Specialist in Indian Banking and Economic Research

Hemindra Hazari

Government banks have been derided for indulging in ‘phone banking’ (being instructed on the telephone by ruling party politicians and civil bureaucrats to lend to specific unworthy companies). But what the Enforcement Directorate’s (ED) affidavit in the Delhi Court (as disclosed by the media -- <a href="https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/71-loans-given-in-kapoor-s-tenure-turned-bad-ed-101633976406867.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">here</a> and <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/banking/finance/enforcement-directorate-says-bank-loan-fraud-was-mutually-beneficial-to-avantha-yes-bank/articleshow/86699558.cms?from=mdr" target="_blank" rel="noopener">here</a>)  reveals is that senior executives from the private sector <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/yes-bank-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:767:1" rel="noopener">Yes Bank (YES IN)</a> were no different from their government counterparts. The only difference is that the concerned senior executives at Yes Bank were excessively paid, and were highly qualified persons from premier institutions, as compared with government bankers. The ED’s charge sheet alleges that senior executives at Yes Bank knowingly engaged in sham transactions, and the accused Yes Bank officials put the onus on the transactions on the now jailed Rana Kapoor, the erstwhile founder-Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Yes Bank. Despite their educational qualifications, previous work experience and the senior positions they held, they allowed themselves to  be reduced to being low-paid clerks – or worse, since the latter at least know enough not to engage in fraudulent transactions. The entire edifice of Yes Bank’s credit appraisal, independent risk management and board oversight was a myth, as nobody recorded strong objections to giving loans to a shell company and structuring a product whose sole objective was a spurious show of compliance with regulatory guidelines.   Stakeholders, media and analysts rarely get to see the inner working of a bank and how loans are appraised, independently evaluated by risk management and subsequently monitored. The ED’s affidavit, as reported by the media, provides such a rare inside knowledge view of how a poor quality loan for a dubious purpose was conceived, structured and approved by an over-qualified and overpaid team, solely on the basis of instructions from the CEO. What is equally disturbing, but also telling, is that three of the accused have left the bank, and have taken up fresh engagements with their new organisations – who, presumably, were impressed with these persons’ work credentials at Yes Bank, and wanted them to continue the same practices for their new employers.What is worrying is that Yes Bank’s practice of having senior executives with impressive qualifications, stellar resumes, and imposing titles, knowingly engaging in such transactions may not be the exception in the private financial sector. Regulatory agencies have investigated or are currently investigating similar transactions at <a href="https://hemindrahazari.com/2021/06/16/cg-power-loan-scandal-indusind-bank-pioneers-lending-without-documents-to-a-firm-with-no-assets/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Indusind Bank</a>, <a href="https://hemindrahazari.com/2021/06/23/aditya-birla-finances-loans-to-a-shell-company-another-reason-why-corporates-shouldnt-be-allowed-to-control-banks/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Aditya Birla Finance</a>, <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/prime/corporate-governance/how-an-eur44-million-loan-from-stanchart-put-murugappas-cg-power-between-sebi-and-a-hard-place/primearticleshow/83285540.cms" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Standard Chartered Bank</a> and <a href="https://hemindrahazari.com/2021/08/31/sebi-exposes-kotak-mahindra-mutual-funds-policy-of-investing-blindly/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Kotak Mahindra Mutual Fund</a>. This indicates that the situation may be systemic. It appears that, for all their experience and seniority, key senior executives in the private financial sector are paid inflated packages precisely for engaging in the intellectually undemanding task of ‘phone banking’. The valuations of private financial firms may need to be reassessed in the light of these disclosures.

