Silver Point

Thomas J. Monaco

Independent Insight Provider

Silver Point is a boutique research firm that focuses on the broader financial services sector, with a particular focus on troubled institutions globally. 

Asia Ex Japan

Equity Bottom-Up

China Merchants Bank H / Equity Bottom-Up

<p><strong><em>*2Q21 Bottom-Line Sees Cracks:</em></strong> China Merchants Bank (3968.HK) [CMB] reported 2Q21 results of CNY 29.1 bn, decreasing CNY 2.9 bn (9.0%) linked quarter, driven by negative operating jaws, a decline net fees and commissions, and higher provisions, tracking weaker credit quality; and </p><p><strong><em>*Credit Wall of Worry Continues To Grow:</em></strong> Net new problem loans continue to accelerate at an Indian bank pace of CNY 20.3 bn or 150.2% annualized versus CNY 18.9 bn or 138.5% at 1Q21. Although CMB’s reserve cover still remains quite robust, the net new NPL ratio trajectory suggests that reserve cover of NPLs will drop to something more in line with a typical mainland Chinese bank.</p>

*2Q21 Bottom-Line Sees Cracks: China Merchants Bank (3968.HK) [CMB] reported 2Q21 results of CNY 29.1 bn, decreasing CNY 2.9 bn (9.0%) linked quarter, driven by negative operating jaws, a decline net fees and commissions, and higher provisions, tracking weaker credit quality; and *Credit Wall of Worry Continues To Grow: Net new problem loans continue to accelerate at an Indian bank pace of CNY 20.3 bn or 150.2% annualized versus CNY 18.9 bn or 138.5% at 1Q21. Although CMB’s reserve cover still remains quite robust, the net new NPL ratio trajectory suggests that reserve cover of NPLs will drop to something more in line with a typical mainland Chinese bank.

China Merchants Bank – Now Negative Operating Jaws

Thematic (Sector/Industry)

<p><strong><em>*Document 15: </em></strong>Recently the China Bank and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC) issued guidance to both banks and insurers on implicit debt of local government financing vehicles (LGFV) via Document 15 – tightening the screws even further; and</p><p><strong><em>*Clarification Was Necessary: </em></strong><span class="leadin">Uncertainties surrounding the definition of local state-owned entity (SOE) with implicit financing support from the government has already led to an aggressive impact on lending.</span> Numerous local infrastructure SOEs have subsidiaries with some form of implicit local government debt support, and without financing Document 15 would have had even more significant consequences. Still over 50% of LGFVs remain affected.</p>

*Document 15: Recently the China Bank and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC) issued guidance to both banks and insurers on implicit debt of local government financing vehicles (LGFV) via Document 15 – tightening the screws even further; and*Clarification Was Necessary: Uncertainties surrounding the definition of local state-owned entity (SOE) with implicit financing support from the government has already led to an aggressive impact on lending. Numerous local infrastructure SOEs have subsidiaries with some form of implicit local government debt support, and without financing Document 15 would have had even more significant consequences. Still over 50% of LGFVs remain affected.

China Banks – Some Clarity On LGFV Financing

Smartkarma Research Team, Smartkarma

Smartkarma Research

Smartkarma Research Team

Smartkarma

Smartkarma unites the fragmented investment industry, connecting institutional investors, independent research providers, and corporates within a single network.

Research Reinvented

<p>For our next Webinar, we welcome Insight Provider <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/profiles/stanley-tsai-cfa" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="accounts:1116" rel="noopener">Stanley Tsai, CFA</a>, who will present his views on positioning in China financials for the remainder of 2021 in the face of a slowing economy, renewed concerns over Covid-19, and asset quality challenges.</p><div><div><h3>The webinar will be hosted on Wednesday, 18 August 2021, 17:00 SGT/HKT.</h3></div></div><div><div>
<div class="content-highlight"><h2><a href="https://share.hsforms.com/1H9pFZOB-RF2J00kbvMmxcw2c5gj?zoom_webinar_id=82322164524" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Register for the Webinar here</a></h2></div>
<p>Stanley Tsai has over two decades' experience as a financials specialist across equities and fixed income. He is currently an advisor to a private investment fund and a non-executive director of a US VC fund.</p>
</div></div>

For our next Webinar, we welcome Insight Provider Stanley Tsai, CFA, who will present his views on positioning in China financials for the remainder of 2021 in the face of a slowing economy, renewed concerns over Covid-19, and asset quality challenges.The webinar will be hosted on Wednesday, 18 August 2021, 17:00 SGT/HKT.
Register for the Webinar here
Stanley Tsai has over two decades' experience as a financials specialist across equities and fixed income. He is currently an advisor to a private investment fund and a non-executive director of a US VC fund.


