Silver Point

Thomas J. Monaco

Independent Insight Provider

Silver Point is a boutique research firm that focuses on the broader financial services sector, with a particular focus on troubled institutions globally. 

Asia Ex Japan

Equity Bottom-Up

*Mixed Bottom-line: State Bank of India (SBIN.IN) [SBI] reported FY 2Q22 results of INR 76.3 bn, improving INR 11.2 bn (17.3%) linked quarter. In fairness, this was a strange quarter, as the provision cut of INR 98.6 bn (98.1%) was unjustified – and not aligned with reality, enabling results to appear far better than they actually were. Effectively cutting loss provisions to zero when NPL coverage is abysmal in order to offset frontloaded pension costs is far from a prudent banking practice; and*Reserve Challenge Should Lead To Capital Raise: Surprisingly, we found that net new NPLs increased just INR 41.7 bn or 10.8% on an annualized basis, which is a far cry from the INR 193.2 bn or 65.9% annualized posted at FY 4Q21. Given the capital and remaining credit challenges, SBI must be better prepared to take additional losses. By our calculation, we find that SBI’s reserves are short INR 841 tn – over two years of pre-tax results or nearly 18% of SBI’s market-cap.

*Mixed Bottom-line: State Bank of India (SBIN.IN) [SBI] reported FY 2Q22 results of INR 76.3 bn, improving INR 11.2 bn (17.3%) linked quarter. In fairness, this was a strange quarter, as the provision cut of INR 98.6 bn (98.1%) was unjustified – and not aligned with reality, enabling results to appear far better than they actually were. Effectively cutting loss provisions to zero when NPL coverage is abysmal in order to offset frontloaded pension costs is far from a prudent banking practice; and*Reserve Challenge Should Lead To Capital Raise: Surprisingly, we found that net new NPLs increased just INR 41.7 bn or 10.8% on an annualized basis, which is a far cry from the INR 193.2 bn or 65.9% annualized posted at FY 4Q21. Given the capital and remaining credit challenges, SBI must be better prepared to take additional losses. By our calculation, we find that SBI’s reserves are short INR 841 tn – over two years of pre-tax results or nearly 18% of SBI’s market-cap.

State Bank of India – Not A Prudent Move

Specialist in Indian Banking and Economic Research

Hemindra Hazari

Even though <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/axis-bank-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:768:1" rel="noopener">Axis Bank Ltd (AXSB IN)</a> reported an impressive growth in net profit, higher than that of its peers, the stock market penalised the bank, as the growth of its business, top line and profit before provisions was lower than that of its peers. The stock market traditionally favours both top and bottom line growth, and in Axis Bank’s case the market believed that the poor business growth is a symptom of a deeper problem in the bank’s business model.Some analysts have highlighted Axis Bank’s poor business indicators in the 2QFY2022 as compared with those of its peers, and their reading-between-the-lines is that it may be an undisclosed or even undiagnosed problem. It is also possible that Axis Bank 2QFY2022 was an off quarter, where the management took its eye off the ball, and that performance may rebound and match that of its peers in 2HFY2022. However, another, more ominous, explanation could be that staff morale may be the cause of the poor performance.This analyst was the first to <a href="https://hemindrahazari.com/2021/05/26/why-are-axis-banks-directors-mum-about-the-extraordinary-staff-churn/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">highlight</a> Axis Bank’s high and worsening attrition from FY2018 to FY2020, when it peaked at 36.8% for the overall bank and an alarming 69.2% for the sales category (this category has the maximum number of staff which sources new business). In FY2021, Axis Bank reported a trend reversal, a significant improvement in attrition to 23.8% (sales attrition at 49.7%); the improvement was also seen in other private sector banks. It is possible that the work-from-home regime in FY2021 resulted in less stressful daily physical meetings, and relaxation in achieving sales targets, on account of the lock-down. With 2QFY2022 gradually returning to normal, the pressures on the staff may have resumed to a point where attrition may have increased and morale plummeted, impacting the top line performance of Axis Bank.Attrition can be a lead indicator for future performance, and analysts have been concerned with the steady senior level <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/markets/stocks/news/two-senior-executives-quit-axis-bank-for-piramal-nbfc/articleshow/75546095.cms" target="_blank" rel="noopener">exits</a> since Amitabh Chaudhry took charge as Chief Executive Officer on January 1, 2019. The latest <a href="https://www.bseindia.com/xml-data/corpfiling/AttachHis/299d20f1-8fa4-45d5-90f5-e4aed0484c6e.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">resignation</a>  was of Rajesh Dahiya, executive director and in-charge of human resources since June 2010. But what was largely unreported was the plight of the bulk of the Axis Bank staff, which was ignored by analysts. This despite the fact that the bank had comprehensive disclosures on the issue which painted a sorry picture of human resource management since FY2018. Staff discontent may take some time to filter down to impacting overall performance, and we need more quarters to monitor performance to validate this hypothesis.The Axis Bank board of directors need to urgently enquire into the reasons for the poor business and revenue performance in 2QFY2022 and the stock market penalising the share price may provide the appropriate push to the board to investigate the matter and come out with remedial measures.