Government banks have been derided for indulging in ‘phone banking’ (being instructed on the telephone by ruling party politicians and civil bureaucrats to lend to specific unworthy companies). But what the Enforcement Directorate’s (ED) affidavit in the Delhi Court (as disclosed by the media -- here and here)  reveals is that senior executives from the private sector Yes Bank (YES IN) were no different from their government counterparts. The only difference is that the concerned senior executives at Yes Bank were excessively paid, and were highly qualified persons from premier institutions, as compared with government bankers. The ED’s charge sheet alleges that senior executives at Yes Bank knowingly engaged in sham transactions, and the accused Yes Bank officials put the onus on the transactions on the now jailed Rana Kapoor, the erstwhile founder-Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Yes Bank. Despite their educational qualifications, previous work experience and the senior positions they held, they allowed themselves to  be reduced to being low-paid clerks – or worse, since the latter at least know enough not to engage in fraudulent transactions. The entire edifice of Yes Bank’s credit appraisal, independent risk management and board oversight was a myth, as nobody recorded strong objections to giving loans to a shell company and structuring a product whose sole objective was a spurious show of compliance with regulatory guidelines.   Stakeholders, media and analysts rarely get to see the inner working of a bank and how loans are appraised, independently evaluated by risk management and subsequently monitored. The ED’s affidavit, as reported by the media, provides such a rare inside knowledge view of how a poor quality loan for a dubious purpose was conceived, structured and approved by an over-qualified and overpaid team, solely on the basis of instructions from the CEO. What is equally disturbing, but also telling, is that three of the accused have left the bank, and have taken up fresh engagements with their new organisations – who, presumably, were impressed with these persons’ work credentials at Yes Bank, and wanted them to continue the same practices for their new employers.What is worrying is that Yes Bank’s practice of having senior executives with impressive qualifications, stellar resumes, and imposing titles, knowingly engaging in such transactions may not be the exception in the private financial sector. Regulatory agencies have investigated or are currently investigating similar transactions at Indusind Bank, Aditya Birla Finance, Standard Chartered Bank and Kotak Mahindra Mutual Fund. This indicates that the situation may be systemic. It appears that, for all their experience and seniority, key senior executives in the private financial sector are paid inflated packages precisely for engaging in the intellectually undemanding task of ‘phone banking’. The valuations of private financial firms may need to be reassessed in the light of these disclosures.

Yes Men at Yes Bank, and Elsewhere: ‘Phone Banking’ in the Private Sector

Silver Point

Thomas J. Monaco

Independent Insight Provider

Silver Point is a boutique research firm that focuses on the broader financial services sector, with a particular focus on troubled institutions globally. 

Asia Ex Japan

Equity Bottom-Up

*No Substance: HDFC Bank (HDFCB.IN) [HDFCB] provided an investor update for FY 2Q22 ahead of its officially scheduled October 16, 2021 earnings release. The highlights were solely related to growth of lending and deposits; and*See No Evil: Nothing was discussed regarding HDFCB’s abysmal credit quality metrics from FY 1Q22, which likely will remain a true headache. At FY 1Q22, net new NPLs actually increased 153% on an annualized basis which is quite worrisome.  We would also be more comfortable if HDFCB was a bit more aggressive with its provisions. By our calculation, reserves are currently short by nearly INR 316 bn or nearly a year of operating results.

*No Substance: HDFC Bank (HDFCB.IN) [HDFCB] provided an investor update for FY 2Q22 ahead of its officially scheduled October 16, 2021 earnings release. The highlights were solely related to growth of lending and deposits; and*See No Evil: Nothing was discussed regarding HDFCB’s abysmal credit quality metrics from FY 1Q22, which likely will remain a true headache. At FY 1Q22, net new NPLs actually increased 153% on an annualized basis which is quite worrisome.  We would also be more comfortable if HDFCB was a bit more aggressive with its provisions. By our calculation, reserves are currently short by nearly INR 316 bn or nearly a year of operating results. 

Head of Research, IPOs & Placements, Aequitas Research

Sumeet Singh

Head of Research, IPOs & Placements

IPOs and Placements coverage across Asia Pacific

Aequitas Research

We cover all listing across the Asia Pacific along with follow-up placements. As of Dec 2020, our team had covered 539 IPOs with a hit rate of 73.5% and 685 placements with a hit rate of 66.8%.

We combine fundamental bottom-up views with our proprietary quantitative framework to provide a holistic coverage across new listings and placements. Our coverage includes pre-IPO notes before the deal is launched, follow-up analysis once the deal is live and post-listing trading analysis as well.

