Pan-Asia Catalysts/Events, Quiddity Advisors

Travis Lundy

Pan-Asia Catalysts/Events

Quiddity Advisors

Quantitative Analysis

The GPIF is the world's largest pension fund at what was $1.6 trillion-plus at the end of December 2019. The management of the GPIF has made remarkable strides in recent years, moving towards market targets for returns of all assets (no more FILP bonds), creating a win-win profitability structure for active managers on multi-year mandates (up to five to seven years it seems), and demanding accountability on stewardship policies and efforts. In March 2010, the GPIF lowered its domestic bond portfolio bogey from 67% to 60% (which was good because it was already there),  and raised its domestic equity, foreign bond, and foreign equity allocation mix midpoints to 12%/11%/12% from 11%/8%/9%. Short Term Assets were set at 5%. In June 2013, they realized they needed to be more aggressive, and so the GPIF spent more than a year studying the problem, having experts in, looking at allocation mixes and trying to be more professional about assessing their liability profile and curve, and decided in October 2014 to implement a much different mix, moving domestic bonds to 35% ±10%, domestic equities to 25% ±9%, foreign bonds to 15% ±4%, and foreign equities to 25% ±8%. There was no bogey for Short Term Assets, but that was assumed to be wrapped up in the domestic bonds portion as a concept.That meant buying equities, and they did.They had already been buying and by the time they announced the new policy in October 2014 officially, they had already gone through the old limits on domestic equities and were at 18.2% (the old upper limit was 18.0%). It took them until March 2015 to get to 22%, and by June they were at 23.4%. Basically, they then let it ride, with some small changes here and there. The big changes were constant reductions in the domestic bond allocation. However in FY15 (year to March 2016) there was an episode of equity buying. That is probably something those interested in flows should study now. The GPIF is currently said to be in the process of conducting an Investment Policy Review. The lead-up to this has seen a number of changes which hint at what could come.<ol>
<li>
The GPIF has become very ESG-focussed. Some of that is the G portion where they talk about being long-term investors, and they have made it mandatory for their investment managers to have a stewardship policy and report on how they execute that policy. They are also looking very much at the longer-term, and CIO Mizuno has blasted short-sellers and any number of other market participants for being short-term (I had issues with a bunch of the comments reported in the FT so got a <a href="https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2020/01/14/1579000419000/The-GPIF-and-the-complexity-of-stewardship/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">letter to Alphaville</a> published - Thanks Jamie!).</li>
<li>The GPIF has started looking at real estate.</li>
<li>
The GPIF has decided that foreign credit which is yen-hedged can be put into the domestic bonds allocation bucket. This means a higher allocation to foreign issuer risk than the old limit.</li>
<li>
The GPIF has stopped lending stocks. This reduces fee income to passive portfolios (foreign equity, as domestic equity lending has never been done, or at least not in many, many years) but it means more pressure on company management.</li>
<li>
The GPIF has changed the way contracts work for active managers. The base concept, according to interviews and articles, is that the active manager gets the same very low management fee on AUM as a passive manager does, but the active manager shares in the upside over the life of the contract, which will be "one market cycle" (i.e. five years, or seven years, or whatever they settle on with the GPIF). This should, ceteris paribus, lead to further outperformance. </li>
</ol>All of these things would, in my mind, point to a higher domestic equity allocation, a higher foreign bond allocation, and a shift to more active management and less passive management in domestic equities (last year the split was 90% passive 10% active). But there are shorter-term factors investors should be looking at. More discussion below.

The GPIF is the world's largest pension fund at what was $1.6 trillion-plus at the end of December 2019. The management of the GPIF has made remarkable strides in recent years, moving towards market targets for returns of all assets (no more FILP bonds), creating a win-win profitability structure for active managers on multi-year mandates (up to five to seven years it seems), and demanding accountability on stewardship policies and efforts. In March 2010, the GPIF lowered its domestic bond portfolio bogey from 67% to 60% (which was good because it was already there),  and raised its domestic equity, foreign bond, and foreign equity allocation mix midpoints to 12%/11%/12% from 11%/8%/9%. Short Term Assets were set at 5%. In June 2013, they realized they needed to be more aggressive, and so the GPIF spent more than a year studying the problem, having experts in, looking at allocation mixes and trying to be more professional about assessing their liability profile and curve, and decided in October 2014 to implement a much different mix, moving domestic bonds to 35% ±10%, domestic equities to 25% ±9%, foreign bonds to 15% ±4%, and foreign equities to 25% ±8%. There was no bogey for Short Term Assets, but that was assumed to be wrapped up in the domestic bonds portion as a concept.That meant buying equities, and they did.They had already been buying and by the time they announced the new policy in October 2014 officially, they had already gone through the old limits on domestic equities and were at 18.2% (the old upper limit was 18.0%). It took them until March 2015 to get to 22%, and by June they were at 23.4%. Basically, they then let it ride, with some small changes here and there. The big changes were constant reductions in the domestic bond allocation. However in FY15 (year to March 2016) there was an episode of equity buying. That is probably something those interested in flows should study now. The GPIF is currently said to be in the process of conducting an Investment Policy Review. The lead-up to this has seen a number of changes which hint at what could come.

