Global Gaming and Casinos Industry Specialist, Casino Business Review LLC

Howard J Klein

I am a 25+ year c-level executive of the casino industry in operations, marketing, international development and strategic planning. Currently, a consultant specializing in the casino space. Industry expert contributor and publisher of a subscription letter called "The House Edge". Extensive experience in marketing and development in the Asian gaming market while a senior executive at Caesars, Ballys Grand and Trump Taj Mahal.
Part of senior executive teams that valued acquisitions and mergers with companies in the casino, hotel, d entertainment rant  and restaurant space.

Global Gaming and Casinos Industry Specialist

Equity Bottom-Up

Huayi Tencent Entertainment / Equity Bottom-Up

<ul>
<li>Movie World park is first stage in long term plan for 20 "movie theme" cities in China.</li>
<li>Jack Ma's investment in company has grown since 2015: Its film finance.</li>
<li>Company sees licensing of intellectual property rather than brick and mortar as key to best asset deployment as they diversify.</li>
</ul>The Walt Disney Company’s just released 1Q19 earnings report held an upside surprise of $1.84 a share beating consensus of $1.57. Revenues of US$15.5bn also beat analysts expectations of US$15.180bn. Filmed entertainment was down due to tough comps from last year’s blockbuster releases. Network TV was up. But what commands our attention in this insight is results from Disney theme parks: All units showed flat to modest growth in attendance, with revenue up primarily due to raised prices. Disney Shanghai was softer than last year attributed to the economic slowdown. Yet theme parks continue to lead the Disney business units year in and year out. Reviewing that result in the light of ongoing research I have been working at on Asia theme park prospects, I focused in on Huayi Brothers. Their movie themed park at Suzhou opened last July. While it is too early to make a long term call on the film company’s diversification into theme parks, their move to monetize their intellectual property in that space foretells more diversification ahead. The Disney business model appears to be proceeding. Huayi Brothers Media Corporation (SHE: 300027)<figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/078/249/original/ZI-3GGO-2011-JUL00-IDSI-96-1.jpeg?1549636221" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="78249"></figure><div class="content-caption">HB structure is building on diversity of IP</div>(All amounts shown in CNY except where otherwise noted). Since an ebullient IPO debut in 2009, when on October 23rd, HB stock skyrocketed to 63.66yuan trading was halted, the stock price has since been both spiked and rocked by events. Most recently, it fell 21% last June when news of the details of a sketchy performance contract for one of HB’s top female stars made headlines. She appeared to have made an effort to disguise her salary. The scandal broke on television. It has triggered an investigation by Beijing officials. Promptly HB founder and Chairman Dennis Wang pledged US$16m to bolster confidence the shares amid continuing disputations between the parties to the scandal. On a positive note, during the last five year period, Alibaba’s (NYSE:BABA) Jack Ma announced he was investing US$103M over 5 years to finance the production of 10 HB films. On that news the shares had spiked 6.6%. There are also standing deals with real estate operator Evergrande Group (HK3333) and Tencent Holding(OTC) to deploy HB intellectual property names and brands into theme parks and online social gaming. Out of this mix of headwinds and tailwinds in the already volatile China entertainment/film sector, we arrive at a point where HB shares have taken a long, sustained beating. We are moved to believe that now rubbing up against a 5 year low, is the stock its worthy of attention for investors who have a risk profile. One needs to be comfortable with HB’s gyrating past trading patterns to see opportunity in its future as a “Disney in the making” in the words of a film executive friend from Hong Kong. Price at writing: 4.51 (52wk low 4.06)5 year high: June 5 2015: 23.261 year high: (2018): 10.143 year high: May 23 2016: 14.303 year low: 4.70 Market cap at writing: 12.61bnP/E 15.11EPS: 0.30Revenue: 3.93bnRevenue growth: 12.7%EBITDA: 625mLTD AT WRITING: 5.92bnEquity: 10.5bnBook value: 3.58bn To get a sense of how major institutional investors were responding to the roller coaster rides of the HB trade we note here that Vanguard International Stock Index Emerging Market Fund, one of HB’s biggest investors, is still holding its position at writing 2,727,202 shares of valued at 23,567,346bn cny. The Disney strategy The company began as a film production studio in 1994 and has since expanded its TV, internet, movie theaters, talent agencies and more recently, theme parks. It is its foray into the theme park space that is the clearest expression of its “Disneyesque” business model. Last July HB opened a 400,000 square meter theme park at Suzhou called “Movie World”. They announced it was the first in a series of 20 “film cities parks” they would create by providing intellectual property from their film hits partnered with realty developers.<figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/078/250/original/HB-Movie-World-Suzhou.jpg?1549636329" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="78250"></figure><div class="content-caption">The movie world complex: A beginning</div> In a study of the China film industry from Deloite Global published in 2017, the researchers noted, “With Disney as its model, HB has launched a “de-cinematic” strategy that integrates the traditional film business, internet entertainment, location-based entertainment, expanding to upstream and downstream industry chains to alleviate dependence on the film industry.” Current estimates are that HB revenues continue heavily in film with over 85.% of its total sales from that sector, another 7.8% from internet entertainment, and 6.6.% from brand licensing. All others contribute 0.8%. However its going forward strategy is not to deploy hard capex on actually building theme parks but to partner with such realty operators like Evergrande as an intellectual property provider. This veers from a Disney formula since that company has financed and developed its theme parks internally from land acquisition to design, construction and operations. But it does comport with the core Disney strategy of monetizing intellectual property sprung from its films. The China film industry is notably dominated by the top 15 companies, among which is HB. The sector is at the same time without a dominant cluster of “major” studios as is the case in the US and other markets. The division of market share among the top players run from the biggest, China Film, at about 4.3% to HB which at 1.3% clusters in the same area between 1% and 2% with at least 8 other producers. This is rooted in the global nature of the film business today where a given year or given share is not necessarily a function of financial or asset deployment power. It reflects in China as everywhere else, the success or failure of individual films from the number of blockbusters to the number of flops it may release in a given year.<figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/078/251/original/hbros-featured-1024x575.jpg?1549636427" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="78251"></figure><div class="content-caption">HB properties lend themselves to theme parks focused on fantasy</div> As Disney’s 1Q19 results show, its filmed entertainment unit was down y/y 2% in operating income largely due to 2018 comps that included several blockbuster films. At the same time, its theme parks were up 13%---almost entirely due to a 7% increase in average visitor spend. And that increase we learn, came almost entirely from raised prices. So the key here is the price elasticity in the theme park business that filmed entertainment does not necessarily provide. In China there is also a wrinkle to the film business that links box office grosses to the trade in studio stocks. Over the years there has been considerable concern as to the accuracy of box office grosses reported by some studios. Our Hong Kong associate in that field outlined the problem. This quote is a translation. “You have instances where studios or theater operators buy up seats in off peak times and theaters that are fundamentally empty. You have ghost grosses. They then report a film has done much bigger business than it actually has because they know that reports of big grosses have a direct effect on the trade of movie stocks. And you get this bizarre situation where the move guys produce phantom grosses to pump up their stock”. “Much of this practice has been cleaned up, particularly among the top companies like HB. But in an economic environment where there are still observers in the financial sector that are not entirely comfortable that Beijing’s own economic GDP, trade and monetary numbers are all that accurate, anything is possible”. One of the priorities long expressed by Xi Jinping has been to end the lack of confidence in government numbers. Clearly such practices as ghost numbers can migrate to the private sector. In any event, estimated ticket sales in 2018 are believed to be relatively accurate rising to nearly US$9bn. Theme Parks forward look: Aging out and creating new Theme parks in China are currently showing a 13% rate of growth through 2017 totaling 190m admissions. According to a theme park engineers AECOM study, China will surpass the US as the globe’s biggest theme park market by 2020. Pipeline projects, of which HB projects it will participate with movie themes, continue to dominate in south and east China locations with 42% of all projects scheduled to open there covering a population base of 528m.<figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/078/252/original/feng-xiaogang.jpg?1549636517" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="78252"></figure><div class="content-caption">One of HB's key creative sources and theming foundations Feng Xiaogang</div>Over 27% of all current pipeline projects are themed to fantasy/cartoon/movie media intellectual property bases. Projected Capex total for the theme part pipeline from 2018 through 2025 is 280bn. Investors in the theme park space also need to understand the ongoing need to keep pop culture icons sprung out of film blockbusters as fresh as possible. The reason is the inevitable “aging out” of the biggest, most formidable themes. Disney characters such as Mickey Mouse made their first appearances in films in the 1920’s US and did not go global until the 1960s-70s. The company has reworked the theming several times. Yet its newest attractions are those like Star Wars Galaxy Edge due to go live at Disney Parks by Q3 this year. The first Star Wars movie debuted in 1977. In brief, children in the 8 to 16 year old demographic cohort back then are now in their fifties. A long list of sequels through last year have kept the imagery and characters refreshed through successive generations. What Disney has done well is to package and repackage its core intellectual property stars like Mickey Mouse, Donald Duck and Toy Story characters like the cowboy to keep younger generations eager to experience the live attractions. This is the core dilemma of investing in any sector heavily dependent on creativity. The takeaway: An investment theory even based on shifting sands can sometime produce powerful results. Facing a fading film business, Walt Disney literally went into deep debt to develop the first Disneyland in 1955. Linked to a television series, the park had a built in marketing engine. Yet by the early 1980s, the aging out of the company’s core characters and poor results from its efforts in non-cartoon films, the stock had taken a hit. The board brought in a new executive team that repurposed its intellectual property, reimagined its animation business and went on to acquire valuable properties from third parties. So our conclusion is that the heart of an entertainment company lies in the capacity to reinvent its character stable and repurpose its original form to a diverse downstream set of revenue producing units. That is what we see in HB. Even though they began business in 1994, as far as their diversification strategy goes, its early stages. If they succeed in their theme park initiatives and other related businesses beyond filmed entertainment, their valuation could surge given the starting point of an effective 5 year low. Part of the forward valuation consideration needs to be the partnerships thus far achieved with Jack Ma ,Tencent, and Evergrande. Do these sophisticated investors see a potential Disney model flourishing downstream?So the question is this: Beyond standard investing metrics applied to HB, do investors need to consider a broader conception of how to value a company’s future. You can’t really measure a forward EBITDA number, or pluck a one year estimated PT out of what may spring from the imagination of the creative community where blockbuster ideas are generated. In the end, at its current low, HB may be a very cheap entry point if it can execute a “Disney-like strategy” over the next five to seven years as its theme park plans spread across the proposed 20 China cities. And the model is Disney. Every time the company appeared to run out of creative gas, it managed to find new inspiredproperties within the minds of its key creative people.So at its five year low we raise the question: Does the investment community see big rewards for HB exchanged for the risks implicit in the shifting sands of artists as opposed to projectable earnings metrics?


Movie World park is first stage in long term plan for 20 "movie theme" cities in China.
Jack Ma's investment in company has grown since 2015: Its film finance.
Company sees licensing of intellectual property rather than brick and mortar as key to best asset deployment as they diversify.