Equity Capital Markets

Aditya Birla Sun Life AMC / Equity Capital Markets

Aditya Birla Sun Life Asset Management Company’s (ABSL) shareholders aim to raise around US$369m via reducing their stake in the company’s Indian IPO. ABSL is the largest non-bank affiliated asset management company (AMC) in India by quarterly average assets under management (QAAUM) and the fourth largest AMC in India. according to CRISIL.ABSL managed total AUM of INR2.9tn across mutual funds, portfolio management services, offshore and real estate offerings, as of Jun 21.ABSL enjoys a strong brand name in the country. However, unlike other AMC’s it lacks a strong parent, i.e. a bank for it to piggyback on its network. Therefore, the company has lagged its larger peers in terms of equity AUM exposure, which flows down to it having lower profitability as well.We have covered various aspects of the deal in our previous note, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/insights/aditya-birla-sun-life-amc-pre-ipo-strong-profit-growth-but-it-s-losing-market-share" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Aditya Birla Sun Life AMC Pre-IPO - Strong profit growth but it’s losing market share</a>.In this note, we will talk about valuations.

Aditya Birla Sun Life Asset Management Company’s (ABSL) shareholders aim to raise around US$369m via reducing their stake in the company’s Indian IPO. ABSL is the largest non-bank affiliated asset management company (AMC) in India by quarterly average assets under management (QAAUM) and the fourth largest AMC in India. according to CRISIL.ABSL managed total AUM of INR2.9tn across mutual funds, portfolio management services, offshore and real estate offerings, as of Jun 21.ABSL enjoys a strong brand name in the country. However, unlike other AMC’s it lacks a strong parent, i.e. a bank for it to piggyback on its network. Therefore, the company has lagged its larger peers in terms of equity AUM exposure, which flows down to it having lower profitability as well.We have covered various aspects of the deal in our previous note, Aditya Birla Sun Life AMC Pre-IPO - Strong profit growth but it’s losing market share.In this note, we will talk about valuations.  

Aditya Birla Sun Life AMC IPO - At a Slight Discount but There’s No Compelling Reason to Buy

Financials & FinTech research, Galliano’s Financials Research

Victor Galliano

Financials & FinTech research

Financials & FinTech, EM & Developed Markets

Galliano’s Financials Research

Galliano's Financials Research provides fundamental research in Emerging Markets financials, including FinTech, as well as financials in select Developed Markets.

The investment style applied is generally value oriented, although Growth At Reasonable Price (GARP) strategies can also be used where appropriate. 

Our investment research approach aim is often contrarian, looking to capitalise on overly sceptical or optimistic consensus views. In terms of valuation techniques, the focus is on PBV ratio to ROE, PE multiples and dividend yield, as well as the application of PEG ratios and, where appropriate, Sum of the Parts (SOTP) valuations.

Thematic (Sector/Industry)

<ul>
<li>We screen 7 Indian banks for their core profitability and their credit quality credentials, in order to identify banks that are good value and have potential to deliver higher returns going forward</li>
<li>We use a number of metrics including pre-provision and post-provision profit, cost of risk and credit quality, as well as capital adequacy ratios</li>
<li>We expect credit quality to continue to worsen in the coming quarters, especially as the moratorium on new NPL classification began to normalise as from April; yet we believe that certain Indian banks are well positioned and have already taken action to counter the threat of higher delinquencies, through cost of risk charges and write-offs</li>
<li>We highlight <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/axis-bank-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:768:1" rel="noopener">Axis Bank Ltd (AXSB IN)</a> as a restructuring and earnings recovery story, and <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/hdfc-bank-ltd-4b6b7a92-9087-468d-9dbe-ab169e77f014" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:558:1" rel="noopener">HDFC Bank (HDFCB IN)</a> for its high quality balance sheet and premium returns, which are not yet fully reflected in valuations; we also see <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/state-bank-of-india" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:160:1" rel="noopener">State Bank Of India (SBIN IN)</a> as an attractive value play, despite its lighter core capital ratio</li>
<li>We are cautious on <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/canara-bank" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:543:1" rel="noopener">Canara Bank (CBK IN)</a>, seeing it as a potential value trap; at first look, <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/bandhan-bank-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:26705:1" rel="noopener">Bandhan Bank Ltd (BANDHAN IN)</a> looks appealing on prospective PBV ratio to ROE and high pre-provision returns but we are wary of its high share of micro-finance and SME credit risk exposure in the light of rising NPA ratios</li>
<li>Risks to our view include, for our bullish calls, worse than expected credit quality resulting in higher cost of risk, higher than expected opex and weak revenue generation; for our bear calls, better than expected revenues with lower than expected opex and cost of risk leading to higher post-provision returns</li>
</ul>