The GPIF has become very ESG-focussed. Some of that is the G portion where they talk about being long-term investors, and they have made it mandatory for their investment managers to have a stewardship policy and report on how they execute that policy. They are also looking very much at the longer-term, and CIO Mizuno has blasted short-sellers and any number of other market participants for being short-term (I had issues with a bunch of the comments reported in the FT so got a letter to Alphaville published - Thanks Jamie!).
The GPIF has started looking at real estate.

The GPIF has decided that foreign credit which is yen-hedged can be put into the domestic bonds allocation bucket. This means a higher allocation to foreign issuer risk than the old limit.

The GPIF has stopped lending stocks. This reduces fee income to passive portfolios (foreign equity, as domestic equity lending has never been done, or at least not in many, many years) but it means more pressure on company management.

The GPIF has changed the way contracts work for active managers. The base concept, according to interviews and articles, is that the active manager gets the same very low management fee on AUM as a passive manager does, but the active manager shares in the upside over the life of the contract, which will be "one market cycle" (i.e. five years, or seven years, or whatever they settle on with the GPIF). This should, ceteris paribus, lead to further outperformance. 
All of these things would, in my mind, point to a higher domestic equity allocation, a higher foreign bond allocation, and a shift to more active management and less passive management in domestic equities (last year the split was 90% passive 10% active). But there are shorter-term factors investors should be looking at. More discussion below.

'Quantamental' Japan Specialist, LightStream Research

Campbell Gunn

'Quantamental' Japan Specialist

ja research

ja research is an independent research platform focused exclusively on Japanese equities. Leveraging data and graphic analysis provided by Japan Analytics, we provide insights on small and medium-sized companies that have been ignored by the sell-side as well as challenging conventional wisdom on larger companies. We also offer analyst and corporate access, the latter with translation if required. 

<figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/122/342/original/2020-03-11_11-02-32.png?1583892183" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="122342"></figure><figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/122/590/original/2020-03-12_07-42-03.png?1583966536" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="122590"></figure><div class="content-caption">Source • Japan Analytics</div>CUMULATIVE CASH FLOWS - In this third and final of our series on Japanese companies that might be compromised as the Covid-19 recession unfolds,  we shall look at Cumulative Cash Flows. Our cash flow model is derived from the disclosed Balance Sheets and Statements of Comprehensive Income and balances to zero for every company for every comparable period. Variations in disclosure between the audited annual yuho and unaudited quarterly kessan tanshin reports, notably when the company is reporting under the weaker IFRS standard can result in unavoidable quarter-to-quarter variations. Consequently, our analysis will focus on year-on-year changes as of the most recent quarterly disclosure irrespective of fiscal year-end.  Our review will cover six principal cash flow metrics:-<ul>
<li>
Operating Cash Flow - Operating Cash Flow comprises all cash flow items relating to transactions with customers and suppliers except inventory cash flows.</li>
<li>
Investing Cash Flow - Investing Cash Flow comprises cash flow to or from Fixed Assets and Inventories. Unlike GAAP Cash Flows Statements, It does not include investments in financial assets.</li>
<li>
Inventory Cash Flow - A sub-set of Investing Cash Flow, inventory Cash Flow is the change in Inventory on the Balance Sheet. </li>
<li>
Free Cash Flow - Free Cash Flow the sum of Operating Cash Flow, Fixed Asset Cash Flow and Inventory Cash Flow.</li>
<li>
Financing Cash Flow - Financing Cash Flow comprises Debt &amp; Lease Liabilities, Investments and the taxation that is allocated to Financing Cash Flow. Debt &amp; Lease Liabilities includes changes in Short and Long-Term Debt and Lease Liabilities and Interest and Bond Issuance Expenses.' Investments' includes Interest &amp; Dividend Income, Purchases and Sales of Securities, Loans, Gains and Losses on Marketable Securities and Equity Earnings.</li>
<li>Change in Cash - Change in Cash is the sum of Free Cash Flow, Financing Cash Flow and Shareholder Cash Flow after including Minorities &amp; Adjustments. </li>
</ul>EXCLUDED - Four companies have been excluded from our review as they have substantial financial subsidiaries - <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/z-holdings-corp" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:19603:1" rel="noopener">Z Holdings (4689 JP)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/rakuten-inc" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:31:1" rel="noopener">Rakuten (4755 JP)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/sony-corp" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:563:1" rel="noopener">Sony (6758 JP)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/japan-post-holdings-co-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:359:1" rel="noopener">Japan Post (6178 JP)</a> which distort their balance sheets. We have also excluded companies with a current market cap below ¥50b, although some exceptions have been made for abnormally large movements, such as those in <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/japan-display-inc" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:8280:1" rel="noopener">Japan Display (6740 JP).</a><a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/toshiba-corp" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:637:1" rel="noopener">Toshiba (6502 JP)</a>-  As an example of our analysis, Toshiba has seen the largest reduction in Cash as a percentage of market value over the last twelve months of any large-cap Japanese company. Toshiba's cash balance has declined by ¥1.4 trillion since peaking in 2019-Q2 - 114% of the current market cap. 70% of the cash generated between 2018-Q4 and 2019-Q2 has been allocated to share repurchases, dividends and cash reduction. The company's net cash remains at a healthy 51% of market value and 43% of Shareholders' Equity; however, Cumulative Operating Cash Flow will fall below zero in the current quarter. There are few additional reductions in Fixed Assets and Inventories that can be sustained without irreparable damage. The logic of buying back shares in an entity that has negative residual returns is not clear to us. Despite the potential for a TOPIX re-inclusion 'bounce', fundamentally the stock should be avoided.<div class="content-highlight">In the DETAIL Section below, we shall look at the top (or bottom) thirty large-cap companies on each of the metric above scaled by market capitalisation. </div>

Source • Japan AnalyticsCUMULATIVE CASH FLOWS - In this third and final of our series on Japanese companies that might be compromised as the Covid-19 recession unfolds,  we shall look at Cumulative Cash Flows. Our cash flow model is derived from the disclosed Balance Sheets and Statements of Comprehensive Income and balances to zero for every company for every comparable period. Variations in disclosure between the audited annual yuho and unaudited quarterly kessan tanshin reports, notably when the company is reporting under the weaker IFRS standard can result in unavoidable quarter-to-quarter variations. Consequently, our analysis will focus on year-on-year changes as of the most recent quarterly disclosure irrespective of fiscal year-end.  Our review will cover six principal cash flow metrics:-

Operating Cash Flow - Operating Cash Flow comprises all cash flow items relating to transactions with customers and suppliers except inventory cash flows.

Investing Cash Flow - Investing Cash Flow comprises cash flow to or from Fixed Assets and Inventories. Unlike GAAP Cash Flows Statements, It does not include investments in financial assets.

Inventory Cash Flow - A sub-set of Investing Cash Flow, inventory Cash Flow is the change in Inventory on the Balance Sheet. 

Free Cash Flow - Free Cash Flow the sum of Operating Cash Flow, Fixed Asset Cash Flow and Inventory Cash Flow.

