Financials Credit Analyst

Hank Calenti, CFA

CreditContinuum

Credit

The pricing of <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/credit-suisse-group-ag" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:22253:1" rel="noopener">Credit Suisse Group (CSGN VX)</a> bonds does not fully reflect the risks, complexity, and low capitalization of the firms’ underlying business model; nor does it capture potential franchise impairment from increasing reputation risk. The recent suspension of redemptions from certain CS funds is at best an embarrassment and at worst a signal that controls remain in need of considerable attention. This is unfortunate, as CS is highly geared to the business cycle and could outperform peers, if it can get its house in order. However, CS’s long-dated Additional Tier 1 bonds already trade tight relative to the challenges facing the firm. Please see: <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/credit-suisse-perfection-priced-into-long-dated-at1" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:48461" rel="noopener">Credit Suisse – Perfection Priced into Long-Dated AT1</a>. As such, we place an Underweight recommendation of CS notes.As Credit Suisse aims to increase its Asset Management (AM) business, the firm is caught between a rock and a hard place with its fund investors. CS froze $10 billion of AM funds linked to assets sourced from Greensill Capital. Known as CS Supply Chain Finance Funds, more than 1,000 institutional and professional investors cannot redeem their holdings in these funds. This also affects all pending redemption requests filed prior to the CS announcement of 1 March. This is not the first blemish on CS’s reputation as it has repeatedly stepped-in it over the last few years and we are increasingly concerned that it may not be the last. In this instance, however, there are reputational and fiduciary issues which could have a more detrimental impact on the franchise. Fortunately, CS cited its fiduciary duty in barricading fund redemptions. This irony seems lost in the marketplace.Taken together, this cannot endear investors in Asia to entrust their wealth with the firm. Asia is Credit Suisse’s targeted growth market. Other wealth managers may capitalize on the repeated missteps.  Furthermore, we also note that both CS and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/ubs-group-ag" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:22590:1" rel="noopener">UBS Group (UBSG VX)</a> long duration bonds sold-off more than others during last week’s Treasury Tantrum. Bad volatility is not beneficial for CS’ or UBS’ wealth management franchises. However, CS widened by more than UBS and, unlike UBS, it did not tighten enough to offset the price decline. Taken together we perceive CS bonds as being at a greater risk of repricing downwards as the year progresses.

The pricing of Credit Suisse Group (CSGN VX) bonds does not fully reflect the risks, complexity, and low capitalization of the firms’ underlying business model; nor does it capture potential franchise impairment from increasing reputation risk. The recent suspension of redemptions from certain CS funds is at best an embarrassment and at worst a signal that controls remain in need of considerable attention. This is unfortunate, as CS is highly geared to the business cycle and could outperform peers, if it can get its house in order. However, CS’s long-dated Additional Tier 1 bonds already trade tight relative to the challenges facing the firm. Please see: Credit Suisse – Perfection Priced into Long-Dated AT1. As such, we place an Underweight recommendation of CS notes.As Credit Suisse aims to increase its Asset Management (AM) business, the firm is caught between a rock and a hard place with its fund investors. CS froze $10 billion of AM funds linked to assets sourced from Greensill Capital. Known as CS Supply Chain Finance Funds, more than 1,000 institutional and professional investors cannot redeem their holdings in these funds. This also affects all pending redemption requests filed prior to the CS announcement of 1 March. This is not the first blemish on CS’s reputation as it has repeatedly stepped-in it over the last few years and we are increasingly concerned that it may not be the last. In this instance, however, there are reputational and fiduciary issues which could have a more detrimental impact on the franchise. Fortunately, CS cited its fiduciary duty in barricading fund redemptions. This irony seems lost in the marketplace.Taken together, this cannot endear investors in Asia to entrust their wealth with the firm. Asia is Credit Suisse’s targeted growth market. Other wealth managers may capitalize on the repeated missteps.  Furthermore, we also note that both CS and UBS Group (UBSG VX) long duration bonds sold-off more than others during last week’s Treasury Tantrum. Bad volatility is not beneficial for CS’ or UBS’ wealth management franchises. However, CS widened by more than UBS and, unlike UBS, it did not tighten enough to offset the price decline. Taken together we perceive CS bonds as being at a greater risk of repricing downwards as the year progresses.

Credit Suisse: Greensill Sows Reputation Risks, Underweight CS Bonds

Financials & FinTech research, Galliano’s Financials Research

Victor Galliano

Financials & FinTech research

Financials & FinTech, EM & Developed Markets

Galliano’s Financials Research

Galliano's Financials Research provides fundamental research in Emerging Markets financials, including FinTech, as well as financials in select Developed Markets.

The investment style applied is generally value oriented, although Growth At Reasonable Price (GARP) strategies can also be used where appropriate. 

