Expert on Japan Retail and Consumer Markets, JapanConsuming

Michael Causton

Expert on Japan Retail and Consumer Markets

Real Insight on Japanese Consumer Markets

JapanConsuming

JapanConsuming is a specialist research firm producing intelligence on Japanese retail and consumer markets. Founded in 2000, JapanConsuming has become the leading provider of insights on Japanese retailers and consumer trends to retailers, brands, government agencies and investors. As well as a highly regarded monthly report on the market, JapanConsuming produces in-depth reports on retail sectors, seminars on key trends and telephone consulting to investors on trends and retailers.

JapanConsuming was founded by Michael Causton and Roy Larke. 

Thematic (Sector/Industry)

<ul>
<li>The shopping mall sector in Japan had a reasonable 2021, recovering some of the sales lost in 2020.</li>
<li>While sales remained well down on 2019, this year too recovery has been strong with some stand out months including a 29% rise in May.</li>
<li>The same cannot be said for mall development which has ground to a halt with the lowest number of new malls since records began in 1977.</li>
</ul>


The shopping mall sector in Japan had a reasonable 2021, recovering some of the sales lost in 2020.
While sales remained well down on 2019, this year too recovery has been strong with some stand out months including a 29% rise in May.
The same cannot be said for mall development which has ground to a halt with the lowest number of new malls since records began in 1977.


Shopping Mall Sales up 3.8% in 2021, but Few New Openings

Asian Insight Provider - Actionable ideas, CrossASEAN Research

Henry Soediarko

Asian Insight Provider - Actionable ideas

CrossASEAN Research

At CrossASEAN Research we strive to produce unbiased and differentiated on the ground insights on companies across South East Asia. Our Research is produced for the most part after face to face meetings and conversations with company management to dig deep into the long term vision and strategy of the companies we cover. We seek to deliver investable and actionable themes on sectors and markets across SE Asia, often in collaboration with other Insight Providers across the region, pooling the vast experience of the analysts within the Smartkarma Ecosystem. We also offer bespoke work and tailor made trips for our clients. 

Insights across South East Asia

Equity Bottom-Up

Japan Airport Terminal Co / Equity Bottom-Up

Investors rushed to buy <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/japan-airport-terminal-co" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:18034:1" rel="noopener">Japan Airport Terminal Co (9706 JP)</a>as the Go-To campaign in Japan showed early promise of success and the finding of the vaccine and drove the share price to increase by 65% in less than 6 months despite the loss-making 2 quarters, 
With the new COVID-19 variant and the uncertainty whether the current vaccine can be used to treat the new mutation of the virus, and the possibly weak quarter ahead as the widespread COVID-19 cases in Japan has halted the Go-To campaign, investors should think it is an opportune time to start shorting <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/japan-airport-terminal-co" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:18034:1" rel="noopener">Japan Airport Terminal Co (9706 JP)</a> . In addition to that, the company is trading at a 93% premium to the peers' tangible book value multiples.

Investors rushed to buy Japan Airport Terminal Co (9706 JP)as the Go-To campaign in Japan showed early promise of success and the finding of the vaccine and drove the share price to increase by 65% in less than 6 months despite the loss-making 2 quarters, 
With the new COVID-19 variant and the uncertainty whether the current vaccine can be used to treat the new mutation of the virus, and the possibly weak quarter ahead as the widespread COVID-19 cases in Japan has halted the Go-To campaign, investors should think it is an opportune time to start shorting Japan Airport Terminal Co (9706 JP) . In addition to that, the company is trading at a 93% premium to the peers' tangible book value multiples. 

Japan Airport Terminal (9706): Close Border Means Weak Revenues?

