Forensic Analyst

Jason Yap, CFA

Forensic Accounting

<ul>
<li>Didi's announced that it would delist from US and prepare for a public listing in Hongkong</li>
<li>Didi is racing against time to do so due to various factors such as, lock-up expiry, HK Stock Exchange review of listing applications, and potential cybersecurity review for HK issuers</li>
<li>There could be parallels in terms of key risks for other non-dual listed China ADSs</li>
</ul>


Didi's announced that it would delist from US and prepare for a public listing in Hongkong
Didi is racing against time to do so due to various factors such as, lock-up expiry, HK Stock Exchange review of listing applications, and potential cybersecurity review for HK issuers
There could be parallels in terms of key risks for other non-dual listed China ADSs


Didi (Didi US)'s Delisting and Its Implications for Non-Dual Listed China ADS

Silver Point

Thomas J. Monaco

Independent Insight Provider

Silver Point is a boutique research firm that focuses on the broader financial services sector, with a particular focus on troubled institutions globally. 

Asia Ex Japan

Equity Bottom-Up

China Pacific Insurance / Equity Bottom-Up

*Weak 3Q21 Results: China Pacific Insurance (2601.HK) (CPIC) reported 3Q21 results of CNY 5.4 bn, declining CNY 3.4 bn (38.5%) linked quarter. Profitability was hurt by both the Life and P&amp;C units, which declined CNY 3.9 bn (52.4%) and CNY 156 mn (10.6%), respectively, to CNY 3.6 bn and CNY 1.3 bn; and*Troubles Continue In Life: During 3Q21, first year premium (FYP) agent per month declined by 41.0% linked quarter largely due to CPIC relying more on online channels to conduct new sales, and intimating agency distribution remained a challenge.The new CEO of CPIC Life mentioned that a new agency restructure will be implemented beginning January 1, 2022.

*Weak 3Q21 Results: China Pacific Insurance (2601.HK) (CPIC) reported 3Q21 results of CNY 5.4 bn, declining CNY 3.4 bn (38.5%) linked quarter. Profitability was hurt by both the Life and P&amp;C units, which declined CNY 3.9 bn (52.4%) and CNY 156 mn (10.6%), respectively, to CNY 3.6 bn and CNY 1.3 bn; and*Troubles Continue In Life: During 3Q21, first year premium (FYP) agent per month declined by 41.0% linked quarter largely due to CPIC relying more on online channels to conduct new sales, and intimating agency distribution remained a challenge.The new CEO of CPIC Life mentioned that a new agency restructure will be implemented beginning January 1, 2022.

China Pacific Insurance – Life Troubles

*Weak Results in Investment and P&amp;C: Ping An Insurance (2318.HK) [Ping An] reported 3Q21 results of CNY 23.6 bn, declining CNY 7.1 bn (23.2%) linked quarter.  Much of the struggle this quarter remained Ping An’s investment portfolio – likely a long-term thematic, where the net investment yield plummet 30 bp to 4.4%. Excluding Ping An Bank (000001.CH) [PAB] whose results were completely managed, all other business units disappointed linked quarter; and*Concerns Increase At Bank And With Expansion Plans:  PAB reported 3Q21 results of CNY 11.7 bn. Don’t shoot off the streamers just yet, credit quality was abysmal and Ping An clearly pulled on its bank lever. By our analysis, we find that credit remains incredibly challenged as net new NPLs are now accelerating at Indian bank pace of CNY 12.4 bn or 159.8% annualized.  Assuming that the accelerated credit break in the PAB portfolio continues to remain at its current level, we find that PAB’s reserves remain CNY 19 bn light.

*Weak Results in Investment and P&amp;C: Ping An Insurance (2318.HK) [Ping An] reported 3Q21 results of CNY 23.6 bn, declining CNY 7.1 bn (23.2%) linked quarter.  Much of the struggle this quarter remained Ping An’s investment portfolio – likely a long-term thematic, where the net investment yield plummet 30 bp to 4.4%. Excluding Ping An Bank (000001.CH) [PAB] whose results were completely managed, all other business units disappointed linked quarter; and*Concerns Increase At Bank And With Expansion Plans:  PAB reported 3Q21 results of CNY 11.7 bn. Don’t shoot off the streamers just yet, credit quality was abysmal and Ping An clearly pulled on its bank lever. By our analysis, we find that credit remains incredibly challenged as net new NPLs are now accelerating at Indian bank pace of CNY 12.4 bn or 159.8% annualized.  Assuming that the accelerated credit break in the PAB portfolio continues to remain at its current level, we find that PAB’s reserves remain CNY 19 bn light.  

Ping An Insurance – Another Abysmal Result

*Bank Call Reveals Nothing: A competitor held a conference call with Ping An Bank (000001.CH) [PAB]. According to management, the market has over-reacted to risks associated with China Evergrande Group (3333.HK) [Evergrande] and certain other developers. Further, PAB believes that policymakers in Beijing are likely to maintain stable growth within the property sector and coordinate the completion of housing projects – and this “should contain” any spillover effect;  *What Wasn’t Addressed: The Group has real estate-related exposure which represents 24.3% of Ping An Insurance’ (2318.HK) [Ping An] stated equity – more so depending which insurance subsidiary (likely Ping An Life [PAL] given the shortfall in 1H21 earnings) this risk is attributed to. There was no mention of Ping An remaining a source of strength to PAB given the PAL stress, nor if PAB participates in real estate financings led by Ping An - normal practice for conglomerates in mainland China; and  *Negative Credit Delta Could Accelerate Capital Raise: By our analysis, we find that PAB credit remains incredibly challenged as net new NPLs have accelerated 102.2% annualized at 2Q21 - up from 53.6% in 1Q21. Assuming the accelerated credit break in the PAB portfolio continues to remain at the current level, we find that PAB’s reserves still remain quite light by CNY 16 bn - representing about two quarters of pre-tax earnings.