We screen 7 Indian banks for their core profitability and their credit quality credentials, in order to identify banks that are good value and have potential to deliver higher returns going forward
We use a number of metrics including pre-provision and post-provision profit, cost of risk and credit quality, as well as capital adequacy ratios
We expect credit quality to continue to worsen in the coming quarters, especially as the moratorium on new NPL classification began to normalise as from April; yet we believe that certain Indian banks are well positioned and have already taken action to counter the threat of higher delinquencies, through cost of risk charges and write-offs
We highlight Axis Bank Ltd (AXSB IN) as a restructuring and earnings recovery story, and HDFC Bank (HDFCB IN) for its high quality balance sheet and premium returns, which are not yet fully reflected in valuations; we also see State Bank Of India (SBIN IN) as an attractive value play, despite its lighter core capital ratio
We are cautious on Canara Bank (CBK IN), seeing it as a potential value trap; at first look, Bandhan Bank Ltd (BANDHAN IN) looks appealing on prospective PBV ratio to ROE and high pre-provision returns but we are wary of its high share of micro-finance and SME credit risk exposure in the light of rising NPA ratios
Risks to our view include, for our bullish calls, worse than expected credit quality resulting in higher cost of risk, higher than expected opex and weak revenue generation; for our bear calls, better than expected revenues with lower than expected opex and cost of risk leading to higher post-provision returns


Indian Banks; Screening for Investment Ideas, Despite the Credit Quality Hurdles

The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI)’s <a href="https://www.sebi.gov.in/enforcement/orders/aug-2021/order-in-the-matter-of-kotak-mahindra-asset-management-company-ltd-_52130.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">order</a>  penalising Kotak Mahindra Mutual Fund (Kotak MF), a subsidiary of <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/kotak-mahindra-bank-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:126:1" rel="noopener">Kotak Mahindra Bank (KMB IN)</a> (KMB) provides an in-depth insight normally unavailable to the public on how imprudently investment decisions are taken by so called professionals in marquee firms who are managing public funds in a fiduciary capacity. The indictment by SEBI shows Kotak MF in a poor light and also casts a spot light on Kotak Mahindra AMC's high profile chairman, Uday Kotak who is also founder-CEO, KMB.Even though investors ultimately (after some delay) recovered their funds, the SEBI order exposes the unprofessional conduct of the concerned debt fund managers and the Investment Committee (IC), in Kotak MF in investing in dubious debt instruments of companies which had no financial ability to pay back the principal and where equity shares was the only security. That such a high-risk transaction conformed to the investment policy of  Kotak MF is a cause for significant concern for all debt investors of Kotak mutual fund schemes. In a shocking revelation, thoroughly exposing Kotak MF’s Investment Policy, the SEBI order <a href="https://www.sebi.gov.in/enforcement/orders/aug-2021/order-in-the-matter-of-kotak-mahindra-asset-management-company-ltd-_52130.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">notes</a>  that the company’s IC on March 7, and May 18, 2016 was <blockquote>not aware of the issuer entity even on the date of approving the proposal to invest in the ZCNCDs [zero coupon non-convertible debentures]. (para 40, p. 34) </blockquote>Such was the professionalism on Kotak MF’s IC that they approved an investment in a corporate entity whose identity they did not know and consequently had no clue about its financials. They did so as documented in its approval note solely on the belief that,<blockquote>repayment of our exposures will, in all probability, be funded through a refinance. We take comfort from the reputation and track record of Essel Group in general and fundamentals, liquidity and performance of Zee shares. (ibid)</blockquote>Although KMB has historically reported strong asset quality, an added concern is that Kotak AMC is a subsidiary of the bank and when Kotak MF  follows such appalling credit appraisal/underwriting practices under its chairman Uday Kotak, can the bank where Kotak is the founder-CEO also be following similar practices where belief overrides financial fundamentals and where the decision-makers invest blindly?The SEBI order is an eye-opener in how investment decisions are taken at mutual funds and as Uday Kotak is the chairman of Kotak AMC, regulators especially, SEBI and the Reserve Bank of India should consider whether such conduct conforms to the fit and proper criteria for managing public money in a fiduciary capacity.