Pan-Asia Catalysts/Events, Quiddity Advisors

Travis Lundy

Pan-Asia Catalysts/Events

Quiddity Advisors

Event-Driven

The Nikkei Asia <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Business-deals/1bn-bid-for-Tokyo-Dome-planned-by-developer-Mitsui-Fudosan" target="_blank" rel="noopener">reported</a> this morning (Japanese article link <a href="https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXMZO66704090X21C20A1MM8000" target="_blank" rel="noopener">here</a>) that <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/mitsui-fudosan-co-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:565:1" rel="noopener">Mitsui Fudosan (8801 JP)</a> intended to partner with someone to launch a Tender Offer to take private <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/tokyo-dome-corp" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:6421:1" rel="noopener">Tokyo Dome Corp (9681 JP)</a>, spending "more than ¥100bn" (vs the ¥85.9bn of yesterday's close) based on the idea that there would be a premium to market price. The Tender Offer could start before 2020 ends.The bigger story here, of course, is that hedge fund Oasis Management has been on the case, urging Tokyo Dome management to do more to improve value for shareholders. Oasis said earlier this month they had been trying to engage with Tokyo Dome since 2018. They went over 5% in December 2019 and according to filings lifted their stake to 9.71% in January 2020. Covid-19 later hit Japan and as a result, the number of events and therefore visitor count at the various features and venues within Tokyo Dome have slowed, and the company is on its back foot. Early this year, Oasis set up a website with a fair bit of material for their case at <a href="https://www.abettertokyodome.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">abettertokyodome.com</a>. There main presentation is linked <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5dd62b05f226644911c6d4e1/t/5efabd9b2d98f71482b79156/1593490878125/OASIS+-+A+Better+Tokyo+Dome+Presentation.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">here</a>. The claims are clear, and frankly, anyone who has been to Tokyo Dome recently will know exactly what Oasis is pointing at in terms of efforts which could make Tokyo Dome a better place to visit and a better company. Among the proposals by Oasis, there are substantially improved digital signage to improve ad revenue, a naming rights agreement like seen at other major Japan venues which could bring in ¥500mm a year or more, overhauled technology to match other world-class venues, substantially improved F&amp;B strategy, etc.  The deck was really an informative read when presented in January of this year and the opportunity seemed clear to me. The onset of covid-19 was a highly unfortunate development in the timeline, and this has disrupted what might have been a much more lively activist discussion. As it is, in October, Oasis called for a shareholder meeting for Tokyo Dome, asking to replace three directors including President Tsutomu Nagaoka. On 10 November, Tokyo Dome held a press conference which saw some floundering, and Oasis <a href="https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20201111005501/en/Oasis-Key-Messages-for-Tokyo-Dome-Shareholders-Regarding-the-EGM-on-December-17-2020" target="_blank" rel="noopener">responded</a> the day after. The shareholder meeting is now set for 17 December. It is somehow not surprising that Corporate Japan is circling the wagons. Tokyo Dome is indicated limit up at ¥1047 now. The past 15+ years looks like the below.<section class="figure"><figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/174/563/original/Screenshot%202020-11-27%20at%2010.27.27%20AM.png?1606444069" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="174563"></figure></section>As a reminder, the stock traded at ¥5000+ in the 1990s.The companies (<a href="https://www.mitsuifudosan.co.jp/corporate/ir/library/news/2020/pdf/news_201127.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Mitsui Fudosan</a>, <a href="https://contents.xj-storage.jp/xcontents/AS01950/1667e514/ffcc/4644/b6a6/6313ea0899ad/140120201127428865.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Tokyo Dome</a>) have both responded to the article first thing this morning saying that they will be holding board meetings to discuss this situation later today and will announce anything which needs to be announced as soon as possible thereafter.The old saying goes "Where there is smoke there is fire" but the question is whether it will be hot enough. As a pure tear-down project, the real estate and history of location/brand would likely be worth well more than ¥100bn. Word in the local press is that Mitsui's partner will be Yomiuri Shinbun, which is taking subsidiary/affiliate <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/yomiuri-land-co-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:12813:1" rel="noopener">Yomiuri Land (9671 JP)</a> private as discussed in <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/yomiuri-land-9671-takeover-probably-the-wrong-price-but-whaddya-gonna-do" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:45025" rel="noopener">Yomiuri Land (9671) Takeover - Probably The Wrong Price But Whaddya Gonna Do?</a>. Yomiuri Land is a cross-holder in Tokyo Dome.I expect I will be writing another episode of <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/japan-needs-more-cowbell" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="insights:41191" rel="noopener">Japan Needs More Cowbell</a> shortly. It is depressing to me that one needs to write it so often, but needs, I expect, must.More on the situation and the potential valuation methodology/constraints below the fold.