Our investment research approach aim is often contrarian, looking to capitalise on overly sceptical or optimistic consensus views. In terms of valuation techniques, the focus is on PBV ratio to ROE, PE multiples and dividend yield, as well as the application of PEG ratios and, where appropriate, Sum of the Parts (SOTP) valuations.

Equity Bottom-Up

<ul>
<li>We see clear evidence that the <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/hsbc-holdings-plc-a723bd63-0890-486f-aaa0-3bb9ad2b95ce" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:21976:1" rel="noopener">HSBC Holdings (HSBA LN)</a> super-tanker is turning</li>
<li>Balance sheet strength at YE 2020, with delivery across most plan metrics in 2020 showing commitment</li>
<li>Execution on costs, the digital transformation, sustainably lower cost of risk going forward and the deepened Asia pivot, with an emphasis on Wealth and Personal Banking revenues, should be core drivers of returns</li>
<li>Potential disposals of France retail banking and possibly the US retail operations would also enhance returns and free up “trapped” RWAs</li>
<li>We believe that 2022E consensus ROE estimates are too conservative and that HSBC could potentially be on a c 8% dividend yield over the medium term</li>
<li>Risks to our positive view on HSBC include slower than expected execution on costs, and tougher competition in Asia retail banking, as well as worse than expected credit quality leading to a lower than expected reduction in cost of risk charges</li>
</ul>


We see clear evidence that the HSBC Holdings (HSBA LN) super-tanker is turning
Balance sheet strength at YE 2020, with delivery across most plan metrics in 2020 showing commitment
Execution on costs, the digital transformation, sustainably lower cost of risk going forward and the deepened Asia pivot, with an emphasis on Wealth and Personal Banking revenues, should be core drivers of returns
Potential disposals of France retail banking and possibly the US retail operations would also enhance returns and free up “trapped” RWAs
We believe that 2022E consensus ROE estimates are too conservative and that HSBC could potentially be on a c 8% dividend yield over the medium term
Risks to our positive view on HSBC include slower than expected execution on costs, and tougher competition in Asia retail banking, as well as worse than expected credit quality leading to a lower than expected reduction in cost of risk charges


HSBC (HSBA LN): The Super-Tanker Is Turning

Given its low capital buffer and plans to lower it further, along with high market risk tolerance and leverage finance exposure, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/credit-suisse-group-ag" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:22253:1" rel="noopener">Credit Suisse's (CSGN VX)</a> Additional Tier 1 (AT1) trades too tight relative to <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/ubs-group-ag" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:22590:1" rel="noopener">UBS (UBSG VX)</a> and most other large banks globally. We see better value elsewhere at this point in the credit cycle.Many analysts compare CS and UBS and conclude that they are largely the same, with UBS having deleveraged its investment banking franchise years earlier. We disagree. While both may suffer outflows in assets under management during a prolonged equity market correction, UBS has a far less market-sensitive franchise during intermittent bouts of volatility, as was clearly shown over the past year. In addition to having a higher trading risk tolerance profile, CS appears to have a higher sensitivity to non-investment grade leverage finance and oil &amp; gas exposures.  These are more sensitive to the business cycle. As of now, with global growth set to accelerate post-vaccination, this is a benefit. However, this is also already priced into CS’ securities.  In fact, the longer-dated AT1 bonds are priced to perfection, in our view.In addition, CS has a substantially lower Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) buffer than UBS and many other European banks.  Furthermore, as CS targets an even lower capital ratio, this buffer is at risk of falling further over the near term. While lofty aspirations to operate at a higher leverage level may be aimed at equity holders, we think it best to take management’s word at face value. Lower capital ratios are not AT1 capital supportive. Unless the firm simultaneously de-risks, sensitivity to non-IG leverage finance and non-IG oil &amp; gas exposures may increase.Furthermore, while we were impressed by Mr. Hoarta-Osório’s leadership at <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/lloyds-banking-group-plc" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:21009:1" rel="noopener">Lloyds Bank (LLOY LN)</a> in the UK, despite several blemishes, we are surprised that the ex-CEO of a UK-centric mortgage bank would be chosen as Chairman of the Board at a global investment bank with wealth management growth aspirations in Asia. We are not convinced this is the best choice and we question if the execution risk from an eventual strategy pivot will be credit positive.We explore these themes and provide an overview of CS’s Q4 results within. We conclude that, taken together amongst its longer-dated peer-issued AT1 notes, we find better value in <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/societe-generale-sa" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:21478:1" rel="noopener">Société Générale's (GLE FP)</a> 2030 first call AT1 than in the recently issued Credit Suisse security. (Please see: <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/societe-generale-s-at1-better-fundamental-and-relative-value-than-bnp" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:48177" rel="noopener">Société Générale’s AT1: Better Fundamental and Relative Value than BNP</a> for more details on SocGen). We also see greater spread pick-up in Credit Suisse’s 2025 first call AT1 note than further out the curve.