The Walt Disney Company’s just released 1Q19 earnings report held an upside surprise of $1.84 a share beating consensus of $1.57. Revenues of US$15.5bn also beat analysts expectations of US$15.180bn. Filmed entertainment was down due to tough comps from last year’s blockbuster releases. Network TV was up. But what commands our attention in this insight is results from Disney theme parks: All units showed flat to modest growth in attendance, with revenue up primarily due to raised prices. Disney Shanghai was softer than last year attributed to the economic slowdown. Yet theme parks continue to lead the Disney business units year in and year out. Reviewing that result in the light of ongoing research I have been working at on Asia theme park prospects, I focused in on Huayi Brothers. Their movie themed park at Suzhou opened last July. While it is too early to make a long term call on the film company’s diversification into theme parks, their move to monetize their intellectual property in that space foretells more diversification ahead. The Disney business model appears to be proceeding. Huayi Brothers Media Corporation (SHE: 300027)HB structure is building on diversity of IP(All amounts shown in CNY except where otherwise noted). Since an ebullient IPO debut in 2009, when on October 23rd, HB stock skyrocketed to 63.66yuan trading was halted, the stock price has since been both spiked and rocked by events. Most recently, it fell 21% last June when news of the details of a sketchy performance contract for one of HB’s top female stars made headlines. She appeared to have made an effort to disguise her salary. The scandal broke on television. It has triggered an investigation by Beijing officials. Promptly HB founder and Chairman Dennis Wang pledged US$16m to bolster confidence the shares amid continuing disputations between the parties to the scandal. On a positive note, during the last five year period, Alibaba’s (NYSE:BABA) Jack Ma announced he was investing US$103M over 5 years to finance the production of 10 HB films. On that news the shares had spiked 6.6%. There are also standing deals with real estate operator Evergrande Group (HK3333) and Tencent Holding(OTC) to deploy HB intellectual property names and brands into theme parks and online social gaming. Out of this mix of headwinds and tailwinds in the already volatile China entertainment/film sector, we arrive at a point where HB shares have taken a long, sustained beating. We are moved to believe that now rubbing up against a 5 year low, is the stock its worthy of attention for investors who have a risk profile. One needs to be comfortable with HB’s gyrating past trading patterns to see opportunity in its future as a “Disney in the making” in the words of a film executive friend from Hong Kong. Price at writing: 4.51 (52wk low 4.06)5 year high: June 5 2015: 23.261 year high: (2018): 10.143 year high: May 23 2016: 14.303 year low: 4.70 Market cap at writing: 12.61bnP/E 15.11EPS: 0.30Revenue: 3.93bnRevenue growth: 12.7%EBITDA: 625mLTD AT WRITING: 5.92bnEquity: 10.5bnBook value: 3.58bn To get a sense of how major institutional investors were responding to the roller coaster rides of the HB trade we note here that Vanguard International Stock Index Emerging Market Fund, one of HB’s biggest investors, is still holding its position at writing 2,727,202 shares of valued at 23,567,346bn cny. The Disney strategy The company began as a film production studio in 1994 and has since expanded its TV, internet, movie theaters, talent agencies and more recently, theme parks. It is its foray into the theme park space that is the clearest expression of its “Disneyesque” business model. Last July HB opened a 400,000 square meter theme park at Suzhou called “Movie World”. They announced it was the first in a series of 20 “film cities parks” they would create by providing intellectual property from their film hits partnered with realty developers.The movie world complex: A beginning In a study of the China film industry from Deloite Global published in 2017, the researchers noted, “With Disney as its model, HB has launched a “de-cinematic” strategy that integrates the traditional film business, internet entertainment, location-based entertainment, expanding to upstream and downstream industry chains to alleviate dependence on the film industry.” Current estimates are that HB revenues continue heavily in film with over 85.% of its total sales from that sector, another 7.8% from internet entertainment, and 6.6.% from brand licensing. All others contribute 0.8%. However its going forward strategy is not to deploy hard capex on actually building theme parks but to partner with such realty operators like Evergrande as an intellectual property provider. This veers from a Disney formula since that company has financed and developed its theme parks internally from land acquisition to design, construction and operations. But it does comport with the core Disney strategy of monetizing intellectual property sprung from its films. The China film industry is notably dominated by the top 15 companies, among which is HB. The sector is at the same time without a dominant cluster of “major” studios as is the case in the US and other markets. The division of market share among the top players run from the biggest, China Film, at about 4.3% to HB which at 1.3% clusters in the same area between 1% and 2% with at least 8 other producers. This is rooted in the global nature of the film business today where a given year or given share is not necessarily a function of financial or asset deployment power. It reflects in China as everywhere else, the success or failure of individual films from the number of blockbusters to the number of flops it may release in a given year.HB properties lend themselves to theme parks focused on fantasy As Disney’s 1Q19 results show, its filmed entertainment unit was down y/y 2% in operating income largely due to 2018 comps that