The Nikkei Asia reported this morning (Japanese article link here) that Mitsui Fudosan (8801 JP) intended to partner with someone to launch a Tender Offer to take private Tokyo Dome Corp (9681 JP), spending "more than ¥100bn" (vs the ¥85.9bn of yesterday's close) based on the idea that there would be a premium to market price. The Tender Offer could start before 2020 ends.The bigger story here, of course, is that hedge fund Oasis Management has been on the case, urging Tokyo Dome management to do more to improve value for shareholders. Oasis said earlier this month they had been trying to engage with Tokyo Dome since 2018. They went over 5% in December 2019 and according to filings lifted their stake to 9.71% in January 2020. Covid-19 later hit Japan and as a result, the number of events and therefore visitor count at the various features and venues within Tokyo Dome have slowed, and the company is on its back foot. Early this year, Oasis set up a website with a fair bit of material for their case at abettertokyodome.com. There main presentation is linked here. The claims are clear, and frankly, anyone who has been to Tokyo Dome recently will know exactly what Oasis is pointing at in terms of efforts which could make Tokyo Dome a better place to visit and a better company. Among the proposals by Oasis, there are substantially improved digital signage to improve ad revenue, a naming rights agreement like seen at other major Japan venues which could bring in ¥500mm a year or more, overhauled technology to match other world-class venues, substantially improved F&amp;B strategy, etc.  The deck was really an informative read when presented in January of this year and the opportunity seemed clear to me. The onset of covid-19 was a highly unfortunate development in the timeline, and this has disrupted what might have been a much more lively activist discussion. As it is, in October, Oasis called for a shareholder meeting for Tokyo Dome, asking to replace three directors including President Tsutomu Nagaoka. On 10 November, Tokyo Dome held a press conference which saw some floundering, and Oasis responded the day after. The shareholder meeting is now set for 17 December. It is somehow not surprising that Corporate Japan is circling the wagons. Tokyo Dome is indicated limit up at ¥1047 now. The past 15+ years looks like the below.As a reminder, the stock traded at ¥5000+ in the 1990s.The companies (Mitsui Fudosan, Tokyo Dome) have both responded to the article first thing this morning saying that they will be holding board meetings to discuss this situation later today and will announce anything which needs to be announced as soon as possible thereafter.The old saying goes "Where there is smoke there is fire" but the question is whether it will be hot enough. As a pure tear-down project, the real estate and history of location/brand would likely be worth well more than ¥100bn. Word in the local press is that Mitsui's partner will be Yomiuri Shinbun, which is taking subsidiary/affiliate Yomiuri Land (9671 JP) private as discussed in Yomiuri Land (9671) Takeover - Probably The Wrong Price But Whaddya Gonna Do?. Yomiuri Land is a cross-holder in Tokyo Dome.I expect I will be writing another episode of Japan Needs More Cowbell shortly. It is depressing to me that one needs to write it so often, but needs, I expect, must.More on the situation and the potential valuation methodology/constraints below the fold.

Mitsui Fudosan Tender For Tokyo Dome (9681) Mooted

'Quantamental' Japan Specialist, LightStream Research

Campbell Gunn

'Quantamental' Japan Specialist

Long-Short Analysis on Japan, Asia and the World

LightStream Research

LightStream conducts quantitatively rigorous and data-driven analysis with a focus on Japan and Asia.

We consistently cover the Tech, Consumer and Industrial sectors, and provide ECM and Events coverage more broadly.

We supplement traditional qualitative insights from company relationships with a robust quantitative foundation that examines as much historical data as is available.
We further refine the accuracy of our insights and calls through the use of alternative data to flesh out current trends, and through a valuation framework that emphasises non-superficial peer group selection and a proper attempt to understand the metrics and changes that have driven security valuations in the past.

<div>
<figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/148/784/original/2020-07-30_08-23-32.png?1596065031" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="148784"></figure><figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/148/785/original/2020-07-30_08-24-39.png?1596065092" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="148785"></figure><figure class="editor-figure mceNonEditable"><img src="https://static-prod.smartkarma.com/images/media/000/148/786/original/2020-07-30_08-25-16.png?1596065140" class="editor-image img-responsive" data-smartkarma-image-id="148786"></figure><div class="content-caption">Source • Japan Analytics</div>
29th JULY - As the pace of announcements picks up, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/ana-holdings-inc" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:5308:1" rel="noopener">ANA (9202 JP)</a>, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/showa-corp" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:15079:1" rel="noopener">Showa (7274 JP)</a>, and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/isetan-mitsukoshi-holdings-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:18871:1" rel="noopener">Isetan Mitsukoshi (3099 JP)</a> were the three 'worst' large-cap results yesterday in terms of our scoring methodology. In the DETAIL below, we cover all the results and forecasts for companies with a market cap of over ¥100 billion and make some trading suggestions.
<hr>
DAILY STATS
</div><hr><div>85 Quarterly Results</div><div><ul>
<li>
Results Score: 30 Positive / 5 Neutral / 50 Negative</li>
<li>
Average Results Score Change: -2.4</li>
<li>
Average % Change in Revenue: -9.7% Quarter YoY / -2.7% Rolling TTM YoY </li>
<li>
Average Operating Profit Margin Change: -1.0ppt</li>
<li>
Percentage Making Quarterly Losses: 24%</li>
</ul></div><hr><div> 35 Annual • 15 Interim Forecasts/Revisions</div><div><ul>
<li>
Annual Forecast/Revision Score: 6 Positive / 1 Neutral / 28 Negative</li>
<li>
Interim Forecast/Revision Score Change: 4 Positive / 0 Neutral / 11 Negative</li>
<li>
Average Forecast/Revision Score Change: -12.8</li>
</ul></div>