Given its low capital buffer and plans to lower it further, along with high market risk tolerance and leverage finance exposure, Credit Suisse's (CSGN VX) Additional Tier 1 (AT1) trades too tight relative to UBS (UBSG VX) and most other large banks globally. We see better value elsewhere at this point in the credit cycle.Many analysts compare CS and UBS and conclude that they are largely the same, with UBS having deleveraged its investment banking franchise years earlier. We disagree. While both may suffer outflows in assets under management during a prolonged equity market correction, UBS has a far less market-sensitive franchise during intermittent bouts of volatility, as was clearly shown over the past year. In addition to having a higher trading risk tolerance profile, CS appears to have a higher sensitivity to non-investment grade leverage finance and oil &amp; gas exposures.  These are more sensitive to the business cycle. As of now, with global growth set to accelerate post-vaccination, this is a benefit. However, this is also already priced into CS’ securities.  In fact, the longer-dated AT1 bonds are priced to perfection, in our view.In addition, CS has a substantially lower Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) buffer than UBS and many other European banks.  Furthermore, as CS targets an even lower capital ratio, this buffer is at risk of falling further over the near term. While lofty aspirations to operate at a higher leverage level may be aimed at equity holders, we think it best to take management’s word at face value. Lower capital ratios are not AT1 capital supportive. Unless the firm simultaneously de-risks, sensitivity to non-IG leverage finance and non-IG oil &amp; gas exposures may increase.Furthermore, while we were impressed by Mr. Hoarta-Osório’s leadership at Lloyds Bank (LLOY LN) in the UK, despite several blemishes, we are surprised that the ex-CEO of a UK-centric mortgage bank would be chosen as Chairman of the Board at a global investment bank with wealth management growth aspirations in Asia. We are not convinced this is the best choice and we question if the execution risk from an eventual strategy pivot will be credit positive.We explore these themes and provide an overview of CS’s Q4 results within. We conclude that, taken together amongst its longer-dated peer-issued AT1 notes, we find better value in Société Générale's (GLE FP) 2030 first call AT1 than in the recently issued Credit Suisse security. (Please see: Société Générale’s AT1: Better Fundamental and Relative Value than BNP for more details on SocGen). We also see greater spread pick-up in Credit Suisse’s 2025 first call AT1 note than further out the curve.

Credit Suisse – Perfection Priced into Long-Dated AT1

<a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/hsbc-holdings-plc-a723bd63-0890-486f-aaa0-3bb9ad2b95ce" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:21976:1" rel="noopener">HSBC Holdings' (HSBA LN)</a> recently issued 4.6% coupon 2030 first call note is beginning to look overbought relative to other banks and relative to its own credit curve. At the same time, returns are likely to be negatively impacted by rising interest rates as the year progresses. As such, we screen for value in HSBC’s Additional Tier 1 (AT1) curve for alternate investment options to achieve greater total returns this year.This is the second insight in a series on HSBC. In the first note, we considered the bank's ability to withstand a material increase in its credit costs and identified potential Covid-19 asset quality sensitivity. Please see <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/hsbc-capital-forbearance-and-covid-19-sensitivity" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:47598" rel="noopener">HSBC: Capital, Forbearance and Covid-19 Sensitivity</a> for more details.In this insight, we determine where the market may be mispricing the bank's credit risk and screen for potential extension risk while considering the liquidity of HSBC's AT1 instruments denominated in US$, Singapore-dollars and Euros.The longer the duration of the bond, the greater the price impact from a parallel shift in the yield curve. In theory, credit spreads should remain unchanged, to strengthen, as the economy recovers, and rates rise. In practice, this depends on the spread level per unit of duration along the credit curve. This accounts for the forward-looking nature of the market with respect to perceived credit risk. With an effective duration of 7.85 years and a relatively low credit risk premium, the 2030 callable AT1 note could suffer a lower total return than all other HSBC AT1s, as the yield curve steepens.Concurrently, given HSBC's Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital buffer of approximately 370 basis points, the 10-year note trades tight relative to banks with higher CET1 buffers. In fact, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/ubs-group-ag" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:22590:1" rel="noopener">UBS Group's (UBSG VX)</a> recently issued 4 3/8% coupon 2031 callable bond currently looks better value relative to each bank’s respective capital buffers.Taken together, we find better value elsewhere along HSBC’s AT1 curve.