Even though Axis Bank Ltd (AXSB IN) reported an impressive growth in net profit, higher than that of its peers, the stock market penalised the bank, as the growth of its business, top line and profit before provisions was lower than that of its peers. The stock market traditionally favours both top and bottom line growth, and in Axis Bank’s case the market believed that the poor business growth is a symptom of a deeper problem in the bank’s business model.Some analysts have highlighted Axis Bank’s poor business indicators in the 2QFY2022 as compared with those of its peers, and their reading-between-the-lines is that it may be an undisclosed or even undiagnosed problem. It is also possible that Axis Bank 2QFY2022 was an off quarter, where the management took its eye off the ball, and that performance may rebound and match that of its peers in 2HFY2022. However, another, more ominous, explanation could be that staff morale may be the cause of the poor performance.This analyst was the first to highlight Axis Bank’s high and worsening attrition from FY2018 to FY2020, when it peaked at 36.8% for the overall bank and an alarming 69.2% for the sales category (this category has the maximum number of staff which sources new business). In FY2021, Axis Bank reported a trend reversal, a significant improvement in attrition to 23.8% (sales attrition at 49.7%); the improvement was also seen in other private sector banks. It is possible that the work-from-home regime in FY2021 resulted in less stressful daily physical meetings, and relaxation in achieving sales targets, on account of the lock-down. With 2QFY2022 gradually returning to normal, the pressures on the staff may have resumed to a point where attrition may have increased and morale plummeted, impacting the top line performance of Axis Bank.Attrition can be a lead indicator for future performance, and analysts have been concerned with the steady senior level exits since Amitabh Chaudhry took charge as Chief Executive Officer on January 1, 2019. The latest resignation  was of Rajesh Dahiya, executive director and in-charge of human resources since June 2010. But what was largely unreported was the plight of the bulk of the Axis Bank staff, which was ignored by analysts. This despite the fact that the bank had comprehensive disclosures on the issue which painted a sorry picture of human resource management since FY2018. Staff discontent may take some time to filter down to impacting overall performance, and we need more quarters to monitor performance to validate this hypothesis.The Axis Bank board of directors need to urgently enquire into the reasons for the poor business and revenue performance in 2QFY2022 and the stock market penalising the share price may provide the appropriate push to the board to investigate the matter and come out with remedial measures.

Axis Bank: Toxic Workplaces Don’t Bring In More Business

*Unnecessary Credit Leverage: Kotak Mahindra Bank (KMB.IN) [KMB] reported FY 2Q22 results of INR 20.3 bn, improving INR 3.9 bn (23.8%) linked quarter. Results were primarily driven by an INR 2.8 bn (39.8%) decline in loss provisions despite credit weakness; and*Credit Delta Less Intense, But Reserves Weak: By our calculation, we find that both net new stressed loans  amounted to an accelerating INR 5.5 bn at FY 2Q22 and aggregate an annualized growth rate of 26.1% - improving throughout the year. Given the weaker credit metrics and current weak reserve cover, we find that reserves at FY 2Q22 fall short by INR 61 bn - about three quarters of stated PBT.

*Unnecessary Credit Leverage: Kotak Mahindra Bank (KMB.IN) [KMB] reported FY 2Q22 results of INR 20.3 bn, improving INR 3.9 bn (23.8%) linked quarter. Results were primarily driven by an INR 2.8 bn (39.8%) decline in loss provisions despite credit weakness; and*Credit Delta Less Intense, But Reserves Weak: By our calculation, we find that both net new stressed loans  amounted to an accelerating INR 5.5 bn at FY 2Q22 and aggregate an annualized growth rate of 26.1% - improving throughout the year. Given the weaker credit metrics and current weak reserve cover, we find that reserves at FY 2Q22 fall short by INR 61 bn - about three quarters of stated PBT. 

