Pan-Asia Catalysts/Events, Quiddity Advisors

Travis Lundy

HK Type 4 license through Ballingal Investment Advisors Ltd. ("BIA" or "BIAL")

BACKGROUND
I have 20+yrs experience in Asia doing alternative strategies (i.e. non-delta1 non long-only) in fixed income, equity derivatives, and activist/catalyst/event-driven and long-short equity strategies with most of that time spent managing money. 

4 years in fixed income macro, 8 years running internal hedge fund and 4yrs investment banking at Citi in Japan, 3 years running an Asia multi-strat portfolio at a hedge fund, 4+yrs as an independent special situations analyst.

Pan-Asia Catalysts/Events

JR West – Lacking Advantages Compared to JR Kyushu

Gravity Works As WeWork Doesn't; Now Plan B

Quiddity Advisors

Event-Driven

<a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/west-japan-railway-co" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:12077:1" rel="noopener">West Japan Railway Co (9021 JP)</a>  is one of the first three listed JR companies (along with <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/east-japan-railway-co" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:14271:1" rel="noopener">East Japan Railway Co (9020 JP)</a> and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/central-japan-railway-co" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:13520:1" rel="noopener">Central Japan Railway Co (9022 JP)</a>) and was always the smallest, in size and investor interest, until <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/kyushu-railway-company" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:23609:1" rel="noopener">Kyushu Railway Company (9142 JP)</a> came along. JR West has "always" traded at a lower EV/EBITDA, EV/EBIT, and PER than a basket of its peers. For a long time that was due to lower ROAs and higher debt/EBITDA. Now ROAs have basically matched the basket of peers and so pre and post-covid, ROEs looked OK. Covid hit hard. Inbound tourism fell, business travel fell, commuting use fell, costs didn't. Gross margins which had been 22-27% for most of the last 20 years fell below zero. Revenues fell by 40%. Four Zero Percent. That is huge for a transport utility.  This is the same story for all the rails, but more for some than others.   The stock is down 50% from late 2019 highs. The question is whether that is enough. <section class="figure"><figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/227/967/original/Screenshot+2021-09-05+at+10.36.27+AM.png?1630809405" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="227967"></figure></section>Last week on 1 September, the company <a href="https://www.westjr.co.jp/global/en/ir/news/2022/pdf/en_20210901.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">announced</a> an offering of 51+mm shares including greenshoe, split 40/60 international/domestic. That is about 40 days volume and after the stock fell 15%, is worth about ¥260bn. The company has a large number of retail shareholders, and a very heavy passive and cross-holding ownership. It has a relatively low active institutional ownership - domestic or foreign. With the dividend down 40+% it still yields ~2% because of where the stock has fallen. Even better for some potential holders, the kabunushi yutai yield is 5+%, and up to 9% if one optimises (and rides the shinkansen, stays in hotels, and eats at restaurants in hotels). That may make it a selling point to some, but institutional investors don't get that benefit, so that aspect alone may not get all of the deal sold.There is an interesting story of Historical Cheapness vs Supply vs Benefits along with large passive ownership and decent-to-large passive demand for the offering. More below the fold.

West Japan Railway Co (9021 JP)  is one of the first three listed JR companies (along with East Japan Railway Co (9020 JP) and Central Japan Railway Co (9022 JP)) and was always the smallest, in size and investor interest, until Kyushu Railway Company (9142 JP) came along. JR West has "always" traded at a lower EV/EBITDA, EV/EBIT, and PER than a basket of its peers. For a long time that was due to lower ROAs and higher debt/EBITDA. Now ROAs have basically matched the basket of peers and so pre and post-covid, ROEs looked OK. Covid hit hard. Inbound tourism fell, business travel fell, commuting use fell, costs didn't. Gross margins which had been 22-27% for most of the last 20 years fell below zero. Revenues fell by 40%. Four Zero Percent. That is huge for a transport utility.  This is the same story for all the rails, but more for some than others.   The stock is down 50% from late 2019 highs. The question is whether that is enough. Last week on 1 September, the company announced an offering of 51+mm shares including greenshoe, split 40/60 international/domestic. That is about 40 days volume and after the stock fell 15%, is worth about ¥260bn. The company has a large number of retail shareholders, and a very heavy passive and cross-holding ownership. It has a relatively low active institutional ownership - domestic or foreign. With the dividend down 40+% it still yields ~2% because of where the stock has fallen. Even better for some potential holders, the kabunushi yutai yield is 5+%, and up to 9% if one optimises (and rides the shinkansen, stays in hotels, and eats at restaurants in hotels). That may make it a selling point to some, but institutional investors don't get that benefit, so that aspect alone may not get all of the deal sold.There is an interesting story of Historical Cheapness vs Supply vs Benefits along with large passive ownership and decent-to-large passive demand for the offering. More below the fold. 

JR West (9021 JP) Offering - Supply Vs Yutai+Passive Demand