Smartkarma Webinar | China Banks: Silver Linings Playbook

<p><strong><em>*Document 15: </em></strong><span class="leadin">Recently the China Bank and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC) </span>issued guidance to both banks and insurers on implicit debt of local government financing vehicles (LGFV) via Document 15 – tightening the screws even further;  and</p><p><strong><em>*No Let Up In Sight: </em></strong>Coupled with the structural reforms of an increase in risk-based capital minimums for certain state banks, the partial bank Wealth Management Product (WMP) resolution, and the recent reserve requirement ratio (RRR) reduction, these tightening measures should act to contain some of the out of control financial risk within the mainland Chinese financial system.</p>

*Document 15: Recently the China Bank and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC) issued guidance to both banks and insurers on implicit debt of local government financing vehicles (LGFV) via Document 15 – tightening the screws even further;  and*No Let Up In Sight: Coupled with the structural reforms of an increase in risk-based capital minimums for certain state banks, the partial bank Wealth Management Product (WMP) resolution, and the recent reserve requirement ratio (RRR) reduction, these tightening measures should act to contain some of the out of control financial risk within the mainland Chinese financial system.

<p><strong><em>*Adding More Complexity In Mainland China:</em></strong> AIA’s hyper-aggressive push into mainland China via acquisition as company fundamentals remain poor. This push unfortunately continues. On June 29, 2020, AIA Group (1299.HK) [AIA] announced that it has agreed to invest USD 1.86 bn (CNY 12 bn) in cash for a 24.99% stake in China Post Life (CPL), a subsidiary of China Post Group via its Hong Kong subsidiary, AIA Company Ltd; </p><p><strong><em>*Head Scratching Move: </em></strong>The CPL deal makes little sense financially, gives AIA no managerial or Board control, is limited to an equity investment without other business cooperation;  and directly competes with AIA China – despite management spin on the matter;  and </p><p><em><strong>*Suffocating Hong Kong Business: </strong></em>AIA’s core Hong Kong business has been an unmitigated disaster for during COVID-19, as it struggles with mainland Chinese visitors. Further, there is limited clarity on AIA’s legacy agents. It also has to deal with the fledgling Bank of East Asia (23.HK) business that it recently acquired. </p>

*Adding More Complexity In Mainland China: AIA’s hyper-aggressive push into mainland China via acquisition as company fundamentals remain poor. This push unfortunately continues. On June 29, 2020, AIA Group (1299.HK) [AIA] announced that it has agreed to invest USD 1.86 bn (CNY 12 bn) in cash for a 24.99% stake in China Post Life (CPL), a subsidiary of China Post Group via its Hong Kong subsidiary, AIA Company Ltd; *Head Scratching Move: The CPL deal makes little sense financially, gives AIA no managerial or Board control, is limited to an equity investment without other business cooperation;  and directly competes with AIA China – despite management spin on the matter;  and *Suffocating Hong Kong Business: AIA’s core Hong Kong business has been an unmitigated disaster for during COVID-19, as it struggles with mainland Chinese visitors. Further, there is limited clarity on AIA’s legacy agents. It also has to deal with the fledgling Bank of East Asia (23.HK) business that it recently acquired. 

AIA – Now Competing With Itself In China

China

Postal Savings Bank of China Co., Ltd. provides banking services. The Company offers deposits, loans, fund settlement, and other services. Postal Savings Bank of China provides its services to individuals, enterprises, and other clients.

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Postal Savings Bank of China C (1658 HK)

China Merchants Bank – Now Negative Operating Jaws

CHINA MERCHANTS BANK: CMB reported QOQ 2Q21 results decline of 9.0% driven by negative operating jaws, a decline net fees and commissions, and...

Thomas J. Monaco

China Banks – Some Clarity On LGFV Financing

CHINA BANKS: Recently the CBIRC issued guidance to both banks and insurers on implicit debt of LGFV via Document 15. Clarification was needed given...

Thomas J. Monaco

Smartkarma Webinar | China Banks: Silver Linings Playbook

Join us on 18 August, 5pm SGT, as we welcome Stanley Tsai, CFA, who will present his views on positioning in China financials in the face of a...

Smartkarma Research

China Banks – Screws Tighten On LGFVs

CHINA BANKS: Recently the CBIRC issued guidance on implicit LGFV debt via Document 15 – further tightening the screws on mainland China's financial...

Thomas J. Monaco

AIA – Now Competing With Itself In China

AIA GROUP: AIA’s aggressive push into China continues with its 25% stake in China Post Life. The deal makes little sense financially, gives AIA no...

Thomas J. Monaco

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