Financing Cash Flow - Financing Cash Flow comprises Debt &amp; Lease Liabilities, Investments and the taxation that is allocated to Financing Cash Flow. Debt &amp; Lease Liabilities includes changes in Short and Long-Term Debt and Lease Liabilities and Interest and Bond Issuance Expenses.' Investments' includes Interest &amp; Dividend Income, Purchases and Sales of Securities, Loans, Gains and Losses on Marketable Securities and Equity Earnings.
Change in Cash - Change in Cash is the sum of Free Cash Flow, Financing Cash Flow and Shareholder Cash Flow after including Minorities &amp; Adjustments. 
EXCLUDED - Four companies have been excluded from our review as they have substantial financial subsidiaries - Z Holdings (4689 JP), Rakuten (4755 JP), Sony (6758 JP), Japan Post (6178 JP) which distort their balance sheets. We have also excluded companies with a current market cap below ¥50b, although some exceptions have been made for abnormally large movements, such as those in Japan Display (6740 JP).Toshiba (6502 JP)-  As an example of our analysis, Toshiba has seen the largest reduction in Cash as a percentage of market value over the last twelve months of any large-cap Japanese company. Toshiba's cash balance has declined by ¥1.4 trillion since peaking in 2019-Q2 - 114% of the current market cap. 70% of the cash generated between 2018-Q4 and 2019-Q2 has been allocated to share repurchases, dividends and cash reduction. The company's net cash remains at a healthy 51% of market value and 43% of Shareholders' Equity; however, Cumulative Operating Cash Flow will fall below zero in the current quarter. There are few additional reductions in Fixed Assets and Inventories that can be sustained without irreparable damage. The logic of buying back shares in an entity that has negative residual returns is not clear to us. Despite the potential for a TOPIX re-inclusion 'bounce', fundamentally the stock should be avoided.In the DETAIL Section below, we shall look at the top (or bottom) thirty large-cap companies on each of the metric above scaled by market capitalisation. 

🇯🇵 JAPAN • Who’s Swimming Naked? > Part 3: Cumulative Cash Flow

<div class="content-caption">
<figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/121/814/original/naakt-jpg.png?1583659197" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="121814"></figure>Source  • <a href="https://hollandbesthotels.wordpress.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://hollandbesthotels.wordpress.com/</a>
</div><blockquote><a href="http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/2001ar/2001letter.html" target="_blank" aria-describedby="external-disclaimer" rel="noopener">“You only find out who is swimming naked when the tide goes out. “</a>- Warren Buffett</blockquote>WHO'S SWIMMING NAKED? - This is the first part of three Insights that will in the spirit of Buffett's famous quip, attempt to highlight those Japanese companies that at the greatest risk from the 2020 Covid-19 recession. We will focus on three factors - the Audit Score, the Altman Z-Score and Cumulative Cash Flows - that individually, and in combination, can highlight those companies most at risk.<hr><figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/121/877/original/2020-03-09_07-18-54.png?1583705968" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="121877"></figure><div class="content-caption">Source • Japan Analytics</div>PART 1: AUDIT SCORE - This factor is 'hiding in plain sight'. Since 2003, the Auditors' Opinion has been available in a format that allows 'parsing' into a database format and the creation of an 'Audit Score'. Although often a coincident rather than a leading indicator, by cumulating the score from year to year, patterns can emerge that highlight unfolding risks as in the case of <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/leopalace21-corp" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:8244:1" rel="noopener">Leopalace21 Corp (8848 JP)</a> above.


Source  • https://hollandbesthotels.wordpress.com/
“You only find out who is swimming naked when the tide goes out. “- Warren BuffettWHO'S SWIMMING NAKED? - This is the first part of three Insights that will in the spirit of Buffett's famous quip, attempt to highlight those Japanese companies that at the greatest risk from the 2020 Covid-19 recession. We will focus on three factors - the Audit Score, the Altman Z-Score and Cumulative Cash Flows - that individually, and in combination, can highlight those companies most at risk.Source • Japan AnalyticsPART 1: AUDIT SCORE - This factor is 'hiding in plain sight'. Since 2003, the Auditors' Opinion has been available in a format that allows 'parsing' into a database format and the creation of an 'Audit Score'. Although often a coincident rather than a leading indicator, by cumulating the score from year to year, patterns can emerge that highlight unfolding risks as in the case of Leopalace21 Corp (8848 JP) above.   

