncoupled - TSE Prime, Price Popping, And Supply To Come

Not quite a year ago, Hitachi Transport consciously uncoupled from SG. A buyback, selldown, squeeze has left HTS with lower float and higher price....

Travis Lundy

Mizuho Financial Group (8411 JP): Systemic Failures - A Human Factor?

Mizuho Bank has now had 6 systems failures so far this year. Are these repeated systems failures simply a hardware problem, a software problem, or...

J. Brian Waterhouse

Showa Denko Placement - Relatively Large Deal, past Deal Didn’t Do Well

Showa Denko K.K. (4004 JP) aims to raise around US$745m via a global follow-on offering. Proceeds from the placement will be used to finance its...

Sumeet Singh

Mizuho Financial Group (8411 JP): Gotohbi Gremlins

Mizuho Bank has suffered its 5th systems failure so far this year, and the FSA is not amused. Neither should shareholders be. Caveat Emptor! (May...

J. Brian Waterhouse

HCM – Miss on Margins

HCM announced slightly concerning 1Q results yesterday as gross margin continues to undershoot and it is unclear when this issue might be resolved.

Mio Kato

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