Kotak Mahindra Bank – Watch Your Costs Too

*Not Fooling Anyone: HDFC Bank (HDFCB.IN) [HDFCB] released a nonsensical set of FY 2Q22 earnings results, despite exhibiting that the bottom-line improved INR 11.0 bn (14.3%) linked quarter. On an operating basis, core results aggregated INR 81.6 bn, up INR 10.3 bn (14.5%) over the period. Puzzling is the INR 75.1 bn (28.5%) increase in problem loans, and the INR 9.1 bn (18.8%) decline in loss provisions during FY 2Q22; and *Credit Disaster Continues:We calculate that net new NPLs actually increased a whopping INR 114.1 bn or 43.2%. By our calculation, reserves are massively short by nearly INR 371.3 bn or over year (and growing) of core operating results – despite the massive under-providing against credit this quarter which suggests that the provision shortfall is closer to two years of results.

*Not Fooling Anyone: HDFC Bank (HDFCB.IN) [HDFCB] released a nonsensical set of FY 2Q22 earnings results, despite exhibiting that the bottom-line improved INR 11.0 bn (14.3%) linked quarter. On an operating basis, core results aggregated INR 81.6 bn, up INR 10.3 bn (14.5%) over the period. Puzzling is the INR 75.1 bn (28.5%) increase in problem loans, and the INR 9.1 bn (18.8%) decline in loss provisions during FY 2Q22; and *Credit Disaster Continues:We calculate that net new NPLs actually increased a whopping INR 114.1 bn or 43.2%. By our calculation, reserves are massively short by nearly INR 371.3 bn or over year (and growing) of core operating results – despite the massive under-providing against credit this quarter which suggests that the provision shortfall is closer to two years of results.  

Government banks have been derided for indulging in ‘phone banking’ (being instructed on the telephone by ruling party politicians and civil bureaucrats to lend to specific unworthy companies). But what the Enforcement Directorate’s (ED) affidavit in the Delhi Court (as disclosed by the media -- <a href="https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/71-loans-given-in-kapoor-s-tenure-turned-bad-ed-101633976406867.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">here</a> and <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/banking/finance/enforcement-directorate-says-bank-loan-fraud-was-mutually-beneficial-to-avantha-yes-bank/articleshow/86699558.cms?from=mdr" target="_blank" rel="noopener">here</a>)  reveals is that senior executives from the private sector <a href="https://www.smartkarma.com/entities/yes-bank-ltd" target="_blank" data-smartkarma-citation="entities:767:1" rel="noopener">Yes Bank (YES IN)</a> were no different from their government counterparts. The only difference is that the concerned senior executives at Yes Bank were excessively paid, and were highly qualified persons from premier institutions, as compared with government bankers. The ED’s charge sheet alleges that senior executives at Yes Bank knowingly engaged in sham transactions, and the accused Yes Bank officials put the onus on the transactions on the now jailed Rana Kapoor, the erstwhile founder-Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Yes Bank. Despite their educational qualifications, previous work experience and the senior positions they held, they allowed themselves to  be reduced to being low-paid clerks – or worse, since the latter at least know enough not to engage in fraudulent transactions. The entire edifice of Yes Bank’s credit appraisal, independent risk management and board oversight was a myth, as nobody recorded strong objections to giving loans to a shell company and structuring a product whose sole objective was a spurious show of compliance with regulatory guidelines.   Stakeholders, media and analysts rarely get to see the inner working of a bank and how loans are appraised, independently evaluated by risk management and subsequently monitored. The ED’s affidavit, as reported by the media, provides such a rare inside knowledge view of how a poor quality loan for a dubious purpose was conceived, structured and approved by an over-qualified and overpaid team, solely on the basis of instructions from the CEO. What is equally disturbing, but also telling, is that three of the accused have left the bank, and have taken up fresh engagements with their new organisations – who, presumably, were impressed with these persons’ work credentials at Yes Bank, and wanted them to continue the same practices for their new employers.What is worrying is that Yes Bank’s practice of having senior executives with impressive qualifications, stellar resumes, and imposing titles, knowingly engaging in such transactions may not be the exception in the private financial sector. Regulatory agencies have investigated or are currently investigating similar transactions at <a href="https://hemindrahazari.com/2021/06/16/cg-power-loan-scandal-indusind-bank-pioneers-lending-without-documents-to-a-firm-with-no-assets/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Indusind Bank</a>, <a href="https://hemindrahazari.com/2021/06/23/aditya-birla-finances-loans-to-a-shell-company-another-reason-why-corporates-shouldnt-be-allowed-to-control-banks/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Aditya Birla Finance</a>, <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/prime/corporate-governance/how-an-eur44-million-loan-from-stanchart-put-murugappas-cg-power-between-sebi-and-a-hard-place/primearticleshow/83285540.cms" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Standard Chartered Bank</a> and <a href="https://hemindrahazari.com/2021/08/31/sebi-exposes-kotak-mahindra-mutual-funds-policy-of-investing-blindly/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Kotak Mahindra Mutual Fund</a>. This indicates that the situation may be systemic. It appears that, for all their experience and seniority, key senior executives in the private financial sector are paid inflated packages precisely for engaging in the intellectually undemanding task of ‘phone banking’. The valuations of private financial firms may need to be reassessed in the light of these disclosures.

