Wirecard AG (WDI AG): MCAMathematik Strongly Support Wirecard's Viability.

Wirecard AG (WDI GR): More Analysis of the Source of Current Saga Shows WDI Is Telling the Truth

European Event-Driven Analyst

Patryk Basiewicz

PGB Research

Forensic Accounting

<p>On June 18th, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/wirecard-ag" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:21743:1" rel="noopener">Wirecard AG (WDI GR)</a> will announce its much-belated fiscal 2019 results. The focus will be on the auditor ability to sign off the accounts. The concern is that revenues and profits associated with Wirecard's third-party business are false and were fabricated. The saga started in 2019 when the Financial Times ("FT") published persuasive evidence suggesting that the third-party business may lead to irregularities. This conclusion seemed to be substantively informed by a series of Excel workbooks that were supplied by a whistleblower(s) to the FT. Special audit by KMPG could not validate those flows, but it did not find any reasons to doubt their veracity either.  So, Wirecard investment case hinges on "faith" and "gut feels".</p>
<p>I believe that looking at the data that started this saga is a natural place to look for hints that can help investors gauge probabilities concerning Wirecard's validity. I analyse the data in the workbooks supplied to the FT by using statistical properties of naturally-occurring numbers, or specifically, Benford-style analysis. Below, I analyse data that relates to Al Alam, and another ignored (or missed) dataset in the whistleblower sheets provided to the FT that can serve as a robustness check.</p>

On June 18th, Wirecard AG (WDI GR) will announce its much-belated fiscal 2019 results. The focus will be on the auditor ability to sign off the accounts. The concern is that revenues and profits associated with Wirecard's third-party business are false and were fabricated. The saga started in 2019 when the Financial Times ("FT") published persuasive evidence suggesting that the third-party business may lead to irregularities. This conclusion seemed to be substantively informed by a series of Excel workbooks that were supplied by a whistleblower(s) to the FT. Special audit by KMPG could not validate those flows, but it did not find any reasons to doubt their veracity either.  So, Wirecard investment case hinges on "faith" and "gut feels".
I believe that looking at the data that started this saga is a natural place to look for hints that can help investors gauge probabilities concerning Wirecard's validity. I analyse the data in the workbooks supplied to the FT by using statistical properties of naturally-occurring numbers, or specifically, Benford-style analysis. Below, I analyse data that relates to Al Alam, and another ignored (or missed) dataset in the whistleblower sheets provided to the FT that can serve as a robustness check.

Wirecard AG (WDI GR): Statistical Analysis of Data that Stated It All Gives WDI a Pass