included several blockbuster films. At the same time, its theme parks were up 13%---almost entirely due to a 7% increase in average visitor spend. And that increase we learn, came almost entirely from raised prices. So the key here is the price elasticity in the theme park business that filmed entertainment does not necessarily provide. In China there is also a wrinkle to the film business that links box office grosses to the trade in studio stocks. Over the years there has been considerable concern as to the accuracy of box office grosses reported by some studios. Our Hong Kong associate in that field outlined the problem. This quote is a translation. “You have instances where studios or theater operators buy up seats in off peak times and theaters that are fundamentally empty. You have ghost grosses. They then report a film has done much bigger business than it actually has because they know that reports of big grosses have a direct effect on the trade of movie stocks. And you get this bizarre situation where the move guys produce phantom grosses to pump up their stock”. “Much of this practice has been cleaned up, particularly among the top companies like HB. But in an economic environment where there are still observers in the financial sector that are not entirely comfortable that Beijing’s own economic GDP, trade and monetary numbers are all that accurate, anything is possible”. One of the priorities long expressed by Xi Jinping has been to end the lack of confidence in government numbers. Clearly such practices as ghost numbers can migrate to the private sector. In any event, estimated ticket sales in 2018 are believed to be relatively accurate rising to nearly US$9bn. Theme Parks forward look: Aging out and creating new Theme parks in China are currently showing a 13% rate of growth through 2017 totaling 190m admissions. According to a theme park engineers AECOM study, China will surpass the US as the globe’s biggest theme park market by 2020. Pipeline projects, of which HB projects it will participate with movie themes, continue to dominate in south and east China locations with 42% of all projects scheduled to open there covering a population base of 528m.One of HB's key creative sources and theming foundations Feng XiaogangOver 27% of all current pipeline projects are themed to fantasy/cartoon/movie media intellectual property bases. Projected Capex total for the theme part pipeline from 2018 through 2025 is 280bn. Investors in the theme park space also need to understand the ongoing need to keep pop culture icons sprung out of film blockbusters as fresh as possible. The reason is the inevitable “aging out” of the biggest, most formidable themes. Disney characters such as Mickey Mouse made their first appearances in films in the 1920’s US and did not go global until the 1960s-70s. The company has reworked the theming several times. Yet its newest attractions are those like Star Wars Galaxy Edge due to go live at Disney Parks by Q3 this year. The first Star Wars movie debuted in 1977. In brief, children in the 8 to 16 year old demographic cohort back then are now in their fifties. A long list of sequels through last year have kept the imagery and characters refreshed through successive generations. What Disney has done well is to package and repackage its core intellectual property stars like Mickey Mouse, Donald Duck and Toy Story characters like the cowboy to keep younger generations eager to experience the live attractions. This is the core dilemma of investing in any sector heavily dependent on creativity. The takeaway: An investment theory even based on shifting sands can sometime produce powerful results. Facing a fading film business, Walt Disney literally went into deep debt to develop the first Disneyland in 1955. Linked to a television series, the park had a built in marketing engine. Yet by the early 1980s, the aging out of the company’s core characters and poor results from its efforts in non-cartoon films, the stock had taken a hit. The board brought in a new executive team that repurposed its intellectual property, reimagined its animation business and went on to acquire valuable properties from third parties. So our conclusion is that the heart of an entertainment company lies in the capacity to reinvent its character stable and repurpose its original form to a diverse downstream set of revenue producing units. That is what we see in HB. Even though they began business in 1994, as far as their diversification strategy goes, its early stages. If they succeed in their theme park initiatives and other related businesses beyond filmed entertainment, their valuation could surge given the starting point of an effective 5 year low. Part of the forward valuation consideration needs to be the partnerships thus far achieved with Jack Ma ,Tencent, and Evergrande. Do these sophisticated investors see a potential Disney model flourishing downstream?So the question is this: Beyond standard investing metrics applied to HB, do investors need to consider a broader conception of how to value a company’s future. You can’t really measure a forward EBITDA number, or pluck a one year estimated PT out of what may spring from the imagination of the creative community where blockbuster ideas are generated. In the end, at its current low, HB may be a very cheap entry point if it can execute a “Disney-like strategy” over the next five to seven years as its theme park plans spread across the proposed 20 China cities. And the model is Disney. Every time the company appeared to run out of creative gas, it managed to find new inspiredproperties within the minds of its key creative people.So at its five year low we raise the question: Does the investment community see big rewards for HB exchanged for the risks implicit in the shifting sands of artists as opposed to projectable earnings metrics?

Huayi Brothers: Their Move to Theme Part Echoes A Disney Business Model Worth a Hard Look