Government banks have been derided for indulging in ‘phone banking’ (being instructed on the telephone by ruling party politicians and civil bureaucrats to lend to specific unworthy companies). But what the Enforcement Directorate’s (ED) affidavit in the Delhi Court (as disclosed by the media -- here and here)  reveals is that senior executives from the private sector Yes Bank (YES IN) were no different from their government counterparts. The only difference is that the concerned senior executives at Yes Bank were excessively paid, and were highly qualified persons from premier institutions, as compared with government bankers. The ED’s charge sheet alleges that senior executives at Yes Bank knowingly engaged in sham transactions, and the accused Yes Bank officials put the onus on the transactions on the now jailed Rana Kapoor, the erstwhile founder-Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Yes Bank. Despite their educational qualifications, previous work experience and the senior positions they held, they allowed themselves to  be reduced to being low-paid clerks – or worse, since the latter at least know enough not to engage in fraudulent transactions. The entire edifice of Yes Bank’s credit appraisal, independent risk management and board oversight was a myth, as nobody recorded strong objections to giving loans to a shell company and structuring a product whose sole objective was a spurious show of compliance with regulatory guidelines.   Stakeholders, media and analysts rarely get to see the inner working of a bank and how loans are appraised, independently evaluated by risk management and subsequently monitored. The ED’s affidavit, as reported by the media, provides such a rare inside knowledge view of how a poor quality loan for a dubious purpose was conceived, structured and approved by an over-qualified and overpaid team, solely on the basis of instructions from the CEO. What is equally disturbing, but also telling, is that three of the accused have left the bank, and have taken up fresh engagements with their new organisations – who, presumably, were impressed with these persons’ work credentials at Yes Bank, and wanted them to continue the same practices for their new employers.What is worrying is that Yes Bank’s practice of having senior executives with impressive qualifications, stellar resumes, and imposing titles, knowingly engaging in such transactions may not be the exception in the private financial sector. Regulatory agencies have investigated or are currently investigating similar transactions at Indusind Bank, Aditya Birla Finance, Standard Chartered Bank and Kotak Mahindra Mutual Fund. This indicates that the situation may be systemic. It appears that, for all their experience and seniority, key senior executives in the private financial sector are paid inflated packages precisely for engaging in the intellectually undemanding task of ‘phone banking’. The valuations of private financial firms may need to be reassessed in the light of these disclosures.

Yes Men at Yes Bank, and Elsewhere: ‘Phone Banking’ in the Private Sector

India

Kotak Mahindra Bank Limited is a full service commercial bank. The Bank offers a wide range of products and services such as personal, commercial, and corporate banking services, including deposit accounts, loans, and investments. Kotak Mahindra Bank serves customers in India.

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Kotak Mahindra Bank (KMB IN)

State Bank of India – Not A Prudent Move

SBI: SBI reported a QOQ FY 2Q22 results increase of 17.3%. A provision cut of 98% was unjustified, only serving to offset frontloaded pension...

Thomas J. Monaco

Axis Bank: Toxic Workplaces Don’t Bring In More Business

2QFY2022 may have been an aberration, but if staff have become unresponsive to the management’s directives to push business growth, Axis has a ...

Hemindra Hazari

Kotak Mahindra Bank – Watch Your Costs Too

KOTAK MAHINDRA BANK: KMB reported a QOQ FY 2Q22 operating result increase of 12.1%, driven by an unnecessary 40% reduction in provisions. Stressed...

Thomas J. Monaco

HDFC Bank – Extending & Pretending

HDFC BANK: HDFCB released a nonsensical set of FY 2Q22 operating basis, which exhibited improvement of 14.5% QOQ. Puzzling is the 28.5% increase in...

Thomas J. Monaco

Yes Men at Yes Bank, and Elsewhere: ‘Phone Banking’ in the Private Sector

It appears that, for all their experience & seniority, key senior executives in the pvt financial sector are paid inflated packages precisely for...

Hemindra Hazari

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