HSBC Holdings' (HSBA LN) recently issued 4.6% coupon 2030 first call note is beginning to look overbought relative to other banks and relative to its own credit curve. At the same time, returns are likely to be negatively impacted by rising interest rates as the year progresses. As such, we screen for value in HSBC’s Additional Tier 1 (AT1) curve for alternate investment options to achieve greater total returns this year.This is the second insight in a series on HSBC. In the first note, we considered the bank's ability to withstand a material increase in its credit costs and identified potential Covid-19 asset quality sensitivity. Please see HSBC: Capital, Forbearance and Covid-19 Sensitivity for more details.In this insight, we determine where the market may be mispricing the bank's credit risk and screen for potential extension risk while considering the liquidity of HSBC's AT1 instruments denominated in US$, Singapore-dollars and Euros.The longer the duration of the bond, the greater the price impact from a parallel shift in the yield curve. In theory, credit spreads should remain unchanged, to strengthen, as the economy recovers, and rates rise. In practice, this depends on the spread level per unit of duration along the credit curve. This accounts for the forward-looking nature of the market with respect to perceived credit risk. With an effective duration of 7.85 years and a relatively low credit risk premium, the 2030 callable AT1 note could suffer a lower total return than all other HSBC AT1s, as the yield curve steepens.Concurrently, given HSBC's Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital buffer of approximately 370 basis points, the 10-year note trades tight relative to banks with higher CET1 buffers. In fact, UBS Group's (UBSG VX) recently issued 4 3/8% coupon 2031 callable bond currently looks better value relative to each bank’s respective capital buffers.Taken together, we find better value elsewhere along HSBC’s AT1 curve.

HSBC: AT1 Positioning for Greater Total Returns

Silver Point

Thomas J. Monaco

Independent Insight Provider

Silver Point is a boutique research firm that focuses on the broader financial services sector, with a particular focus on troubled institutions globally. 

Asia Ex Japan

*Super Results And Will Only Get Better: JP Morgan Chase &amp; Co (JPM.US) [JPM] reported 4Q20 bottom-line results of USD 12.1 bn, increasing USD 2.7 bn (28.5%) linked quarter. On a core operating basis, we note an even stronger QOQ improvement, with numbers coming in at USD 12.1 bn or USD 3.1 bn (34.6%) higher than 3Q20. Results were essentially driven by a reserve reversal of USD 1.9 bn, which no doubt will be a consistent theme in 2021;*Credit Weakness Significantly Decelerates: We find that net new NPLs on a linked quarter amounted to only USD 1 mn or well under 1.0% on an annualized basis. The pace of increase has decelerated from the 7.0% and 26% posted in 3Q20 and 2Q20, respectively; and*Solid Share Buyback In Place: JPM noted that it could repurchase a maximum number of shares of USD 4.5 bn for 1Q21.

*Super Results And Will Only Get Better: JP Morgan Chase &amp; Co (JPM.US) [JPM] reported 4Q20 bottom-line results of USD 12.1 bn, increasing USD 2.7 bn (28.5%) linked quarter. On a core operating basis, we note an even stronger QOQ improvement, with numbers coming in at USD 12.1 bn or USD 3.1 bn (34.6%) higher than 3Q20. Results were essentially driven by a reserve reversal of USD 1.9 bn, which no doubt will be a consistent theme in 2021;*Credit Weakness Significantly Decelerates: We find that net new NPLs on a linked quarter amounted to only USD 1 mn or well under 1.0% on an annualized basis. The pace of increase has decelerated from the 7.0% and 26% posted in 3Q20 and 2Q20, respectively; and*Solid Share Buyback In Place: JPM noted that it could repurchase a maximum number of shares of USD 4.5 bn for 1Q21. 

Switzerland

UBS Group AG provides financial services to private, corporate and institutional clients. The Company offers investment banking, retail banking, corporate and institutional banking, as well as holistic wealth management planning and asset management services. UBS also offers securities services such as fund administration and third-party fund management.

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UBS Group AG (UBSG VX)

Credit Suisse: Greensill Sows Reputation Risks, Underweight CS Bonds

CS bonds do not fully reflect the risks, complexity, and low capitalization of the firms’ underlying business model; nor do they capture potential...

Hank Calenti, CFA

HSBC (HSBA LN): The Super-Tanker Is Turning

Cost gains, digital transformation, lower cost of risk going forward and the deepened Asia pivot on revenue growth, should be core drivers of...

Victor Galliano

Credit Suisse – Perfection Priced into Long-Dated AT1

Many analysts compare CS and UBS and conclude that they are largely the same. We disagree. Given its low capital buffer, higher leverage finance...

Hank Calenti, CFA

HSBC: AT1 Positioning for Greater Total Returns

HSBC’s recently issued AT1 is beginning to look overbought. Returns may be negatively impacted by rising interest rates. We screen for better total...

Hank Calenti, CFA

JP Morgan Chase & Co. – Just Wow

JP MORGAN CHASE: JPM] reported 4Q20 bottom-line results increased 28.5% linked quarter, driven by a reserve reversal. Net new NPLs on a linked...

Thomas J. Monaco

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