The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI)’s order  penalising Kotak Mahindra Mutual Fund (Kotak MF), a subsidiary of Kotak Mahindra Bank (KMB IN) (KMB) provides an in-depth insight normally unavailable to the public on how imprudently investment decisions are taken by so called professionals in marquee firms who are managing public funds in a fiduciary capacity. The indictment by SEBI shows Kotak MF in a poor light and also casts a spot light on Kotak Mahindra AMC's high profile chairman, Uday Kotak who is also founder-CEO, KMB.Even though investors ultimately (after some delay) recovered their funds, the SEBI order exposes the unprofessional conduct of the concerned debt fund managers and the Investment Committee (IC), in Kotak MF in investing in dubious debt instruments of companies which had no financial ability to pay back the principal and where equity shares was the only security. That such a high-risk transaction conformed to the investment policy of  Kotak MF is a cause for significant concern for all debt investors of Kotak mutual fund schemes. In a shocking revelation, thoroughly exposing Kotak MF’s Investment Policy, the SEBI order notes  that the company’s IC on March 7, and May 18, 2016 was not aware of the issuer entity even on the date of approving the proposal to invest in the ZCNCDs [zero coupon non-convertible debentures]. (para 40, p. 34) Such was the professionalism on Kotak MF’s IC that they approved an investment in a corporate entity whose identity they did not know and consequently had no clue about its financials. They did so as documented in its approval note solely on the belief that,repayment of our exposures will, in all probability, be funded through a refinance. We take comfort from the reputation and track record of Essel Group in general and fundamentals, liquidity and performance of Zee shares. (ibid)Although KMB has historically reported strong asset quality, an added concern is that Kotak AMC is a subsidiary of the bank and when Kotak MF  follows such appalling credit appraisal/underwriting practices under its chairman Uday Kotak, can the bank where Kotak is the founder-CEO also be following similar practices where belief overrides financial fundamentals and where the decision-makers invest blindly?The SEBI order is an eye-opener in how investment decisions are taken at mutual funds and as Uday Kotak is the chairman of Kotak AMC, regulators especially, SEBI and the Reserve Bank of India should consider whether such conduct conforms to the fit and proper criteria for managing public money in a fiduciary capacity.  

SEBI Exposes Kotak Mahindra Mutual Fund’s Policy of Investing Blindly

India

Kotak Mahindra Bank Limited is a full service commercial bank. The Bank offers a wide range of products and services such as personal, commercial, and corporate banking services, including deposit accounts, loans, and investments. Kotak Mahindra Bank serves customers in India.

Price Gauge
52-week Range	0.00 - 0.00
Market Cap (USDm)	0.00
P/E	0.00
Dividend (Yield)	0.00

Kotak Mahindra Bank (KMB IN)

Yes Men at Yes Bank, and Elsewhere: ‘Phone Banking’ in the Private Sector

It appears that, for all their experience & seniority, key senior executives in the pvt financial sector are paid inflated packages precisely for...

Hemindra Hazari

HDFC Bank – No Credit

HDFC BANK: HDFCB provided a balance sheet growth update for FY 2Q22. Nothing was discussed regarding HDFCB’s challenged credit quality nor its low...

Thomas J. Monaco

Aditya Birla Sun Life AMC IPO - At a Slight Discount but There’s No Compelling Reason to Buy

Aditya Birla Sun Life Asset Management Company’s (ABSL) shareholders aim to raise around US$369m via reducing their stake in the company’s Indian IPO.

Sumeet Singh

Indian Banks; Screening for Investment Ideas, Despite the Credit Quality Hurdles

Screening for ideas, we are positive on Axis Bank and HDFC Bank, and State Bank of India too; due to credit quality concerns, we are cautious on...

Victor Galliano

SEBI Exposes Kotak Mahindra Mutual Fund’s Policy of Investing Blindly

When Kotak MF follows poor underwriting under its chairman Uday Kotak, can KMB also be following similar practices where belief overrides...

Hemindra Hazari

Price Gauge

52-week Range

Market Cap (USDm)

P/E

Dividend (Yield)