🇯🇵 JAPAN • Who's Swimming Naked? > Part 1: Audit Score

Event-Driven

Hitachi Construction Machinery / Event-Driven

With a relatively full slate of large value takeovers in Developed Asia in the past year - often by parents but also by buyout funds - and the availability of significant credit to finance such takeovers, this Smartkarma Original insight looks at what constitutes an attractive target for takeover, and seeks to construct a framework for screening and filtering companies for further study. 
The filtering is conducted across two basic measures which seek to answer two basic questions:
<ol>
<li>What might supply look like?</li>
<li>What might demand look like?</li>
</ol>
The first basic problem with creating such filters is that on the Supply side, using databases to determine whether a controlling shareholder wants to sell is almost a lost cause from the beginning. But the exercise throws up some interesting case studies, and it is important to understand why such screening could lead to interesting results. 
On the demand side, it is a difficult and complicated exercise because financial data moves around, shifting through time and relative price because competitors also shift in time and price. A clear example of a company which might have been "relatively" attractive vs peers a month ago might not be after the market ructions at the end of February 2020 when this was written. Prices were, of course, lower, which means that a good screening process is dynamic, both in relative and absolute measures. It is also somewhat difficult to create a one-size-fits-all screen for attractive targets because in certain countries, certain industries (telecom, airlines, social infrastructure, defence) are covered by foreign ownership limits, other industries (banks, brokers, insurers) rarely see leveraged buyouts, and takeovers in other industries (Chinese homebuilders) are, for lack of a better word, simply off the table at certain times.
In addition, there are lots of ways in which companies might present themselves as attractive targets. If someone controls a company, and wants to sell it cheaply, there are lots of potential buyers who will fall all over themselves to get in line to buy it. But companies can be attractive targets because of the potential for changing profit metrics and multiples through restructuring, asset reorganisation, industry reorganisation, or simply waiting for the cycle to change. 
Using valuation metrics with a cutoff line can be challenging because common multiples such as PER, PCFR, PBR, EV/EBITDA may ignore significant value available from longer-term securities holdings, non-operating real estate assets which are not managed in optimal fashion, etc. 
In short, screening can only go so far. But we try.
At the end, we take a brief look at 10 companies from Developed Asia which show up as a result of our screening efforts. The resulting list is dominated by Japanese companies because some of the companies which show up from other countries fit the "no-go" categories above (airlines, financial companies, defence technology subject to foreign ownership limits, Chinese homebuilders subject to skepticism, etc.). Some are also clearly Emerging Asia businesses with Developed Asia listings. Screening for Emerging Asia got a few companies which are high on anyone's target list, including one which saw an unsolicited takeover approach earlier this week (end-Feb 2020), and another which has been in acquisition mode for years. 
We find the thinking process and screening technology has thrown up some previously less-than-obvious candidates which deserve further work.

With a relatively full slate of large value takeovers in Developed Asia in the past year - often by parents but also by buyout funds - and the availability of significant credit to finance such takeovers, this Smartkarma Original insight looks at what constitutes an attractive target for takeover, and seeks to construct a framework for screening and filtering companies for further study. 
The filtering is conducted across two basic measures which seek to answer two basic questions:

What might supply look like?
What might demand look like?

The first basic problem with creating such filters is that on the Supply side, using databases to determine whether a controlling shareholder wants to sell is almost a lost cause from the beginning. But the exercise throws up some interesting case studies, and it is important to understand why such screening could lead to interesting results. 
On the demand side, it is a difficult and complicated exercise because financial data moves around, shifting through time and relative price because competitors also shift in time and price. A clear example of a company which might have been "relatively" attractive vs peers a month ago might not be after the market ructions at the end of February 2020 when this was written. Prices were, of course, lower, which means that a good screening process is dynamic, both in relative and absolute measures. It is also somewhat difficult to create a one-size-fits-all screen for attractive targets because in certain countries, certain industries (telecom, airlines, social infrastructure, defence) are covered by foreign ownership limits, other industries (banks, brokers, insurers) rarely see leveraged buyouts, and takeovers in other industries (Chinese homebuilders) are, for lack of a better word, simply off the table at certain times.
In addition, there are lots of ways in which companies might present themselves as attractive targets. If someone controls a company, and wants to sell it cheaply, there are lots of potential buyers who will fall all over themselves to get in line to buy it. But companies can be attractive targets because of the potential for changing profit metrics and multiples through restructuring, asset reorganisation, industry reorganisation, or simply waiting for the cycle to change. 
Using valuation metrics with a cutoff line can be challenging because common multiples such as PER, PCFR, PBR, EV/EBITDA may ignore significant value available from longer-term securities holdings, non-operating real estate assets which are not managed in optimal fashion, etc. 
In short, screening can only go so far. But we try.
At the end, we take a brief look at 10 companies from Developed Asia which show up as a result of our screening efforts. The resulting list is dominated by Japanese companies because some of the companies which show up from other countries fit the "no-go" categories above (airlines, financial companies, defence technology subject to foreign ownership limits, Chinese homebuilders subject to skepticism, etc.). Some are also clearly Emerging Asia businesses with Developed Asia listings. Screening for Emerging Asia got a few companies which are high on anyone's target list, including one which saw an unsolicited takeover approach earlier this week (end-Feb 2020), and another which has been in acquisition mode for years. 
We find the thinking process and screening technology has thrown up some previously less-than-obvious candidates which deserve further work.