*Bank Call Reveals Nothing: A competitor held a conference call with Ping An Bank (000001.CH) [PAB]. According to management, the market has over-reacted to risks associated with China Evergrande Group (3333.HK) [Evergrande] and certain other developers. Further, PAB believes that policymakers in Beijing are likely to maintain stable growth within the property sector and coordinate the completion of housing projects – and this “should contain” any spillover effect;  *What Wasn’t Addressed: The Group has real estate-related exposure which represents 24.3% of Ping An Insurance’ (2318.HK) [Ping An] stated equity – more so depending which insurance subsidiary (likely Ping An Life [PAL] given the shortfall in 1H21 earnings) this risk is attributed to. There was no mention of Ping An remaining a source of strength to PAB given the PAL stress, nor if PAB participates in real estate financings led by Ping An - normal practice for conglomerates in mainland China; and  *Negative Credit Delta Could Accelerate Capital Raise: By our analysis, we find that PAB credit remains incredibly challenged as net new NPLs have accelerated 102.2% annualized at 2Q21 - up from 53.6% in 1Q21. Assuming the accelerated credit break in the PAB portfolio continues to remain at the current level, we find that PAB’s reserves still remain quite light by CNY 16 bn - representing about two quarters of pre-tax earnings.   

After Ant Financials' IPO was pulled in November 2020, market participants eventually came to terms with the potential repercussions on the fintech industry.  The initial concerns of anti-monopoly, systemic risks, and data protection have since become familiar topics. 
Amongst listed fintech companies, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/lufax-holdings" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:29690:1" rel="noopener">Lufax Holdings (LU US)</a> bore the brunt of the regulatory crackdown on the fintech sector, losing more than half its market capitalisation since the mid February 2021 peak. Lufax currently trades at a forward EV/EBITDA of 4.2x and P/B of 1.3x.
While Lufax initially distanced itself from Ant (drawing attention to its loan facilitation model instead of Ant's co-lending model) and the harsh rules that Ant was subject to, it soon became apparent that Lufax's loan facilitation model would not be spared.
Lufax started a series of self-policing efforts, citing ongoing dialogue with regulators, while searching for alternative models to maintain loan book growth and net margins. 
The narrative has gradually since switched to negatives being discounted to Lufax's share price, renewed optimism of business reform efforts, and that Lufax has turned the tide. 
This article discussed potential risks that remain and how recent new regulations imposed on Ant would (once again) have a ripple effect on fintech players, like Lufax.

After Ant Financials' IPO was pulled in November 2020, market participants eventually came to terms with the potential repercussions on the fintech industry.  The initial concerns of anti-monopoly, systemic risks, and data protection have since become familiar topics. 
Amongst listed fintech companies, Lufax Holdings (LU US) bore the brunt of the regulatory crackdown on the fintech sector, losing more than half its market capitalisation since the mid February 2021 peak. Lufax currently trades at a forward EV/EBITDA of 4.2x and P/B of 1.3x.
While Lufax initially distanced itself from Ant (drawing attention to its loan facilitation model instead of Ant's co-lending model) and the harsh rules that Ant was subject to, it soon became apparent that Lufax's loan facilitation model would not be spared.
Lufax started a series of self-policing efforts, citing ongoing dialogue with regulators, while searching for alternative models to maintain loan book growth and net margins. 
The narrative has gradually since switched to negatives being discounted to Lufax's share price, renewed optimism of business reform efforts, and that Lufax has turned the tide. 
This article discussed potential risks that remain and how recent new regulations imposed on Ant would (once again) have a ripple effect on fintech players, like Lufax. 

Lufax (LU) - Not Yet a Turnaround Story Despite Sharp De-Rating

China

Lufax Holding Ltd operates technology-empowered personal financial services platform. The Company connects financial institutions to facilitate lending and wealth management products tailored to individual customer's needs and risk appetites.

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Lufax Holding (LU US)

Didi (Didi US)'s Delisting and Its Implications for Non-Dual Listed China ADS

As Didi races against time to delist from US, it faces, amongst others, lock-up expiry, HK listing review, and potential cybersecurity review. What...

Jason Yap, CFA

China Pacific Insurance – Life Troubles

CHINA PACIFIC: CPIC reported a 3Q21 QOQ results decline of 38.5%, driven by both the Life and P&C units. The new CEO of CPIC Life mentioned that a...

Thomas J. Monaco

Ping An Insurance – Another Abysmal Result

PING AN: Ping An reported a QOQ 3Q21 results decline of 23.2%, attributed to its investment portfolio. Excluding PAB, whose results were managed,...

Thomas J. Monaco

Ping An Insurance – Don’t Bank On It

PING AN: Competitor conference call with PAB reveals nonchalant management. The Group has enormous real estate-related exposure, and questions of...

Thomas J. Monaco

Lufax (LU) - Not Yet a Turnaround Story Despite Sharp De-Rating

Among listed fintech firms, Lufax bore the brunt of the regulatory crackdown on the sector, losing more than half its market capitalisation. This...

Jason Yap, CFA

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