Source • Japan Analytics
29th JULY - As the pace of announcements picks up, ANA (9202 JP), Showa (7274 JP), and Isetan Mitsukoshi (3099 JP) were the three 'worst' large-cap results yesterday in terms of our scoring methodology. In the DETAIL below, we cover all the results and forecasts for companies with a market cap of over ¥100 billion and make some trading suggestions.

DAILY STATS
85 Quarterly Results

Results Score: 30 Positive / 5 Neutral / 50 Negative

Average Results Score Change: -2.4

Average % Change in Revenue: -9.7% Quarter YoY / -2.7% Rolling TTM YoY 

Average Operating Profit Margin Change: -1.0ppt

Percentage Making Quarterly Losses: 24%
 35 Annual • 15 Interim Forecasts/Revisions

Annual Forecast/Revision Score: 6 Positive / 1 Neutral / 28 Negative

Interim Forecast/Revision Score Change: 4 Positive / 0 Neutral / 11 Negative

Average Forecast/Revision Score Change: -12.8


🇯🇵 JAPAN • Results & Revisions 29th July - Kao, SMFG, Nomura, NRI, Asahi Holdings, NRE

Hitachi Construction Machinery / Event-Driven

With a relatively full slate of large value takeovers in Developed Asia in the past year - often by parents but also by buyout funds - and the availability of significant credit to finance such takeovers, this Smartkarma Original insight looks at what constitutes an attractive target for takeover, and seeks to construct a framework for screening and filtering companies for further study. 
The filtering is conducted across two basic measures which seek to answer two basic questions:
<ol>
<li>What might supply look like?</li>
<li>What might demand look like?</li>
</ol>
The first basic problem with creating such filters is that on the Supply side, using databases to determine whether a controlling shareholder wants to sell is almost a lost cause from the beginning. But the exercise throws up some interesting case studies, and it is important to understand why such screening could lead to interesting results. 
On the demand side, it is a difficult and complicated exercise because financial data moves around, shifting through time and relative price because competitors also shift in time and price. A clear example of a company which might have been "relatively" attractive vs peers a month ago might not be after the market ructions at the end of February 2020 when this was written. Prices were, of course, lower, which means that a good screening process is dynamic, both in relative and absolute measures. It is also somewhat difficult to create a one-size-fits-all screen for attractive targets because in certain countries, certain industries (telecom, airlines, social infrastructure, defence) are covered by foreign ownership limits, other industries (banks, brokers, insurers) rarely see leveraged buyouts, and takeovers in other industries (Chinese homebuilders) are, for lack of a better word, simply off the table at certain times.
In addition, there are lots of ways in which companies might present themselves as attractive targets. If someone controls a company, and wants to sell it cheaply, there are lots of potential buyers who will fall all over themselves to get in line to buy it. But companies can be attractive targets because of the potential for changing profit metrics and multiples through restructuring, asset reorganisation, industry reorganisation, or simply waiting for the cycle to change. 
Using valuation metrics with a cutoff line can be challenging because common multiples such as PER, PCFR, PBR, EV/EBITDA may ignore significant value available from longer-term securities holdings, non-operating real estate assets which are not managed in optimal fashion, etc. 
In short, screening can only go so far. But we try.
At the end, we take a brief look at 10 companies from Developed Asia which show up as a result of our screening efforts. The resulting list is dominated by Japanese companies because some of the companies which show up from other countries fit the "no-go" categories above (airlines, financial companies, defence technology subject to foreign ownership limits, Chinese homebuilders subject to skepticism, etc.). Some are also clearly Emerging Asia businesses with Developed Asia listings. Screening for Emerging Asia got a few companies which are high on anyone's target list, including one which saw an unsolicited takeover approach earlier this week (end-Feb 2020), and another which has been in acquisition mode for years. 
We find the thinking process and screening technology has thrown up some previously less-than-obvious candidates which deserve further work.