Equity L/S Analyst | Forensic Accounting | India, Yellowstone Equity

Ankit Agrawal, CFA

Equity L/S Analyst | Forensic Accounting | India

Forensic Accounting

In this Smartkarma Original, we bring to you a forensic analysis tool that scores companies across Developed Asia on their accounting risk. We use 25+ accounting parameters in our framework to come up with an accounting risk score. Our tool is based in Excel and is linked dynamically to Capital IQ for fetching latest data.
Insight Flow
<ol>
<li>Forensic Analysis Framework</li>
<li>Excel Model
<ol>
<li>How to Download and Use the Tool</li>
<li>Steps to Run the Model</li>
</ol>
</li>
<li>Target Universe</li>
<li>Companies with Highest Accounting Risk </li>
<li>Summary Statistics from our Analysis</li>
<li>Key Model Limitations and Risks</li>
<li>Appendix
<ol>
<li>List of Companies in our Target Universe with Accounting Risk Score &gt;= 8</li>
<li>Glossary</li>
<li>Snapshot of Capital IQ Screener Used for Filtering Universe</li>
<li>Switch Formula Calculation Option in Excel</li>
<li>Refresh Worksheet Option in Capital IQ Plugin</li>
</ol>
</li>
</ol>
<div class="content-highlight">
What's Original?
Over time with experience and taking cues from past financial shenanigans, we have developed a proprietary quantitative framework for identifying accounting irregularities. This framework comprises of 25+ accounting parameters and takes into account 10 years of historical data to assess the quality of accounting.
</div>

In this Smartkarma Original, we bring to you a forensic analysis tool that scores companies across Developed Asia on their accounting risk. We use 25+ accounting parameters in our framework to come up with an accounting risk score. Our tool is based in Excel and is linked dynamically to Capital IQ for fetching latest data.
Insight Flow

Forensic Analysis Framework
Excel Model

How to Download and Use the Tool
Steps to Run the Model


Target Universe
Companies with Highest Accounting Risk 
Summary Statistics from our Analysis
Key Model Limitations and Risks
Appendix

List of Companies in our Target Universe with Accounting Risk Score &gt;= 8
Glossary
Snapshot of Capital IQ Screener Used for Filtering Universe
Switch Formula Calculation Option in Excel
Refresh Worksheet Option in Capital IQ Plugin




What's Original?
Over time with experience and taking cues from past financial shenanigans, we have developed a proprietary quantitative framework for identifying accounting irregularities. This framework comprises of 25+ accounting parameters and takes into account 10 years of historical data to assess the quality of accounting.


A Forensic Analysis Tool for Detecting Accounting Red Flags: Focus on Developed Asia

Japan

Toshiba Corporation manufactures and markets electrical and electronic products. The Company's products include digital products such as PCs and televisions, NAND flash memories, and system LSIs (large-scale integrated), as well as social infrastructures such as power generators, medical equipment, and home appliances.

Price Gauge
52-week Range	0.00 - 0.00
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Toshiba Corp (6502 JP)

JAPAN DELTA IV - Is The GPIF In Buying?

The GPIF is the world's largest pension fund at what was $1.6 trillion-plus at the end of December 2019. The management of the GPIF has made...

Travis Lundy

🇯🇵 JAPAN • Who’s Swimming Naked? > Part 3: Cumulative Cash Flow

CUMULATIVE CASH FLOWS - In this third and final of our series on Japanese companies that might be compromised as the Covid-19 recession unfolds, ...

Campbell Gunn

🇯🇵 JAPAN • Who's Swimming Naked? > Part 1: Audit Score

“You only find out who is swimming naked when the tide goes out. “- Warren BuffettWHO'S SWIMMING NAKED? - This is the first part of three Insights...

Campbell Gunn

A Potential Asian LBO Screening System

With a relatively full slate of large value takeovers in Developed Asia in the past year - often by parents but also by buyout funds - and the...

Travis Lundy

A Forensic Analysis Tool for Detecting Accounting Red Flags: Focus on Developed Asia

In this Smartkarma Original, we bring to you a forensic analysis tool that scores companies across Developed Asia on their accounting risk. We use...

Ankit Agrawal, CFA

Price Gauge

52-week Range

Market Cap (USDm)

P/E

Dividend (Yield)