With a relatively full slate of large value takeovers in Developed Asia in the past year - often by parents but also by buyout funds - and the availability of significant credit to finance such takeovers, this Smartkarma Original insight looks at what constitutes an attractive target for takeover, and seeks to construct a framework for screening and filtering companies for further study. 
The filtering is conducted across two basic measures which seek to answer two basic questions:

What might supply look like?
What might demand look like?

The first basic problem with creating such filters is that on the Supply side, using databases to determine whether a controlling shareholder wants to sell is almost a lost cause from the beginning. But the exercise throws up some interesting case studies, and it is important to understand why such screening could lead to interesting results. 
On the demand side, it is a difficult and complicated exercise because financial data moves around, shifting through time and relative price because competitors also shift in time and price. A clear example of a company which might have been "relatively" attractive vs peers a month ago might not be after the market ructions at the end of February 2020 when this was written. Prices were, of course, lower, which means that a good screening process is dynamic, both in relative and absolute measures. It is also somewhat difficult to create a one-size-fits-all screen for attractive targets because in certain countries, certain industries (telecom, airlines, social infrastructure, defence) are covered by foreign ownership limits, other industries (banks, brokers, insurers) rarely see leveraged buyouts, and takeovers in other industries (Chinese homebuilders) are, for lack of a better word, simply off the table at certain times.
In addition, there are lots of ways in which companies might present themselves as attractive targets. If someone controls a company, and wants to sell it cheaply, there are lots of potential buyers who will fall all over themselves to get in line to buy it. But companies can be attractive targets because of the potential for changing profit metrics and multiples through restructuring, asset reorganisation, industry reorganisation, or simply waiting for the cycle to change. 
Using valuation metrics with a cutoff line can be challenging because common multiples such as PER, PCFR, PBR, EV/EBITDA may ignore significant value available from longer-term securities holdings, non-operating real estate assets which are not managed in optimal fashion, etc. 
In short, screening can only go so far. But we try.
At the end, we take a brief look at 10 companies from Developed Asia which show up as a result of our screening efforts. The resulting list is dominated by Japanese companies because some of the companies which show up from other countries fit the "no-go" categories above (airlines, financial companies, defence technology subject to foreign ownership limits, Chinese homebuilders subject to skepticism, etc.). Some are also clearly Emerging Asia businesses with Developed Asia listings. Screening for Emerging Asia got a few companies which are high on anyone's target list, including one which saw an unsolicited takeover approach earlier this week (end-Feb 2020), and another which has been in acquisition mode for years. 
We find the thinking process and screening technology has thrown up some previously less-than-obvious candidates which deserve further work.

Japan

Nomura Real Estate Holdings, Inc. sells and leases condominiums, residential houses, and office buildings.  The Company also manages REITs, real estate development, and consulting services.

Price Gauge
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Nomura Real Estate (3231 JP)

Shopping Mall Sales up 3.8% in 2021, but Few New Openings

Shopping mall development largely stalled in 2021 and, while there will be some rebound, the longer-term trend is for less development and a focus...

Michael Causton

Japan Airport Terminal (9706): Close Border Means Weak Revenues?

With the new COVID-19 variant, uncertainty whether the vaccine is working, and possibly weak quarter as the COVID-19 in Japan increased halted the...

Henry Soediarko

Mitsui Fudosan Tender For Tokyo Dome (9681) Mooted

It appears Mitsui Fudosan and Yomiuri Land will be bidding for Tokyo Dome in order to fend off the activism of 9.7% holder Oasis. That's a pity....

Travis Lundy

🇯🇵 JAPAN • Results & Revisions 29th July - Kao, SMFG, Nomura, NRI, Asahi Holdings, NRE

29th JULY - As the pace of announcements picks up, ANA (9202 JP), Showa (7274 JP), and Isetan Mitsukoshi (3099 JP) were the three 'worst'...

Campbell Gunn

A Potential Asian LBO Screening System

With a relatively full slate of large value takeovers in Developed Asia in the past year - often by parents but also by buyout funds - and the...

Travis Lundy

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